Polling in UB One Week Before Election

Sant Maral has released a poll ahead of the presidential election that gives a glimpse of some of the tendencies in public opinion.

As of June 19, no more polling is allowed, so one week ahead of the election, this will be the only indication of possible outcomes we’ll have.

Methods

As I have done previously, I would caution that methodological challenges in administering these kinds of surveys in Mongolia (for example, the absence of some kind of baseline general social survey that would allow for a comparison of the survey respondents with the general population) makes this kind of poll suggestive of some tendencies, but no more.

From what I can tell from the report published by Sant Maral, this poll was limited to Ulaanbaatar further casting doubt on its utility as anything akin to a prediction of the election result.

But, a week before the election, this is the best information we have and much credit goes to L Sumati for conducting these kinds of polls.

At least, a sample of nearly 1,500 respondents in Ulaanbaatar sounds promising, though the report offers no information on the sampling methodology.

Candidate Choice

The most important information comes right at the outset, i.e. respondents intention to vote for one of the three candidates.

Percentages come out as 54% for Elbegdorj, 37% Bat-Erdene and 9% Udval.

Given DP strength in Ulaanbaatar, we’d expect him to do well with city voters, so this result suggests a victory by Elebgdorj, but perhaps a very closely won victory where a run-off is still a distinct possibility.

How Firm is Voters’ Commitment?

The poll suggests that commitment to Elbegdorj is higher than to Bat-Erdene or Udval  which might mean that we could still see some movements between those two, and possibly to Elbegdorj as well, in the final days of the campaign, though only 57% are “very confident” in the choice they made for the poll.

Run-Off, Participation, Issues and Voting Blocks

If we assumed something like 30% of voters to be living in Ulaanbaatar (it may be higher in population terms [check census], but many of those might not be registered in Ulaanbaatar and turnout will be greater in the countryside as well), Elbegdorj would have to do very well (close to 50%) in the countryside to win an outright majority of votes in the first round. To me, this poll doesn’t seem to settle my debate with Mendee regarding a run-off in previous posts (Me I, Mendee, Me II), other than to suggest that my original expectation for Udval to be garnering around 8% of the vote may hold roughly.

The 70% who stated that they would be voting on June 26 would be wonderful news in that this would be an increase over 2012, certainly in terms of participation in the city. If this holds true, it may also avoid the re-polling that will be necessary in polling stations where fewer than 50% of voters cast their ballots next week. Over ¾ of the respondents see the election as being fair or only facing minor problems. That is obviously good news in terms of voters’ confidence in the process and in democracy

If we look at issues that voters are focused on, it’s noticeable that the top two issues (standard of living and unemployment) are not particular subject to presidential powers or policy. The third issue, corruption, is one that Elbegdorj is certainly campaigning on.

As far as election platforms of the candidates go, over half of the respondents report no opinion on Udval’s platform suggesting that her communication or campaign has not been very effective on substance. The corresponding numbers for Bat-Erdene and Elebgdorj are around 1/3.

Surprisingly (to me) support for Udval is not heavily concentrated in older age groups, at least in Ulaanbaatar, while Bat-Erdene definitely receives more support among older voters.

As the first female candidate for president, Udval does seem to be drawing some women to vote for her, though primarily from Bat-Erdene who has a 5.4% differential between male and female voters, while Elbegdorj is supported more strongly by women than men, though only slightly. This suggests that Udval’s gender will have some impact, but may not really be producing the emergence of a women’s voting bloc of any kind.

Support for Elbegdorj increases with level of education while the reverse is true for Bat-Erdene. Voters who have received some higher education are clearly more supportive of Elbegdorj and the drop-off among Udval voters is high. Perhaps not surprisingly given her association with Enkhbayar and the MPRP, Udval’s support is strongest among the least economically well-off voters.

 

Posted in Democracy, Democratic Party, Elections, JD Democratization, Mongolian People's Party, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Party Politics, Politics, Presidential 2013, Public Opinion, Ulaanbaatar | Tagged | Leave a comment

Elbegdorj Platform

[This post was researched and co-written by Brian White at The Mongolist blog.]

Previous posts have offered an overview over the three candidates’ platforms, as well as of their foreign policy goals.

Ten days before the election, President Ts Elbegdorj is considered the clear favourite. In the absence of further polls, this appears primarily based on the conventional wisdom that incumbents enjoy an advantage over challengers. In the case of the Mongolian presidency, it is difficult to say whether there is truly an “incumbency effect” given how few races there have been in the democratic era.

Previous Incumbents

N Bagabandi is the only incumbent to win two elected terms, but there have only been five elections since 1993. P Ochirbat served two terms, but one was an appointed term after the dissolution of the socialist government and the other through popular election under the current constitution. He lost his bid for a second elected term (third term overall) to Bagabandi. N Enkhbayar won his election in 2005 running against non-incumbents. Elbegdorj then played the spoiler defeating President Enkhbayar in 2009.

Whether there is any truth to the wisdom regarding incumbents in Mongolia, it does makes intuitive sense in the absence of other data. Elbegdorj already holds the office and has a proven track record, so voters know what they’re getting. He just has to show he has earned another term. His challengers, on the other hand, have to not only prove that they deserve a chance at the position but also that they have the experience and skills to do better than him.

 Five Broad Areas of Policy-Making

Elbegdorj’s platform is divided into five board policy areas: 1. rule of law, 2. local participation in solutions, 3. support for producers, 4. environmentally friendly development, and 5. internationally respect for Mongolia. Unlike his challengers’ platforms which take a more negative approach to framing issues, the president’s tone is positive and assertive focusing on areas of past success and future opportunities for improvement. Of course, as incumbent he is afforded the luxury of pointing to past successes to promote his qualifications, but he also must put a positive spin on his record in order to effectively argue that he deserves another term.

Rule of Law

“Rule of law” is an area the president has promoted in the past, and it is one area where he has constitutional authority to directly implement change. He gives it extensive treatment in his platform with 12 policy points under this section focusing on judicial reforms and fighting corruption. The president seems to envision establishing a legal culture and environment in the country that will elevate Mongolia to international democratic standards. The other candidates also discuss some of the same policy issues in this area such as promoting an independent judiciary or tackling corruption, but they are not bundled together as tightly as in the president’s platform.

Local Participation

The “local participation in governance” section includes proposals to devolve budget management further to local jurisdictions and to provide special administrative status to large towns and provincial capitals. Udval also touches on this area, but she only promotes the direct election of provincial and city governors.

Support for Producers

Under the “support for producers” section, he not only promotes government getting out of the way of “producers” but also specific policy reforms that will encourage small and medium-sized business growth. For example, he suggests strictly limiting state budget expenditures to domestic suppliers of goods or services whenever and wherever possible. Bat-Erdene also describes policies to support domestic production, but he focuses more on rural industries. Elbegdorj also includes policy ideas about managing the country’s mineral resources, but he does not mention Oyu Tolgoi, Tavan Tolgoi, or other strategic deposits by name, something that both his challengers do. The over all emphasis in this section is on creating a fair and competitive environment for investment and business in all industries.

 Environmentally Friendly Development

The “environmentally friendly development” section includes standard ideas about protecting the countries natural resources. There are also some unique policy suggestions around refining laws to protect the environment from extremely hazardous activities such as handling chemicals or toxic waste. Moreover, he goes out of his way to state flatly that Mongolia shall not become a dump for nuclear or other waste.

