By Julian Dierkes
Once again, geopolitical realities are catching up with Mongolia and there is very little the government of Mongolia can do about it, even if it wanted to.
Russian autocrat Vladimir Putin will be visiting Ulaanbaatar to commemorate the 85th anniversary of the battle of Khalkin Gol (Nomonhan). He will do so in defiance of an ICC arrest warrant. Mongolia ratified the Rome Statute in 2002. The first Mongolian judge to the ICC was appointed earlier this year. Apparently, the ICC has re-asserted Mongolia’s obligation to follow through on arrest to the BBC.
Yet, an arrest seems inconceivable from a Mongolian perspective.
Caveats
I have only a newspaper-reader-based understanding of Russian foreign policy, Russian politics generally, or the ICC. I am merely trying to offer some context and analyses that focuses on the Mongolian perspective here.
Khalkin Gol
Clearly, the battle of Khalkin Gol is a touchstone of Mongolian-Soviet/Russian relations. Soviet and Mongolian forces collaborated in the summer of 1939 to repel Japanese advances from Manchuria toward the northwest and thus the Soviet Union and Mongolia. The battle was significant for effectively ending any north/westward expansion of Japanese imperialism, but also as a testing ground for (later Marshal) Georgy Zukhov and his tank tactics for the Red Army.
Mongolian troops were involved with artillery and cavalry. Subsequently, Mongolian troops were only involved in World War II as volunteers.
Throughout the postwar era, the battle was commemorated on Sept 3 as a highpoint of Mongolian-Soviet collaboration and friendship. Given the close and emotional bonds with the Soviet Union and Russia felt by many Mongolians, this has been an important date.
Commemoration of Khalkin Gol Anniversary by Leaders’ Visits
Despite the importance of Khalkin Gol for Mongolia-Russia relations, the commemoration of its anniversary (beyond the routine exchange of congratulatory letters) is relatively recent and limited to Pres. Putin. The two visits that Leonid Breshnev paid to Mongolia, for example, came in January 1966 and on the 50th anniversary of the 3rd party congress of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party in November 1974, not for a Khalkin Gol anniversary.
However, Putin has visited Mongolia for the lasts three five-year anniversaries, 2009, 2014, 2019. Once-in-five-years visits seem to be about the extent of Putin’s attention to Mongolia. When it comes, it involves quasi-imperial grandstanding, but this attention is at best sporadic.
Geopolitical Circumstances
As is obvious to even the most casual observer, Mongolia is very much stuck between a rock and a geopolitical hard place given its overbearing two neighbours. Broadly speaking, the Mongolian foreign policy of striving for constructive relations with those two neighbours, but also building and deepening relations with “third neighbours” (primarily OECD countries), has been successful. There are occasional flare-ups in relations with the two neighbours, but no longer-term deterioration of relations. On the global stage, Mongolia grapples far above its weight class. Over the past ten years or so, this foreign policy has focused even more on the UN and international initiatives, but has also added some attention to regional, intra-Asian free trade.
That relatively stable situation has changed with the threat of a bipolar (U.S.-China) world, and with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Now, the gravest geopolotical threat to Mongolia is probably a sitation where the Chinese regime feels compelled to force Mongolia into an “us or them” choice. Mongolia’s utter economic dependence on China gives the country little leverage or even degrees of freedom.
The invasion of Ukraine has changed the situation in that it has pushed the Russian regime toward China, relying on the Chinese regime as a bulwark against international sanctions. To Mongolia, a diminished Russia that is somewhat subservient to China is probably more threatening that a sporadically-interested imperialist Russia because this situation implies a possible agreement of the two neighbours. The only concrete such agreement that has emerged is the plan for a Siberia-China gas pipeline that would run through Mongolia. To many, this seems like more of a pipedream (largely for Russisan sellers of gas) than a concrete project, but it will certainly be trucked out again in the coming days as evidence of trilateral cooperation.
Mongolian Options
Given the geopolitical context does the Mongolian government have any agency?
Clearly (to me), there is no chance of exercising that agency by arresting Putin. That would be almost suicidal with virtually no upside and no one to come “rescue” Mongolia. To expect such a move is almost willfully naive toward Mongolia’s reality.
Presumably, the initiative toward this visit has come from Putin, even though it is formally at the invitation of the government of Mongolia and Pres. Khurelsukh more specifically. The calculation of what this visit means in geopolitical terms must also be almost an entirely Russian one. Keeping the caveat of my relative ignorance of the Russian political context in mind, I doubt that bilateral relations between Russia and Mongolia or between Putin and Khurelsukh have entered much into these calculations. Putin wants to assert his power and defiance against the ICC and “the West” more generally, the Khalkin Gol anniversary provides the occasion, and Mongolia is a a bit of a victim to this calculation.
