New to Ulaanbaatar April 2025

Posted on April 29, 2025 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

I’ve been keeping lists of things that are arriving to/disappearing from central Ulaanbaatar: June-July 2024 | August 2023 | May 2023 | November 2022 | August 2022 | December 2019 | June 2019 | April 2019 | December 2018 | August 2018 | October 2017 | June 2017 | May 2016 | December 2015 | May 2015 | November 2014 | May 2014 | October 2013 | June 2013 | October 2011 | August 2011. More informal versions of these observations also appear in the /ulaanbaatar/change/ category. I’ve also collected observations about change in the countryside.

Bulgan added her observations in Spring 2022.

I’ve copied previous lists here and am adding to them. New items since previous posts appear in italics. Since this list has been growing, I’m also beginning to delete some items that I’ve had on the list for some time. Strikethrough means that these items will be off the next list.

This list was cruelly interrupted by something that was new to the world in 2020, a global pandemic and thus restrictions on travel. After not being able to visit for 32 months, I finally made it back in August 2022.

What has arrived?

  • drive-home service for drivers who have been drinking. You call the service, they drop off a driver who drives you home in your car and is then picked up again. Given – fortunately – much stricter enforcement of drunk driving laws, a great service!
  • airport road is getting ever fancier, now there’s a giant overpass just before crossing the Tuul on the way into town. Lots of fancy on/off-ramps popping up everywhere on roads.
  • fully electric cars, charging stations, green license plates for electric cars, Tesla
  • street art (several years now, but I hadn’t noted this before) and newly commissioned public art Seeing more tags though. On buildings and in pedestrian tunnels. One particularly common one in one part of town: ‘to be or not to be’. Deep!
  • several new parks: North of Winter Palace, Southeast corner of Sukhbaatar Sq, also astroturf on Sukhbaatar Square (summer 2022) seemingly quite popular as picnic spot, park in Yarmag. The park behind Government House is open to the public again.
  • As a specific park: the redesign of the Children’s Park seems to represent commitment to preservation of that open space and greater incorporation into urban centre. The new park opened on July 4.
  • Not just parks but also nearby urban recreation, such as municipal nature reserves and hiking.
  • Oat milk and lactose-free milk. Of course, good health reasons for both, but still a little odd in the land of meat and dairy.
  • Eye makeup with small glittering tears in the corner of an eye. Note that I am not much of a fashion correspondent, but I remember seeing this first in Japan in the early 1990s when it was called ピカピカ, I think. Cat eyes have also arrived.
  • Coffee choices. Not just Korean chains, but more local choices appearing.
  • Taste for spicy foods. Surely this has arrived via Korean food, but quite the contrast to years ago when spices seemed entirely absent.
  • Solar panels on commercial buildings, also on balconies, in downtown core
  • The development of Mongolian brand consumer products, especially food products has been happening for years and I can’t pinpoint the moment they started appearing on grocery shelves in big numbers. While I still find New Zealand butter in Mongolia strange, most of the dairy shelf is now made in Mongolia, for example.

Category: increasing agricultural and domestic food production in #Mongolia.
No street vendors this time of year, but (fancy) supermarket offered 8 different varieties of honey for sale. The brand name won me over.

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— Mongolia Focus (@mongoliafocus.bsky.social) April 21, 2025 at 8:16 PM

  • So many renovated sidewalks with paving stones, benches, and planters.
  • Yoshinoya – 吉野家. How obvious are beef bowls for the Mongolian market, but their appearance is sudden to me.
  • Shisha bars. I had seen these before, but neglected to note that down.
  • Convenience stores have become a very common sight in downtown Ulaanbaatar but also beyond. Currently, this is a duopoly of CU and GS25. Note that small grocery stores have disappeared from town with the rise of these convenience stores.
  • байхгүй (“we don’t have that”) has become a frequent response of waiters in restaurants referring to items listed on the menu, but not actually offered.
  • Some new buildings appear to be considering the public space that they’re providing, for example through setbacks from the street and parks in those setbacks. One example would be large office building/mall on the way into town from Zaisan on the right before Peace Bridge with its broad sidewalk, plantings.
  • In addition to the Northwest of town and the area around the power plants which have been somewhat industrial, Yarmag seems to be turning into an industrial zone in parts as well, with the surroundings of the old airport seeing some warehouse developments.
  • In terms of city planning, many of the very large developments in Yarmag and elsewhere seem to be stand-along neighbourhoods, rather than forming a part of a larger district. Note that they all seem to have a large supermarket as an anchor.
  • Visible Korean influences continuing to grow.
  • Imagery of Mongolian People’s Republic appearing as pop cultural reference point. Not sure whether that signals nostalgia for state-socialist days (Ostalgie).
  • Blue license plates for government cars. [More on license plates]
  • Men carrying umbrellas as protection from the sun.
  • Big bus procurement scandal in 2023-24, but some very modern buses around town and major busstop construction projects.
  • Google Maps now offers transit connections as well as traffic updates. The former easier for me to use than local alternatives, as I’m familiar with Google Maps interface. Makes public transit that much more usable for visitors even before the Metro is “completed”.
  • On the drive west out of town, I passed through the underpass for the railroad for the first sign. Always such a bottleneck for traffic previously, amazing to avoid via an underpass.
  • MIAT now makes an announcement in German on the Frankfurt flight
  • Beach flags as advertisement
  • Big streets into the city now all treelined (1b tree subotnik!), those drives will look quite different in some years
  • A good portion of the trash cans in the downtown core seem to have been removed
  • There seem to be many more people using electric rental scooters in town. With them, the ringing of bells to warn pedestrians has arrived on bike paths. But in 2025, there’s a new game in town:

 

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A post shared by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes)

  • Have I not mentioned Ramen before?

 

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  • Traffic light LED strips in the sidewalk at some Peace Ave intersections

Always something new in Ulaanbaatar:
Traffic light strips in the sidewalk, paired with tactile tiles common across Japan as well.
Traffic strips blink and turn colour, ppl see them without looking up from screens, I imagine.
#Mongolia

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— Mongolia Focus (@mongoliafocus.bsky.social) April 20, 2025 at 8:17 PM

What has disappeared, or at least nearly?

  • for-pay scales (actually, they seem to be hanging on)
  • Victims of Political Persecution Memorial Museum. Promised floor dedicated to museum in newly-constructed large building on site does not appear to exist!
  • private fences encroaching on public land/sidewalks
  • It seems like (Korean) convenience store chains are replacing the small grocery stores that were ubiquitous in the downtown core. Not gone yet, but waning.
  • Urban heritage core. One building at a time, heritage buildings in the centre of town are being torn down, largely replaced by generic glass-and-steel towers.
  • Airplane turn-arounds. For the first few years, I often connected through Bejing and China Air pilots had the habit of taking a look at Ulaanbaatar and turning back around. Seemed like 1 of 3 flights. Reason: high side winds. I haven’t been travelling through authoritarian China for many years, but it seems like the new airport suffers less from dangerous winds and even from the fog that was rumoured to be common.

What will appear in the future

  • navigation systems. Google now offers in-town traffic updates. Countryside systems still limited.
  • mental maps shifting to street names/addresses instead of landmarks
  • subway (really, I wish they had selected light rail instead, but who knows whether either will come)
  • urban renewal and historical restorations embracing district north of government house (National University of Mongolia, German embassy, etc.), but perhaps it will be too late for that
  • Combined Heat and Power Plant #5 (yeah, right!)
  • hipsters discovering УАЗ (minivan and jeep), but also Porters, perhaps as platform for mobile raves?
  • giant hole blown into Bogd Khaan mountain to “drain” polluted air out of the valley (that actually is a proposal, but it will not appear! There also seems to be a proposal to blast away mountains on either end of the valley to let bad air escape!)
  • some kind of traffic routing system with overhead displays
  • Mongolia-themed bicycle stands, for example roof structure of a ger as a steel structure
  • vending machines
  • Chinese cars. I see more of these in 2025, esp. the green license plate electric cars, but still not a very large number.
  • Misters at outdoor restaurants. Very attractive feature in cities like Almaty and Bishkek when it gets hot.
  • In the very long term, current young people (starting from 2000s birth cohorts) will think of themselves as the Prius generation, analogous to German Generation Golf.
  • Given that the drive into Ulaanbaatar may now take longer than the flight to Ulaanbaatar, airport hotels must be on their way.

What will disappear in the medium-term future

I’m going out on a predictive limb here… 2-3 years is what I mean by “near future”.

Actually, since I have been predicting this as “near future” change for some years now, I guess I was wrong with all these predictions, and have changed the listing to medium-term future.

  • stretched-out hand to signal for a car ride
  • that awkward extra half-step on most stairs
  • whitening make-up.

What will disappear in the long-term future

I mean beyond 7 years or so. None of these seems to be coming true quite yet, so I’ve changed the name of this category from medium-term to long-term.

  • new (to Mongolia) cars that are right-hand drive
  • the neo-classical Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, with its Stalinist (if that’s an architectural style) spire [Tough call to make as the MFA building is now dwarfed by its own annex]
  • deels in the city [actually, they seem to be making a bit of a fashion comeback among young people]
  • some of the downtown university campuses
  • buildings of 4 floors or less in the urban core
  • Russian minivans (УАЗ452)
  • the Winter Palace. It won’t disappear entirely, but it is more-and-more surrounded by a very urban and very tall landscape making it look somewhat forlorn, a fate it shares with many other buildings
  • heritage buildings
  • street vendors with their little cardboard boxes of tissues, lighters, soda, perhaps rounded out by pine nuts or other offerings
  • that colour in staircases and hallways of apartment and public buildings
  • streetsweepers
Posted in Change, Curios, Ulaanbaatar | Tagged | 4 Comments

Plus ça change

Posted on April 22, 2025 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

“Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” = The more things change, the more they stay the same.

I feel like I experience perpetual déjà vu (yes, this is turning into a French post) in discussing constellations of political actor. Many people seem to want to talk about the personalities involved in current politics and rely on this as a lens to understand democratization or backsliding. Yet, most of the constellations of actors are repeating patterns that have been seen before.

In part, I think this is due to the prominence of international actors who are on medium-term stays in Ulaanbaatar only (diplomats, donor organizations, etc.) and to whom these constellations are new. Mongolian analysts also participate in these discussions as the fragmented and personalistic nature of politics in Mongolia seems to point to a focus on the people involved.