International Respect

The last area of the president’s platform, like the the rule of law section, is a place the president has a direct ability to actively influence policy. This section includes 14 policy points with several points focusing on Mongolia as a diplomatically active member of the international community. The president seems keen to promote his international prestige and his success as head of state. However, his policies in general are not significantly different from his challengers in several areas. Just like his challengers he supports a continuation of the country’s foreign policy stance vis-a-vis Russia, China, and “third neighbours,” programs aimed at reducing alcoholism, and engaging Mongolian ex-pats in other countries to encourage them to contribute to the country’s development.

Portrayal

Elbegdorj Campaign CrestThe look of Elbegdorj’s campaign website harkens back to his 2009 campaign which in itself was clearly inspired by the 2008 campaign by President Obama in the U.S. The most obvious marker here is the image of Elbegdorj himself here which is done in a style resembling that of the now iconic poster of President Obama.

Other than some cartoons that are interspersed into the listing of campaign foci, the webpage is quite text-heavy and very calm in its presentation, i.e. there are no moving parts or a twitter feed for example.

Conclusions

Elbegdorj’s campaign is clearly the campaign of an incumbent. Relying on his record as president that is not marred by any particular scandals, crises or major mistakes, Elbegdorj highlights areas in his election platform where he can point to his record, but also legitimately claim to have a further program. With these focus areas, he sticks closer to the areas where the president actually has some influence and power (judiciary, foreign policy) or where he has had concrete achievements (the establishment of citizens’ halls for local participation).

Posted in Democracy, Democratic Party, Elections, Foreign Policy, Governance, International Relations, Policy, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | Leave a comment

Tweet-Up in Ulaanbaatar

I am inviting my Mongolian Twitter followers (and others interested) to meet in person on Friday, June 21st at 16:30h, at the American Center for Mongolian Studies in Ulaanbaatar (Rm 306, Center 34 Building, near Zanabazar Museum, location).

Topics I will be happy to discuss (auch auf Deutsch, 日本語でもいい):

  • this blog: areas we should write more about, analyses that we’ve got wrong, etc.
  • the election, of course
  • study in Canada, at the Univ of British Columbia, and in Asia Pacific Policy Studies
Posted in American Center for Mongolian Studies, Canada, International Relations, Politics, Presidential 2013, Research on Mongolia, Social Media, Ulaanbaatar | Tagged | 1 Comment

Odd Numbers of Arrows: The Abe-Udval Connection

When I looked at Udval’s campaign website for the first time, the photo of her holding a bundle of arrows jumped out at me immediately. Yes, she’s wearing a beautiful light-blue deel, but it’s the arrows that caught my attention.

These are the strange connections that occur to someone who focuses his research attention on Japan and Mongolia.

The Three Arrows of Mori Motonari

The economic reforms initiated by Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo have been described by him and others as “Abenomics”. They consist of three specific reforms: 1. monetary policy, 2. fiscal policy, and private investment. Combined these three are meant to re-invigorate the Japanese economy by overcoming deflation and the general malaise associated with post-bubble Japan. Quartz offers a further explanation.

The image of the three arrows is significant and goes back to 16th century daimyo Mōri Motonari (毛利 元就) who is said to have encouraged his three sons to be united in strength by letting them compare the strength of one arrow (easily snapped) compared to three arrows bundled together. Fighting economic malaise is thus a task that requires a unified, multi-pronged strategy according to PM Abe.

The Five Arrows of Alun Gua

This legend is what I thought of when I saw the photo of Udval, but I was initially unsure what the Mongolian reference was (if any). Fortunately, crowdsourcing the Twitterverse came to my rescue when one of my followers, Maizorig, pointed me to a passage of the Secret History of the Mongols where the mythical matriarch Алун гуа (Alun Gua) offers the same fable as Lord Motonari to her five sons, namely that a single arrow is weak, but that a bundle of arrows is very strong. Tjalling Halbertsma of Groningen University had made the same connection to the legend of the matriarch.

It’s not clear to me whether Udval might have also chosen focus on the “five dangers” to Mongolia that she sees to reference this fable, but at least the photo on her website might evoke this.

The fable obviously is very attractive as a metaphor and I don’t know if anyone has looked at this parallel between Japan and Mongolia. I also have little knowledge of the special significance the numbers three and five may hold, other than being odd numbers.

While there are many ties between Japan and Mongolia (common linguistic roots, Sumo, development aid, exchange students, Mongolia as go-between for Japan and North Korea, etc.), I don’t think there are any particular affinities between Udval and Abe, nor would the five-arrows photo seem to be a direct reference to Abenomics.

Posted in Japan, Literature, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | Leave a comment

2013 Presidential Candidates: Foreign Policy Proposals

With the election right around the corner, we thought it would be helpful to offer a brief comparison of the foreign policy proposals from the three candidates. Since setting foreign policy measures is one of the primary roles of the president as head of state, it is not only a pertinent topic, but one which the candidates can directly effect, should they choose.

(All information from official Mongolian-language action plans as found on official websites or Mongolian news sites, if I incorrectly translated anything, please do let me know).

For other posts on the respective platforms see

Ts. Elbegdorj – Democratic Party

Incumbent President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj’s action plan saves his foreign policy plans for the last of its 5 sections. The proposal is primarily concerned with Mongolia’s international image, probably in response to some notable scandals lately, including the money laundering issue, and perhaps even the one-sided reporting on Enkhbayar’s arrest last year.

The header to section 5 says that special attention will be paid to Mongolia’s international reputation, as well as the development of policies that strengthen the country’s security, independence, and autonomy. The predictable statements of developing multilateral and bilateral relations (5.1), and cooperating with neighbors and other countries (5.2) are referenced. Attention will be paid to Mongolia’s participation in the regional economy, infrastructure, and security apparatuses (5.3). Specific reference is made to Asia, the Pacific, and Europe (5.5), perhaps setting the parameters of Mongolia’s main geographic focus. He states that Mongolia is committed to strengthening human rights, rule of law, and transparency throughout the Asian continent, with specific attention to Northeast Asia (5.6), which further supports Mongolia’s identity as a Northeast Asian country, as opposed to Central Asian. Foreign and Domestic policy cross paths with reference to Mongolia’s cooperation with internationally backed health initiatives including those against alcoholism (5.8). Section 5.9 and 5.10 support the development of Mongolian studies internationally, although I am bit confused as to how exactly this would be done, and would suggest that it is in large part a concession to more nationalist-leaning voters. Section 5.12 is related, with a proposal to increase Mongolian participation in the in global arts and culture, as well as sports.

 

B. Bat-Erdene– Mongolian People’s Party

Candidate for the MPP, B. Bat-Erdene, makes significantly less focus on foreign policy issues. While foreign policy will undoubtedly be central to Mongolia’s economic, environmental, and physical security, the section of the action plan devoted specifically to foreign policy is significantly shorter than Elbegdorj’s proposal. He titles the section “It is the president’s responsibility to (to ensure) balanced and friendly foreign relations”.

The obligatory statement that government policy will continue Mongolia’s valued peaceful relations is first on the agenda (7.1). Mongolia’s dignity in the international community will be strengthened (7.2). He seems to place additional emphasis on relations with Mongolia’s neighbors by devoting a separate subsection to the issue (7.3), but he is still devoted to furthering Mongolia’s “third neighbor policy” (7.4). He calls for an integrated government foreign policy (7.5), which I find really odd, since Mongolia’s foreign policy has always seemed centralized and united. Like Elbegdorj, he also makes reference to supporting Mongolians abroad, which is likely in reaction to recent incidents against Mongolian citizens in China, but aimed at increasing voter participation in the Mongolian ex-pat community.