Regardless of how conversations about a possible visit might actually have unfolded, could the government of Mongolia have at some point said, “no, we’re not inviting you”. I doubt it. This is where this situation contrasts with last year’s BRICs summit in South Africa, where I can imagine that the South African government might have prevailed on Putin’s representatives that not-coming was the best option.
Protests
I do hope that there will be some protests during Putin’s visit, ideally on Sukhbaatar Sq or in front of the embassy. Some such protests have been going on since the invasion of Ukraine.
I will also watch how some of the opposition members of cabinet will behave as both the DP and KhUN have been critical of Russia and the government’s silence on the invasion of Ukraine in the past.
However, I also suspect that the Russian side will lean heavily on the Mongolian government to hide protests as much as possible. I don’t think Putin has any interest in showing that he allows dissent or criticism and his main purpose during the visit will be to gloat. I do not imagine that he will want that gloating spoiled by ugly posters.
On the other hand, the MPP government has faced some criticism for its sometimes heavy-handed response to protesters, particular from opposition parties who are now represented in cabinet. Could this be the equivalent of the UN abstention (see below), i.e. no overt resistance to the visit, but let protesters be the proxy to assuage international perceptions of a submission to Putin’s agenda?
I wonder if Khurelsukh will plant a tree with Putin? Ceremonial tree planting has become an element of state visits, in part to bolster Khurelsukh’s international credentials via his Billion Tree Campaign.
Some people jokingly refer to this campaign as a subotnik, i.e. state-required labour often of a ceremonial or perfunctory nature or purpose. Would getting a former-KGB-agent-turned-head-of-state to plant a tree be the ultimate diplomatic post-Soviet subotnik? Or, will Putin not plant a tree as a sign of subtle Mongolian defiance?
What Power does Russia Hold?
There are possible reactions that the Russian government might embrace immediately and there are more drastic possibilities that are likely only implied. I am not considering reactions to an actual arrest here, but rather reactions had the Mongolian government at some point indicated with any conviction that they would prefer for Putin not to come visit.
The obvious reaction would be that the diesel supply would be interrupted. Sure, supply chain issues might be blamed, but in terms of the import of fuels, Mongolia is entirely at Russia’s mercy, at least until the long-awaited Sainshand refinery is completed. The more existential threat that is likely only implied is some kind of military reaction or even invasion.
There have only been a few instances in the past where Mongolia has pushed back forcefully on a Russian powerplay, at least with some kind of public version of that dispute playing itself out. I have previously reviewed this 2008 defiance and concluded that that was possible at a specific time in specific circumstances.
Less public and less obvious resistance by the Mongolian government might be a bit difficult to discern. For example, I have come to see abstentions on UN votes aimed at Russia as defiance. Yes, Mongolia is not voting against Russia, but also not for Russia which is probably as far as this defiance can go. I have previously argued this in Foreign Policy.
Reactions
There will be some dismay at Mongolia’s unwillingness to carry out the warrant in the media and also among some officials, but largely based on ignorance of the Mongolian context or insistence on very dogmatic liberal internationalism. I have tried to offer some of the context to the current situation above to make the point that Mongolia’s calculation may be very different where its value commitments strongly point at the ICC while a realist assessment of its situation will demand that the visit goes smoothly.
I would be surprised if this dismay is strong enough to end the ongoing flurry of visits by European and Asian officials from the pope to the Slovenian president. That flurry is part of a strategy to counter authoritarianism prompted by Russia that has led to the “rediscovery” of Mongolia as a democratic outpost. That imperative of a value-driven foreign policy will remain strong despite next week’s actions and some statements that might come as a result.
The ICC will likely make statements on how it will be disappointed by the lack of enforcement of its warrant. As far as I can tell (not very far) the Rome Statue does not seem to have any obvious responses built in against signatories who do not enforce a warrant. Maybe this endangers the future appointment of Mongolian judges or will lead to discussions/censure at future ICC signatory meetings?
Some autocrats and Putinophiles particularly among the populist right in Europe will be somewhat emboldened, though they are generally quite ignorant about the world and will understand little of the Mongolian context.
Limits of Internationalist Foreign Policy
The current discussions do highlight one challenge for Mongolian foreign policy. One version of that foreign policy is “we’re friends with everyone”. That argument is strong when Mongolia claims to have some modicum of sway over North Korea where other nations have none. But it also means that a dictator like A Lukashenko is not only allowed to come visit Ulaanbaatar, but his visit this June was loudly celebrated by government social media. I much preferred Laotian and Bhutanese visits this summer.
Likewise, when Mongolia joins an international convention like the Rome Statue, there is some expectation from other signatories that this is not an act of joining for joining’s sake or to be friends with everyone and a joiner, but also out some understanding of and dedication to the substance of that convention.
