By Julian Dierkes
Pres. Khuresukh offered his resignation as president on Nov. 17. On Nov 19 the Great State Khural accepted that resignation.
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This resignation came as a total surprise, not just to me but to other analysts and the Mongolian public. It came just a month after a state visit to Germany that was a big symbolic foreign policy for Mongolia with all the pomp and circumstance of a full state visit, coupled with the opening of a Chinggis Khaan exhibit in Berlin. I had not heard any rumours that such a move might be coming.
Ostensibly, he resigned because of corruption allegations against him that taint the office of the president.
Reasons for his Resignation
Khurelsukh’s Claims
This narrative of corruption allegations tainting the presidency seems quite disingenuous. There have been corruption allegations against him all along, as there have been against previous presidents and numerous other politicians. That is not new. There are no particularly new or grievous allegations in the last several weeks, even though former mayor of Ulaanbaatar Kh Nyambaatar, now apparently holed up in Canada, has been very active in alleging all kinds of misconduct. This activity seems to have been largely fuelled by allegations levelled at Nyambaatar in the context of the proposed Tuul highway.
Nothing restricts the president in responding to such allegations either through disclosures or authorizing investigations into the charges. Again, there have been corruption allegations against presidents as long as I have been following Mongolian developments closely, so from Pres Enkhbayar onwards.
I also note that this resignation bears strong resemblance to Khurelsukh’s resignation as prime minister in January 2021. At the time, he claimed that he was resigning in response to protests that centred on human rights violations that were justified by the government as COVID19 responses. The protests were notable, but they were neither particularly large or pointed, certainly not in comparison to the late-2022 “coal theft” protests, for example. With a firm parliamentary majority in place, why would a prime minister resign in response to protests? Similarly, this week he pointed to DP demands for his resignation, but opposition parties everywhere in the world are tasked with criticizing governments. Often, including in Mongolia, this criticism suggests resignation of officials as a appropriate response. Nothing new in that.
Only months after his resignation as PM, Khurelsukh was nominated as the MPP’s candidate in the 2021 presidential election which he won. Neither he nor the government responded to the protests any further, so the narrative of Khurelsukh as an unsually moral leader was not borne out by subsequent ations.
Looking back at 2021, I would thus have to conclude that he resigned based on some political calculus of claiming the high moral ground (responding to citizens’ unhappiness) and removing himself from executive activities of the government to run for president somewhat freely.
Given the parallel in disingenuous reasons offered, I have to suspect for myself that there is some kind of other political calculation behind his resignation now which will only reveal itself in coming months.
Was He Pushed?
An alternative explanation was that Khurelsukh was somehow pushed out. There is always room for speculation about shifting political alliances in Mongolian politics, but it does not seem plausible to me that some such alliance pushed him out.
First of all, what would their leverage over him be? If he had not resigned, he would have had a bit more than half a year left in his term that he could have served out relatively quietly. Given the constitutional provision of a single six-year term, there did not seem to be a chance of an electoral threat against him.
In all the internecine struggles within the MPP since Oyun-Erdene was pushed out as prime minister in early June of 2025, Khurelsukh has stayed relatively aloof. Sure, there is rampant speculation that he is supporting one side or a particular individual or another, but he has not really been involved in this infighting at least not in a way that is visible to the outside.
What Could the Political Calculus Behind Resignation Be?
Some variously plausible scenarios come to my mind as to what Khurelsukh might be pursuing.
Unlikely calculations
First of all, the likelihood that he rides off into the sunset after a long political career seems very small, given his past history.
Secondly, the likelihood that his calculus involves some particular substantive agenda is also small. As a politician he has never espoused any particular ideas or policies other than the trite “to serve the nation”. He has not taken positions on some of the most challenging political challenges that Mongolia faces, like inequality, corruption, air pollution or governance issues in the mining industry. He is no different from his predecessor Kh Battulga as president who also seemed to never have had any particular political idea. In this, they are not dissimilar to many other Mongolian politicians. Sure, 1 billion trees, but that program seemed to be humming along and may actually provide him the kind of legacy that politicians seem to crave. I do not see any other real legacy projects that he has dedicated such devotion to or that others have opposed that would be worth pursuing through a 3D chess move like resigning from the presidency.