 

N. Udval– Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party

N. Udval, candidate for the MPRP, presents an action plan that differs significantly from the rest of the competition. As we saw in the 2012 Parliamentary elections, the MPRP is a largely reactionary party, and seeks broad reforms throughout the country coupled with a decidedly non-subtle appeal for resource nationalization. Foreign policy is covered in number 4 of her 5 action pillars. The MPRP showed an interesting play on numbers in 2012 by using the phrase шударга ёс (justice) coalition, while also presenting 9 candidates (ёс also being the Mongolian word for nine and numerologically significant as 3×3). This year, the party presents 5 policy pillars each with 5 subsections (organization a social scientist is happy to see, I dare say!). Oddly enough the section is not even labeled foreign policy/relations, but rather “Ways of protecting and strengthening national independence and the economy”.

She gets off to a classic enough start calling the enrichment of friendly relations with Russia and China as well as the expansion of the third neighbor policy (4.1). After that, however, the proposals become more specific and interesting than the broad proposals of the other two candidates. The next proposal (4.2) makes specific reference to the importance of access to international markets for landlocked countries, and that she will strive to enhance international cooperation on this front. Subsection 4.3 declares that foreign investment must be helpful and fair to the country, as well as stating that domestic investors should have the upper hand. This is pretty striking and rather odd, considering the still limited avenues available for domestic investors. Subsection 4.4 proposes the implementation of Mongolian majority ownership for strategic mineral resources, such as Oyu Tolgoi and Tavan Tolgoi. 4.5 calls for refurbishing rail and road links from Mongolia to Europe and Asia. This is certainly an important consideration and goes hand in hand with 4.2; however, I am unsure what effect this might have on rail links from OT into China/Russia, considering differing rail gauges and Russian joint-ownership of the Mongolian railway system.

 

Conclusions

Looking at these summaries and combining information from other posts on this blog, three important points come up.

1)    Mongolia has limited policy options. None of these proposals are particularly revolutionary when it comes to the basic tenants of Mongolian foreign policy. All three support continued good relations with Russia and China, balanced by support to the «third neighbor policy». No serious political party can possibly seek to upset relations with Russia or China as the country’s top economic partners, but no one wants to see a Mongolia economically or politically dominated by either or both neighors, necessiting the continued engagement of outside powers, regional and global.

2)    Most of the proposals are made to appeal to voters, not policy makers. By this I mean that for the most part the limited changes proposed seem to be aimed more at attracting voters with vague statements that change is necessary rather than meaningful policy measures. B. Bat-Erdene’s proposal calls for more consistency in policy measures, but I have yet to see any evidence of disjointed policy making from Ulaanbaatar. Rather this seems aimed at dicrediting Elbegdorj’s policies. N. Udval does make reference to some radical proposals (such as the nationalization of stategic resources and the role of domestic investors) that would change the Mongolian landscape significantly, but I can’t see anyway that as president she or her party could effectively implement such measures. The MPRP is in coalition with the DP for the time being, so nationalization is off the table, although some re-negotiation might be a possibility. The role of domestic investment is still limited in a country where the per capita GDP is just over $5,000. Rather, she seems keen to capitalize on the MPRP voter base, which has included a more nationalist-leaning segment of the population since its creation last year.

3)    Third parties make Mongolian politics more interesting. The status-quo DP and MPP are making far more moderate proposals than the MPRP, and while international investors might be worried about her proposals, it certainly does add a strong new voice to the political arena. Her approach is decidedly different, and the move for infrastructal integration and policies to mitigate the country’s landlocked status are laudable (although her role in these policies as president is limited). The MPRP got slightly over 20% of the vote last year, which is significant as a third party. I would certainly like to see some counter proposals by other thrid parties, such as the Social Democrats or the Civil Will, Green Party. While they might not want to waste resources on a campaign they cannot hope to win, new voices and action plans can certianly contribute to Mongolia’s political development.

Posted in Elections, Foreign Investment, Foreign Policy, International Relations, Nationalism, Politics, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | 5 Comments

Bat-Erdene Election Platform

[This post was researched and co-written by Brian White at The Mongolist blog.]

Bat-Erdene’s platform begins similarly to Udval’s by describing challenges facing the country. He does not go as far as Udval in labeling them as “dangers,” but the same message is being conveyed about the social and economic conditions in the country. He describes a divided government not meeting the needs of the people, a deteriorating natural environment, stagnant wages and high prices, disappointment in Oyu Tolgoi not living up to its promise, an unfair legal environment, and the lack of broad-based government policy.

Eight Responsibilities

The platform is divided into eight sections categorized by “responsibilities” the president has to the country. These are: 1. promote national unity, 2. lead a fair society, 3. promote correct economic policies, 4. implement policies that protect the environment and shore up the national wealth equally and fairly, 5. make the law and courts equally and fairly serve the people, 6. stabilize government employees’ working conditions to provide the people equal and fair services, 7. maintain balanced and friendly foreign relations, and 8. adhere to democracy and elevate the national character.

Within each section he outlines specific policy positions. There is significant overlap in policies with the other two candidates, but there are areas in which the platform is distinct. Under section three, for example, Bat-Erdene emphasizes support for agriculture and animal husbandry. Elbegdorj also outlines policies to support domestic industries but in much broader terms. Udval is more concerned with the social safety net and work conditions.

Mining Policy

Section four includes a promise to more aggressively manage environmental and mining policies. He supports reexamining all mining licenses and debating which projects benefit the country’s development (and presumably eliminating those that don’t) and establishing tough government control over those projects. Oyu Tolgoi is mentioned directly under its own policy position in this section with a call to improve the investment agreement to make it more profitable and balanced. Tavan Tolgoi is conspicuously absent in the any of the policies areas. Udval does include Tavan Tolgoi along with Oyu Tolgoi in areas concerning large strategic deposits, and Elbegdorj does not mention any of the large projects by name, only referring to the mining industry in general terms.

His choice of words is interesting with some policies in section two. Instead of saying “I support policy X,” he says “I support examining policy X.” Examples are reducing the cost of public transportation for the poor in Ulaanbaatar, reducing the costs of higher education, and creating services to support ex-military personnel. The way these issues are presented gives the impression of wanting to strike a populist chord without actually committing to any of them. Given the president’s limited ability to  implement specific policies one could argue that most positions taken in the platforms are empty promises, so equivocal statements with a positive tone stand out against the other unequivocal positions the president has little real power to implement.

Social Media and Images

Both, Bat-Erdene’s homepage as well as his election platform page display logos for Facebook and YouTube very prominently. They also include a Twitter feed. Interestingly, this feed displays messages from Bat-Erdene (fairly sparse), as well as messages that are tweeted at him or mention him. When I tweeted about this post, for example, my tweet showed up immediately on Bat-Erdene’s feed. Such an unfiltered stream means that – surprisingly – criticism as well as praise and random mentions show up on the campaign webpage.

Most of the images on the website show Bat-Erdene among large crowds of people, though they don’t particularly seem to play up his wrestling past or any claims to traditional values.

See also Bat-Erdene’s foreign policy platform.