Repeating Patterns

Having gone through many cycles of politicians over the past 20 years that I’ve been paying close attention to Mongolia, I have to ask, do we really deepen our understanding of the political system and of democratization by gossiping about the personal relationships between various actors. Did understanding N Enkhbayar’s decades-long feud with his own party (MPRP/MPP) help us understand anything about the political system in the late 2000s, through the 2010s? Did figuring Kh Battulga out tell us anything about the presumed decline of democracy that we seem to be seeing now? What about the N Enkhbold vs U Khurelsukh battle? And, for the debate that has been raging for the past several years, do we need to understand the relationship and/or rivalry between U Khurelsukh and L Oyun-Erdene, or now between Khurelsukh, Oyun-Erdene and N Uchral?

As you can probably tell by the tone of my question, I think that a focus on the personalities can be a distraction and a bit of an analytical trap that we as a community of analysts fall into.

Yes, of course, some positions in a political system come with greater power than others. Understanding how the individuals who occupy those positions think and how they relate to each other has to be an element of an understanding of contemporary developments. Those positions include decision-making powers as defined by the constitution, most prominently, the members of the National Security Council, president, prime-minister and speaker of the Great Khural. Various cabinet-secretaries have also played important roles in shaping policy agendas (such as they are). The leaders of political parties and of factions of political parties do not  hold constitutional power, but they also have a clear role to play.

Fragmentation of Power

However, there is that fundamental observation of a fragmentation of political power. This is a topic I have written about in the past, perhaps most explicitly in a 2021 post. I initially came to this observation by thinking about investments and corruption. Whenever boom times arrive in Mongolia, I tend to get calls from international investment advisors or potential investors to ask whom they need to know to push into a certain market. Often, investors will tell me, “I met the vice minister for … and they reassured me that they would help me enter this market.” My response is always, “that’s very nice, but there are many vice ministers”. That’s why some of the grand corruption charges in the context of large projects like Oyu Tolgoi never made much sense to me. What single politician was ever in a position over the past 20 years to actually make a project happen? There were always rivals within the party and in the political system who would oppose any initiative by any given individual and would be able to restrain the power of others. This is at heart of one of the puzzles of the past several years, i.e. even with super-majorities in parliament and now the presidency, the MPP does not seem to be able to get all that much done. And, the government has felt compelled to bring the DP and KhUN on-board in their grand coalition because it has been afraid of opposition. That is fragmentation of power in action! And that is a pattern that I’ve seen repeatedly over the past 20 years entirely irrespective of the people involved. Powerful-seeming actors come and go, but the pattern of fragmentation remains and provides some checks-and-balances on the domination by single individuals. Once-powerful-seeming individuals are still active, yet seem to be relegated to the sidelines: Su Batbold, S Bayar, N Enkhbayar, M Enkhbold in the MPP, but also Lu Bold, S Erdene, Ch Saikhanbileg, even Ts Elbegdorj are all examples of that.

Political Vacuousness

Another pattern is the emptiness of the various power struggles. Did Enkhbayar have a substantive disagreement with the rests of the MPRP? Have Battulga and Elbegdorj pursued different policies? Do Khurelsukh and Oyun-Erdene have different goals? Generally, no. In fact, one of the puzzles about actors like Enkhbayar, Battulga, and Khurelsukh especially is that it remains unclear to me why they are even in politics. Has one of the three of them actually had a political project? Can you name a general political idea that any of them have pursued to make the world or Mongolia a better place? No, 1 billion trees do not count for a political goal. So, when the individuals involved in today’s political struggles (not debates!), the impact on decisions is actually entirely unclear. If any of the speculation about various changes of government (oh, have we had a lot of speculation of that kind over the past 20 years!) ever came true, would any actual policies have changed?

Of course, it is this vacuousness and absence of any actual political goals that fuels a lot of the concern about these individuals. If my observation that neither Battulga nor Khurelsukh really have any kind of substantive agenda for the future of Mongolia, their apparent desire to run for second presidential terms is a concern, because it seems to be a desire to be in power for power’s sake. And, I think that’s why many debates are consumed with speculation about specific constellations of actors. Since we cannot engage with factions led by these kind of politicians about the substance of policies they might pursue, we are left to speculate about their power ambitions and what those ambitions might mean for democracy (generally, nothing good).

Speculation

So, I generally try to stay away from speculation about the future trajectory of “leaders”. Perhaps, that is an important role to play for someone who continues to observe the political scene over many years. “Remember M Enkhbold? Oh you don’t? So, don’t worry so much about Khurelsukh.” I am more interested in finding underlying patterns like the fragmentation of power, the absence of substance from political debates, or the persistent belief in single “best” solutions, sometimes justified as “pragmatism”.

Of course, that bears the risk, that one of these times, I will be wrong and some leader will actually emerge to become authoritarian or destroy democracy, and that is a real worry. But, that was a worry just as much eight or twelve years ago, as it is now.

Posted in Constitution, Democracy, Governance, Government, Politics, Reflection | Tagged | 7 Comments

Minegolia: A Curse or a Complex Reality?

Posted on April 15, 2025 by bulgan batdorj

By Bulgan Batdorj 

Note: This is a post I originally drafted in 2019 but never posted. I hesitated because my thinking was still evolving. Since then, my understanding has evolved, but I believe it is valuable to share this early reflection because I think many of my friends at the time shared similar mindset – seeing mining as the problem (and villains are always part of the story) and education as the solution.

Today, in 2025, I see new research by PhD.c Orkhon and PhD. Bolormaa on education and water issues in Mongolia. I also see many emerging challenges facing the country. While my perspective has matured, I still catch my mind being tempted by conspiracy theories—it’s easy to look for simple explanations in a complex system. But I now recognize that real change in Mongolia requires long-term commitment and systemic thinking as the foundation.

Here at Mongolia Focus, we will continue sharing our observations and reflections on mining in Mongolia.

_________________________

Is mining good or bad for Mongolia?  Is Minegolia cursed? What is happening with the water sources, are they all depleted? I had an itch to know about mining in Mongolia. There were always pro and anti-arguments about having or not having mining which were hard to understand. The impact sounded irreplaceably damaging yet the benefit was life-giving for us. So I wanted to understand more about mining which led me to quit my job in pursuit of making sense of this Minegolia dilemma.

In my earlier phase of the research, I was almost on the pursuit to find something or someone to blame for the lack of success Mongolia was going through. See, Mongolia is a democratic country, small population and an abundance of mineral wealth. How come all these equate to corruption, economic and political instability and polarization of the people? It did not make sense at all. So, I started my witch hunt – someone is doing something bad.

My suspects could be divided into two broad categories of “external” and “internal”. Those external suspects all our foreign friends, two neighbors, and our third neighbors, their development and policy arms as well as the businesses.

Those domestic suspects were politicians, political parties, and public service. But these people are elected, supported, and tolerated by the public. So they are like the “wart” on the face, very ugly, but are only the symptoms, not the root cause. A very common factor that seem naturally the root cause is understood as the lack of “education” of the public?

The matter of “education” is a big issue at the national level, Mongolians invest in education.  Mongolia is often praised for its high literacy rates—higher, in fact, than Japan, South Korea, and Australia on a per capita basis.

It became increasingly clear that our challenge wasn’t just the quantity of education but the quality and content. Not only the quality of the formal or technical education but also the emphasis of non-formal education, i.e. democracy, media literacy, health knowledge, environmental education are in shortage. On top of the education, the questions of identity and value are not in the core if they are present at all. Deficiency of “identity”, “value” and “education” are a good breeding ground for disinformation, populistic politic, and coercion.

Every time I pinned Mongolia’s challenges to a single factor—whether foreign influence, political elites, or education—my arguments unraveled under the probing questions of my professors and peers. The problem was not simply that these factors existed—but that I had been examining them in isolation.

I later realized that Mongolia’s struggles are products of a complex, dynamic system, where actors and structures—domestic and foreign, political and social, formal and informal—are interdependent. These interactions produce patterns that are difficult to predict and even harder to untangle. This realization led me to the concept of “wicked problems”—problems that are persistent, multifaceted, and resistant to simple solutions. My colleagues wrote about chronic policy failures in Mongolia very clear symptom of a wicked problem.

Reflecting now, I see that mining, like many of Mongolia’s challenges, is neither wholly good nor entirely bad. It is deeply entangled within the broader web of social, economic, and political dynamics. A search for villains alone will not yield understanding—let alone solutions.

Posted in Bulgan Batdorj, Mining, Research on Mongolia, Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment

Academic Freedom Index

Posted on April 9, 2025 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

For some years, I have been collecting Mongolia’s score and rank on various global indices. I have also occasionally commented on some of these indices. Here, I want to focus on the Academic Freedom Index.

#Mongolia score declined slightly in #AcademicFreedomIndex drawing on @vdeminstitute.bsky.social data.

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— Mongolia Focus (@mongoliafocus.bsky.social) 19. März 2025 um 09:57

What is the Academic Freedom Index?

From the AFI’s website:

The Academic Freedom Index (AFI) assesses de facto levels of academic freedom across the world based on five indicators: freedom to research and teach; freedom of academic exchange and dissemination; institutional autonomy; campus integrity; and freedom of academic and cultural expression. The AFI currently covers 179 countries and territories, and provides the most comprehensive dataset on the subject of academic freedom.

These five indicators are included in the V-Dem dataset. As is the case for V-Dem generally, this is an index that relies exclusively on scoring by experts. This is unlike other indices that rely primarily on information reported by national statistical offices like UNDP’s Human Development Index, or indices that include survey data like the Corruption Perception Index.

[Disclosure: I serve as an expert in several index projects, including V-Dem.]

Obviously, different methodologies bring different advantages and disadvantages with them. There are many global efforts focused on the UN to make statistical reporting comparable across nations, making indices based on such reporting most-easily comparable across countries. Of course, this assumes that national statistical offices operationalize data collection consistently and honestly. But, such statistical indices are clearly limited to topics that are meaningfully measurable by numbers.

Expert-based indices like the Academic Freedom Index, have the significant advantage that they can be conducted independently of the state, an aspect that may be most relevant to countries scoring low on various indices. Expert-based indices are inherently qualitative, i.e. they convert the assessment by an expert into a numerical score, which is a strength via independence and expertise, but a weakness in terms of validity and comparability. Few people can be considered an expert on multiple or even two countries, so that these expert-based survey attempt to assemble a list of experts around the world. There are many different ways in which organizers attempt to mitigate against different criteria or scales across experts by offering detailed instructions, including questions about confidence of specific judgements, or scoring experts themselves by offering them vignettes to score particular topics as a way to compare across experts. Some might also see a significant weakness in such expert-based indices in that they are virtually all based in OECD countries and, lo and behold, OECD countries generally rank high in these indices. Questions around comparability also make some of the expert indices inherently sticky or conservative in that they are looking for legislative changes or significant events to change the score for a country, particularly when the range of scores is limited.

