Remonstrance in Red and Black, With Response: The Demonstrations of January 2025

By Marissa J. Smith

So far, winter 2025 has seen two brief demonstrations. Neither approaches the scale of the last major demonstration event, the so-called “coal theft”/нүүрс хуулгайч protests of December 2022 and January 2023, which was followed by a cabinet reshuffle (see post).

The earlier protests might be characterized as remonstrance, albeit in a direct, rude mode; also a more muted mode was seen. The absence of Mongolian script, which was found in abundance in demonstrations in the past few years, is notable. This might be related to the expansion of use of the script by the government, which I observed this past summer, and is in congruence with The Law on the Mongolian Language, stipulating that as of January 1, 2025, “State and local self-government bodies shall conduct their official affairs in dual scripts of Cyrillic and Mongol Script.” In this new context, Mongolian script may be inappropriate for addressing the state. The second demonstration appears to counter the first set of demonstrations, and was nationalist in character, with participants aligning themselves explicitly with the state.

Remonstrance in Red and Black

The first demonstrations, occurring primarily on January 11, saw large crowds drawn to the Central Square in front of the Government Building, a march around the square, and also at least one physical encounter. In the latter, soldiers stationed on the steps of the Government Building held back demonstrators pushing up towards the monumental statue of Chinggis Khaan and the doors through which demonstrators entered the Government Building in 2023.

Across these events, a specific sign with large red capital letters in Mongolian Cyrillic was observable, reading:

“ХУЛГАЙЧИД,
ЛУЙВАРЧИД
ЗАЙЛЦГАА”

This sign directly orders “theives and swindlers to get the **** out!.”

At the same time, signs with contrasting, more polite tones, were also displayed on online media:

“Эх орондоо сайхан амьдрах боломж олго!!!” [Confer the possibility of living well in the motherland!]

(Post on Facebook, Zuv.mn)

Other demonstrators and social media posts included past slogans/hashtags, including “огцор” [resign], the slogan that characterized the massive demonstrations that culminated with the resignation of then-Prime Minister (now President) Khurelsukh in 2021(see this post). The protest has mostly petered out, with members of the Liberté movement associated with E. Odbayar continuing at the time of writing.

Riding in Response

(Facebook Reel by Морьтон Монгол)

The second demonstration, visible on social media on January 25, consisted of a long string of riders and race horse trainers (уяач), some bringing spare mounts, wearing opulent Mongolian traditional clothing. In addition to the spare mounts, some members of the ride were singing, bringing a martial character to the action. They carried no signs and labeled their action only as морьтон монгол, “Mongols on horseback.” One of their social media posts however carried the label “Төрийнхөө сүлдэнд адуугаа залсан Морьтон Монголчууд мориндоо мордхоороо сүрдмээр юм. 🇲🇳🇲🇳🇲🇳,” [Having adorned their horses with the State emblem, the Mongolians on Horseback are terrible as they ride], explicitly identifying their action as in alignment with the interests and power of the state.

The second demonstration appears to be a counter-demonstration comprising of members of more affluent groups aligned with the state, as against the first group of demonstrators, who made remonstrance against the state (in modes both more rude and more polite).

Posted in Civil Society, Demonstrations, Politics, Protest, Protest, Social Movements | Tagged | Leave a comment

Road Numbering

By Julian Dierkes

I do really like my Mongolia countryside drives, whether I am along for the ride as a passenger or driving myself.

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes)

One of the aspects I really like is the visual peace of staring across the vast, open countryside. Compared to total visual overload of signage on Japanese roads or the relative frequency of signage on Canadian roads even in relatively remote Canadian roads, there is very little distraction on Mongolian roads. Given driving styles and the variable quality of the roads, that is probably a good thing.

But signage is actually kind of interesting. It is also something that I have occasionally commented on in my updates on what I have observed to be new in the countryside.

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes)

This is an unusual collection of several road signs in one spot on the road from Khatgal to Murun. You might wonder why four signs are posted here within 25m or so of one another when there really is quite a lot of space across the countryside.

The occasional signs warning of animals have also caught my attention.

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes)

This message here, “watch out for cows” really applies to the entire country and I do find it amusing that cows and other herds sometimes seem to avoid the locations of these signs in particular, but are almost ubiquitous otherwise.

By contrast, the large road signs as in the above near Khatgal, leave something to be desired. The schematic representation of directions is typically at best that, schematic, rather than reflecting actual intersections or directions. Even less helpful is the fact that distances are not offered on these signs and are rarely posted otherwise.

As I was thinking about these road signs this summer, I started wondering about the road numbering system. Roads appear to be all called A-something, the something usually being a four-digit number. As anyone who has driven across the countryside knows, a four-digit designation for roads seems a bit of overkill in a nation where there are only several dozen cross-country roads in the entire country. Perhaps this is designed for some future expansion of the road system, but for now, I do not find a road designation as A1101 (that would be that road between Murun and Khatgal, for example) all that intuitive.

However, I have found an explanation of the road numbering system and it is at least somewhat systematic: All roads are called A-something. The first two digits designate the road, numbered sequentially 01 to 27 at least as of 2018 when that explanation was written. That means that the Khatgal-Murun highway is road 11, for example. The final two digits are sections of the road, so that this road is section 01, for example. Road 11 continues West from Murun where it turns into section 02 until Uliastai where section 03 begins which finally ends at the intersection with Road 03 in Altai . By contrasts, the road heading from Murun eastward, towards Bulgan is section 02 of road 09, so A0902. I have not discovered any system to the numbering of the roads or the sections, for example heading to/from Ulaanbaatar, or in particular cardinal directions.

In terms of the sequential numbering, that would seem to suggest that Road 01 should be the oldest in Mongolia. A0101 leads from Nalaikh via Bagakhangai to Choir where it turns into A0102 past Sainshand where it turns into A0103 all the way to the Chinese border. I do not know whether that was the first road built, but that certainly seems plausible as part of a North-South axis paralleling the Transsiberian Railroad. Note that the airport road is designated A40 as possibly the latest road (not sure if that’s the case in 2024) without any segments.

Posted in Countryside, Curios, Tourism, Transportation | Tagged | Leave a comment

Khurelsukh at UN General Assembly

By Julian Dierkes, Alexander Morrow and Anshika Srivastava

In 2021, Pres. U Khurelsukh spoke at the UN General Assembly for the first time as president. He has returned every year since then. Unlike his immediate predecessor, Kh Battulga, he is thus continuing Mongolia’s internationalist agenda and giving the United Nations a prominent role in that. This dedication to participation in global dialogues also reinforces the steady stream of world leaders who have been visiting Mongolia over the last two years.

Obviously, the address to the General Assembly is a tightly-scripted occasion with only 5 minutes allotted to speakers. There are a lot of speakers in this sequence and many of them can be drowned out in the crowd, even for dedicated UN-watchers. However, for the 79th General Assembly, Pres. Khurelukh was handed a relatively prominent spot. He opened the debate on the second day as the first speaker in the 9h block and was closely followed by Ukrainian Pres V Zelensky whose address is likely to attract attention.

Elements in the Speech

Khurelsukh’s speech included some familiar touchpoints, but also included some announcements. As always on UN occasions, Mongolia’s nuclear-free status was emphasized.

But, Pres Khurelsukh opened with a reference to a sculpture entitled, “Consciousness” “by a renowned Mongolian artist”, Ochirbold A, that had been gifted by the government of Mongolia in 2017.

Peaceful Resolutions to Conflict

As Pres. Khurelsukh had done in his 2022 address, he spoke about the importance of peaceful resolutions to conflict in general terms. He did not mention the Russian invasion of Ukraine explicitly and that invasion is not the only conflict that his words could be applied to, but he did emphasize territorial integrity which might be especially application to the case of an invasion.