Posted in Elections, Environment, Inequality, Judiciary, Mining, Mongolian People's Party, Oyu Tolgoi, Party Politics, Policy, Presidential 2013, Social Media | Tagged | 1 Comment

Foreign Policy Roundup #2: May 26-June 8, 2013

Here is the 2nd installment of our new bi-weekly series, the Foreign Policy Roundups. In every roundup, I offer a very brief 1-2 sentence  summary of foreign policy news, with a link to the original article. Most of the articles are from Mongolian-language sources. As a non-native Mongolian speaker, I welcome comments on any mistakes, especially if I incorrectly translated ministry names or other governmental institutions. I am still tinkering with the formatting, but trust that the new layout is a big step forward.

 

Mining

The Mongolian Ministry of Mining signed a memorandum with the French Geological Service on scientific and technological cooperation.

Minister of Mines, D. Gankhuyag made an official visit to Australia. During this trip, he discussed scholarship agreements for Mongolian students to study in Australia.

As Mongolia marked UN World Environment day, President Elbegdorj stressed Mongolia’s potential as a source of wind power, not just mineral resources.

CSIS ran an article on China’s impact on Mongolia’s resource policies.

 

Incidents

Over the past several weeks, the E.U. has been investigating 5 counts of money laundering in Mongolia. One incident involved 5 transfers of 201,000 euro each to B. Davaadorj, Mongolia’s ambassador to Germany.

 

Diplomacy

Mongolia decided to open new consulates in Jakarta, Pusan, and Hailar; plus, embassies in Brasilia, Kabul, Istanbul, and Bishkek.

Robert Reid, Country Director of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, was awarded the Mongolian presidential medal of friendship.

Presidential Advisor, R. Bold, received Baatar Ochirov, the Deputy of the Citizen’s Council of the Republic of Kalmykia. They exchanged opinions on topics ranging from education and economic development to Oirat history.

Minister of Foreign Affairs, L. Bold, met with Adriana Poveda, at the Mongolian Consulate in Madrid.

North Korea and Mongolia marked 65 years of diplomatic relations. 

Minister of Health, J. Amarsanaa, attended the WHO’s 66th annual meeting in Geneva.

May 27-29, Vice Minister of Foreign Relations D. Gankhuyag attended the Proliferation Security Initiative meeting in Warsaw, Poland. During the meeting, D. Gankhuyag met separately with the Polish and Belarusian representatives, to discuss bilateral diplomatic and economic relations.

Mongolia’s Ambassador to the European Union, Kh. Davaadorj, presented his credentials to the President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso.

The “Ulaanbaatar Declaration” announced at the 2013 Community of Democracies meeting has been adopted by the UN.

 

Security

Minister of Defence, D. Bat-Erdene represented Mongolia in Singapore at the Shangri-La Dialogue.

Posted in 2013, Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy Roundup | Tagged | Leave a comment

Presidential Election as Test of DP Dominance

The upcoming presidential election will be the first occasion for the DP’s claims to stand for clean government to be tested in an election campaign since the party’s predecessor dominated the 1996-2000 parliament.

This will be the first election that the four highest (constitutionally and de facto) offices in Mongolia are held by the DP: president, prime minister, chairman of parliament, mayor of Ulaanbaatar.

With these offices comes the power of appointments and executive direction for various state institutions.

Historical Precedents

As Mendee wrote in his argument doubting that a run-off is likely, current DP dominance is the third example of a such dominance by a party in democratic Mongolia after 1996 and 2000.  For each case, the winning party went beyond the political transition of the government as prescribed under the 1992 Constitution and other relevant legislation.

Parties politicized government services by appointing party-affilliated officials beyond political posts in each ministry and agency, took over state-owned enterprises such as the airline, railway, mining companies, and increased their influence over the judiciary.  This competition over the state bureaucracy, provincial and county offices, and state-owned enterprises were slowed down in 2004 and 2008 because of the relatively balanced election results (no single party became majority).

The DP as Underdog

Throughout its existence (and the history of its predecessors), the DP has portrayed itself as an antithesis to the MPRP/MPP’s entanglements with the state bureaucracy. These claims (election shenanigans, use of the bureaucracy for political purposes, etc.) have always had some credibility, simply because of the strength of the MPP, especially in the countryside and of the large number of MPP appointments within the state apparatus.

The DP has thus frequently portrayed itself as an underdog of sorts, fighting against entrenched MPP sympathies within the bureaucracy. Well, it is no longer an underdog, so let’s see how it behaves when it is in charge.

Of particular relevance in the upcoming presidential election will be the General Election Commission and the security apparatus.

In the 2012 parliamentary election commission the GEC played a prominent role, not only for its controversial blocking of the candidacy of now-convicted Enkhbayar, but also because it enforced some stricter innovations in the election law with some vigour and managed the election fairly effectively. Important areas of activity were the feasibility check on parties’ platforms, the approval of candidates, improvements to voter registration, the deployment of electronic vote counting machines, as well as the post-election procedures for re-counts and the certification of election victories. Some of these areas are less critical in a presidential campaign with only three candidates running and the greater simplicity of candidate approval, monitoring and the actual counting of votes in this set-up.

At the same time, there may be greater expectations of the GEC in terms of is supervision of the media which has come to be seen as increasingly politicized through the purchase or control of media outlets by parties and even individual politicians. Any attempts by the MPRP to bargain with the DP or MPP over the candidacy of N Udval may also attract the scrutiny of the GEC.

The Make-Up of the GEC

5 out of 9 members of the GEC are appointed by the Parliament, 2 by the President, and 2 by the Supreme Court.  Only Chairman and Secretary of the GEC are permanent positions.  Although the Law of GEC requires these posts to be filled by civil servants, political parties – especially when they are majority in parliament or hold the presidency – appoint their high-profile party members of the GEC.

The GEC includes two of such politicians at the moment: Ch Sodnomtseren, a former MP from the DP (2004-2008) and member of the DP-led cabinet (1999-2000), and B Bilegt, Chief of the Police Department (Mr. Bilegt was appointed when he was working as Chief of the National Security Council Office, which works for the President). The remaining members are public servants, without notable party affiliation.

The Security Apparatus

The Police Department and the General Intelligence Agency are two critical parts of the security apparatus for the election.  Besides their main tasks, the Police Department maintains safety whereas the General Intelligence Agency ensures security of vote-counting systems and investigates election-related fraud and offenses under the crimes against the state institution statutes.

Logically, any political party and politicians have a strong desire to have influence over these institutions; therefore, both organizations need institutional safeguards from being used by the political parties and to maintain professional integrity.

However, the DP is overriding some of these institutional checks. For the first time, the DP-led government appointed an influential DP member as a head of the Police Department. Although it was an important effort to install civilian oversight over police organizations (just as the DP appointed the first civilian defence minister in 1996), the President awarded the brigadier general rank to this civilian, political party-affiliated chief of the Police.

This certainly undermine the principle of professional merit for police professionals while instigating a desire among police professionals to cultivate connections with political parties for promotion or simply to maintain their posts.

The DP-led government also appointed a party-affiliated official as the Chief of the General Intelligence Agency.  Even though the Prime Minister appeared to accept the decision of the Constitutional Court when appointing the current chief for the Deputy Chief’s post, he later re-appointed his protege as the Chief of the General Intelligence Agency.  The Prime Minister, first, neglected the relevant legislation to keep intelligence appointments out of the parliamentary elections, and second, downplayed the rulings of the Constitutional Court.

 A DP Take-Over?