Survey-based indices attempt to harness crowd wisdom by distributing the ranking of a given country across many more respondents than expert indices generally do. But, such survey indices are thus also susceptible to changes in the understanding of a given topic or in perceptions of governments. It is this later concern that also exists regarding expert surveys and will be a bit of a focus on the discussion below.

Why Global Indices

Accountability

Donors as well as voters might be looking for a way to assess the effectiveness of governments’ efforts on a particular topic. That is perhaps the dominant basis behind efforts related to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. Through a global process, such goals have been identified, say relating to girls’ education as an example. Governments can then be held accountable for their (lack of) success in reaching these goals.

Benchmarking

Governments may also want to compare themselves to other sets of countries to understand where they might want to focus their efforts because they are lagging countries they might consider good comparisons.

For different questions, one might want to compare to different countries. For example, the size of the population probably differentiates countries meaningfully when we are comparing social service provision. Mongolia and China may be neighbours, but their population numbers are on such a vastly different scale that few comparisons of social indicators make a lot of sense without a lot of qualifications. But, a relevant comparison group might be former state-socialist countries. For example, when looking at the development of (democratic) governance, comparing Mongolia to Poland may be of greater interest (shared starting point for democratization, roughly) because of their state-socialist history than South Korea even though democracy in South Korea has been operating for about as long as Mongolia. When looking at trade statistics, the Land-Locked Developing Countries might be the most relevant comparison.

Academic Comparisons

Any large-scale modelling of the behaviour of states will have to rely on some version of global indices to be included. For example, almost any comparative model is likely to include consideration of governance, some measure of democracy vs autocracy is generally seen as causally related to just about any state outcome. This is exactly where V-Dem enters the scene as perhaps the most academic of all the global indices. Perhaps not surprising, it thus includes measures of academic freedom.

How has Mongolia Done in the AFI?

Above, I have shown the graph produced on the Academic Freedom Index webpage, here’s the same data using the V-Dem graphing tools:

 

Post by @jdierkes@sciences.social
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This graphs the five indicators for Mongolia for the democratic era, i.e. since 1990, that make up the Academic Freedom Index. After rising rapidly in the early 1990s with a new constitution and establishment of academic freedom, indicators remained stable until 2019. Campus integrity has fluctuated a bit, but gone from 2.01 in 2019 to current 1.69. Second highest is freedom of academic exchange and dissemination going from 1.47 in 2019 to current 0.86 Next, freedom to research and teach, 1.39 to 0.81 Second lowest is freedom of academic and cultural expression, 1.27 to 0.63 The lowest indicator is institutional autonomy, going from 1.31 to 0.53. Note that these changes are classified on the AFI website as “not significant”.

Compare some of these changes to other countries.

Compare those graphs to bigger trends around the world, for example OECD and Asia scores.

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— Mongolia Focus (@mongoliafocus.bsky.social) 19. März 2025 um 11:46

Maybe one of the first things to note here is that scale matters. When you look at Mongolia’s score only (as in Bluesky post at the top), the change looks somewhat frightening or at least concerning. When you compare Mongolia’s score to other countries/regions, you may be frightened for the world (as long as you agree that academic freedom is an important element in democracy and good governance) and also concerned about the direction of Mongolia’s trend, but perhaps less so.

In a subsequent post, I will analyze how I understand Mongolia’s score.

Posted in Academia, Global Indices, Higher Education, Social Change | Tagged | 1 Comment

Guest Post: The Centre for Law and Democracy’s Analysis of the Draft Law on Freedom of the Media

Posted on April 1, 2025 by JDierkes

By Toby Mendel

Background

Mongolia adopted its Law on Media Freedom in 1998 (1998 Media Law) as a statement of its commitment to media freedom. The 1998 Media Law, however, has only four short articles which set out the following standards:

  • Article 1 describes the purpose of the law as being to guarantee freedom of expression and the right to publish, as set out in the Constitution of Mongolia.
  • Article 2 states: “The Parliament shall be prohibited to adopt any laws restricting freedom of mass media”.
  • Article 3 comprises two key ideas, namely that the media shall be responsible for what they disseminate, and that the State shall not censor media content or finance others to do this0s.
  • Article 4 prohibits State organisations from owning media outlets.

While the intention behind this was no doubt positive, in fact the 1998 Media Law suffers from being too vague, too general or unrealistic, while the clearest provision, Article 4, has simply been ignored. Article 2, for example, is just unrealistic. Every country in the world has laws which restrict freedom of expression and indeed media freedom. It may have been inspired by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which states, in relevant part, “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press”. However, in practice, courts in the United States have defined a number of categories of so-called “unprotected speech” so as to get around the otherwise apparently absolute nature of this prohibition.

International law takes an arguably much more practical approach, providing broad protection for freedom of expression but also allowing States to impose restrictions as long as they meet a strict three-part test. This allows for a more careful tailoring of restrictions. For example, courts in the United States have not been able to read the right of journalists to protect their sources into the First Amendment, whereas international courts have had no problem doing this under international guarantees.

Local actors in Mongolia have long understood that the 1998 Media Law needs to be revised so as to provide more practical protections for media freedom, and there have been a number of attempts to introduce replacement legislation over the years. None, however, have come to fruition (i.e. in the form of a law actually getting passed).

That may change soon. The current government has made a commitment to adopt a Law on Freedom of the Media (draft Media Law) and, in 2024, the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs (MJHA) struck a multi-stakeholder Working Group to develop this legislation. A consultation draft was released at the end of October 2024. I happened to be in Mongolia at the time, for the launch of the Media Law Forum on 1 November 2024, and so I was able to meet with the MJHA Working Group to give them some quick feedback on the draft.

Discussion on Law on Media Freedom

The MJHA Working Group has now handed the draft over to Parliament, where it is being considered by the Legal Standing Committee (the 23 January draft is available here in Mongolian). If that Committee approves it for further consideration by Parliament, the latter will likely set up a working group to review the draft. As part of this process, the Parliament of Mongolia formally asked UNESCO for technical assistance to help ensure the draft Media Law was in line with international standards. UNESCO, in turn, reached out to my organisation, the Centre for Law and Democracy, to provide this technical assistance. I prepared a detailed analysis of the draft Media Law, which is available in both English and Mongolian, and undertook a mission to Ulaanbaatar from 23-29 March to meet with local stakeholders to discuss this analysis and its recommendations.

The current draft: strengths and weaknesses

Overall, the intention behind the draft Media Law is positive and almost all of its provisions are oriented towards protecting media freedom. As such, I believe it is important to move forward with this legislation, albeit in a way that makes necessary improvements to it. My analysis identifies numerous areas where the draft could be improved. These may be grouped into four different areas. First, there are a lot of fairly technical comments about improving the language and approach.

Second, one provision, namely Article 5.1, is problematical from a media freedom perspective. This article describes itself as setting out “principles” which must be adhered to by journalists, but the rules in Article 5.1 are actually restrictions on the work of journalists. They are also all either entirely inappropriate as standards for journalism – such as the requirement for journalists to “prioritise national security” – or are legitimate only as part of a system of professional regulation (self-regulation) of the media and not as directly binding legal requirements. This provision should simply be removed. There are also a number of provisions calling on the media to base their reporting on facts or to report accurately. This is again inappropriate as a directly binding legal requirement, although the need for the media to act professionally to ensure the accuracy of the information they disseminate is covered by all self-regulatory systems.

Third, in many cases, the provisions in the draft Media Law are unduly vague or general. For many of these provisions, I have proposed enhancements to the language so as to provide more practical support for media freedom. For example, Article 6.1 is very similar to Article 2 in the 1998 Media Law. Here, I have proposed that this be replaced by a set of conditions on any laws which restrict media freedom, in line with the three-part test for this under international law. An 11 March 2025 post on this site by Dulamkhorloo Baatar, Founder and Chair of the Nest Center for Journalism Innovation and Development, includes a focus on the problematical Article 13.14 of the Criminal Code. While it might be preferable simply to repeal this provision, setting clear standards for restrictions on freedom of expression might allow for this and the many other problematical provisions in Mongolia law to be reviewed.

Another example of this is Article 14, which addresses media self-regulation. Article 14.1 states that the media sector “will have” its own independent self-regulatory body, while the following articles set out mandatory conditions for the system, such as that it will adopt professional standards for the media, accept and review complaints relating to those standards and issue professional opinions in relation to those complaints. While this appears to recognise the self-regulatory system run by the Media Council of Mongolia, it does nothing to support that body and it is also not very clear. For example, if a second self-regulatory body were to be set up, would it also be recognised? I have instead proposed that the law provide for the recognition of any body which has certain characteristics (largely in line with those currently found in Article 14). But I have also proposed that, where a body has been recognised, complaints about the members of the body should be required to go through the self-regulatory system before a court case may be lodged. This approach applies in Indonesia and it has proven to be very successful in terms of both providing redress for the public and protecting media freedom. If adopted, this would significantly enhance the work of the Media Council.

Finally, my analysis casts this draft Media Law as a quasi-constitutional law, given that protection of a constitutional right is its stated purpose. As such, it should set out a broad range of governing standards for media freedom, which other laws must then comply with. From this perspective, the draft Media Law is missing a number of important elements, which I spell out in my analysis. These include, for example, the governing principles for public service media (independence, public funding and accountability to the public), as well as for the regulation of other media sectors (journalists, and print, broadcast and digital media). A 25 February 2025 blog on this site by Dulamkhorloo Baatar, Founder and Chair of the Nest Center for Journalism Innovation and Development, available here, also suggests other areas which should be included in the draft Media Law, such as subsidies for the media, but this is quite controversial and challenging to include in legislation of this sort.

The draft Media Law can be described as a good start, but more needs to be done. This law has the potential to play an important role in safeguarding media freedom in Mongolia and, as such, it should be prioritised. But significant amendments will be needed if it is to fulfil that potential.

About Toby Mendel

Toby Mendel is the Executive Director of the Centre for Law and Democracy (CLD), a Halifax, Canada based international human rights organisation which focuses on foundational rights for democracy (freedom of expression, the right to information, freedom of association and assembly and the right to participate). He has worked on these issues globally and in countries around the world for over 25 years. In addition to leading CLD, he also works with a range of inter-governmental organisations – including UNESCO, the World Bank, the OSCE and the Council of Europe – on these human rights issues. He has been working in Mongolia since 2001 and, in 2021, he was awarded the Mongolian Friendship Medal by the President of Mongolia. In March 2017, he posted a guest blog on this site, The Long Journey – Towards a Broadcasting Law in Mongolia.