“my country upholds the principles of the UN Charter, particularly the commitment to refrain from using force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state. In addressing disagreements and conflicts, we call upon countries and nations around the world to prioritize diplomatic dialogue over confrontation, promote unity over hostility, and pursue collective goals rather than 3 divisiveness in order to consistently cooperate in strengthening international peace and security.” (https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/79/mn_en.pdf)

Coming especially only weeks after Pres. V Putin’s visit to Ulaanbaatar which had generated international attention as the government of Mongolia did not arrest Putin on his outstanding ICC warrant, this was another effort at walking the fine line between outraged by Russian aggression and not being able to say so directly due to the hold that Russia has over Mongolia’s (energy) security.

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping was raised as a particularly important role played by Mongolia in supporting international peace and security. Highlighting the sacrifices made by the 4,300 UN Blue Helmets who have given their lives in the pursuit of peace, Khurelsukh emphasized the importance of peacekeeping to a world experiencing an apparent increase in armed conflict and terrorism. His speech also noted with some pride the outsized contribution of Mongolia to the personnel of UN peacekeeping operations over the past twenty years given the country’s small population. At the same time, his speech took the opportunity to outline steps that Mongolia would be taking prospectively to further advance the cause of UN peacekeeping. These were a reaffirmation of Mongolia’s commitment to increase the participation of women in United Nations peacekeeping, as well as a pilot project to better support peacekeepers and their families.

Climate Change

Despite the speech’s acknowledgement of rising interstate war and armed conflict Khurelsukh did not neglect the importance of climate change and other non-traditional sources of insecurity in his remarks. Rather, emphasizing that climate change was an existential risk to humanity, President Khurelsukh took the opportunity to shine a spotlight on a number of national efforts that the Mongolian government was undertaking to mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change within the auspice of the Sustainable Development Goals. In addition to these efforts, in line with his overall emphasis on multilateral engagement through UN bodies and forums, Khurelsukh brought attention to numerous diplomatic initiatives hosted by Mongolia to combat the negative effects of climate change. This included Mongolia’s plan to host the 17th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and a declaration that the year 2026 would be the International Year of Rangelands and Pastoralists.

Landlocked Developing Countries

Dovetailing with these initiatives, Khurelsukh also highlighted efforts to engage diplomatically with fellow Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs) through the United Nations. Affirming his commitment to raise the collective profile of LDDCs on the world stage, Khurelsukh brought particular attention to the Third UN Conference on LDDCs and urged the whole international community to recommit to setting goals and guidelines for advancing the development prospects of LDCCs.

Mongolian Queens

In his speech, Pres. Khurelsukh spoke about gender equality, women’s rights, and the role of women in various sectors of society by drawing attention on Mongolia’s commitment to women empowerment and efforts to eliminate barriers to gender equality. Khurelsukh took an interesting approach with the mention of “Mongolian Queens” to highlight the state’s culture that has long witnessed, honoured, and valued the strategic role women have played in shaping the social fabric and governance of the state over centuries. Tracing history back to the empire of Chinggis Khaan, Mongolia had consorts, daughters, and even captives (Fatima) hold positions that enabled them to play a strategic role in diplomacy, territorial administration, and expansion of the empire.

Today, Mongolia’s commitment to gender equality and women empowerment has taken the shape of proactively recognizing the integral role women play in society and supporting a feminist take on state leadership, diplomacy, international peace, and sustainable development, at least according to Khurelsukh. In the June 2024 Mongolian Parliamentary elections, 32 female candidates stepped in as elected members of parliament thereby boosting female representation in parliament up to 25.4%. This increase in representation can be linked primarily to the adoption of a “zipper” system for party lists for proportional representation where female and male candidates have to alternate.

Khurelsukh spoke about Mongolia hosting the 2024 World Women’s Forum under the “Towards a Green Future” theme that highlighted the importance of women leadership in achieving the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals agenda and resulted in the “Ulaanbaatar Declaration: Towards a Sustainable Future”. However, while the state is trailblazing the path to women empowerment with such systemic supports & tools, it would be premature to say that a glass ceiling is no longer imposed on women in Mongolia who aspire for leadership in politics and business. Corruption and patriarchy continue to be a very prevalent systemic issue within the Mongolian government, we see that women aspiring for political leadership remain susceptible to smear campaigns, traditional mindsets, gender stereotypes, and violence which pushes many to maintain distance or disengage from politics.

Khurelsukh ended his speech with, “May the Eternal Blue Sky bless us with peace throughout the world.” That is certainly a wish that is easy to support for any audience, but the speech once again tried to stake out that difficult territory for Mongolia to emphasize peace while being wedged between two neighbours who do not always seem to have peaceful attentions. The speech also reiterated Mongolia’s commitment to many UN-led initiatives and its participation in those.

About A Srivastava and A Morrow

Anshika Srivastava is a graduate student in the University of British Columbia’s School of Public Policy and Global Affairs specializing in Global Governance & Security. Anshika holds a Bachelor’s in Global & International Studies, specialization in Global Politics from Carleton University. Her interest areas include foreign policy, national security & defense studies.

Alexander Morrow is a graduate student in the University of British Columbia’s School of Public Policy and Global Affairs. He has received a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and History from the University of British Columbia. His research focuses on the intersection between geopolitics and the evolution of political institutions in the Indo-Pacific region.

Posted in Alexander Morrow, Anshika Srivastava, Foreign Policy, International Relations, Mongolia and ..., Peacekeeping, UN | Tagged | Leave a comment

Quick Observations On the Eve of Local Elections 2024

By Marissa J. Smith

While I was in Mongolia this summer for the 2024 Parliamentary Elections and was discussing the results for third parties, some interlocutors expressed enthusiasm for the 2024 local (Citizen’s Representatives’ Khural) elections, which will take place tomorrow Mongolia-time (October 11), as an opportunity for third parties to acquire seats.

Comparing the number of candidates by party for the Parliamentary elections (https://ikon.mn/elections/2024/parties) with that for the local elections (https://dnn.mn/news/308908) reveals a sharp contrast:

 

I have discovered that Ikon.mn has a wealth of information on this election, here it is possible to see how many candidates each party is running for each electoral district. For example, KhUN and the DP’s candidates for Ulaanbaatar and for each of UB’s districts.

Posted in Elections, Local Elections, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Mongolian Hoops Dreams — Creation of Soft Power Through Basketball

By Benjamin Nuland

Basketball was introduced to Mongolia in the 1960s by the Russians and Chinese.  More recently, basketball has become Mongolia’s most popular sport, but Mongolians’ associations are primarily American. This fascination lives under the halo of the NBA and its associations with American pop culture – NBA jerseys and streetwear define “cool” and passion around NBA games resembles levels in the US.  The cultural impact pays huge dividends to America’s soft power among Mongolia’s young population.  How then can all three stakeholders – Mongolia, the US and the NBA benefit from this undeniable cultural trend

Mongolia does not have much of a history with team sports, but it seems that basketball could be a sport that breaks this pattern; since 2017 Mongolia’s men’s teams have medaled five times at the FIBA 3×3 Asian Cup. Furthermore, the Mongolian women’s 3×3 basketball team qualified for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics for the first time. With three Mongolian players playing in the American NCAA, including Mike Sharavjamts, who hopes to be the first Mongolian drafted by the NBA when he graduates from the University of Utah in  2026, it seems that basketball in Mongolia will only gain further momentum over the next few years. (For more insights, check out this piece by Zorigtkhuu Bat-Erdene: Mongolia’s Success in Team Sports.)

In 2024 Mongolia hosted the 3×3 basketball world tour, but it has never been able to attract an NBA team or secure a visit from an NBA star. Nevertheless the demand is there. This leaves an interesting gap that the United States could fill with an unconventional foreign policy initiative.


Why Basketball Works

 On a macro-level, basketball appeals to what expert Tuvshinzaya Gantulga calls the real strength of American-Mongolian relations, “the philosophical underpinning of democracy.” Basketball initiatives would not be perceived as a support for American corporate advantage, but rather, a celebration of ideals that Mongolia also celebrates – perseverance, hard work, teamwork, and opportunity. China and Russia would likely perceive this type of influence as benign, borne from the same cultural forces that popularize basketball in their own countries rather than a seeping US influence. Even if China does see Mongolian basketball in competitive terms, it would focus on “upping its game” on the court, to the benefit of both countries.