Some might see the decisions on appointments to the GEC and to posts overseeing the security apparatus as the typical efforts of a party to assert control. This assertion of control by the DP would undoubtedly continue if Elbegdorj is re-elected to a second term. The question will be what use the DP will put this control to? Will it be for (personal) enrichment (or awards for party supporters)? Will it be for the manipulation of voters’ opportunities to express their views? Will it be as a lingering threat to political opposition? Or, will the DP give these institutions the independence and non-political character that would lend credibility to their claims of the mantle of clean governance.

Posted in Corruption, Democracy, Democratic Party, Elections, Governance, JD Democratization, Law, Party Politics, Politics, Presidential 2013, Security Apparatus | Tagged , | 2 Comments

Udval Election Platform

Speculation about some kind of Udval retreat notwithstanding, based on information contributed by and co-written with Brian White at The Mongolist, we discuss Udval’s election platform here.

Broad Goals

Similar to the other candidates, Minister of Health N Udval intends to fight corruption, reform the judiciary, reduce partisan influence and improve services in governance, protect the environment, make effective use of natural resources, reduce alcoholism, promote investment in schools and hospitals, and continue a foreign policy of good relations with Russia and China and an active courting of “third neighbours.”

Local participation in governments is one of the areas that is addressed by all candidates, including Udval who is calling for the direct election of provincial and city governors (who are currently elected by local parliaments). Udval also emphasizes improvements to the election law. She would like proportional representation introduced to Mongolia’s electoral system (presumably to replace the current mix of proportional and direct election ridings), and she intends to fight electoral fraud and corruption.

In terms of social issues, she emphasizes the need to improve health care, reduce domestic violence, and increase education opportunities in a less business oriented way than her opponents. She also supports a transition to hourly wages instead of the current standard of monthly salaries for most workers. She has a rather strident position on tightening the criminal code to put more people behind bars. On security issues she describes herself as a “security watchdog” who will put the country first.

“Five Dangers” and Twenty-Five Policies

Udval starts her platform by outlining “five dangers” she’ll address as president: 1. Economic dependence and insecurity from foreign influence and domestic corruption, 2. Degradation and exploitation of the working class 3. Divided government characterized by partisan graft and patronage, 4. Degradation of the environment and society, and 5. Lack of faith in a corrupted judiciary and press. The other two candidates have similar assessments of the economic and social challenges facing the country, but their approaches are different. Elbegdorj addresses them less directly in the body of his platform without a point-by-point list of challenges. Bat-Erdene outlines a list of challenges in the opening of his platform just like Udval but with a slightly softer tone and not nearly as extensively as her.

The rest of her platform is divided into five broad policy positions with five issues each, making a total of twenty-five policy points. The structure of the policy areas does not appear to exactly mirror the five dangers portion of the platform, and presumably it is left to voters to make the connections between specific policy prescriptions such as supporting an independent press or improving the conditions of the border protection force and any of the five dangers.

The five broad policy positions are:

  1. The basis of Mongolian political policy is the Mongolian people,
  2. Provide for citizens equally, offer welfare with a mother’s heart, and maintain the national security,
  3. Make the national security “watchdogs” work
  4. Protect and bind the state’s independence through economic means, and
  5. Improve the national justice system.

A Latecomer to Social Media

The imagery of the campaign website is difficult to classify. The first noticeable element of the website is the heavy emphasis on social media. Udval’s Twitter feed takes up the right quarter of the homepage (not the campaign platform page).

This is somewhat surprising as Udval has not been an active tweeter until the beginning of the campaign, having posted a mere 120 messages as of June 9 and gathered not even 450 followers. Even Bat-Erdene, who has also not been terribly active, has tweeted over 700 times and has over 9,000 followers, while Elbegdorj occasionally gets involved in Twitter discussions and has over 60,000 followers. Many of Udval’s tweets thus far also merely lead to photographs or videos rather than engaging potential voters on policy issues, making the prominence of the Twitter feed on the home page an odd choice.

While the front page shows Udval in a traditional deel, further photographs show her primarily at work in business suits.

See also Udval’s foreign policy platform.

Posted in China, Corruption, Elections, Foreign Investment, Governance, Judiciary, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Policy, Politics, Presidential 2013, Social Media | Tagged | 1 Comment

Is Udval in it for Real?

Here are some speculative musings from around the international ger stove…

When the MPRP was deciding on whether to run a candidate in the election some weeks ago, there was a fair bit of speculation that this decision was a calculated one to extract concessions from either the DP or MPP in return for not running a candidate. This is what happened with the MNDP which first announced that it would run a candidate but then endorsed Elbegdorj. One might imagine that the DP offered concessions in cabinet or parliament.

However, the MPRP was unable to strike a deal at the time and nominated N Udval.

Now, there is some talk that perhaps Udval might not really carry through with her candidacy.

How Udval Might Withdraw

It’s still unclear to me what that means as a formal withdrawal is expressly prohibited by the election law (27.8), but I imagine that there could be some announcement of, “Oh, we’ve changed our mind, now we’re endorsing Elebgdorj/Bat-Erdene” from the MPRP. Udval would still appear on the ballot and probably receive some votes, but would not continue to contest the election.

Why Udval Might Withdraw

Such a withdrawal clearly only makes sense if the MPRP is able to strike a bargain with either the DP or the MPP.

Bargaining with the MPP

As the MPP is in disarray and out of power, the MPP currently has relatively little to offer, unless the MPRP was bargaining under the assumption that an MPRP endorsement for Bat-Erdene would be very likely to produce a Bat-Erdene election victory. If this were to come about, the victory will have hinged on the MPRP endorsement and concessions might be substantial.

Clearly, some kind of pardon for Enkhbayar is in the mix of discussions here.

However, as the president does appoint officials to a number of functions, especially in foreign policy and the judiciary, a significant number of positions could be at stake as well. Presumably, securing the presidency would offer a lot of potential appointments for the MPRP.

The longer term potential offer could also be some kind of re-merger of the MPP/MPRP with an eye toward the 2016 parliamentary election, though probably not much sooner as such a re-merger would imply either a grand coalition in parliament joined by the MPP or an awkward continuation of the current coalition despite a party realignment.

What would be the downside to the MPRP? Only the cabinet complications if Bat-Erdene wins. If Elbegdorj still wins despite an MPRP endorsement for Bat-Erdene, the DP would obviously be very displeased with the MPRP. That might mean no pardon for Enkhbayar (which Elbegdorj may be contemplating in any case, independent of any negotiations with the MPRP), and marginalization in cabinet, though the DP can’t really kick the MPRP out of the coalition.

Bargaining with the DP

The DP could obviously offer an Enkhbayar pardon (if that is not already a done deal). Beyond that most likely concessions would have to do with presidential appointments (as in the above scenario with the MPP), and possibly some realignment in cabinet.

By initially running Udval as a candidate, the MPRP would also have laid the groundwork to emphasize its independence for the 2016 Ikh Khural election, though that seems far off and whether voters will still remember this act of seeming defiance is unclear.

Concessions from the DP would also very much depend on Elbegdorj’s perception of his campaign chances. If he feels pretty confident, why offer any concessions to the MPRP and why not take his chances with voters? In a run-off, his chances would probably still be good, even if the MPRP were to endorse Bat-Erdene in this run-off. So if Elbegdorj is happy with his chances, he would seem unlikely to offer concessions.