Posted in Media and Press, Toby Mendel | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Noorog.mn, Youth Media Staff Detained for Unclear Charges

Posted on March 20, 2025 by JDierkes

By Dulamkhorloo Baatar and Unumunkh Jargalsaikhan

You may remember me from my previous two-part blog post about the proposed Press Freedom bill (Draft Bill | Analysis and Outlook). This time, I am addressing you with a yet gloomier picture on Mongolia’s democracy and civic space.

2025.03.18 Ulaanbaatar | Eight staff of Noorog.mn media were detained under charges initially understood as “breaking national unity” under clause 19.9.1 of Criminal code, with their contents intensifying concerns over the growing crackdown on press freedom in the country.

Local Mongolians blew up after the event, expressing their support for Noorog.mn and for press freedom.

Noorog.mn has been known for its critical reporting and explainer contents on Mongolia’s political and economic landscape. The outlet had previously announced that it would cease political coverage due to mounting pressure. However, the latest raid indicates that authorities continue to scrutinize and suppress independent journalism, especially as Noorog.mn nears the completion of a documentary on Mongolia’s electoral process, scheduled for release in April.

According to Noorog media staff, who have been interrogated between 10 PM, March 17th, until 06:30 AM the next day, the nature of the interrogation focused on the content of their reporting, and why they decided to cover each of their stories. After arresting them from a place different from their office, their office was also raided and essential work equipment, including computers, hard drives and mobile phones were seized.

Photo: Noorog.mn CEO Ulamsaikhan Otgon addresses the media after the overnight interrogation. Full video can be seen here: https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1DPDPEk3wB/

In a press conference at 12:30, shortly after being released from the overnight interrogation, Noorog.mn CEO Ulamsaikhan Otgon stated to the media that this was an unexpected detention and they were informed that they were being questioned for illegally acquiring personal information, and breaking national unity.

Unclear Justifications from Authorities

The Mongolian Cyber Police Authority has provided vague and ambiguous explanations for their actions. In a statement to the media, following the press conference by Noorog.mn, law enforcement officials said, “It is impossible to tell the grounds for this arrest. After checking all their files and hardware, we will know what kind of clause we should use for this arrest.” Another statement added, “We noticed possible violations of the law. It is not defined yet. Investigation is working on proving them.” Furthermore, during this press conference, the stated that “there are indications that Noorog.mn has been carrying out illegal gambling” and “this arrest was carried out following a chat from a citizen” adding that “this arrest has nothing to do with their contents or journalistic activities”. This was entirely different from what Noorog.mn staff had been informed during their overnight interrogation.

Photo: Head of Cyber Police Department Taivan.S addresses the media on the Noorog case. Full video can be seen here: https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1B4kPijGMG/

Such remarks by the authorities only deepen concerns about the arbitrary nature of the raid and the potential for authorities to construct charges retroactively. The lack of clear legal justification raises serious questions about due process and the rule of law in Mongolia’s handling of independent journalism.

Photo: Minister of Justice and Home Affairs Altangerel Oyunsaikhan addresses the Noorog case while informing journalists on Government meeting decisions. Full video can be seen here: https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1BjxUreZ2b/

The next day, the Minister of Justice and Home Affairs, Altangerel Oyunsaikhan stated that Noorog.mn staff were arrested under suspicions that they were organizing illegal online gambling, with a total of 9.3 billion MNT transferred through six different accounts and on a separate charge that the alleged caused a suicide by a different individual, which had been under investigation since September, 2024. This is a stark contrast from what the Noorog staff had been informed during their interrogation.

Most importantly, the suspected suicide case involves Ulamsaikhan’s late girlfriend, which is a deeply personal and completely unrelated issue.

Despite authorities’ remarks, aimed at diluting the discussion away from press freedom, Nest believes that the entire process adds to concerns over the crackdown on press freedom, proving that authorities are able to use any legal clause to shut down independent journalism.

Additionally, the fact that the authorities are exposing deeply personal, yet unrelated information in this case is extremely inhuman and an egregious action aimed at breaking the courage and morale of the Noorog team.

Even at this time, there is existing concern that this very act of sending a blog post for Mongolia Focus could be framed as an espionage or, desacato case against the author of this post.

This is even more concerning after a recent study by V-Dem institute on the global democratic landscape showed that Mongolia’s democratic landslide is heavily noticed. Mongolia has been marked as one of two lost democracies in South and Central Asia, including India.

Contrary to the democracy map by Freedom House from a year earlier, V-Dem report categorizes Mongolia as one of 45 countries autocratizing globally.

The series of events also prove the need to significantly improve the existing Press Freedom Law. “Even if the proposed bill was passed, this would not have made any difference in this specific case. It would not have been able to provide any protection for the media”, said lawyer Narantsetseg Batsaikhan.

Call for help

With all the recent unfolding events, we feel the authorities will use all necessary measures to put Noorog.mn behind bars, and international support is critical at this moment. We call for your help in supporting the press freedom in Mongolia. Despite remarks by the authorities, the nature of their very first interrogation and the fact that their journalistic materials are still not released, prove that this arrest was entirely aimed at targeting them as a media organization. Nest center stands ready to provide additional support and on the ground information on this issue.

About the Authors

Dulamkhorloo Baatar is founder and CEO of Nest Center for Journalism Innovation and Development NGO, a media support organization.

Unumunkh Jargalsaikhan is a media development specialist and freedom of expression advocate. He reports local news to international agencies and is a program manager at NEST Center for Journalism Innovation and Development

Posted in Dulamkhorloo Baatar, Media and Press, Unumunkh Jargalsaikhan, Youth | 1 Comment

Guest Post: More to Know about the Proposed Press Freedom Bill – Analysis and Outlook

Posted on March 11, 2025 by JDierkes

By Dulamkhorloo Baatar

I have recently written about the context and content of the proposed new Press Freedom law. Here, I will add some analyses and a sense of the draft’s chance of adoption.

Why are we concerned?

“The draft law on Media Freedom, presented to the Parliament, is praised for including important regulations that ensure journalists’ and media organizations’ right to protect their sources, as well as for promoting transparency in media ownership and financing. However, it is premature to conclude whether the draft law improves the Law on Press Freedom, adopted in 1998, until it is officially adopted by the Parliament and its implementation effectiveness is assessed.” said Narantsetseg Batsaikhan, CEO and co-founder of Fidelitas Partners law firm.

Additionally, even in case the proposed bill is adopted and becomes a law, there are several problematic clauses.

The draft lays out five key principles that media organizations should follow including dissemination of factual information, ensuring objectivity, prioritizing national security, human rights and the public interest, to uphold human dignity and justice and to show respect to legally protected confidentiality. “The mention of safeguarding national security is concerning as it may open a pathway for the state to intimidate journalists and sentence them behind closed doors” according to Mandkhaikhatan Tsevegmid, the CEO of Youth Policy Watch. The removal of such vague principles is also very important according to International Center for non-profit Law (ICNL). “Under international legal standards we don’t recommend prohibiting the publication of false news or require the publication of fact because the term “fact” or “false information” are very broad and gives authorities the discretion to decide that something is not fact or violates the law.” said Lily Liu, legal advisor at ICNL. The Press Institute of Mongolia also states that the mention of these vague principles poses a significant risk to journalists and indicates that several provisions need to be clarified to be effectively utilized to ensure freedom of the press.

The Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs has submitted the Press Freedom Bill as part of a package of laws regulating civic space, including the Law on protests. “Across the bills submitted by the Ministry of Justice, we see a trend to further shrink civic space and increase state interference” said Mandkhaikhatan at the request of Nest Center to comment on the legal landscape. Her concern is shared among several civil society advocates, including the Nest Center despite optimism from the international community welcoming the proposed bill.

Personal liability of journalists isn’t addressed properly in the proposed bill

Another key issue that is still left unaddressed is the personal liability of journalists. This issue that is currently being addressed by the Criminal Code is expected to be left unaddressed even after multiple mentions by civil society groups during a series of discussions with the Ministry of Justice.

The Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs have included two definitions on misinformation and a hybrid of disinformation and malinformation, claiming this will provide guidance to how provision 13.14 under the Criminal Code is applied. The problematic provision uses the term of false information in place of libel and has been used to intimidate journalists under this clause. According to Globe International Center, a total of 2260 cases have been opened under this provision between 2020 and 2024, and 133 instances were submitted to court.

If we break down the data, only on 5 cases, the journalist was found guilty, and was sentenced under the Criminal Code after libel provision was added to the law in January 2020. Between 2020 and 2024, a total of 5 journalists were found guilty under the Criminal Code provision 13.14 out of a total of 2260 cases opened. Although the data is scarce and scattered when it comes to the criminalization of libel, according to Globe International Center, in the four years leading to 2024, 5 percent of all cases opened under this clause was submitted to court and only 0.3 percent of cases was ruled guilty by court. This would mean 99.7 percent of all accused are intimidated under this clause.

Firstly, the fact that only a fraction of the cases opened are submitted to court shows that this clause is mostly used as an intimidation tool, calling journalists to be questioned only to be recused after a series of questioning. Secondly, the prohibiting of false information violates Mongolia’s commitments to the ICCPR, Article 19.

Contrary to what the Ministry of Justice claims, local lawyers say that even if a definition is provided in the Press Freedom Law, it can’t be used to define how the Criminal Code is applied, as the Criminal code is a standalone, procedural law.

Merely providing definition to disinformation in the Press Freedom Law is expected to be insufficient to address the fact that journalists are still being questioned and sentenced by this provision.

“Rather than just including terminology and content specific to the digital environment and dissemination methods in the draft Bill on Press Freedom, it is more important to outline a process that ensures the rights are implemented equally in these different environments and methods. This will help protect press freedom. The draft law needs improvement in this direction in my view.” said Narantsetseg Batsaikhan, CEO and co-founder of Fidelitas Partners law firm.

Do we believe the bill will be successfully passed this time?

If history is any indication, former President Elbegdorj had withdrawn a Press Freedom Bill he had submitted more than a decade ago as the bill’s entire concept was lost during Parliament discussion due to conflicting interests.

“It is unclear how the draft law will change during the stages of discussion and adoption by Parliament. Members of Parliament, standing committees, party, and coalition groups may introduce dissenting opinions or propose substantive changes to the draft law in accordance with the procedures set out in the Law on Procedure of the Plenary Session of the State Great Khural of Mongolia.” said Narantsetseg Batsaikhan, CEO and co-founder of Fidelitas Partners law firm.

Civil society groups are now in a wait and see mode until the Parliament session commences in March to see the initial reaction from Parliament members. Although conflicting interests of MPs may pose a threat to the passage of an ideal law, the civil society groups are hopeful that the current Parliament with record number of members, most of them new to the Parliament would uphold their duties to protect the constitutional rights.