The successes of Basketball Diplomacy can be portrayed as a local Mongolian success story. A rise in the quality of local basketball leagues would increase domestic revenue, and represent a new form of economic diversification into sports. By cultivating local talent, Mongolia would also have the opportunity to send students overseas for education in American universities. From the US perspective, an initiative which can hook an entire generation to embrace American culture would be a major victory

By cultivating its talent to showcase internationally, Mongolian basketball would bolster national pride through sport patriotism. Success in international competitions can also amplify Mongolia’s status on the world stage. In this sense, the US would not only be bolstering Mongolia’s basketball success, but also its confidence as a sovereign nation in a neighborhood dominated by China and Russia.

For US corporations like the NBA and Nike, the benefit from participating in basketball diplomacy might be small in the short term, but they would be seeding an opportunity for a larger, long-term win at relatively low cost. The NBA already participates in TV programming in Mongolia, selling live broadcast rights and supporting fan-focused Mongolian language programming.  Merchandise sales, though small, penetrate the leading edge of Mongolian youth.  Opportunities to monetize that fanbase will only grow with the popularity of the sport. There may also be a bit of a halo effect of Mongolian success in other “small” nations around Asia who might be embracing basketball.

By boosting local leagues, the US can draw NCAA or NBA scouts to the exceptional talent already developing in Mongolia.  One could only imagine the frenzy, and business opportunity, created if a Mongolian ever achieved stardom in the NCAA or NBA. Shortly after Mike Sharavjamts joined, the University of Dayton Fliers created a Mongolian Facebook account that quickly attracted nearly 30,000 followers.

How the US Could Build Basketball Diplomacy in Mongolia

The US government has long-standing programs across several agencies that could build soft power through basketball in Mongolia. They can also coordinate the work of their partner NGOs. There are many case studies worth referencing

USAID has launched programs in Somalia and Tunisia, where US government funding is used to build basketball courts and training facilities and provide equipment for youth programs. This could provide the initial funding that kickstarts local basketball programs.

The State Department’s Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs offers a few initiatives:

The Sports Visitor Program invites young athletes, coaches, and administrators from around the world to the United States for sports-based exchanges. Young Mongolians would participate in both basketball training and joint workshops on leadership, team building, conflict resolution, as well as inclusion and equity in sports. The US Embassy runs this program under its umbrella of English language teaching initiatives; this year it provided scholarships for 5 kids to travel to the US to learn English through playing basketball.

The Global Sports Mentoring Program (GSMP) [from its website] is a professional development exchange that pairs international leaders with American executives in the sports sector for a mentorship that promotes inclusion and gender equality. GSMP delegates develop in-depth action plans aimed at leveling the playing field for women and girls and increasing sports access and opportunities for people with disabilities. The GSMP has impacted 310,000 individuals from around the world but has yet to reach Mongolia. The program would be a great way to reach out to Mongolia’s women’s basketball community, which is already making a splash on the international scene.

The International Sports Programming Initiative (ISPI) is a competition for US-based NGOs to pitch effective two-way exchanges that engage underserved youth, coaches, and sports administrators under the themes of leadership, excellence, tolerance and respect. The winners receive grants to administer these projects in their targeted communities and could provide a pathway for American NGOs to launch their basketball activities in Mongolia.

The Sports Envoy Program sends professional athletes for short term visits to less developed areas. Beyond engaging with young Mongolians, NBA envoys would meet with senior officials to discuss efforts to improve the administration youth basketball programs. For Mongolian government officials, the presence of a ‘global ambassador’ would be crucial to putting Mongolia ‘on the map,’ bringing international awareness to both Mongolian basketball and Mongolia’s geopolitical relevance. The US Embassy plans to bring Mike Sharavjamts back to Mongolia for a brief visit. If a tour is approved, Sharavjamts’ visit would not only inspire Mongolian kids, but also provide a patriotic victory for Mongolia’s national identity.

Embassy Ulaanbaatar could also host watch parties for NCAA March Madness or the NBA Playoffs at American Corners or stage events similar to its large-venue watch parties for presidential elections.

FIBA, the International Basketball Association, could establish a Mongolian chapter of the Basketball For Good program, which provides year-round basketball coaching to kids from underserved communities around the world.

Other American-backed NGOs could create “Train the Trainer” Programs in Mongolia, where local coaches would receive free coaching training from experienced coaches.

As these programs gain traction, the NBA itself might consider establishing its seeding programs in Mongolia. Examples include the basketball school the NBA established in Egypt, or the Basketball Without Borders NBA elite training programs, which has emerged as a fast track to cultivate local talent and popularize the NBA throughout Asia and Africa.

The NBA can also expand its current deals with Mongolian TV to include initiatives proven successful in other developing markets.  Similar to its Chinese reality show, “Mengniu NBA Basketball Disciple” the NBA could collaborate with Mongolian TV channels and create a countrywide competition for youth hoopsters. The winners would earn a tryout with an NBA Developmental League team and a chance to play in the US. Having recently hosted the “Candidate 2024” competition, Mongol TV is well suited to produce this show. Considering the popularity of basketball from Ulaanbaatar to Mongolia’s smallest bags, one could imagine value created for the NBA.

The NBA Global Games are a series of exhibition matches normally held in countries with rapidly developing basketball programs like France, Japan, and Mexico. If an NBA team could briefly stop in Ulaanbaatar for a game against Mongolia’s “The League” all stars, it would also be a major win for US soft power.

Conclusion

Basketball is emerging as the most popular sport in Mongolia, particularly among Mongolia’s media savvy youth, its future leaders.  When it comes to creating goodwill, basketball is also one of the US’s great superpowers, the NBA’s stars live in an aspirational halo full of American cultural values. Basketball diplomacy has been extremely effective in countries where the US aspires to win hearts and minds. Throughout the world, including in China, NBA players like Michael Jordan, Kobe Bryant and Jeremy Lin, achieved the kind of goodwill diplomats can only dream of. At the same time, Basketball is a universal language, non-threatening and aspirational to the US’s adversaries, among them Mongolia’s assertive neighbors, China and Russia. From Mongolia’s perspective, basketball is a natural medium to upweight its visibility on the global stage and build national pride. In that sense, basketball diplomacy can serve Mongolia’s key goals of building geopolitical relevance and its own soft power.

About Benjamin Nuland

Benjamin Nuland is a Jack Hachigian Scholar at Yale University currently studying history and international relations. Recently completing the Directed Studies Program, he’s received the Topol Silliman Grant and the Summer Experience Award to study in Mongolia the summer under the guidance of Professor Arne Westad and Professor Julian Dierkes.

Posted in Benjamin Nuland, Curios, Pop Culture, Sports, United States | Leave a comment

Change in the Countryside June 2024

By Julian Dierkes

For some years, I have now traced visible changes in Ulaanbaatar on my periodic visits.

I’ve kept a similar list for countryside changes, somewhat less regular as extended visits to the countryside don’t come nearly often enough for me. Earlier notes appeared in August 2023 | July 2023 | June 2019 | October 2017June 2017 | October 2015. Additions/edits to that list are marked in italics below, candidates for omissions in strikethrough.

Note that my last list appeared in August 2023, so this is an incremental update to that list.

Visible Manifestations of Social Change in the Countryside

What has Arrived?