Perhaps more likely calculations
Note that I am calling these more likely purely on plausibility grounds and my limited political imagination.
Some kind of move to change the constitution? The goal here could be a) a push toward a presidential democracy and/or b) the removal of the one-term limit. I still do not really see Khurelsukh making a move to try to seek another term. This would seem to be such a clear contravention of the previous decision to lengthen the term of the presidency but restrict it to a single term that I cannot see Mongolian voters supporting that at least not now.
Presidential democracy? There has been unhappiness about the relatively vague, perhaps ineffective division of power between the presidency and the government for some time. Governments (and prime ministers) chafe at the stature of the president, presidents chafe at the restrictions on their power to judicial and diplomatic appointments and symbolic acts. Note however, that largely Mongolian voters seem to have taken the opportunity to elect presidents that were nominated by one party and parliaments dominated by the other party, though that has not been the case for the duration of the Khurelsukh presidency. You would think that a super or absolute majority of parliament would be enough for a party, but then it still remains very unclear why MPP governments have taken on coalition partners and divisions in the MPP have been significant recently, so perhaps a prime minister and president from the same party does not quite resolve those challenges.
Many proposals made for changes in Mongolia’s political structure I regard as tinkering, i.e. they seem to be changes for change’s sake not to improve anything in particular. Often they are not given much of a chance to actually show whether they might bring about the desired change. The flip-flopping over electoral systems from majoritarian to proportional systems is a good example. The differences between presidential and parliamentary forms of government would be another example. Is the somewhat ambiguous role between president and prime minister at the root of some of Mongolia’s political challenges? I do not think so. Would any of these challenges be addressed by shifting to a more presidential system or fully to a parliamentary system? Seems unlikely to me. Instead, I would argue that the fragmentation of power with many different power centres has been a crucial element of a political balance against populism and any authoritarian tendencies, so I am somewhat fond of ambiguities in political structure. But Khurelsukh might not be, so perhaps some such bigger change is the goal here.
The MPP is somewhat in disarray. I think that Khurelsukh cares about the party, its organizational strength and its recent dominance over Mongolian politics. Having resigned, he might now seek the party chairmanship and a mandate to reunite the party. He might even seek the prime ministership for this purpose. So, a party rescue mission, so to say, although that seems suspiciously selfless.
Presumably, taking over the MPP would give Khurelsukh a significant power base and allow him to support a presidential candidate with a good chance at winning a coming election. People have long speculated about Khurelsukh pursuing some kind of Putin-Medvedev scenario, maybe that is what he is aiming at?
What happens next?
That seems unclear.
Acceptance of the president’s resignation by parliament has presumably led to the installation of UIX speaker S Byambatsogt as interim president. This also triggers a four-month countdown to a presidential election. That implies a March election. For logistical reasons, holding a national election in March would be quite challenging. Given the size of the country, winter conditions, and the extensive apparatus required for elections (from ballots to technology to support the electronic count), is a March election even feasible?
Tsagaan Sar 2027 is in the second week of February. So, the campaign could start right after Tsagaan Sar for a mid-March vote. But that would require preparations for the election to be well under way before the holidays.
Holding an election in Ulaanbaatar and aimag centres seems perfectly possible. But the countryside? What happens when a region experiences a local zuud or other adverse weather for a significant amount of time during the preparations? Given general winter conditions that seems entirely plausible.
But what if it is deemed too challenging to organize a March election? Change the law to extend the four-month countdown from the resignation? That seems like messing with a pretty important regulation of a response to unlikely (until now) constitutional events and thus unattractive.
An election held under adverse conditions does not seem like an obvious advantage to any particular candidate. Sure, the MPP may be more organized to nominate a candidate relatively quickly and activate the party machinery faster than the opposition can. But at the same time, I would imagine that a March poll would depress participation and perhaps especially so in the countryside which is more likely to vote for an MPP candidate over all. I thus do not see a clear benefit to the MPP from a winter vote, nor to the other parties.
In short, a bit of a mess.
Personal Request
Having been in country for all elections save the COVID elections since 2008, I was certainly planning to be in Mongolia for the 2027 presidential election. My unversity is on break from Mar 22 to Apr 3, so if there has to be a winter presidential election, Mar 29 or so would work well for me.😉