This is especially true as Elbegdorj may not have much to offer in terms of concessions in parliament. While the DP appears to be united behind Elbegdorj, that might not mean that he has a lot of power to persuade other parts of the party, especially the parliamentary factions, to offer concessions on his behalf.

This speculation is further complicated by the on-going whispers about a post-election replacement of Altankhuyag as PM either in a negotiated fashion or through a party revolt. Given the precarity of the current cabinet arrangement, why would another faction leader saddle himself with a strengthened MPRP in cabinet just to support the president?

Another scenario would be that anyone who is scheming to replace Altankhuyag may try to secure the support of the MPRP in this scheme. In such a scenario this schemer might well be happy to offer concessions in a package for an Udval withdrawal & support for a run on the prime minister.

If Elbegdorj is worried about his campaign, of course, then concessions to the MPRP become much more likely.

MPRP Miscalculation

There is also an interpretation of the rumours about an Udval withdrawal that looks at her nomination as a miscalculation on part of the MPRP, namely that such a nomination would extract concessions, but in the end neither DP or MPP has bitten on that bait.

There may be some realization within the MPRP that Udval as a surrogate Enkhbayar may not be a very strong candidate, that concessions are not forthcoming and that some kind of withdrawal is thus a way to avoid an embarrassing showing in the election.

Conclusions?

In the above, I’ve tried to think through some of the political logic of various scenarios after running these thoughts by some trusted fellow observers of the political scene. I’m not (yet) in Mongolia to be able to pick up direct political vibes and thus can’t offer an assessment of the likelihood of any of these scenarios unfolding, but though that these discussions were worth sharing to offer more of an understanding of the current political dynamics.

Posted in Elections, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Party Politics, Politics, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | 2 Comments

Presidential Election Platforms

[This post was researched and co-written by Brian White at The Mongolist blog.]

A cursory examination of the platforms of all three presidential candidates (incumbent Ts Elbegdorj, Member of Parliament B Bat-Erdene, and Minister of Health N Udval) gives the impression of considerable overlap in policy positions.

All the candidates intend to fight corruption, reform the judiciary, reduce partisan influence and improve services in governance, protect the environment, make effective use of natural resources, reduce alcoholism, promote investment in schools and hospitals, and continue a foreign policy of good relations with Russia and China and an active courting of “third neighbours.”

Note that of these general topics, it is only the areas of the judicial system and foreign relations that fall under the direct powers of the president, while the other policy areas frequently mentioned are areas where the president has at most persuasive powers.

There is so much overlap between the published platforms that it makes it difficult to pick out how these campaigns are different. But, examining the platforms point-by-point, they are not exactly the same. Each candidate emphasizes some areas more than others producing a distinct tone for each platform.

In terms of tone, Elbegdorj’s platform can be summed up by paraphrasing his opening campaign remarks with “we have done a lot, and we have much more to do.” It does not come across as negative or scary, and it is outward looking and future-oriented. This, obviously, is the campaign pitch of an incumbent who has had a relatively successful four years in office, not suffering any major scandals, and seeing his own party win the 2012 parliamentary election.

Bat-Erdene and Udval both start their platforms by outlining the many problems and dangers facing Mongolia. Minister Udval goes as far as outlining “five dangers” she’ll address as president. In general, both of the two challengers see uneven economic development, insidious foreign influence, corruption, a deteriorating environment, and social degradation as dangers to the future of the country.

It is easier to conceptualize the platforms by thinking of them as arranged on a spectrum from the most positive about the current state of affairs to Mongolia, to a more critical assessment. Elbegdorj is enjoying the benefits of incumbency by employing high-minded and positive (yet not terribly specific) rhetoric intended to inspire on one end. Bat-Erdene is then a few paces down the spectrum. He is using his public persona and status as a sports celebrity to express an inspiring message in safe policy areas like national pride but also employing a darker, scarier tone for more controversial policy areas such as the environment and mining. Udval is then at the other end predominantly focusing on the challenges and failures of the country and framing the future as full of dangers.

The considerable overlap in policy positions lends credence to arguments that the election will hinge on personality and perceptions of leadership ability. President Elbegdorj has the advantage of incumbency with a record of experience in national leadership positions. Mr. Bat-Erdene has much less experience, but has the advantage of personal charisma and celebrity. Minister Udval has much more professional and managerial experience than Mr. Bat-Erdene having served multiple times as a cabinet minister and the head of national organizations, but she lacks the benefit of President Elbegdorj’s incumbency and Mr. Bat-Erdene’s personal charisma and celebrity.

Platforms, of course, exist on paper, and each candidate’s position and areas of emphasis may evolve in the course of the campaign as they challenge each other publicly on specific issues. It is also important to remember that the president’s constitutional power is limited, and a candidate’s support of or opposition to issues in policy areas does not necessarily imply (s)he would have any ability to act on those preferences as president. The platforms are interesting reflections of the candidates’ personalities and the political parties’ priorities, but their effectiveness as a guide to how each will govern is arguably weak.

The candidate’s platforms are available here:

 

Posted in Corruption, Democracy, Democratic Party, Education, Elections, Foreign Policy, Health, Mongolian People's Party, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Party Politics, Policy, Politics, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | 6 Comments

I’m Still Thinking Run-Off…

Mendee has posted some very good reasons why he thinks a run-off following the June 26 presidential election is unlikely. At least until we see another Sant Maral poll (I’m hoping there will be one more before the June 19 ban on further polling) that indicates tendencies and directions about voter preferences, I will stick with my earlier expectation (not prediction) of a run-off.

What Triggers a Run-Off?

There are actually two conditions under which additional voting is triggered, one that is focused on participation by electoral district, one that is focused on the vote share garnered by the winning candidate.

1. If fewer than 50% of the eligible voters in a given electoral district vote, there will be additional voting one week after the initial vote (ie July 3). [Article 61.7, Law on the Presidential Election of Mongolia] No matter whom voters have voted for in a given district (= roughly 800 to 3,500 voters), 50% of them have to cast a vote to validate that district’s result.

2. If no candidate receives more than 50% of the votes cast in the entire country, a run-off between the top two candidates will be held two weeks after the initial vote, i.e. July 10. [Article 62, Law on the Presidential Election of Mongolia]

I am interested in the second kind of run-off here, i.e. the leading vote-getter on June 26 only gets a plurality of votes, not a majority, triggering a run-off between the top two vote-getters, i.e. Ts Elbegdorj and B Bat-Erdene, unless something really dramatic (and unlikely) happens in the campaign.

Electoral Math

 Third (and more) Candidates

In my post previewing the election for the Financial Times’ ‘beyond BRICS’ blog, I had initially mistakenly written that N Udval was the first third candidate in a presidential election because the 2009 election when I was an election monitor only involved N Enkhbayar and Ts Elbegdorj.

Let’s quickly look at the vote share of 3rd and 4th candidates in previous elections (I’m taking all the figures below from the nicely organized Wikipedia pages on Mongolian presidential elections).

1997: 6.8% (J Gombojav, Mongolian Conservative United Party)
2001: 3.6% (L Dashnyam, Civil Will)
2005: 14.1% (B Jargalsaikhan, Republican Party); 11.5% (B Erdenebat, Motherland Party)

If we assume for a moment that there is some continuity in voters’ behaviour when faced with a choice of more than two candidates, independent of the party affiliation and the party candidates themselves, we would expect Udval to receive some share of the votes that lies between 3 and 15%, roughly. [If there are any election specialists out there, I would welcome comments on whether such an expectation of consistency across elections is reasonable.]