  • Guardrails in some curves on major cross-country roads
  • While street signs (speed limits, warnings of curves, etc.) used to be a curious rarity (“when there hasn’t been a sign for 100km, why this one?”) they now seem to appear in clusters.
  • The state is reasserting its authority in some places. Roadside safety inspections of vehicles have returned. On a drive between Baruun-Urt and Chinggis (<3 hrs) we were stopped by police three times: marmot inspection (we weren’t carrying), tire disinfection, seatbelt check. The latter was really a bit of a local police extortion attempt.
  • Fences around large parcels of lands. As far as I can tell these are hayed for winter fodder as nothing seems to be planted there. Fences keep out animals in this case to let grass grow.
  • Pretty significant agricultural activity, esp. around Darkhan and Erdenet, but also towards Kharkhorin. Many locations and huge fields that I don’t remember seeing on first visit to the area in 2008. Entire valleys dedicated to wheat and rapeseed in particular in 2023.
  • Not all fences around xashaa (property lots) are wood anymore. There are some prefab concrete slabs, corrugated metals, etc. Some residents are also integrating shipping containers into their fence.
  • Virtually all aimag centres now seem to have at least one tall building (8+ stories).
  • New, modern houses are appearing in soum centres. Only buildings in towns that don’t have a big wooden fence around them.
  • “No littering” signs.
  • Motorcycle helmets. Perhaps a greater attention to personal safety more generally as some of the boats we rode offered life vests. Riding helmets for tourist horse/camel rides as well.
  • Even soum centres have significant tree planting programs going on. Freshly-planted trees in so many public and private spaces.
  • Bike infrastructure in towns and many kids riding around on bikes.
  • Very communicative drivers. For example, signal right means, “it’s clear, you can pass” and signal left “no, don’t pass”. Sometimes you get flashing hazards as a thank you, but they can also mean “animals in the road”. It was less clear to me what the flashing headlights mean. Sometimes they seemed to be the oddly-universal, “speed trap” ahead, but sometimes there wasn’t a speed trap after that. While you’re passing, flashing headlights mean, “cutting it a bit close there, buddy”.
  • Thule-style roof boxes in cars travelling between cities and towns. Roof-mounted canopies to roll out for camping have also appeared.
  • Real coffee has appeared at ger camps.
  • Some ger camps have also embraced green houses.
  • There are Khushuur (Хушуур) stands everywhere along the big roads.
  • We actually witnessed sun screen being applied to a Mongolian child!
  • I had heard mention of herders using their Prius to move a herd, but actually saw that. Highlight was when the door of the Prius opened to bark at a recalcitrant sheep. Now there are rumours of herding-by-drone, but I have not witnessed that.
  • Herders listening to podcasts. Well, at least I saw some herders with earplugs.
  • Ger-customized wall carpets. Generally, inside curtains on gers seem more common.

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes)

  • Ger bed & breakfast, ger buudal. It is not clear to me whether some enterprising printing shop has simply delivered many printed signs for such ger rentals in the countryside or if they are a new phenomenon. I have yet to stay at one.
  • I noticed more monasteries in soum centres across Arkhangai, Khuvsgul and Bulgan.
  • Starlink receivers on car roofs. Perhaps these have replaced satellite phones (see below).
  • Paved roads to soum centres. With all aimag centres connected, some soum centres are bound to follow. For example, I saw a very smooth road from Bulgan to Orkhon Soum.
  • Capsule coffee machines. Given the volume of garbage they produce, this does not seem like a good development…
  • On the Darkhan road, I came across a cut-out cardboard police officer. It made me slow down!

What has Disappeared, or at least, Nearly Disappeared?

  • The clever move to simply drive cross-country around toll booths on major roads.
  • Satellite phones. Still necessary for country-side connectivity around 2010, now I haven’t seen one in some time.
  • 500ml water bottles. There has been a real push toward refilling from larger bottles to reduce waste. Still waiting for personal bowls to make a bigger comeback.

What will Appear in the Future?

  • Much more directional street markers.
  • Cross-country biking, hiking, and riding routes away from major roads. Drives designated as scenic routes.
  • Some kind of ultra- or other sonic device that will scare herds away from roads.
  • Straight dirt paths. Currently, some kind of path-is-better-over-there logic turns all tracks into slalom tracks.

What will Disappear in the Future?

  • Roughly in the 2000s, I would guess, more cars were beginning to show up in the countryside, but road-construction was not revving up yet. That meant that on big cross-country routes, entire valleys were scarred by multiple parallel tracks. Along the paved sections of major roads, these scars are slowly disappearing in the landscape. That is a very slow process, however, so even in spots where new roads now provide a good way of driving through valleys/over passes, the scars remain. In some areas the grated tracks that mark some inclines towards passes especially are now overgrown next to paved roads, still visible as ridges, but melting into the landscape slowly.
  • At construction sites, the paved roads are often simply blocked with large dirt heaps across the lanes. Effective, but scary at night.
  • Greeting of official visitors at city gates.
  • Fancy streetlight design must be a state socialist heritage somehow along with other forms of public art. There are vaguely futuristic designs throughout Mongolia, but they are even more surprising in provincial towns than in Ulaanbaatar. Somehow, I don’t think that they will continue to be built.
  • Lumber bridges on major roads. As roads are being built across the country, these – somewhat scary – bridges appear to be disappearing, though they are sometimes visible just up or downriver from newly constructed bridges.
  • Roadside sales of airag, pine nuts, berries, etc. Airag is inevitably offered in reused large soda bottles while the pine nuts are often filled into small plastic bags. Berries in particular seem to typically be offered by younger children, standing by the road.
  • People huddling with animals under bridges. 

What won’t Disappear in the Medium Term?

  • Composite electricity poles. In the countryside these consist of a concrete base to which a wooden pole is tied with wire/brackets which ends in a triangle that has space for three attached cables. Metal poles have appeared, but I know similar composite poles from the Yukon and Alaska, so they  must be well-adapted to extreme temperatures and will thus last.
  • Litter. Growth in domestic tourism will make the countryside more littered, but awareness of littering will ultimately build. Such a blight on Mongolia!
  • Buried tires to mark property lines. It seems that there are so many practical reasons (cheap, indestructible, visible to off-roading drivers) that this practice will continue.
Posted in Change, Countryside, Curios | Tagged | Leave a comment

How Unfortunate: Putin Visits Mongolia

By Julian Dierkes

Once again, geopolitical realities are catching up with Mongolia and there is very little the government of Mongolia can do about it, even if it wanted to.

Russian autocrat Vladimir Putin will be visiting Ulaanbaatar to commemorate the 85th anniversary of the battle of Khalkin Gol (Nomonhan). He will do so in defiance of an ICC arrest warrant. Mongolia ratified the Rome Statute in 2002. The first Mongolian judge to the ICC was appointed earlier this year. Apparently, the ICC has re-asserted Mongolia’s obligation to follow through on arrest to the BBC.

Yet, an arrest seems inconceivable from a Mongolian perspective.

Caveats

I have only a newspaper-reader-based understanding of Russian foreign policy, Russian politics generally, or the ICC. I am merely trying to offer some context and analyses that focuses on the Mongolian perspective here.

Khalkin Gol

Clearly, the battle of Khalkin Gol is a touchstone of Mongolian-Soviet/Russian relations. Soviet and Mongolian forces collaborated in the summer of 1939 to repel Japanese advances from Manchuria toward the northwest and thus the Soviet Union and Mongolia. The battle was significant for effectively ending any north/westward expansion of Japanese imperialism, but also as a testing ground for (later Marshal) Georgy Zukhov and his tank tactics for the Red Army.

Mongolian troops were involved with artillery and cavalry. Subsequently, Mongolian troops were only involved in World War II as volunteers.

Throughout the postwar era, the battle was commemorated on Sept 3 as a highpoint of Mongolian-Soviet collaboration and friendship. Given the close and emotional bonds with the Soviet Union and Russia felt by many Mongolians, this has been an important date.

Commemoration of Khalkin Gol Anniversary by Leaders’ Visits

Despite the importance of Khalkin Gol for Mongolia-Russia relations, the commemoration of its anniversary (beyond the routine exchange of congratulatory letters) is relatively recent and limited to Pres. Putin. The two visits that Leonid Breshnev paid to Mongolia, for example, came in January 1966 and on the 50th anniversary of the 3rd party congress of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party in November 1974, not for a Khalkin Gol anniversary.