“Regardless of the digital environment or the means of dissemination, legislators must fully uphold their duty to ensure the guaranteed exercise of the constitutional right to freedom of expression. There is no legislation specifically aimed at ensuring the implementation of the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of expression” said Narantsetseg.

What’s next?

The spring Parliament session is expected to commence mid-March or early April.

Although the proposition of the bill is a welcome step towards ensuring freedom of expression, the international community, as well as local CSOs agree that there is a long way to go for the proposed bill to be sufficient to address existing issues.

Julie Hunter, senior legal advisor at ICNL states that, “Mongolia does stand out for its generally much better laws and having open process. I think it is a very encouraging sign. And the challenge is to safeguard and continue to protect rights and not necessarily to rush laws. I understand the eagerness to pass the law, but if they do have any of these more restrictive provisions those can be so problematic that they might eclipse the positive aspects of the law. I think the press freedom effort is really important because free journalism and access to information is one of the bedrocks to democracy. We need to protect it globally.” Pierre Dagard, from RSF says, “this draft law is a good basis on which the Parliament can work on”.

Local civil society groups and media professionals will continue to monitor the process and advocate for a legal environment that would be relevant in the years to come.

About Dulamkhorloo

My name is Dulamkhorloo Baatar. I run the Nest Center for Journalism Innovation and Development NGO, established in 2020 to support media organizations to become financially sustainable and resilient, enabling them to better serve the public’s right to information. Following our incubation programs enabling journalism startups to invest in their public interest reporting and creating several high impact stories, our beneficiaries started witnessing increased intimidation attempts which led us to gear our mission towards improving legal regulations and creating a safeguard for journalists.

Posted in Dulamkhorloo Baatar, Media and Press | 2 Comments

Guest Post: Reflections of my visit: Change, Challenges and Resilience

Posted on March 10, 2025 by bulgan batdorj

By Bolormaa Purevjav 

This is a part of our series on “Change in the countryside.”

After living in Vancouver, Canada, for six years while completing my PhD, I returned to Mongolia in the summer of 2024. This visit was an opportunity to reconnect with my homeland and witness the changes that had taken place over the years. I spent the summer traveling across four provinces—Khovd and Zavkhan in the west and Sukhbaatar and Dornod in the east. Having extensively traveled across Mongolia in the past, I was eager to revisit these regions, which are known for their breathtaking landscapes and contrasting natural beauty.

Western provinces: coffee over milk tea

In the western provinces, the magnificent mountains filled me with the same energy and admiration as before. However, it was impossible to ignore the rapid modernization in provincial centers. New hotels offering Western-style breakfasts and coffee had emerged. Surprisingly, traditional Mongolian milk tea (suutei tsai) and boorzog—a classic fried pastry often enjoyed with fresh cream—were absent from the menus. When I inquired, the answer was clear: fresh cream and milk tea were no longer commonly made, as making and serving coffee was considered more “modern and cool,” alongside the convenience of coffee machines, which were perhaps also more profitable. It was striking to see coffee culture take root deeply, even in rural Mongolia.

Another noticeable shift was in service quality. While infrastructure had improved, hospitality had not kept pace. Hotel staff often lacked proper training—some hotels had clean rooms yet with unchanged bed sheets and missing towels. Previously, I enjoyed chatting with staff, who eagerly shared stories about their communities. This time, however, many were distant or too busy to engage.

A concerning dynamic was also noticeable in workplaces, where young employees were subjected to verbal criticism without regard for their feelings during my visit in throughout the provinces I visited. This lack of empathy at the workplace,  reservations of emotional connection and openness in the general hospitality and general work environments shows the growing disconnect between modernization and emotional intelligence.

Eastern provinces: New economic growth and changing traditional economy

In the eastern provinces, a different set of dynamics played out. Hotels in Sukhbaatar and Dornod were fully booked, bustling with tourists and business people from China and Russia. In Dornod, a major event in Khalkhyn Gol soum commemorated Mongolia’s victory over Japan in 1945 in alliance with the Soviet Union, which accounted for the influx of Russian visitors. Chinese businesses were visibly expanding their presence in both provinces. This rise in Chinese presence reflects the deeper economic interconnections emerging between Mongolia and its neighbours, though it also raises concerns about local industries.

In Sukhbaatar, herders suffered devastating livestock losses, with some losing up to 80% of their animals due to the harsh winter (dzud). Despite these struggles, I deeply admired the wisdom and resilience of an older herder who told me, “Nature has given to us abundantly for years. If it takes back once, that is acceptable—it will give again in time.” His words reflected a profound understanding of the natural cycle, but I also recognized that younger herders, especially those with families of three to five children, could not afford to be so patient. The risks of losing everything were too high, and many were contemplating giving up herding as a primary livelihood. Instead, they were seeking alternative income sources to reduce their vulnerability and avoid further risks to their families’ survival.

Nevertheless, Mongolia’s resilience remains strong. The entrepreneurial spirit is alive, with young Mongolians striving to start businesses and adapt to changing market demands.

Herders, though struggling, continue to find ways to sustain their livelihoods, forming cooperatives and adjusting migration patterns to cope with climate change.

Economic divide and social challenges

A growing economic divide is becoming increasingly evident, particularly in urban areas. The gap between wealthy elites and ordinary citizens continues to widen. While supermarkets are well-stocked, reflecting the country’s consumer-driven growth, poor customer service persists. This issue stems from a lack of proper training, low wages, and heavy workloads within the service sector. Despite the availability of goods, the quality of service remains subpar, which contributes to customer dissatisfaction.

Young Mongolians are seeking opportunities abroad due to the prospect of better job opportunities and higher wages. This migration of skilled workers is leaving critical sectors, such as healthcare and education, struggling to find qualified professionals. The loss of talent is creating gaps in these essential services, further deepening the inequality between those who can access quality services and those who cannot.

Social cohesion and young Mongolians

The growing division between different social groups is weakening trust in institutions and breaking down social cohesion. As the gap widens between the wealthy elites and the rest of society, many people feel increasingly disconnected from the country’s progress and the institutions that should be serving them. This sense of disconnection leads to frustration and a loss of trust in the government and other societal systems, as people feel that their needs are being overlooked.

This feeling of frustration is particularly strong among younger generations. They face harsh workplace environments, financial struggles, and uncertainty about their futures. With many young people facing low job security, heavy workloads, and a lack of career advancement opportunities, their stress levels increase. The morale declines, and ethical standards in the workplace suffer. This situation contributes to a growing sense of disillusionment, with many individuals feeling that their efforts won’t lead to a better future. As optimism fades, people become less motivated to work together or contribute to society’s overall well-being.

Ulaanbaatar, progress and pollution

Ulaanbaatar, too, has transformed, both positively and negatively. Office culture has modernized, with some workplaces adopting hybrid models, reflecting broader global trends. More Mongolians are gaining international education and experience, bringing back valuable skills and ideas. Amid rapid changes, the country retains its strong cultural identity, with traditions such as Naadam, throat singing, and respect for elders continuing to shape society.

At the same time, air pollution and traffic congestion have worsened significantly, overshadowing the city’s progress. The thick smog poses a severe health risk, affecting not only the current population but also unborn children. Addressing air pollution is not just an environmental issue—it is a fundamental necessity for public health and quality of life. Without urgent solutions, the city’s livability will continue to decline. Our country is evolving rapidly and experiencing significant modernization, but it faces deep-rooted challenges that threaten its future sustainability. Key issues such as air pollution, inflation, and the erosion of workplace morale must be addressed. Investment in education, workforce training, and sustainable environmental practices is crucial.

Mongolia remains resilient, but the road ahead requires a joint effort for a prosperous, bright future.

About Bolormaa Purevjav

Bolormaa Purevjav holds a PhD in Mining Engineering from the University of British Columbia (UBC). She is an engineering economist and an independent researcher with many years of experience in social performance and water resources management. A graduate of UBC’s Mining Engineering program, she currently serves as a Senior Lecturer at the German-Mongolian Institute for Resources and Technology (GMIT).

Posted in Air Pollution, Bolormaa Purevjav, Change, Countryside, Demography, Economics, Environment, Herding, Inequality, Pop Culture, Public Opinion, Reflection, Society and Culture, Younger Mongolians, Youth | 1 Comment

Russian-Mongolian Friendship and the Rehabilitation of Tsedenbal and Filatova

Posted on March 3, 2025 by Marissa Smith

By Marissa J. Smith

After leading the Mongolian People’s Republic continuously since 1952, Yu. Tsedenbal was dismissed from his office in 1984 while traveling in Moscow (Atwood 2004, 549). Tsedenbal and his Russian wife, Filatova, never returned to Mongolia.

However, ever since, Tsedenbal’s legacy has been periodically re-contested. Though at the time of the Democratic Revolution some had even called for Tsedenbal to be tried in Mongolia, when Tsedenbal did die in 1991, his body was returned to Mongolia (Sanders 2017, 818). Tsedenbal’s son Zorig also returned and ran for parliamentary election in 2000 (Ibid.). More recently, in the mid-2010s, a new statue of Tsedenbal was erected in front of the State Drama Theater, directly across from the statue of Rinchen at the National Library, which in turn had replaced a statue of Stalin. For a few years at least, members of the Mongolian People’s Party participated in an official ceremony laying flowers there to memorialize Tsedenbal.

Since the beginning of 2025, a new wave of Tsedenbal-memorialization has taken place. As in the mid-2010s, Tsedenbal and Filatova’s son Zorig, media productions, and the statue have been elements in the drama. 

Pop star and former Member of Parliament Javkhlan performs his ballad about Tsedenbal and their shared homeland, “Baruul Dargiin Nutag.” The official music video is available on YouTube:

However, a new element is the explicit participation of Russian actors to encourage narratives of Russian-Mongolian friendship featuring Tsedenbal and Filatova.

As previously discussed on this blog, the marriage of Tsedenbal and Filatova has long been symbolic of Mongolian-Russian relations. However, in the past this was a multivalent and ambiguous; while today, parties are moving to make the marriage Tsedenbal and Filatova an explicitly positively coded example of Russian-Mongolian friendship, with Mongolia as a subject of Russian civilizational and imperial projects.

In December 2024 it was reported that, the Russian ambassador to Mongolia laid flowers at the statue of Tsedenbal in front of the State Drama Theater:

In recent years, Filatova has been annually celebrated on Children’s Day, and credited with projects such as the Nairamdal (“Friendship”) camp. This year, however, the Russian Cultural Center participated in “continuing the tradition of memorialization.“

At the same time, backlash from the public against these narratives is also evident from social media commentary (see links above). Additionally, while visiting Erdenet this past summer, I observed a memorial placard to Tsedenbal at the Mongolian-Russian Friendship monument, which had been defaced.