Thinking purely about the numbers then, every percentage point of votes that Udval receives, means that one of the two other candidates has to win that many more votes relative to the other candidate. If Udval wins 10% of the votes, for example, Elbegdorj would have to win over 56% to Bat-Erdene’s 44% among the remaining 90% of voters who didn’t vote for Udval in order to avoid a run-off. The number of votes Udval can garner thus has a significant impact on the likelihood of a run-off.

Put another way, winning candidates in multicandidate elections in the past have been able to avoid the run-off by decisively beating the 2nd place candidate.

1997: N Bagabandi’s 62.5% vs. P Ochirbat’s 30.6%
2001: N Bagabandi’s 59.2% vs. R Gonchigdorj’s 37.2%
2005: N Enkhbayar’s 54.2% vs. M Enkhsaikhan’s 20.2%

1997 and 2001 seem particularly relevant here as both elections involved three candidates and the 3rd candidates received relatively few votes, a scenario that is likely this year. In both elections, Bagabandi received around 60% of the votes.

Udval Candidacy

The question of how strong Udval will be as a candidate is what I devoted the first post in this series to. The early days of campaigning have not given any indication that she is building any significant momentum by turning out to be a candidate that holds a (surprising) appeal to any specific groups of voters. I will thus stick with my guess of a result of more than 3%, but probably less than 10% for her for the moment. Obviously, that is quite a range when taking the electoral math above into account.

Let’s look at results from last year’s parliamentary election as a guide. Udval appears to be widely perceived as a stand-in for Enkhbayar so we might assume that she will receive a good portion of the Enkhbayar loyalist vote. I also assume that most Enkhbayar loyalists are fairly motivated to vote as they are disgruntled about Enkhbayar’s fate. They may also be concentrated in the countryside where participation rates are higher.

To estimate the share of Enkhbayar/MPRP loyalists, it is the share in the popular vote in the parliamentary election that is relevant as direct mandates in specific ridings might be subject to a different dynamic. The Justice Coalition received 22.3% of the popular vote in the 2012 parliamentary election.

Obviously, these are not all MPRP or Enkhbayar loyalists as the Coalition also includes the Mongolian National Democratic Party and I don’t see any obvious way to take a guess at the share of the 22.3% that might have been MPRP vs. MNDP voters. However, my above estimate of 3-10% for Udval looks low when we look at the Justice Coalition’s 22.3% as that would suggest that as few as 10% or only as many as 40% of Justice Coalition voters were MPRP voters.

Despite the lack of excitement around Udval or her “Five Dangers” platform, the above does lead me to expect that she will get a share of the vote that might well force a run-off unless Elbegdorj can really outpoll Bat-Erdene.

Elbegdorj Candidacy

This is the part that makes me hesitate to actually predict a run-off rather than to merely think it likely. I think that Mendee is absolutely right that Elbegdorj may well campaign very effectively and simply win the election, no matter what mathematical hurdle the Udval candidacy throws in his way.

He could win the election by a) running a very strong campaign himself, b) Bat-Erdene’s campaign faltering, or c) (perhaps most likely) some combination of a) and b).

Obviously, Elbegdorj has been in Mongolian politics for a long time and has a lot of experience campaigning. He continues to be a rousing speaker, and Mongolians seem to find him engaging (if not personable) when they see him from afar or on TV, as well as more up close. His presidency has not seen any major scandals or disasters that are tied to him in any way. There are some areas where he will point to achievements. In the absence of any mistakes during his first term, Elebgdorj will presumably enjoy some incumbency bonus.

Bat-Erdene Candidacy

Unlike Elbegdorj, Bat-Erdene is relatively untested as a candidate. Yes, he’s been elected to parliament, of course. But, even in 2012, he was elected via the Khentii aimag constituency. In some local races, the campaign may well amount to perceptions of a candidate as strongly rooted locally (I imagine that Bat-Erdene’s wrestling career helped here, as wrestlers often seem to be closely identified with their aimag of origin), as well as face recognition. His election and re-election in Khentii thus doesn’t necessarily signal that he’s a strong campaigner in the way that Elebgdorj’s involvement in multiple national campaigns does.

It thus remains to be seen whether Bat-Erdene runs into any scandals or gaffes along the way in the campaign that seriously hurt his chances. And, as is evident from previous elections, a weak second choice can certainly propel a frontrunner past the 50% hurdle.

DP Strength

Finally, Mendee’s argument about the strength of the DP organization and its strength in various state bodies is very interesting and perhaps most worrying. This will be one of the important aspects to watch about this election. Policy differences between Elbegdorj and Bat-Erdene might not amount to very much, but an Elebgdorj win would clearly cement DP domination for the next three years. Mendee’s reference to the winner-take-all aftermath of the 1996 or 2000 elections is thus a warning sign of what may be going on at the moment. This surely deserves a post of its own, in addition to a focus on this topic on this blog and by election monitors.

Posted in Democratic Party, Elections, JD Democratization, Mongolian People's Party, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Party Politics, Politics, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | Leave a comment

Run-off Is Unlikely

Politics in Mongolia is always interesting, dynamic, and puzzling – especially, towards  elections.  I like to challenge Julian’s earlier post about the potential for a run-off in the presidential election and argue that the incumbent has a strong likelihood of winning outright; therefore, runoff is unlikely.

Elebgdorj’s Popularity

First, President Elbegdorj, despite the small margin of victory over the MPP candidate in 2009, still leads the public opinion polls – regarded one of the strongest politicians.  Of course, with doubts in public opinion polls (without clear understanding of their methodology and degree of objectiveness), Elbegdorj appears to hold a relatively high ratings.

Second, Elbegdorj didn’t made any visible mistakes in last four years.  His attempts to strengthen the mining regime, to increase  public participation in the policy-making processes (e.g., Citizen’s Hall), to advocate the devolution of power to locality, to discourage alcohol consumptions, and to promote Mongolia’s international image (e.g., extensive travels, visibility in foreign media and forums) were important contributions to our democracy, governance, and sovereignty.

Third, his critical approach to the MPP-led government was appealing.  However, as the election nears, he seems to be caught up in constraints of the current political and economic structures.  He became noticeably silent about questionable behaviours of his former party (technically, he must be politically neutral when he is holding the power of presidency).  On these three points, he would easily get enough votes to secure his second term.

DP Dominance of the Political Structure

Then, there are reasonable beliefs about the DP dominance in the political structure – which provides protection at minimum and support at maximum.  Clearly, the DP is not playing by  key governance principles (e.g., rule of law, transparency, equal opportunity).  Following the MPRP’s ‘winner take all’ principle of 2000, the DP has already used similar tactics. Now we see repeated pattern of ‘winner take all’ from the DP take-over in 1996, the MPRP in 2000, and now in 2012.

First, the DP and its coalition didn’t consult with other political actors and public when changing the key electoral laws (Law on Local Elections and importantly, Law on the Presidential Election).

Second, the DP now took over all key agencies in charge of organizing, monitoring, and enforcing the elections.  DP-affilliated politicians are now heading the General Election Commission, the Police Department, the General Intelligence Agency, and Chief Prosector’s Office.  The DP has already taken over key state-owned enterprises and  financial institutions.  All these institutions, in principle, should be politically neutral and professionally administered.

Third, the majority of provinces are now lead by the DP-affilliated politicians.  Although it is difficult to know how much influence these DP-affilliated politicians are asserting at the local level, the likelihood is very high when one looks at behaviours of the DP politicians in the national government.