However, Putin has visited Mongolia for the lasts three five-year anniversaries, 2009, 2014, 2019. Once-in-five-years visits seem to be about the extent of Putin’s attention to Mongolia. When it comes, it involves quasi-imperial grandstanding, but this attention is at best sporadic.

Geopolitical Circumstances

As is obvious to even the most casual observer, Mongolia is very much stuck between a rock and a geopolitical hard place given its overbearing two neighbours. Broadly speaking, the Mongolian foreign policy of striving for constructive relations with those two neighbours, but also building and deepening relations with “third neighbours” (primarily OECD countries), has been successful. There are occasional flare-ups in relations with the two neighbours, but no longer-term deterioration of relations. On the global stage, Mongolia grapples far above its weight class. Over the past ten years or so, this foreign policy has focused even more on the UN and international initiatives, but has also added some attention to regional, intra-Asian free trade.

That relatively stable situation has changed with the threat of a bipolar (U.S.-China) world, and with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Now, the gravest geopolotical threat to Mongolia is probably a sitation where the Chinese regime feels compelled to force Mongolia into an “us or them” choice. Mongolia’s utter economic dependence on China gives the country little leverage or even degrees of freedom.

The invasion of Ukraine has changed the situation in that it has pushed the Russian regime toward China, relying on the Chinese regime as a bulwark against international sanctions. To Mongolia, a diminished Russia that is somewhat subservient to China is probably more threatening that a sporadically-interested imperialist Russia because this situation implies a possible agreement of the two neighbours. The only concrete such agreement that has emerged is the plan for a Siberia-China gas pipeline that would run through Mongolia. To many, this seems like more of a pipedream (largely for Russisan sellers of gas) than a concrete project, but it will certainly be trucked out again in the coming days as evidence of trilateral cooperation.

Mongolian Options

Given the geopolitical context does the Mongolian government have any agency?

Clearly (to me), there is no chance of exercising that agency by arresting Putin. That would be almost suicidal with virtually no upside and no one to come “rescue” Mongolia. To expect such a move is almost willfully naive toward Mongolia’s reality.

Presumably, the initiative toward this visit has come from Putin, even though it is formally at the invitation of the government of Mongolia and Pres. Khurelsukh more specifically. The calculation of what this visit means in geopolitical terms must also be almost an entirely Russian one. Keeping the caveat of my relative ignorance of the Russian political context in mind, I doubt that bilateral relations between Russia and Mongolia or between Putin and Khurelsukh have entered much into these calculations. Putin wants to assert his power and defiance against the ICC and “the West” more generally, the Khalkin Gol anniversary provides the occasion, and Mongolia is a a bit of a victim to this calculation.

Regardless of how conversations about a possible visit might actually have unfolded, could the government of Mongolia have at some point said, “no, we’re not inviting you”. I doubt it. This is where this situation contrasts with last year’s BRICs summit in South Africa, where I can imagine that the South African government might have prevailed on Putin’s representatives that not-coming was the best option.

Protests

I do hope that there will be some protests during Putin’s visit, ideally on Sukhbaatar Sq or in front of the embassy. Some such protests have been going on since the invasion of Ukraine.

I will also watch how some of the opposition members of cabinet will behave as both the DP and KhUN have been critical of Russia and the government’s silence on the invasion of Ukraine in the past.

However, I also suspect that the Russian side will lean heavily on the Mongolian government to hide protests as much as possible. I don’t think Putin has any interest in showing that he allows dissent or criticism and his main purpose during the visit will be to gloat. I do not imagine that he will want that gloating spoiled by ugly posters.

On the other hand, the MPP government has faced some criticism for its sometimes heavy-handed response to protesters, particular from opposition parties who are now represented in cabinet. Could this be the equivalent of the UN abstention (see below), i.e. no overt resistance to the visit, but let protesters be the proxy to assuage international perceptions of a submission to Putin’s agenda?

I wonder if Khurelsukh will plant a tree with Putin? Ceremonial tree planting has become an element of state visits, in part to bolster Khurelsukh’s international credentials via his Billion Tree Campaign.

Some people jokingly refer to this campaign as a subotnik, i.e. state-required labour often of a ceremonial or perfunctory nature or purpose. Would getting a former-KGB-agent-turned-head-of-state to plant a tree be the ultimate diplomatic post-Soviet subotnik? Or, will Putin not plant a tree as a sign of subtle Mongolian defiance?

What Power does Russia Hold?

There are possible reactions that the Russian government might embrace immediately and there are more drastic possibilities that are likely only implied. I am not considering reactions to an actual arrest here, but rather reactions had the Mongolian government at some point indicated with any conviction that they would prefer for Putin not to come visit.

The obvious reaction would be that the diesel supply would be interrupted. Sure, supply chain issues might be blamed, but in terms of the import of fuels, Mongolia is entirely at Russia’s mercy, at least until the long-awaited Sainshand refinery is completed. The more existential threat that is likely only implied is some kind of military reaction or even invasion.

There have only been a few instances in the past where Mongolia has pushed back forcefully on a Russian powerplay, at least with some kind of public version of that dispute playing itself out. I have previously reviewed this 2008 defiance and concluded that that was possible at a specific time in specific circumstances.

Less public and less obvious resistance by the Mongolian government might be a bit difficult to discern. For example, I have come to see abstentions on UN votes aimed at Russia as defiance. Yes, Mongolia is not voting against Russia, but also not for Russia which is probably as far as this defiance can go. I have previously argued this in Foreign Policy.

Reactions

There will be some dismay at Mongolia’s unwillingness to carry out the warrant in the media and also among some officials, but largely based on ignorance of the Mongolian context or insistence on very dogmatic liberal internationalism. I have tried to offer some of the context to the current situation above to make the point that Mongolia’s calculation may be very different where its value commitments strongly point at the ICC while a realist assessment of its situation will demand that the visit goes smoothly.

I would be surprised if this dismay is strong enough to end the ongoing flurry of visits by European and Asian officials from the pope to the Slovenian president. That flurry is part of a strategy to counter authoritarianism prompted by Russia that has led to the “rediscovery” of Mongolia as a democratic outpost. That imperative of a value-driven foreign policy will remain strong despite next week’s actions and some statements that might come as a result.

The ICC will likely make statements on how it will be disappointed by the lack of enforcement of its warrant. As far as I can tell (not very far) the Rome Statue does not seem to have any obvious responses built in against signatories who do not enforce a warrant. Maybe this endangers the future appointment of Mongolian judges or will lead to discussions/censure at future ICC signatory meetings?

Some autocrats and Putinophiles particularly among the populist right in Europe will be somewhat emboldened, though they are generally quite ignorant about the world and will understand little of the Mongolian context.

Limits of Internationalist Foreign Policy

The current discussions do highlight one challenge for Mongolian foreign policy. One version of that foreign policy is “we’re friends with everyone”. That argument is strong when Mongolia claims to have some modicum of sway over North Korea where other nations have none. But it also means that a dictator like A Lukashenko is not only allowed to come visit Ulaanbaatar, but his visit this June was loudly celebrated by government social media. I much preferred Laotian and Bhutanese visits this summer.

Likewise, when Mongolia joins an international convention like the Rome Statue, there is some expectation from other signatories that this is not an act of joining for joining’s sake or to be friends with everyone and a joiner, but also out some understanding of and dedication to the substance of that convention.

Posted in Foreign Policy, Mongolia and ..., Russia | Tagged | Leave a comment

More on Oyun-Erdene’s Cabinet

By Julian Dierkes and Bulgan B

Marissa Smith has already provided an overview of the new cabinet. Here, we’re adding some more information in cabinet members as we had done for previous cabinets.