Monument to Russian-Mongolian victory in WW2 with Erdenet mine in the background (left), and defaced monument to Tsedenbal (right), Erdenet, June 2024

References:

Christopher P. Atwood. (2004). Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire. New York: Facts on File.

Julian Dierkes, Kenny Linden, and Marissa Smith. (2020). “Historical Memories: Contemporary Perspectives on Choibalsan,” Mongolia Focus.

Sanders, Alan J.K. (2017). Historical Dictionary of Mongolia (4th ed.). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 816–823.

Posted in Mongolia and ..., Mongolian People's Party, Russia | Tagged | Leave a comment

Guest Post: What you should know about Mongolia’s proposed Press Freedom bill

Posted on February 25, 2025 by JDierkes

By Dulamkhorloo Baatar

After 27 years, Mongolia takes another stab at passing a new Press Freedom Bill. The bill was submitted to Parliament for discussion in late January 2025 and is expected to be discussed as soon as the Parliamentary sessions commence in mid-March. This is at least the third attempt to renew the current Press Freedom Law which was adopted in 1998. The simple 4-provision law of 1998 guarantees freedom of the press by prohibiting all forms of censorship and state ownership of media, but fails to guarantee protection of confidential sources, which have long been a cause of intimidation for journalists pursuing investigative reporting.

Photo: Ministry of Justice and Home affairs submits Press Freedom Bill to Parliament for discussion. 2025/01/25 Photo credit: Parliament

As the media environment drastically changed in the wake of social media era and false information, the country has been amending other existing laws to deal with these modern problems. Currently, defamation is criminalized under the Criminal Code which has been long frowned upon by the international community. Criminalizing defamation was one of the key reasons Mongolia’s Press Freedom Index fell to 109 (declining by 21 places year-on-year) out of 180 countries tracked by the Reporters Without Borders (RSF) in 2024, its historic low since the index was tracked. The proposed legislation follows an attempt by the government in 2023 to pass the “Law on Protecting Human Rights on social media” which was vetoed by President Khurelsukh Ukhnaa following an outcry from civil society groups and journalists leading to concerns of state censorship such as blocking all forms of communication if a government member decided a certain situation was threatening national security.

A month after the proposition of the Press Freedom Bill the Minister of Digital Development, Innovation and Communication announced plans to establish an anti-disinformation unit under the government, which is seen as yet another step to shrink the freedom of expression space.

We are concerned that the legislative process follows an existing international trend of closing civic space and shrinking press freedom observed across the globe despite Mongolia’s celebrated democratic success.

Nest Center for Journalism Innovation and Development NGO is closely watching the public discussions on the proposed bill as this will have a lasting impact on Mongolia’s democracy.

Existing legislation

According to Globe International Center NGO, who have been a strong advocate of press freedom in the last 26 years, there are currently 300 mentions of the words “press” and “information” in existing legislations in Mongolia, each imposing duties and responsibilities to media organizations. Currently, defamation lawsuits are possible under the Criminal Code, under the guise of disinformation. Although Mongolia is celebrated for having an “Access to Information Law”, it singles out 68 types of information as open to public and journalists, while more than two thousand types of information are “protected” by other legislations and regulations categorized as state or organizational secrets. Despite the current proposed draft, “” said Onon Batmunkh, CEO of Globe International Center in a conversation with Nest Center for this blogpost.

There have been instances where provisions about keeping state secrets or espionage have been utilized to put public figures and journalists behind bars, leaving the public without much information about the details of the cases.

A number of key issues are still left unregulated due to the lack of legal environment. All media staff, except the journalists working for broadcast media do not enjoy the right to protect confidential sources to this day. The existing legal environment does not accept the legality of freelancers, which has been a challenge for individual journalists to access certain information in an already challenging environment.

Existing legislations except the 1998 Press Freedom law imposes duties and responsibilities to media organizations and journalists and fails to explore international best practices to support freedom of expression.

Additionally, the criminalization of defamation continues to be possible under the Criminal Code, provision 13.14. According to Globe International data, a total of 2260 cases have been opened under this provision between 2020 and 2024, and 133 instances were submitted to court. This proves that this clause poses a threat to freedom of expression. Furthermore, it opens doors for intimidation against journalists, calling them out to be questioned multiple times, just to have the case closed after multiple interrogations.

Is new legislation needed?

According to the author of the proposed bill, the Minister of Justice and Home Affairs Altangerel Oyunsaikhan, a number of key improvements are expected from the adoption of the bill. “Firstly, the adoption of the bill will help improve the press freedom index which has been constantly declining in the past few years. The ability of journalists ensured by the international conventions that Mongolia abides by will strengthen. The legality of self-regulation organization and the right to protect confidential sources will be put in place. And by providing a definition of disinformation, journalists who have been questioned under the Criminal Code will be protected. Also, we will ensure transparency of media organizations and support the development of responsible media organizations.” he said in an online panel discussion led by Nest Center in December 2024.

Photo: Online panel discussion about the proposed Press Freedom Bill conducted by Nest Center. (Participants from left to right: Munkhmandakh Myagmar, CEO of Press Institute of Mongolia, Dulamkhorloo Bataar, Chairperson at Nest Center for Journalism Innovation and Development NGO, Lily Liu, Legal Advisor at ICNL, Julie Hunter, Senior Llegal Advisor at ICNL, Altagerel Oyunsaikhan, Minister of Justice and Home Affairs of Mongolia)

The right to protect confidential sources was long requested by the media community from the state. This is one of the key and welcome additions proposed in the draft bill on Press Freedom. “I personally think we need to work together to improve the proposed draft bill as it has attempted to regulate several key issues that are currently missing in the 1998 Press Freedom law, such as ensuring right to publication from the state, prohibiting any attempts to censor and shrink freedom of the press and freedom of expression, prohibiting creation of any government position with the role to censor and intimidate media and journalists, as well as ensuring the protection of confidential sources which has been long requested by civil society organizations”, said Munkhmandakh Myagmar, CEO of Press Institute of Mongolia in a separate conversation with Nest Center.

There is also need to recognize freelance journalists and renew journalism related terms to better navigate the changing information space and fit the social media first world. Additionally, there is a need to address the changing business ecosystem and differentiate individual information creators from journalists who are bound by professional ethics.

With this said, Nest Center feels that no additional regulation is needed unless it significantly improves the existing legislative environment for journalists and creates a legal safeguard for them to effectively serve the public’s right to information. After all, it is better to operate in a grey area than operating in a closed space. Nest Center’s position is to significantly improve the proposed legislation during Parliament discussion as there is significant need to legislate new trends, but is decreasing the Press Freedom in the name of a Freedom Bill.

What the draft bill fails to address?

Even after a series of discussions with groups of civil society organizations as well as the media, the bill still fails to address a number of key issues that would bring meaningful improvements to the information ecosystem.

“Some of the main issues we observed in Mongolia over the past years are, growing number of attacks against journalists in the form of threats and pressure, sometimes arrest. A certain amount of it was reported to be coming from public officials or politicians. We’ve also seen the use of defamation laws to silence journalists and politicization of media outlets through ownerships which is highly concentrated in Mongolia. And finally, what was also striking was the poor working conditions of journalists. Low salary, high workload result in some pressure to produce less value content or that is detrimental to respect of journalistic ethics” said Pierre Dagard, Head of Advocacy at RSF in a virtual panel discussion organized by Nest Center.

Photo: Online panel discussion about the proposed Press Freedom Bill conducted by Nest Center. (Participants from left to right: Altantuya.B, Specialist and the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs, Dulamkhorloo Bataar, Chairperson at Nest Center for Journalism Innovation and Development NGO, Naranjargal Khashkhuu, Founder of Globe International Center, Pierre Dagard, Head of Advocacy at RSF)

The current draft fails to address the deficit in advertising revenue created by the growth of social media companies. It overlooks the existing best practices that support professional journalism such as softer taxing requirements or subsidies, which would have a tremendous enabling effect on the resiliency of media organizations.

A group of international rapporteurs, including the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression laid out several non-invasive mechanisms to support the freedom of expression in a joint declaration in 2017, including introducing subsidies for media organizations to support their public interest reporting which are yet to be considered in existing regulations.

It also includes a number of provisions that impose more duties and responsibilities for media organizations. “The current draft is more of an industry regulation rather than a Press Freedom Bill. It includes provisions stating that the state ensures freedom of the press while it is already ensured by the Constitution implying that state holds the power over media organizations” said Mandkhaikhatan Tsevegmid, CEO of Youth Policy Watch NGO, an advocate for better governance.

There has also been a reluctance to accept international standards such as the Initiative that ensure due processes are followed during news creation, and rather preferring imposition of requirements framed as principles in the bill. ing imposition of requirements framed as principles in the bill.

I will offer an analysis and an outlook for the bill in coming days.

About Dulamkhorloo

My name is Dulamkhorloo Baatar. I run the Nest Center for Journalism Innovation and Development NGO, established in 2020 to support media organizations to become financially sustainable and resilient, enabling them to better serve the public’s right to information. Following our incubation programs enabling journalism startups to invest in their public interest reporting and creating several high impact stories, our beneficiaries started witnessing increased intimidation attempts which led us to gear our mission towards improving legal regulations and creating a safeguard for journalists.

Posted in Dulamkhorloo Baatar, Media and Press | 3 Comments

Remonstrance in Red and Black, With Response: The Demonstrations of January 2025

Posted on January 30, 2025 by Marissa Smith

By Marissa J. Smith

So far, winter 2025 has seen two brief demonstrations. Neither approaches the scale of the last major demonstration event, the so-called “coal theft”/нүүрс хуулгайч protests of December 2022 and January 2023, which was followed by a cabinet reshuffle (see post).

The earlier protests might be characterized as remonstrance, albeit in a direct, rude mode; also a more muted mode was seen. The absence of Mongolian script, which was found in abundance in demonstrations in the past few years, is notable. This might be related to the expansion of use of the script by the government, which I observed this past summer, and is in congruence with The Law on the Mongolian Language, stipulating that as of January 1, 2025, “State and local self-government bodies shall conduct their official affairs in dual scripts of Cyrillic and Mongol Script.” In this new context, Mongolian script may be inappropriate for addressing the state. The second demonstration appears to counter the first set of demonstrations, and was nationalist in character, with participants aligning themselves explicitly with the state.

Remonstrance in Red and Black

The first demonstrations, occurring primarily on January 11, saw large crowds drawn to the Central Square in front of the Government Building, a march around the square, and also at least one physical encounter. In the latter, soldiers stationed on the steps of the Government Building held back demonstrators pushing up towards the monumental statue of Chinggis Khaan and the doors through which demonstrators entered the Government Building in 2023.