With his own mostly positive profile of the last four years and the DP’s dominance in  domestic politics, Elbegdorj is likely to win a  second term presidency; therefore, run-off appears to be unlikely – especially, when the economy is enjoying growth and bonds.

 

 

Posted in Democracy, Democratic Party, Elections, Mongolian People's Party, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Party Politics, Politics, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | 2 Comments

New Book: Does Everyone Want Democracy? Insights from Mongolia

Does Everyone Want Democracy? Insights from Mongolia by Paula L.W. Sabloff. Left Coast Press 2013. 266 pp., 282 pp. / 6.00 x 9.00 / Apr, 2013, eBook (978-1-61132-719-9), Hardback (978-1-59874-565-8)

Do all people desire democracy? For over a century, the idea that democracy is a universal good has been an article of faith for American policymakers. Anthropologist Paula Sabloff challenges this conventional wisdom about who wants democracy and why. Starting with the psychological literature, she explains that certain values (personal dignity, self-determination, and justice) appear to be universally esteemed today, partly because they match up with some universal human such emotions as hope and fear. She argues that people can live these emotions and values better under democracy, which promotes economic and political freedom, than totalitarianism, which does not. Thus the principles of democracy may, indeed, be universal. However, the data collected from 1,283 interviews of Mongolian citizens suggest that how people want their government to act is idiosyncratic. Mongolians’ culture, history, current circumstances and future aspirations influence how they want government to support them and how they view their role in maintaining democracy.

The book begins with an historical chapter, for one cannot talk about governance in Mongolia without understanding Chinggis Khaan and his place in the hearts of Mongolians today. Photographs from the archives of the National Museum of Mongolian History illustrate the historical chapter.The book then describes people’s changing attitude toward human rights, political rights and freedoms, economic rights and freedoms, government’s responsibility toward its people and citizens’ responsibilities toward their government. Tables and original photographs illustrate this part of the text.

This fascinating study of Mongolia – feudal until it became the first country to follow Russia into communism and now struggling with post-socialist democratization – is a model for investigating how everyday people around the world actually think about and implement democracy on their own terms.

Paula L. W. Sabloff is a professor at the Santa Fe Institute. She is a political anthropologist who has conducted research in Mexico, the United States, and Mongolia. She has taught at the University of Pittsburgh and the University of Pennsylvania. She curated the exhibition “Modern Mongolia: Reclaiming Genghis Khan” at the University of Pennsylvania Museum and the National Museum of Natural History (Smithsonian Institution). She is editor of several books including Modern Mongolia: Reclaiming Genghis Khan (2001), Mapping Mongolia (2011), and Higher Education in the Post-Communist World (1998). She is currently applying network theory to Mongolian and Mexican databases.

Posted in Democracy, Elections, Governance, Politics, Publications, Research on Mongolia, Society and Culture | Tagged | Leave a comment

Foreign Policy Roundup #1: May 12-25, 2013

This is the first in a bi-weekly to weekly series, that I am calling the Foreign Policy Roundup. In every roundup, I offer a very brief 1-2 sentence  summary of foreign policy news, followed by a link to the original article. Most of the articles are from Mongolian-language sources. As a non-native Mongolian speaker, I welcome comments on any mistakes, especially if I incorrectly translated ministry names or other governmental institutions. Future posts will include commentary on important developments and stories.

…………………..

5/12: Ts. Jambaldorj was named Mongolia’s representative to ASEAN. http://politics.news.mn/content/143834.shtml

5/12: The President of “Russian Railways”, V. Yakunin arrived in Mongolia and met with President Altanhuyag and Minister of Transportation, A. Gansukh, to discuss joint projects and planning. http://politics.news.mn/content/143838.shtml

5/13: Foreign Minister L. Bold met with the General Secretary of the OSCE, L. Zannier. During the meeting Zannier expressed his happiness that Mongolia had become an official member of the OSCE, and L. Bold thanked the organization for their help in organizing the Community of Democracies meeting.  http://www.mfa.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2436%3A2013-05-13-09-31-03&catid=43%3A2009-12-20-21-55-03&Itemid=62&lang=mn

5/13: State Secretary J. Bayartsetseg represented Mongolia at the UN General Assembly on the question of Human Trafficking, where he presented Mongolia’s legal measures to stop human trafficking. http://www.mfa.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2436%3A2013-05-13-09-31-03&catid=43%3A2009-12-20-21-55-03&Itemid=62&lang=mn

5/13: Mongolian Minister of Labor, Sanjmyatav signed an MOU with his South Korean counterpart on an official visit to the ROK. http://politics.news.mn/content/144145.shtml

5/14: Ministry of Justice State Secretary J. Bayartsetseg met with the director of the UN Drug Department Yu. Fedetov. During the meeting they discussed options to jointly address technical and legal issues on this topic. Drug trafficking’s connection to human trafficking and corruption was also mentioned. http://www.mfa.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2438%3A2013-05-14-07-04-59&catid=43%3A2009-12-20-21-55-03&Itemid=62&lang=mn

5/14: The Mongolian consulate in Eren, China (Inner Mongolia) met with Chinese officials to discuss a recent attack on a Mongolian citizen in the city. http://www.mfa.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2439%3A2013-05-14-08-12-43&catid=43%3A2009-12-20-21-55-03&Itemid=62&lang=mn

5/14: Mongolia’s Parliamentary Director, Z. Enkhbold received the North Korean ambassador, Hon Gyu. http://politics.news.mn/content/144164.shtml

5/14: Foreign Policy reported on a Mongolian-led project with Myanmar at Mozambique to form an group of resource-rich countries bordering on BRICS nations. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/14/mongolia_myanmar_mozambique_alliance_m3

5/20: The Senate Marshal of Poland’s Parliament, B. Borusevic, made an official visit to visit with members of the Mongolia’s Ikh Hural. This was his second visit to the country, and he commented on the remarkable changes he observed on Ulaanbaatar since 1999. Both sides noted the importance of Parliament-to-Parliament relations.  http://politics.news.mn/content/144851.shtml

5/21: During B. Borusevic’s visit, he signed off on four projects, dealing with Mongolia’s natural environment, child welfare, and “green development”. http://www.mfa.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2445%3A66-4-&catid=43%3A2009-12-20-21-55-03&Itemid=62&lang=mn

5/21: Deputy Minister D. Terbishdavga attended the 13th Mongolia-China Government Relations Commission in Beijing. http://politics.news.mn/content/144989.shtml

5/22: Parliament Director Z. Ekhbold met with CEO Mike Jones of Jenny Oil, where they discussed recent surveys in Mongolia. Survey research results indicated that Mongolian resources might be of higher quality than Arabian oil reserves. http://politics.news.mn/content/145199.shtml

5/22-5/24: Mongolia’s Minister of Transportation, A. Gansukh, was in Germany for the International Transport Forum. http://politics.news.mn/content/145461.shtml

5/24: Mongolian Minister of Energy, M. Sonompil, discussed energy issues in Vienna, Austria at the Austrian National Parliament. http://www.mfa.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2453%3A2013-05-24-07-23-16&catid=43%3A2009-12-20-21-55-03&Itemid=62&lang=mn

5/24-30: Vice President of the German Parliament, Edward Oswald, is on an official visit to Mongolia, during which he will be meeting with the Mongolia-Germany Parliamentary Working Group. http://politics.news.mn/content/145281.shtml

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