(new cabinet members in bold, if no party is listed in a bracket, the minister is from MPP)

Prime Minister – L. Oyun-Erdene, MP
Born 1980 in Ulaanbaatar
Journalist, Lawyer
Graduated from Bers Institute
Mongolian State National University, Mongolian Education University 2008
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University 2015
Worked in Governors Office of Berkh city, Khentii 20012002
World Vision 2002-2008
Head, Social Development Department of Bayanzurkh District Governor’s Secretariat 2008-2009
MPP Governing Board Secretariat 2009
Head of Party Organization Department, MPP 2009-2011
Secretary, MPP 2011-2012
Acting Secretary-General, MPP 2012
President of MPP SDM Youth Association 2010 – 2015
(Sanders 217, 650)
Secretary of the Mongolian People’s Party 2011-2012
Acting General Secretary of the Mongolian People’s Party 2012
Member of Parliament 2016-Present
Cabinet Secretary 2017-2021
Prime Minister, 2021-present

Cabinet Secretary – N. Uchral
b. 1985 in Ulaanbaatar
Degree in law, Ikh Zasag International University, 2007
MBA, University of Gloucestershire, 2010
Master degree in history, Mongolian University of Education, Master of History, 2012
Doctorate degree in history, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2013
General Director, Royal Academy and Royal International Institute, 2010-2016
Member of Parliament, 2016-Present
Minister of Digital Development and Communications, 2022

First Deputy Prime Minister and Economy and Development – L. Gantumur, MP [DP] 
Born in 1973, Ulaangom, Uvs province
Communication engineer, Sendai Denpa College, Japan, 1996
Electrical engineer, Technical and Technological University, Nagaoka, Japan, 1999
Member of Parliament (three terms), 2004-2016
Minister of Education, Culture and Science, 2012-2016
President of Mongolian Democratic Youth Association, 2007-2010
Vice President of Mongolian Democratic Youth Association, 2000-2007
Deputy director, “Setgeshgui Trade” LLC, 2000-2004

Deputy PMS. Amarsaikhan, MP
Born 1973, Nalaikh, Ulaanbaatar
Linguist and Lawyer, Fresno College (California) 1996;
English Metropolitan College, 1998
Los Angeles College, 2000
Master’s degree in law from Southwestern University
Staff at Science and Information Technology Center 1992-1994
Attache at the Embassy of Mongolia to PRC, 2000-2004
Manager of Investment and Foreign Trade at American Trade and Development, 2004-2007
CEO, President and Director of BOD, Oyunii Undraa Group LLC 2007-2017
Member of the Citizen Representative Council 2012-2020
Head of the budget, finance and economic committee of the Citizen Representative Council 2016-2017
Chairman of the Citizen Representative Council 2017-2019
Mayor of Ulaanbaatar 2019-2020
Member of Parliament 2020-Present
Deputy Prime Minister, 2021

Deputy PM for Trade and Investment – T. Dorjkhand, MP [KhUN]
Born 1977 in Ulaanbaatar
Bachelor in Public Finance, MUST in 1995
Master, Public Economic Policy, Hitotsubashi University, Japan, 2004
Trained in Public and Private Partnership in Infrastructure, Harvard University, USA, 2010
Trained in Financial Theory, Oxford University, UK, 2012
Specialist in the Fiscal policy in Ministry of Finance, 1999-2002
Intern in the Ministry of Finance in Japan, 2003-2004
Acting head, Loan and aid department, Ministry of Finance, 2005-2012
Head of the Financial policy and loan management department, Ministry of Finance, 2012-2015
Advisor to the Executive Director, Asia Pacific Region, International Financial Corporation, Washington, USA, 2013-2015
Co-founded the KhUN, headed the BOD, 2016-2020
Member of Parliment, 2020-Present

Finance – B. Javkhlan, MP
Born 1975 in Darkhan
Economist, graduated from MUST in 1997
University of California, Riverside, 2008
Indiana University, 2009
Controller, Mongolbank 1997-1999
Plenipotentiary Mongolbank Representative to Agricultural Bank 1999-2000
Senior Controller, Mongolbank, 2000-2004
Deputy Director of the Trade and Development Bank 2004-2007
Elected to MPP Little Khural, 2013
MP since 2016 to Present
Head of Parliamentary Subcommittee for Local Leadership, 2016-2020
Deputy Vice President of the Bank of Mongolia 2010-2016
Minister of Finance, 2021-

Defense – S. Byambatsogt, MP
born in 1974, attended secondary school in Khovd
Economist and manager, Institute of Finance and Economics, graduated 1998
Master’s degree in business studies, Maastricht university
MPRP Social Democratic Mongolian Students Association, 2006-2008
MPRP/MPP Little Khural, Member, 2005, 2007, 2010
MPP Leadership Council, 2013
Member of Parliament (Khovd), 2008 – 2020
2016, Minister of Justice and Home Affairs
2022, Minister of Road and Transport Development

Justice and Internal Affairs – O. Altangerel, MP [DP]
Born in 1981, Uvurkhangai province
Bachelor in law, MUST, 2003
Master, Public Management and Law, MUST, 2017
Training Officer, Mongolian Law Enforcement Authority, 2003-2006
Advocator, Association of Mongolian Advocates, 2007-2024
Head of the Policy and coordination department, Ministry of Justice, 2012-2014
Head of the Ethics, Judiciary, 2013-2015
Deputy head, Mongolian Democratic Party, 2023
Member of Parliament, 2024-Present

Education – P. Naranbayar, MP [KhUN]
Born in 1976
Bachelor in International Relations, MUST, 2000
Master in law, Kioto University, Japan, 2007
PhD in International study, MUST, 2015
Specialist/officer in the Collaborative Relations Unit, Ministry of Environment, 2000-2002
Assistant to the Minister of Environment, 2002-2004
Head of the Japan Ecological Foundation Representative Office, 2002-2004
Officer in the Innovation Department, National Development and Innovation Committee of Mongolia, 2009-2011
Acting Head, Tourism Department, Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 2011
Director of the Shine Mongol Secondary Education School 2012-2020
Chair of the party’s Ulaanbaatar committee, KhUN Party
Representative of the Citizen’s Representative Khural, Head of Human Development Committee, 2020-2024
Member of Parliament, 2024-Present

Roads and Transport – B. Delgersaikhan, MP
Born in 1964, Dornogobi
Bachelor in law, University of Law Enforcement, 1987
Detective, Dornogobi Police Unit, 1987-1989
Lead detective and Head of the unit, Police Office of Dornogobi, 1989-2002
Founder and director of “Dorniin Gobi” LLC, 2002-2016
Director, “Bold tomor Eroo gol”LLC, 2004-2015
Member of Parliament (three terms), 2014-2020, 2020-2024, 2024-Present

Tourism, Culture and Sport – Ch. Nomin, MP
Born 1983, Ulaanbaatar
Daughter of Chinbat, Director of Gatsuurt Company (gold mining and agriculture)
University of East Anglia in 2003, Economics and Accounting 2006;
Director of External Relations of the Gatsuurt Group, 2006-2007
Manager, Terelj Hotel (owned by Gatsuurt), 2007
Director of “Terelj Suikh” LLC 2008-2011;
Harvard Business School 2018;
Executive Director of Mongol TV 2011-2021
Minister of Culture, 2021-2024

Environment and Climate Change – S. Odontuya, MP [DP]
Born in
Bachelor in international law, University of Saint Petersburg, Russia, 1988
Master in Business Administration, University of Saint Petersburg, Russia, 1989
Officer at the Science Technological Center of Mongolia, 1988-1991
Director, “Sod Trade” LLC, “Lots Invest” LLC, 1991-2012
Head of the “Irgen Ta Baylag” foundation, 2010-2012
Advisor to the Minister of Health, 2010-2012
Mayor of Bayangol District, 2016-2020
Member of Parliament (Four terms), 2012-2016, 2020-2024, 2024-Present

Foreign Relations – B. Battsetseg, MP
Born in 1973 in aimag center of Bayankhongor province
Graduated secondary school, Darkhan
Graduated from International Relations School at MUST in 1996
Directors of publishing houses Az Khur LLC, and Munkhiin Useg LLC 1996 to 2004
Institute of Finance and Economy 2000; Maastricht University of Management in 2005
Unit Director at Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency, 2005-2007
Chairman of the board, Munkhiin Useg 2007-2015
Advisor to MPP Secretary-General, 2010-2011
Administration office, and Head of Foreign Relations and Cooperation Department of MPP 2010-2012
Director of the Board of Directors of Munkhiin Useg Publishing 2020 to Jan 28, 2021
Advisor to the Minister of Finance 2015-2016
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 2016-2020
Minister of Foreign Affairs 2021-present
Member of Parliament 2024-present