Across these events, a specific sign with large red capital letters in Mongolian Cyrillic was observable, reading:

“ХУЛГАЙЧИД,
ЛУЙВАРЧИД
ЗАЙЛЦГАА”

This sign directly orders “theives and swindlers to get the **** out!.”

At the same time, signs with contrasting, more polite tones, were also displayed on online media:

“Эх орондоо сайхан амьдрах боломж олго!!!” [Confer the possibility of living well in the motherland!]

(Post on Facebook, Zuv.mn)

Other demonstrators and social media posts included past slogans/hashtags, including “огцор” [resign], the slogan that characterized the massive demonstrations that culminated with the resignation of then-Prime Minister (now President) Khurelsukh in 2021(see this post). The protest has mostly petered out, with members of the Liberté movement associated with E. Odbayar continuing at the time of writing.

Riding in Response

(Facebook Reel by Морьтон Монгол)

The second demonstration, visible on social media on January 25, consisted of a long string of riders and race horse trainers (уяач), some bringing spare mounts, wearing opulent Mongolian traditional clothing. In addition to the spare mounts, some members of the ride were singing, bringing a martial character to the action. They carried no signs and labeled their action only as морьтон монгол, “Mongols on horseback.” One of their social media posts however carried the label “Төрийнхөө сүлдэнд адуугаа залсан Морьтон Монголчууд мориндоо мордхоороо сүрдмээр юм. 🇲🇳🇲🇳🇲🇳,” [Having adorned their horses with the State emblem, the Mongolians on Horseback are terrible as they ride], explicitly identifying their action as in alignment with the interests and power of the state.

The second demonstration appears to be a counter-demonstration comprising of members of more affluent groups aligned with the state, as against the first group of demonstrators, who made remonstrance against the state (in modes both more rude and more polite).

Posted in Civil Society, Demonstrations, Politics, Protest, Protest, Social Movements | Tagged | Leave a comment

Road Numbering

Posted on November 17, 2024 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

I do really like my Mongolia countryside drives, whether I am along for the ride as a passenger or driving myself.

 

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One of the aspects I really like is the visual peace of staring across the vast, open countryside. Compared to total visual overload of signage on Japanese roads or the relative frequency of signage on Canadian roads even in relatively remote Canadian roads, there is very little distraction on Mongolian roads. Given driving styles and the variable quality of the roads, that is probably a good thing.

But signage is actually kind of interesting. It is also something that I have occasionally commented on in my updates on what I have observed to be new in the countryside.

 

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This is an unusual collection of several road signs in one spot on the road from Khatgal to Murun. You might wonder why four signs are posted here within 25m or so of one another when there really is quite a lot of space across the countryside.

The occasional signs warning of animals have also caught my attention.

 

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This message here, “watch out for cows” really applies to the entire country and I do find it amusing that cows and other herds sometimes seem to avoid the locations of these signs in particular, but are almost ubiquitous otherwise.

By contrast, the large road signs as in the above near Khatgal, leave something to be desired. The schematic representation of directions is typically at best that, schematic, rather than reflecting actual intersections or directions. Even less helpful is the fact that distances are not offered on these signs and are rarely posted otherwise.

As I was thinking about these road signs this summer, I started wondering about the road numbering system. Roads appear to be all called A-something, the something usually being a four-digit number. As anyone who has driven across the countryside knows, a four-digit designation for roads seems a bit of overkill in a nation where there are only several dozen cross-country roads in the entire country. Perhaps this is designed for some future expansion of the road system, but for now, I do not find a road designation as A1101 (that would be that road between Murun and Khatgal, for example) all that intuitive.

However, I have found an explanation of the road numbering system and it is at least somewhat systematic: All roads are called A-something. The first two digits designate the road, numbered sequentially 01 to 27 at least as of 2018 when that explanation was written. That means that the Khatgal-Murun highway is road 11, for example. The final two digits are sections of the road, so that this road is section 01, for example. Road 11 continues West from Murun where it turns into section 02 until Uliastai where section 03 begins which finally ends at the intersection with Road 03 in Altai . By contrasts, the road heading from Murun eastward, towards Bulgan is section 02 of road 09, so A0902. I have not discovered any system to the numbering of the roads or the sections, for example heading to/from Ulaanbaatar, or in particular cardinal directions.

In terms of the sequential numbering, that would seem to suggest that Road 01 should be the oldest in Mongolia. A0101 leads from Nalaikh via Bagakhangai to Choir where it turns into A0102 past Sainshand where it turns into A0103 all the way to the Chinese border. I do not know whether that was the first road built, but that certainly seems plausible as part of a North-South axis paralleling the Transsiberian Railroad. Note that the airport road is designated A40 as possibly the latest road (not sure if that’s the case in 2024) without any segments.

Posted in Countryside, Curios, Tourism, Transportation | Tagged | Leave a comment

Khurelsukh at UN General Assembly

Posted on October 21, 2024 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes, Alexander Morrow and Anshika Srivastava

In 2021, Pres. U Khurelsukh spoke at the UN General Assembly for the first time as president. He has returned every year since then. Unlike his immediate predecessor, Kh Battulga, he is thus continuing Mongolia’s internationalist agenda and giving the United Nations a prominent role in that. This dedication to participation in global dialogues also reinforces the steady stream of world leaders who have been visiting Mongolia over the last two years.

Obviously, the address to the General Assembly is a tightly-scripted occasion with only 5 minutes allotted to speakers. There are a lot of speakers in this sequence and many of them can be drowned out in the crowd, even for dedicated UN-watchers. However, for the 79th General Assembly, Pres. Khurelukh was handed a relatively prominent spot. He opened the debate on the second day as the first speaker in the 9h block and was closely followed by Ukrainian Pres V Zelensky whose address is likely to attract attention.

Elements in the Speech

Khurelsukh’s speech included some familiar touchpoints, but also included some announcements. As always on UN occasions, Mongolia’s nuclear-free status was emphasized.

But, Pres Khurelsukh opened with a reference to a sculpture entitled, “Consciousness” “by a renowned Mongolian artist”, Ochirbold A, that had been gifted by the government of Mongolia in 2017.

Peaceful Resolutions to Conflict

As Pres. Khurelsukh had done in his 2022 address, he spoke about the importance of peaceful resolutions to conflict in general terms. He did not mention the Russian invasion of Ukraine explicitly and that invasion is not the only conflict that his words could be applied to, but he did emphasize territorial integrity which might be especially application to the case of an invasion.

“my country upholds the principles of the UN Charter, particularly the commitment to refrain from using force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state. In addressing disagreements and conflicts, we call upon countries and nations around the world to prioritize diplomatic dialogue over confrontation, promote unity over hostility, and pursue collective goals rather than 3 divisiveness in order to consistently cooperate in strengthening international peace and security.” (https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/79/mn_en.pdf)

Coming especially only weeks after Pres. V Putin’s visit to Ulaanbaatar which had generated international attention as the government of Mongolia did not arrest Putin on his outstanding ICC warrant, this was another effort at walking the fine line between outraged by Russian aggression and not being able to say so directly due to the hold that Russia has over Mongolia’s (energy) security.

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping was raised as a particularly important role played by Mongolia in supporting international peace and security. Highlighting the sacrifices made by the 4,300 UN Blue Helmets who have given their lives in the pursuit of peace, Khurelsukh emphasized the importance of peacekeeping to a world experiencing an apparent increase in armed conflict and terrorism. His speech also noted with some pride the outsized contribution of Mongolia to the personnel of UN peacekeeping operations over the past twenty years given the country’s small population. At the same time, his speech took the opportunity to outline steps that Mongolia would be taking prospectively to further advance the cause of UN peacekeeping. These were a reaffirmation of Mongolia’s commitment to increase the participation of women in United Nations peacekeeping, as well as a pilot project to better support peacekeepers and their families.

Climate Change

Despite the speech’s acknowledgement of rising interstate war and armed conflict Khurelsukh did not neglect the importance of climate change and other non-traditional sources of insecurity in his remarks. Rather, emphasizing that climate change was an existential risk to humanity, President Khurelsukh took the opportunity to shine a spotlight on a number of national efforts that the Mongolian government was undertaking to mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change within the auspice of the Sustainable Development Goals. In addition to these efforts, in line with his overall emphasis on multilateral engagement through UN bodies and forums, Khurelsukh brought attention to numerous diplomatic initiatives hosted by Mongolia to combat the negative effects of climate change. This included Mongolia’s plan to host the 17th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and a declaration that the year 2026 would be the International Year of Rangelands and Pastoralists.

Landlocked Developing Countries

Dovetailing with these initiatives, Khurelsukh also highlighted efforts to engage diplomatically with fellow Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs) through the United Nations. Affirming his commitment to raise the collective profile of LDDCs on the world stage, Khurelsukh brought particular attention to the Third UN Conference on LDDCs and urged the whole international community to recommit to setting goals and guidelines for advancing the development prospects of LDCCs.

Mongolian Queens

In his speech, Pres. Khurelsukh spoke about gender equality, women’s rights, and the role of women in various sectors of society by drawing attention on Mongolia’s commitment to women empowerment and efforts to eliminate barriers to gender equality. Khurelsukh took an interesting approach with the mention of “Mongolian Queens” to highlight the state’s culture that has long witnessed, honoured, and valued the strategic role women have played in shaping the social fabric and governance of the state over centuries. Tracing history back to the empire of Chinggis Khaan, Mongolia had consorts, daughters, and even captives (Fatima) hold positions that enabled them to play a strategic role in diplomacy, territorial administration, and expansion of the empire.

Today, Mongolia’s commitment to gender equality and women empowerment has taken the shape of proactively recognizing the integral role women play in society and supporting a feminist take on state leadership, diplomacy, international peace, and sustainable development, at least according to Khurelsukh. In the June 2024 Mongolian Parliamentary elections, 32 female candidates stepped in as elected members of parliament thereby boosting female representation in parliament up to 25.4%. This increase in representation can be linked primarily to the adoption of a “zipper” system for party lists for proportional representation where female and male candidates have to alternate.

Khurelsukh spoke about Mongolia hosting the 2024 World Women’s Forum under the “Towards a Green Future” theme that highlighted the importance of women leadership in achieving the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals agenda and resulted in the “Ulaanbaatar Declaration: Towards a Sustainable Future”. However, while the state is trailblazing the path to women empowerment with such systemic supports & tools, it would be premature to say that a glass ceiling is no longer imposed on women in Mongolia who aspire for leadership in politics and business. Corruption and patriarchy continue to be a very prevalent systemic issue within the Mongolian government, we see that women aspiring for political leadership remain susceptible to smear campaigns, traditional mindsets, gender stereotypes, and violence which pushes many to maintain distance or disengage from politics.

Khurelsukh ended his speech with, “May the Eternal Blue Sky bless us with peace throughout the world.” That is certainly a wish that is easy to support for any audience, but the speech once again tried to stake out that difficult territory for Mongolia to emphasize peace while being wedged between two neighbours who do not always seem to have peaceful attentions. The speech also reiterated Mongolia’s commitment to many UN-led initiatives and its participation in those.

About A Srivastava and A Morrow

Anshika Srivastava is a graduate student in the University of British Columbia’s School of Public Policy and Global Affairs specializing in Global Governance & Security. Anshika holds a Bachelor’s in Global & International Studies, specialization in Global Politics from Carleton University. Her interest areas include foreign policy, national security & defense studies.

Alexander Morrow is a graduate student in the University of British Columbia’s School of Public Policy and Global Affairs. He has received a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and History from the University of British Columbia. His research focuses on the intersection between geopolitics and the evolution of political institutions in the Indo-Pacific region.

Posted in Alexander Morrow, Anshika Srivastava, Foreign Policy, International Relations, Mongolia and ..., Peacekeeping, UN | Tagged | 2 Comments

Quick Observations On the Eve of Local Elections 2024

Posted on October 9, 2024 by Marissa Smith

By Marissa J. Smith

While I was in Mongolia this summer for the 2024 Parliamentary Elections and was discussing the results for third parties, some interlocutors expressed enthusiasm for the 2024 local (Citizen’s Representatives’ Khural) elections, which will take place tomorrow Mongolia-time (October 11), as an opportunity for third parties to acquire seats.

Comparing the number of candidates by party for the Parliamentary elections (https://ikon.mn/elections/2024/parties) with that for the local elections (https://dnn.mn/news/308908) reveals a sharp contrast:

 

I have discovered that Ikon.mn has a wealth of information on this election, here it is possible to see how many candidates each party is running for each electoral district. For example, KhUN and the DP’s candidates for Ulaanbaatar and for each of UB’s districts.

Posted in Elections, Local Elections, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Mongolian Hoops Dreams — Creation of Soft Power Through Basketball

Posted on September 17, 2024 by JDierkes

By Benjamin Nuland

Basketball was introduced to Mongolia in the 1960s by the Russians and Chinese.  More recently, basketball has become Mongolia’s most popular sport, but Mongolians’ associations are primarily American. This fascination lives under the halo of the NBA and its associations with American pop culture – NBA jerseys and streetwear define “cool” and passion around NBA games resembles levels in the US.  The cultural impact pays huge dividends to America’s soft power among Mongolia’s young population.  How then can all three stakeholders – Mongolia, the US and the NBA benefit from this undeniable cultural trend

Mongolia does not have much of a history with team sports, but it seems that basketball could be a sport that breaks this pattern; since 2017 Mongolia’s men’s teams have medaled five times at the FIBA 3×3 Asian Cup. Furthermore, the Mongolian women’s 3×3 basketball team qualified for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics for the first time. With three Mongolian players playing in the American NCAA, including Mike Sharavjamts, who hopes to be the first Mongolian drafted by the NBA when he graduates from the University of Utah in  2026, it seems that basketball in Mongolia will only gain further momentum over the next few years. (For more insights, check out this piece by Zorigtkhuu Bat-Erdene: Mongolia’s Success in Team Sports.)

In 2024 Mongolia hosted the 3×3 basketball world tour, but it has never been able to attract an NBA team or secure a visit from an NBA star. Nevertheless the demand is there. This leaves an interesting gap that the United States could fill with an unconventional foreign policy initiative.


Why Basketball Works

 On a macro-level, basketball appeals to what expert Tuvshinzaya Gantulga calls the real strength of American-Mongolian relations, “the philosophical underpinning of democracy.” Basketball initiatives would not be perceived as a support for American corporate advantage, but rather, a celebration of ideals that Mongolia also celebrates – perseverance, hard work, teamwork, and opportunity. China and Russia would likely perceive this type of influence as benign, borne from the same cultural forces that popularize basketball in their own countries rather than a seeping US influence. Even if China does see Mongolian basketball in competitive terms, it would focus on “upping its game” on the court, to the benefit of both countries.

The successes of Basketball Diplomacy can be portrayed as a local Mongolian success story. A rise in the quality of local basketball leagues would increase domestic revenue, and represent a new form of economic diversification into sports. By cultivating local talent, Mongolia would also have the opportunity to send students overseas for education in American universities. From the US perspective, an initiative which can hook an entire generation to embrace American culture would be a major victory

By cultivating its talent to showcase internationally, Mongolian basketball would bolster national pride through sport patriotism. Success in international competitions can also amplify Mongolia’s status on the world stage. In this sense, the US would not only be bolstering Mongolia’s basketball success, but also its confidence as a sovereign nation in a neighborhood dominated by China and Russia.

For US corporations like the NBA and Nike, the benefit from participating in basketball diplomacy might be small in the short term, but they would be seeding an opportunity for a larger, long-term win at relatively low cost. The NBA already participates in TV programming in Mongolia, selling live broadcast rights and supporting fan-focused Mongolian language programming.  Merchandise sales, though small, penetrate the leading edge of Mongolian youth.  Opportunities to monetize that fanbase will only grow with the popularity of the sport. There may also be a bit of a halo effect of Mongolian success in other “small” nations around Asia who might be embracing basketball.

By boosting local leagues, the US can draw NCAA or NBA scouts to the exceptional talent already developing in Mongolia.  One could only imagine the frenzy, and business opportunity, created if a Mongolian ever achieved stardom in the NCAA or NBA. Shortly after Mike Sharavjamts joined, the University of Dayton Fliers created a Mongolian Facebook account that quickly attracted nearly 30,000 followers.

How the US Could Build Basketball Diplomacy in Mongolia

The US government has long-standing programs across several agencies that could build soft power through basketball in Mongolia. They can also coordinate the work of their partner NGOs. There are many case studies worth referencing

USAID has launched programs in Somalia and Tunisia, where US government funding is used to build basketball courts and training facilities and provide equipment for youth programs. This could provide the initial funding that kickstarts local basketball programs.

The State Department’s Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs offers a few initiatives:

The Sports Visitor Program invites young athletes, coaches, and administrators from around the world to the United States for sports-based exchanges. Young Mongolians would participate in both basketball training and joint workshops on leadership, team building, conflict resolution, as well as inclusion and equity in sports. The US Embassy runs this program under its umbrella of English language teaching initiatives; this year it provided scholarships for 5 kids to travel to the US to learn English through playing basketball.

The Global Sports Mentoring Program (GSMP) [from its website] is a professional development exchange that pairs international leaders with American executives in the sports sector for a mentorship that promotes inclusion and gender equality. GSMP delegates develop in-depth action plans aimed at leveling the playing field for women and girls and increasing sports access and opportunities for people with disabilities. The GSMP has impacted 310,000 individuals from around the world but has yet to reach Mongolia. The program would be a great way to reach out to Mongolia’s women’s basketball community, which is already making a splash on the international scene.

The International Sports Programming Initiative (ISPI) is a competition for US-based NGOs to pitch effective two-way exchanges that engage underserved youth, coaches, and sports administrators under the themes of leadership, excellence, tolerance and respect. The winners receive grants to administer these projects in their targeted communities and could provide a pathway for American NGOs to launch their basketball activities in Mongolia.

The Sports Envoy Program sends professional athletes for short term visits to less developed areas. Beyond engaging with young Mongolians, NBA envoys would meet with senior officials to discuss efforts to improve the administration youth basketball programs. For Mongolian government officials, the presence of a ‘global ambassador’ would be crucial to putting Mongolia ‘on the map,’ bringing international awareness to both Mongolian basketball and Mongolia’s geopolitical relevance. The US Embassy plans to bring Mike Sharavjamts back to Mongolia for a brief visit. If a tour is approved, Sharavjamts’ visit would not only inspire Mongolian kids, but also provide a patriotic victory for Mongolia’s national identity.

Embassy Ulaanbaatar could also host watch parties for NCAA March Madness or the NBA Playoffs at American Corners or stage events similar to its large-venue watch parties for presidential elections.

FIBA, the International Basketball Association, could establish a Mongolian chapter of the Basketball For Good program, which provides year-round basketball coaching to kids from underserved communities around the world.

Other American-backed NGOs could create “Train the Trainer” Programs in Mongolia, where local coaches would receive free coaching training from experienced coaches.

As these programs gain traction, the NBA itself might consider establishing its seeding programs in Mongolia. Examples include the basketball school the NBA established in Egypt, or the Basketball Without Borders NBA elite training programs, which has emerged as a fast track to cultivate local talent and popularize the NBA throughout Asia and Africa.

The NBA can also expand its current deals with Mongolian TV to include initiatives proven successful in other developing markets.  Similar to its Chinese reality show, “Mengniu NBA Basketball Disciple” the NBA could collaborate with Mongolian TV channels and create a countrywide competition for youth hoopsters. The winners would earn a tryout with an NBA Developmental League team and a chance to play in the US. Having recently hosted the “Candidate 2024” competition, Mongol TV is well suited to produce this show. Considering the popularity of basketball from Ulaanbaatar to Mongolia’s smallest bags, one could imagine value created for the NBA.

The NBA Global Games are a series of exhibition matches normally held in countries with rapidly developing basketball programs like France, Japan, and Mexico. If an NBA team could briefly stop in Ulaanbaatar for a game against Mongolia’s “The League” all stars, it would also be a major win for US soft power.

Conclusion

Basketball is emerging as the most popular sport in Mongolia, particularly among Mongolia’s media savvy youth, its future leaders.  When it comes to creating goodwill, basketball is also one of the US’s great superpowers, the NBA’s stars live in an aspirational halo full of American cultural values. Basketball diplomacy has been extremely effective in countries where the US aspires to win hearts and minds. Throughout the world, including in China, NBA players like Michael Jordan, Kobe Bryant and Jeremy Lin, achieved the kind of goodwill diplomats can only dream of. At the same time, Basketball is a universal language, non-threatening and aspirational to the US’s adversaries, among them Mongolia’s assertive neighbors, China and Russia. From Mongolia’s perspective, basketball is a natural medium to upweight its visibility on the global stage and build national pride. In that sense, basketball diplomacy can serve Mongolia’s key goals of building geopolitical relevance and its own soft power.

About Benjamin Nuland

Benjamin Nuland is a Jack Hachigian Scholar at Yale University currently studying history and international relations. Recently completing the Directed Studies Program, he’s received the Topol Silliman Grant and the Summer Experience Award to study in Mongolia the summer under the guidance of Professor Arne Westad and Professor Julian Dierkes.

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