Mining & Industry – Ts. Tuvaan, MP [DP]
Born in 1972, Ulaanbaatar
Graduated from Comenious University, Republic Of Slovakia
Bachelor in medicine, Mongolian University of Medicine, 2000
Secretariat of the Chingeltei District Democratic Party Unit, 2000-2008
Advisor to the Minister of Health, 2008-2012
Deputy Minister of Industry and Agriculture, 2012-2015
Head of the Human Development and social welfare, 2015
Secretary General of Democratic Party, 2017-2020
Member of Parliament, 2020-2024, 2024-Present

Family and Social Protection – L. Enkh-Amgalan, MP
Born 1970 in Khuvsgul; graduated secondary school in Murun
Economist and IT Engineer, Graduated from the University of Saint Peterburg in 1992; Dakota University [sic] in USA the in 1996; and Hangdon University in 2002
Director-General of Interpress LLC 1995-1996
Editor in Chief at Il Tovchoo Newspaper, Montsame Agency 1992-1995
Vice President of MCS Group, Board of Directors of Unitel Group 1996-2012
Advisor to the Prime Minister of Mongolia, 2011-2012
Member of Executive Committee of the MPP, 2012-Present
Member of Parliament since 2012-Present
Chairman of the Standing Committee on Education, Culture and Science, Deputy Speaker of the State Great Hural, 2016-2017
Deputy Speaker of the State Great Hural 2017-2020
Chairman of the Standing Committee on State Structure of the State Great Hural from 2020
Minister of Education and Science, 2021-2024

Urban Development and Housing – J. Batsuuri , MP [DP]
Bachelor, University of Finance and Economics, Mongolia, 1993
Master, Management Academy, Mongolia, 2003
Dealer, Mongolian Stock Exchange, 1992-1994
Director, Molor Impex, LLC, 1994-1999
Director, Dorvolt, 1999-2000
Deputy Director, Government Service Authority, 2005-2007
Head of the Sukhbaatar Province Unit of Democratic Party, 1997-2017
Governor of Sukhbaatar Province, 2008-2016
Advisor to the President of Mongolia on Rural development, 2017
Member of Parliament, 2020-2024, 2024-Present

Health – T. Munkhsaikhan, MP
Born 1983 in Ulaanbaatar.
Graduated from the Mongolian National University of Medical Sciences, 2006 and 2013, Medical Doctor, with master’s degree in Medicine.
Doctor, National Trauma and Orthopaedic Research Center of Mongolia, 2008-2014
Head of the surgery department, National Trauma and Orthopaedic Research Center of Mongolia, 2014-2018
Director-General, National Trauma and Orthopaedic Research Center of Mongolia, 2016-2018
Director-General, State Hospital Central Hospital #1, 2019-2020
Minister of Health, 2020-21

Food, Agriculture, and Light Industry – J. Enkhbayar, MP
Minister of Defense around 2012
Born 1973, Ulaanbaatar
Graduated from the Military school in 1991
Studied law at the MUST, 1999
MBA, Maastricht University, Netherlands, 2005
Director at “Gazar”LLC, and BOD at “Nekhii” LLC, and “Suljmel” LLC, 1992-2000
Director and Deputy Director at the Monitoring unit, Ulaanbaatar Customs Authority, 2002-2004
Advisor to the General Customs Authority, 2004-2006
Deputy director and Secretariat General at the General Agency for Specialised Inspection, 2006-2008
Member of Parliament, five terms, 2008-2012, 2012-16, 2016-20, 2020-24, 2024-Present
Minister of defence 2012

Energy – B. Choijilsuren, MP
b. 1970, Tes, Uvs province
Automation and telemechanics, Urals Higher Polytechnic, Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinberg), graduated 1993
MPRP/MPP Little Khural, 2005-2015
Member of Parliament, 2012-Present
Minister of Finance, 2016
Minister of Energy, 2022

Digital Development and Communications –  Ts. Baatarkhuu, MP [DP]
Born in 1981, Binder soum, Khentii Province
Social Science, MUST 1999-2002
Khan-Uul University, 1999-2004
Management Academy, 2005-2007
Head of the Press, Government of Mongolia, 2005-2006
Director of the Lector Center, 2004-2012
Acting Mayor, 2012-2013
Citizens’ representative, 2012
BOD, MLS training LLC, 2013-2016
Advisor to the President of Mongolia, 2016
Advisor to the Urban Policy Research Institute, 2014-Present
Head of the DP caucus, Citizen’s Representative Council, 2016-Present
Director of MLS Training, LLC 2016
Citizens’ representative, 2016-2020
Secretary General, Democratic Party, 2020-
Member of Parliament, 2024-Present

Twenty-Minute City – R. Erdeneburen, MP [DP]
Studied law, at NUM, 1999
Assistant to the MP, 2000-2004
Member of Parliament, 2004-2008
Advisor to the Minister of Environment, 2009-2010
Secretariat to the Ministry of Defence, 2012-2015
Secretariat, Ministry of Labour, 2015-2016
BOD, Songolt Design LLC 2018
Member of Parliament, 2024-Present

National Monitoring and Evaluation Commitee – E. Odbayar, MP [DP]
Bachelor in Business Administration, School of Economy and Business, 2008
Master in economics, School of Economy, NUM, 2012
Master in public administration, Management Academy, 2015
Started as secialist, senior specialist and Director of the Unit, Mongolian Labour Exchange, 2007-2012
Director of the Internal Monitoring, Evaluation and Inspection at the Ministry of Human Development and Social Protection, 2012-2013
Director of the Secretariat, National Authority for Children, 2013-2015
Director of the Internal Monitoring, Evaluation and Inspection at the Ministry of Human Development and Social Protection, 2015-2016
Director of the National Authority for Children, 2016
Director of the DP secretariat, 2017-2019
Advisor to the DP Head, 2033-2023
General Secretariat of of the DP, 2023-2024
Member of Parliament, 2024

Posted in Democratic Party, Government, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Guest Comment: Mongolia’s Democratic Party Gambit into Government

By Sugar Munkhtsooj

The Mongolian parliamentary elections of 2024, the first since constitutional amendments increased the number of parliamentarians from 76 to 126, concluded in June with results that largely aligned with predictions from pundits and pollsters. As expected, the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) secured victory, while several smaller parties made their way into parliament. However, it was the post-election developments that caught many observers by surprise.

A Surprising Move

Mr. L. Oyun-Erdene, leader of the MPP, which commanded a simple majority of 68 parliamentarians, made an unexpected gesture by inviting the leaders of the HUN Party and the Democratic Party of Mongolia (DP) to join what he termed a “Courage for Rapid Development” Government. This arrangement was not a formal coalition, which would have been governed by specific rules and regulations. Instead, it was framed as an invitation to opposition parties “to tackle the pressing issues facing Mongolia together.”

For Oyun-Erdene, this move makes tactical sense given the political environment. Appointed by his predecessor, Mr. U. Khurelsukh upon his ascendancy to Presidency, Oyun-Erdene spent the last three years navigating a tough post-COVID economy while simultaneously fighting to retain his position. His primary goal was to survive in office until the election, proving to skeptics within his party that he could deliver electoral success.

With victory secured, the decision to invite the two parties serves to strengthen the stability of his government and, by extension, his own position. Commanding just 68 seats, Oyun-Erdene was vulnerable to potential challenges from disgruntled factions within his own party, who could have easily sided with the opposition to topple the government by simple majority of 64 parliamentarians. By bringing opposition parties into the fold, he has effectively neutralized this threat. On a broader scale, this move allows him to present a unified front when dealing with neighboring countries on major projects, such as the long-discussed Tavan Tolgoi power plant, uranium deals with France, and railway infrastructure improvements with China and Russia.

The Democratic Party’s Calculations

For Mr. L. Gantumur, leader of the Democratic Party, the decision to join the government may have been driven by a different set of considerations. The DP’s choice to participate in the government faced much stronger criticism compared to that of the HUN Party, which many in the DP had long considered an ally of the ruling MPP.

Critiques came from various quarters, raising valid concerns. Even Mr. N. Enkhbayar, the third president of Mongolia and a long-time leader of the MPP, publicly disapproved of this arrangement, arguing that right-wing and left-wing parties cannot coexist effectively in one government. Voices within the DP feared a loss of the party’s distinct identity and its prominent position as one of Mongolia’s two major parties. Others expressed concern about the erosion of checks and balances that a healthy opposition provides.

Gantumur, elected as Party Leader in 2023 after a bitter leadership dispute that nearly tore the DP apart, may have seen strategic necessity in joining the government to save the party from obscurity. Several factors likely influenced this decision:

Party Rebuilding:

Joining the government allows Mr. Gantumur to break the vicious cycle of self-destruction that has plagued the Democratic Party (DP) and begin the process of rebuilding it into a modern organization. The discipline and structure required to operate within the government are expected to positively impact the party’s internal processes as well.

Maintaining party morale in opposition is challenging in any context, but particularly so in Mongolia. Unlike in Commonwealth countries, Mongolia lacks a state-provided systematic environment and ecosystem for opposition parties to operate effectively. Once out of power, a party must rely on its own resources to remain politically relevant until the next election. Like any thriving organization, a political party needs funds and new members to stay viable.

This challenge became increasingly difficult for the DP over the past four years due to a bitter leadership dispute at its headquarters. The internal strife caused many talented professionals to leave the party, with some abandoning politics altogether. Notable departures include Mr. B. Dulguun, who joined Mr. Oyun-Erdene’s team to become director of a government think tank, and Mr. S. Sanaser, who ran on a HUN party ticket in an Ulaanbaatar district. Both Harvard-trained economists were once considered the future of the party.

This exodus of talent, coupled with the increased dominance of extreme voices from the party’s fringes, has made it difficult for the DP to rebrand itself as a viable political force capable of governing. Not to mention that the weakening of Mongolia’s second-largest party poses a risk to the country’s political balance, as it becomes more susceptible to extreme political ideologies.

Rebuilding Cadre:

On a more practical level, joining the government allows the DP to position the next generation of its leaders to gain valuable governing experience. All political parties need to demonstrate their competence and ability to govern effectively. Being away from national government for the past eight years has left the party with a shortage of experienced professionals who meet the legal criteria for top government positions.

Indeed, the DP is already struggling to fill its allotted positions in the new government, often relying on individuals with experience from former DP administrations. Gantumur’s move can be seen as an attempt to bring a cadre of young DP members into mid-level government positions, providing them with crucial experience in governance and policy-making.

By participating in governance, even as a junior partner, allows DP to work towards rebuilding its reputation, attracting new talent, and preparing for future electoral contests with a stronger, more experienced team.

Risks and Opportunities

One major risk of this cooperation with the ruling party is the potential loss of identity and voter base, a common fate for junior partners in coalition governments. Some worry that the DP might face significant losses in the crucial local elections scheduled for October 11, 2024.

The upcoming local elections are particularly crucial, given the enhanced powers granted to local administrations by the 2020 legal changes. Moreover, they also serve as important political springboards for those eyeing national politics: in the 2024 elections, five district governors ascended to the national parliament.

Paradoxically, the DP’s decentralized structure may prove advantageous. Unlike the MPP’s rigid hierarchy, the DP’s factional nature allows local branches to maintain distinct identities in rural Mongolia. This grassroots strength was evident in 2020 when the party secured 10 aimag governorships despite heavy national losses.

At the parliamentary level, the DP isn’t entirely abandoning its watchdog role. A cadre of newly elected young MPs has voiced strong responses to recent national scandals—including the tragic death of a juvenile in custody and the controversial imprisonment of a prominent journalist—signaling a commitment to accountability that transcends political alliances.

Looking Ahead

The question now looming over Mongolia is whether this “cooperation government” will truly address the nation’s pressing issues or simply entrench a system rife with corruption. It remains to be seen how long this experiment in political cooperation will survive. However, in an age of increasing polarization, the Mongolian case of political unity stands out as a pertinent example.

About Sugar Munkhtsooj

Mr. Sugar Munkhtsooj is a management consultant and former Secretary for International Relations of the Democratic Party of Mongolia.

Posted in Democratic Party, Government, Ikh Khural 2024, Party Politics, Politics, Sugar Munkhtsooj | Leave a comment

CWGP and National Coalition Results

By Julian Dierkes

Beyond the DP’s success, the second great surprise (to me) of the election results was that the Civil Will Green Party re-entered parliament with four seats and the National Coalition gained four seats on its first attempt.

Of course, the threshold to gain seats via the party list meant that a single member was mathematically impossible while a two-seat share was improbable. CWGP and NC also benefitted from the equal redistribution of the over 200,000 votes cast for parties that did not clear the minimum thresholds. The 41,555 re-distributed seats (per party/coalition that passed the threshold) were thus a boost of more than 50% to the votes case for CWGP and NC while they had a proportionally much lower impact on KhUN, DP or MPP tallies. The four seats for both of these parties are thus close to the minimum representation made possible by the new system. However, it should still be acknowledged that those parties both garnered over 70,000 votes or just over 5%.

Note that the New Unified Coalition (Шинэ нэгдсэн эвсэл) just barely missed clearing the threshold of 5% (4.8%). Had that coalition received only 2,000 or so more votes, the redistributed votes would have dropped to around 20,000 (207,000 – 74,000 = 133,000 / 6 = 22,000), likely giving CWGP and NC only three seats rather than the current four, though that calculation is obvious hypothetical and I have not performed it to the last decimal place to come up with a precise estimate.

How many more Shine campaigners might have been needed to gain those 2,500 votes?

But in terms of the evaluation of the success of these two parties, I take note that the nature of the proportional system in the version adopted by the Mongolian parliament coupled with the particular configuration and the large number of votes cast for parties/coalitions not represented (nearly 14.3% of votes) led to the relative strong showing for CWGP and NC in terms of seats.

Civil Will Green Party

When I look through my photo collection from this election, I did not take a single photo of CWGP during the campaign. That is not representative of their presence, of course, but rather of the lack of attention I paid to CWGP.

With the departure from politics by former CWGP leader S Oyun, the party had no longer played a visible role, at least not to me. Glancing at their platform, there seemed to be nothing that particularly stood out about their appeal.

Yet, in driving across Tov, Arkhangai and Khuvsgul ahead of the election, we did see sporadic CWGP flags and signage in most soums, suggesting that there is some ongoing organizational presence.

In the end, however, as with the surprisingly strong result of the DP, I would speculate that it is name recognition that drove CWGP’s success. Not name recognition of any particular candidates, but rather a familiarity with the party name from its previous stints in parliament. Contributing to this name recognition may have also been D Enkhbat’s nomination and strong showing in the 2021 presidential election. While he had been nominated by KhUN at the time, he may still be somewhat associated with CWGP from his time in the 2008-2012 MP for CWGP.

National Coalition

Given the prominence of N Nomtoibayar, the National Coalition’s success was perhaps less surprising, but four seats was a strong showing. Nomtoibayar has been visible, though also notorious, on the national political stage for some years, guaranteeing him some name recognition by voters. In an election that largely was constructed as us (opposition) vs. them (MPP), Nomtoibayar’s notoriety may have made him a plausible foil to MPP dominance. While the Coalition was also present across the countryside, given its recent formation, I struggle to find any other explanation for its success beyond Nomtoibayar’s notoriety. His wealth may have also supported the recruitment of some credible candidates as well as the availability of funding for campaign activities.

Posted in Civil Will Green Party, Elections, Ikh Khural 2024, National Coalition, Party Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment