Foreign Policy Roundup #5: August 18-September 1

[The last two weeks of foreign affairs news from Mongolia. Most articles directly translated from Mongolian news sources.]

 

Asia

Mongolia’s Ambassador to Pakistan, Ts. Sukhbaatar, presented his credentials to President Asif Ali Zardari. Among other things, they discussed Mongolian-Pakistani cooperation in the ADB’s Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) program.

Mongolia’s director of Parliament, Z. Enkhbold, met with a group of Thai representatives in Ulaanbaatar, expressing that Thailand is a key partner for Mongolia in Southeast Asia. This year, Mongolia and Thailand mark 40 years of diplomatic relations.

Mongolia’s ambassador to Thailand presented his credentials to the Thai Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn.

On official invitation from the Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Mongolia, and met with L. Bold. They discussed ways to increase mutual cooperation, and signed a Memorandum of Understanding on furthering cooperation.

L. Bold attended a meeting in Japan on Oita-Mongolian Friendship and Cooperation.

Leader of Parliament, Z. Enkhbold, received Mr. M. Xayashi, head of the Mongolian-Japanese Friendship Forum. The meeting of the Forum focused on societal and economic cooperation as well as student exchanges.

The Secretary of Administration of the Mongolian Parliament, B. Boldbaatar, received Sultanov Marat Abdrazokovich, a member of Kyrgyzstan’s Parliament current on an official trip to Mongolia.

The Diplomat and East Asia Forum ran an article on Mongolian-Kazakhstani relations proposing 3 reasons for the limited ties between the two countries: historical political boundaries, Kazakhstani-Russian relations, and the democratic-authoritarian restrictions.

Europe

Mongolia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, L. Bold, met with Ireland’s Ambassador to Mongolia, where they discussed relations in the broader context of Mongolian-European affairs.

The Mongolian Embassy in Stockholm opened a “Citizen’s Room” where Mongolians can come together to discuss a variety of issues and seek council as needed.

Consultations were held between the German and Mongolian Ministries of Foreign Affairs, during which they discussed opportunities for cultural and governmental cooperation in the area of education. They also took the time to mark 40 years of diplomatic relations.

The Mongolian-Czech Governmental Commission held their 5th meeting.

Mongolia’s ambassador to the Czech Republic, D. Zumberellham, met with the Czech Vice President, to discuss economic affairs ahead of a meeting of the Mongolia-Czech business forum.

The director of the Russian Federation’s Election Commission visited Mongolia an expressed interest in Mongolia’s experience with new electoral technologies.

On the invitation of vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, D. Gankhuyag,  Russia’s undersecretary of foreign affairs I. V. Morgulov made an official visit to Mongolia. During his trip, he met with the Mongolian Prime Minister and head of the Mongolian-Russian Governmental Commission. They also held official consultations between their respective Foreign Affairs Ministries.

Mongolian passport holders can now travel to Belarus visa-free for up to 90 days. Mongolia and Belarus are also preparing to conclude an agreement on cooperation in science and technology.

 

North America

Minister of Defense, D. Bat-Erdene, met with U.S. Senator John MacCain and Sheldon Whitehouse in Ulaanbaatar to discuss US-Mongolian defense cooperation.

Middle East

Mongolian appointed a new consulate in the Kingdom of Jordan, which will operate out of Mongolia’s Embassy in Cairo. The consulate will not only handle issues of trade of investment, but also provide protection for Mongolian citizens’ interests in the country.

Posted in 2013, Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy Roundup, Mongolia and ... | Tagged | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Documenting Buddhist Past

There has been a very worthwhile project aiming to document Mongolia’s Buddhist history going on for some years. This is an effort led by scholars, but with a very impressive cultural footprint and organized under the auspices of the competent and active Mongolia Arts Council. See also the Facebook Page for this project. The project is now looking for support to publish their findings.

Help bring Mongolia’s Buddhist past to life online

By Konchog Norbu

Published on Buddhadharma August 10th 2013

At the height of Mongolia’s Buddhist culture, there were well over a thousand monasteries and temples spread across its deserts, steppelands, and forested mountains. After the ruthlessly efficient Stalinist religious purges of the late 1930s, however, there were exactly three left standing. Now enjoying religious freedom under a democratic system, the Mongolian people, in partnership with international friends, are determined to preserve the memory of their spiritual heritage before it’s too late — and you can help.

Since 2008, Mongolia’s Buddhist Monasteries Project has already sent teams to visit more than 1,300 sites of old and revived temples (mapping them using GPS coordinates), and to collect images, religious artifacts, and the priceless memories and stories of elders, many of whom were young monks before the purge. Now the project aims to organize and publish this vast data trove on an interactive website so that Mongolians — and people worldwide — can delve into the details of Mongolia’s rich Buddhist past.

The Arts Council of Mongolia has created an Indiegogo page to raise the $8,000 needed to complete the task of bringing Mongolia’s Buddhist history to life online. If you’d care for more information, or would like to make a contribution, http://www.indiegogo.com/projects/mongolia-s-buddhist-monasteries-project

For video and photographs see http://www.indiegogo.com/projects/mongolia-s-buddhist-monasteries-project?c=gallery

Posted in Buddhism, History, Research on Mongolia | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Christopher Carter on the Role of Bag Governors

This post features a new community character from Bag 4, Abu the bag governor. This summer alongside this community I experimented with a participatory planning tool that I hope to refine over the upcoming years at UBC.  Participating clans were given a GPS enabled point and shoot camera with a prompt to capture the things that they value about a nomadic lifestyle in addition to where and how they use surface water resources during their summer at high mountain pastures or Jailao. Abu’s family was one of the participating clans.

Responsible for organizing decision making at the bag level as interim governor, Abu lassoes mares for Kumis (fermented horse milk) production

In a qualitative sense we learned that a majority of participants worry little about the quality of unprotected point sources and seldom discuss water resource development at bag meetings. However they retain a strong sense of ownership about protecting the water quality and using water efficiently. In a quantitative sense we learned the exact location and number of bastao (springs) accessed by the community at pasture and are now able to now fashion maps that merge the location and illustration of community water use alongside climate and LANDSAT data. This can illustrate a changing human resource relationship with surface water and be used by the community leaders to represent themselves in the policy arena.

My personal hope at the ground level is that participants gained a critical sense of their water resource capital and the potential for participation in the development in an era of emerging mineral resource extraction, desertification and glacial recession.In this transcribed interview I sat down with Abu to discuss his role as interim governor and the photos he and his family took over three weeks.

What’s happening in this photo Abu? 

Here we see traditional Kazakh culture, traditions, habits, our relatives and our neighbors  Dairy products and fresh mares milk (Kumis) too. Only in the summer do Kazakh people milk horses and share tea once a year do we have this gathering. Also, this photo will be a memory of Cj and Emilie, our guests from Montana, and a memory of that day. I really like this photo.

Can you explain what you like about being the acting bag governor? 

I enjoy working as bag governor because I get to communicate with many people in bag 4 everyday and then there is the salary. 

How does nomadic bag 4 make decisions?

When I organize a bag meetings (4 times a year) we make decisions about the movement of this bag between pastures and the soum center and we ask the suggestions of the people. After hearing suggestions, we make a choice on the dates to move. We also vote then on decisions regarding foreign NGO projects as well as local development funding that is mostly used for livestock care.

What would you change about this organization of government?

I think the system is good because we are able to hear all of the people’s ideas and address the problems that way at a small scale.  

How many meetings do you hold a year? 

Usually four times a year, but if there is a special problem, we meet.

What are your hopes for the future of this Jailao? Concerns? 

A rock protected spring in the centre of nomadic bag 4.

I don’t exactly know the future of this Jailao because the weather changes very quickly and it is sometimes very difficult with animals. However there is less water in the bastao (springs) some summers and I am worried that in the future they may run dry.  If we fence around the bastao, or build a house to protect the source in all seasons, that that will protect it for future useThe families that are closest would have the responsibility to maintain it.

Christopher J. Carter is a Masters Candidate in Comparative Development Planning at the School of Regional and Urban Planning (SCARP) at the University of British Columbia. His 2013 participatory research on water development policy in Olgii Province is supported by a fellowship from BioRegions International. 

Posted in Christopher Carter, Countryside, Kazakhs, Nomadism, Research on Mongolia, Water | 1 Comment

Introducing ‘Mongolia Research Hub’ at the University of Queensland

Today, more than ever before, research and informed discussion is required to successfully negotiate Mongolia’s rapid development in the face of interrelated political, economic, social and environmental challenges.

The Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining (CSRM) part of the University of Queensland’s Sustainable Minerals Institute (SMI), has launched Mongolia Research Hub as an initiative to promote collaborative research and discussion on the opportunities and challenges for sustainable development presented by the rapid growth of Mongolia’s resource industry.

CSRM’s research is committed to improving the environmental and social performance of the resources sector globally. In Mongolia, CSRM has engaged with mining related issues at the national, regional and community level with a diverse range of partners and is rapidly expanding its expertise in the field.

Current Research focus

In 2013, CSRM won an AusAID Development Research Award Scheme (ADRAS). The ADRAS is AusAID’s flagship competitive research program, funding primary research projects to improve the quality and effectiveness of Australian aid in developing countries. The project, titled ‘Managing the impacts of minerals development on women and men and their traditional livelihoods in Mongolia‘ will be conducted from June 2013 until June 2015. The project is collaboration between interdisciplinary team of researchers based in Australia and a range of partners in Mongolia, including NGOs, universities and government agencies. As the first output, the research team has produced two videos that show the dramatic change of two mine sites, Tavan Tolgoi coal mine and Sharyn Gol mine, over the past four decades, using Landsat satellite imagery.

CSRM has also launched a research project, titled ‘Tracking the Negotiation and Implementation of the South Gobi Cooperation Agreement (SGCA)’ that seeks to better understand the effectiveness of negotiated agreements in developing country settings as a key mechanism for managing community impacts and benefits through structuring mutually beneficial relationships between resource companies and host communities. The main focus of the research is Rio Tinto`s ongoing agreement making with host communities and local government authorities around the Oyu Tolgoi mine in the South Gobi Province (Umnugovi Aimag) of Mongolia. More information on the agreement can be found here: www.goviin-erin.mn

CSRM’s researchers are also involved in a number of research projects focusing on specific themes identified in the Mongolian context, including a research project on understanding the dynamics of interaction between recent extreme climatic disasters and the current resources boom, a project on potential Gender Based Violence (GBV) in mining communities, and finally a project on enterprise development in mining zones in Mongolia.

These various projects highlighted in the Mongolia Research Hub, seek to contribute and inform debates concerning sustainable minerals development globally, while assisting Mongolia map its specific mining and development trajectory.

Posted in Australia, Development, Mining, Mongolia and ..., Research on Mongolia | Tagged | Leave a comment

A Network Approach to NGO Development: Women’s NGOs in Mongolia

This article presents results of a social network survey of women’s NGOs in Mongolia, which was conducted during the spring of 2010. The main objective of the survey was to understand the structural properties of collaborative interactions among women’s NGOs. Among Mongolian NGOs, women’s organizations have been most active to form and join networks among NGOs, which have taken different forms, such as umbrella organizations and issue-specific coalitions, since the 1990s. It presents the main findings of social network analysis (SNA) and discuss its broader implications for NGO development.

(The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law Volume 15, Issue 1, March 2013).

Posted in Civil Society, Democracy, Publications, Research on Mongolia | Tagged | Leave a comment

The Limitations of Mongolian-Kazakhstani Relations

I have recently had an article published on The Diplomat, in which I explore Mongolian-Kazakhstani relations. I argue that despite geographical and cultural proximity, relations between these two post-communist states are limited by three factors:

  1. Historical Political Boundaries
  2. Kazakhstan’s continued close relationship with the Russian Federation
  3. Mongolia’s unwillingness to pursue relations with authoritarian states
Posted in Central Asia, International Relations, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and ... | Tagged | Leave a comment

Does Presidential Pardon Bring End to Enkhbayar Saga?

Mongolian President Ts Elbegdorj was narrowly re-elected to a second term in the June 26 presidential election. He is embarking on this second and final term with expectations of personnel continuity and policy stability. He is setting out on this path with a bit of a bang, the announcement of a pardon for former President N Enkhbayar who has been released into civilian hospital care earlier in August 2013.

Enkhbayar’s pardon is not unexpected and a political gamble to remove one of the thorns in Elbegdorj’s side as he embarks on his next four years in office.

Recapping the Enkhbayar Saga

Enkhbayar rose through the then-Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) and was elected to the Ikh Khural (parliament) for this first time in 1992. He became the first person to hold all three highest elected offices in the country: prime minister (2000-04), chairman of parliament (2004-05), and president (2005-09).

Despite Enkhbayar’s powerful positions and central role in the party, he is rarely associated with any particular policy initiatives or directions. The most momentous decision for Mongolia that should have come during his watch was the signing of an Investment Agreement covering Anglo-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto’s investment in the massive Oyu Togloi gold and copper project. Yet, Enkhbayar was relatively un-inolved in this decision and the Agreement was ultimately only possible after Enkhbayar had lost the 2009 election, during Elbegdorj’s first term in the context of a “grand coalition” of the MPRP and DP under Prime Minister S Bayar.

His power waned during his term as president and he was defeated in his bid for re-election by Elbegdorj in 2009 in part because his own party no longer stood behind him. He became further alienated from his party when then-Prime Minister S Bayar announced Enkhbayar’s defeat to Elbegdorj very quickly after the election. This decision to force Enkhbayar to concede quickly was driven more by a desire for a speedy result following the violent unrest that had come with allegations of irregularities in the 2008 parliamentary election.

Enkhbayar’s alienation from the MPRP intensified when S Batbold became party leader. Batbold asserted his leadership by pushing a name-change for the party which reverted to its pre-1924 name of Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) in 2010.

While this name change was widely supported within the party, Enkhbayar gathered the opposition to the change and formed a splinter party which was ultimately allowed to assume the name of Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party, even though the MPP was the organization that continued the existence of the socialist era-MPRP and retained its organization and assets.

As leader of the MPRP, Enkhbayar has taken a significant populist turn through the members of parliament that form the “Justice Coalition” together with the Mongolian National Democratic Party.

Allegations of Corruption

Allegations of corruption followed Enkhbayar throughout his political career. Most of these allegations focused on the business activities of his wife and the privatizations of public companies, but also pointed to the very sudden paying off of Mongolia’s legacy debt to Russia during Enkhbayar’s term as prime minister in 2003 by U.S.-Canadian mining entrepreneur Robert Friedland.

These allegations led to calls for investigations as soon as Enkhabayar’s electoral defeat lifted his immunity. Enkhbayar’s was arrested in April 2012, just as he was preparing for parliamentary elections at the end of June of that year. While some of the allegations were ultimately borne out by his trial and conviction, the timing of his arrest during the election campaign was seen by many as politically motivated and possibly orchestrated by Elbegdorj. This impression was reinforced by a public relations effort with sometimes downright silly blog posts, paid advertisements disguised as articles, and messages of support from foreign officials that seemed to be coordinated internationally by Enkhbayar supporters.

The campaign supporting Enkhbayar intensified when he went on hunger strike and was placed under hospital care during his pre-trial arrest. Despite various legal shenanigans and the international campaign, Enkhbayar was convicted of relatively minor corruption charges in August 2012 and sentenced to seven years in prison which was later reduced to three years.

Enkhbayar’s Pardon and Its Implications

The fact that Elbegdorj has pardoned Enkhbayar has not come as a surprise. It deflects accusations against Elbegdorj and the DP that they are partisan in their pursuit of anti-corruption measures and makes the president look more like a head of state above the political fray.

The implications of this pardon will only become clear in the coming months as the fate of the MPRP under Enhkbayar and his and the party’s role in cabinet and parliament become clearer. Since his arrest, the MPRP has largely been an Enkhbayar-proxy party.

Party representatives may have tried to negotiate with the DP over an Enkhbayar pardon at various moments, including when the MPRP was debating whether to field a presidential candidate or not. In the end, the party did nominate N Udval, so the current pardon does not appear part of a political bargain to prolong the cabinet under current Prime Minister N Altankhuyag. On the other hand, the MPRP members do have a fair bit of leverage as the DP-led cabinet is dependent on them for a majority.

Enkhbayar himself could conceivably be aiming for a return to active politics through a run for parliament in 2016, or, possibly even for the presidential election in 2017 when he would be 59 years old assuming that his health problems are not as severe as they may have appeared at times.

If the MPRP remains in the governing coalition this will present the challenge of how to distinguish itself from other coalition members in 2016. If they decide to leave the coalition, on the other hand, this may doom them to irrelevancy unless Enkhbayar’s visibility remains high.

The party landscape in Mongolia will continue to change in coming years as the Mongolian People’s Party tries to reclaim its dominant position and as the DP has its hands on all levers of power for the coming three years. If Enkhbayar does re-emerge as an active politician, this will have an impact on other DP officials, but probably not on Elbegdorj who has granted him this pardon.

Posted in Corruption, Democratic Party, Law, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Politics, Populism | Tagged | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Christopher Carter on Kazakh Mongolians in Far West

For the past month I have been living at the mountain pastures of the fourth bag of Saqai Soum in Olgii province Mongolia working on researching participatory planning and water resource development.

Olgii province is home to Mongolia’s largest ethnicity, a Kazakh and Sunni Muslim people who have lived a nomadic lifestyle in the Altai mountains of Mongolia for at least 200 years. Following the Mongolian Revolution in 1921 a permanent border was drawn between Mongolia, Russia and China, ethnic Kazakhs living nomadically in Mongolia were effectively cut off from freely moving  to their homeland.

Today they remain the aimag’s majority and taking a majority of political seats at the bag, soum and aimag level. In the next few posts here on Mongolia Focus I hope to share some first-hand accounts of development and social change amongst Kazakh Mongolians living nomadically in the nation’s westernmost province.

I first met Baelkhan and his extended family two years ago and today he is 83 years old, which makes him the oldest man in the Bag. I had the chance to sit down with him last week at his summer pasture (Jailao) to hear about the changes he has seen in society and landscape of  Central Olgii province.

Baelkhan and the youngest addition to his clan, Tilik, observe the rounding up of horses for the annual Kumis (Fermented Mares Milk) celebration.

What is your history of Jailao (Summer Pasture) here in Bag 4? When I was young, I began to work with animals and did not attend any formal education.  I instead learned all of the aspects of being a good herder and have done this my whole life.

What is the most important change you have witnessed in Bag 4? Ten years ago, at the end of the Soviet era, livestock became private property and the govenment started to work in a new way supporting herding/animals. From this time on, I noticed that the animals health, breeding and populations increased in quality.

You have lived in Mongolia as a Soviet Satellite and now as a Democratic state, what are your observations of this transition? Life before, life after? In the Soviet age there were good things like free universal education, today in a democratic Mongolia, higher education can be expensive. Under Soviet control when you would graduate from high school there where many government opportunities for employment and even some light industry jobs here in Olgii. Today, alot of countryside people here see little opportunity for regional employment after university (high school) and cannot afford higher education. Because they are not qualified for the few jobs here and can produce their own food/ sell cashmere to support a family, many choose to be Malchin (herders)in the countryside. I also think the health of our animal populations have gotten higher in quality today.

How has the landscape of the Muztao valley changed in the past 50 years? Life on this landscape 50 years ago was very difficult, low precipitation for many years, very dry with cold winters and many Dzuds (Severe cold events).  Today I have noticed recently here that we are getting more rains and that the grass is getting better. Muztao mountain had much more ice on the glacier and received more snow in the past, in the spring the runoff was sometimes hard to deal with, some flooding . Today there is less fresh water melting off in the spring but it is higher quality (less sediment) and more managable. I don’t worry that Muztao has less water runoff because some years it recieves alot of snow. It is always changing.

What are your hopes for this Jailao (Summer Pasture)? Over time the climate and pasture quality in this Jailao has varied alot. But in the past 5 years i have noticed the grass has been much better, also there have been fewer Dzuds. The climate here is changing so it is very unpredictable .My worries are about the Dzuds, I always pray that they will not come. My hope for the future is that our families animals remain healthy and that the natural resources in this place remain healthy.

What is your highlight of your life as a Kazakh herder? I think that working with animals, living off their products and living in the fresh air my whole life is the highlight.

 About Christopher Carter

Christopher J. Carter is a Masters Candidate in Comparative Development Planning at the School of Regional and Urban Planning (SCARP) at the University of British Columbia. His 2013 participatory research on water development policy in Olgii Province is supported by a fellowship from BioRegions International.

Posted in Christopher Carter, Countryside, Grassland, Kazakhs, Nomadism, Water | Leave a comment

Foreign Policy Roundup #4: July 28-August 4, 2013

The Foreign Policy Roundup returns, after a 2 month hiatus! As a reminder, in these bi-weekly posts I provide a brief summary of Mongolia’s international affairs developments over the past two weeks. (Most of the stories are from Mongolian-language sources, that I have translated on my own; therefore, any misspelled names of people or organizations are simple transliteration issues. If you do find any errors, please let me know.)

 

 

Multilateral Diplomacy

Minister L. Bold met with the UN Population Fund’s Mongolia Resident Representative Kitihara Naomii, at which he was handed the UNFPA’s recommendations for Mongolia.

Secretary for Foreign Affairs, G. Tsogtsaikhan, met with the Director of the Mongolian Division of the ILO, Liljert Perry, during which they exchanged opinions and ideas on the issues of strengthening Mongolia’s ability to manage migration (particularly to control emigration) and human trafficking.

D. Erdenbaatar was appointed director of the International Federation of Aeronautical Information Management Associations in charge of Asia-Pacific Affairs.

 

Bilateral Diplomacy

Luxembourg’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean Asselborn, made an official visit to Mongolia, where he met with Minister L. Bold and Deputy Minister D. Terbishdagva.

U.S. President Barak Obama sent an official letter of congratulations to President Elbegdorj. In the letter, he praised Elbegdorj’s role in strengthening Mongolia’s democracy and mentioned the success of their last meeting in 2011 at the White House.

Mongolia’s Ambassador to Kazakhstan, J. Sukhee, presented his credentials to Kazakhstan’s vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saribay Kairat, and discussed Kazakhstan-Mongolian ties.

Mongolia’s Ambassador to Great Britain meet with British Parliament members to discuss security, political, and cultural cooperation and celebrate 50 years of diplomatic relations. To further support educational and cultural relations, Britain announced that it would increase the number of government scholarships offered to Mongolian students.

L. Durgerjav, Mongolia’s Ambassador to Bulgaria, presented his credentials to the President of Bulgaria. The President made specific note of the ancient traditional ties between Bulgarians and Mongolians, and expressed his hope that modern relations would bring their respective peoples peacefully together.

The Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted a senior delegation from the PRC.

Mongolia discussed cooperation with Japan in the medical sector.

Mongolia’s ambassador to Turkey, B. Bathishig, met with Turkish officials to discuss bilateral relations and ways to increase regular consultations between the two countries.

Economics

Minister Ch. Saihanbileg went to Hong Kong, meeting with the Hong Kong Financial Minister, Jon Tsan, and Director of Economic Development, Andrew Von. They discussed Mongolian plans for foreign investment, infrastructure, and finance.

Minister of Economic Development, N. Batbayar, traveled to Japan to discuss how to strengthen the Mongolian-Japanese strategic partnership, intensify bilateral economic relations, and develop new areas of cooperation.

Luxemburg and Mongolia have started negotiations for a Tax Treaty to avoid double taxation.

Defense/Security

Minister L. Bold met with the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Samuel J. Locklear to discuss cooperation between their respective defense departments and exchange ideas on future developments, especially after the U.S. withdraw from Afghanistan.

Mongolia participated for the first time in The Royal Edinburg Military Tattoo, an annual international military festival. Mongolian traditional dancers performed during the festival.

Posted in 2013, China, Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy Roundup, Japan, Mongolia and ..., United States | Tagged | Leave a comment

Failed States Index

The Fund for Peace released its 2013 Failed States Index (FSI) earlier in July 2013 and I’ve included the ranking in our Mongolia Scorecard.

Methodology

The Failed States Index aims to identify ” pressures [that] are pushing a state towards the brink of failure” and is issued by the U.S.-based Fund for Peace. Over 75% of its funding comes from foundations and “Government Contracts and Grants”.

The index is constructed through a combination of data triangulation and “critical review”, “scores are apportioned for every country based on twelve key political, social and economic indicators (which in turn include over 100 sub-indicators) that are the result of years of painstaking expert social science research”. As is the case with many of these indices, this explanation leaves much to be desired, though the website also offers links to a number of reviews of the index.

Mongolia in the Failed States Index

As I would have expected, Mongolia does not exhibit any indication of becoming a failed state and it is thus in the “stable” category of the FSI, ranked at 129 (out of 179, Rank 1 is a failed state) with a score of 57.8 (out of 120, lower = more stable).

There are 12 subindicators to the overall score with a maximum score of 10 on each of these subscores to add up to the overall possible total of 120 that would mark an utterly failed state.

Mongolia receives the lowest (= most stable) scores on “massive movement of refugees” (2.2) and “chronic human flight” (2.5) and is least stable as regards to “uneven development” (6.3) and “deterioration of public services” (5.7).

In terms of the movement of refugees, Mongolia’s score is the 23rd-lowest in the world and very close to Canada’s (2.1). This indicator mainly seems to rely on the presence of refugees in country.

For human flight Mongolia ranks even higher (20) and is preceded by New Zealand and follower by Italy with this ranking. This  indicator mainly seems to rely on outmigration from the country.

The uneven development indicator largely measures levels of income inequality (Gini coefficient) and shares of income by population segments. Here, Mongolia ranks 77th and is close in score to Thailand, for example.

The “deterioration of public services” indicator is least clear to me and includes “pressures and measures related to: policing, criminality, educational provision, literacy, water & sanitation, infrastructure, quality healthcare, telephony, internet access, energy reliability, roads”. Here Mongolia ranks at 87th just ahead of Vietnam.

This indicator is a bit puzzling, but I would imagine that Mongolia may do poorly in water & sanitation, roads while it should score quite well (in comparison to other countries with a similar subindicator score) on literacy, internet access.

Mongolia’s ranking is virtually unchanged from 2012. In looking at the subindicators, it seems to me that the “public service” score may increase in the future as this includes a number of areas that are being addressed actively by government policy, while the uneven development indicator may be unlikely to budge. Poverty and economic decline may also change from its current, fairly positive position (56th, 4.7) if there was a long-term downturn in commodity prices that would undermine Mongolia’s tax revenues and growth from natural resource projects. Many of the other subindicators also seem like they are likely to be stable for the foreseeable future.

Posted in Democracy, Development, Global Indices, Governance, Inequality, JD Democratization, Politics, Population, Security Apparatus, Social Issues, Social Movements | Tagged | Leave a comment

Seeking Research Collaborator on Education

Looking for a Research Collaborator for Small Project on Private Education in Ulaanbaatar

I have heard some reports about the mushrooming of private primary and secondary schools in Ulaanbaatar. These schools seem to fall on a very wide spectrum from posh schools that are aiming at a mix of expatriate and wealthy Mongolian students to small, low-fee schools in ger districts. Estimates point to around 200 schools of various kinds, but there seems to be very little detailed information.

I am now planning a small research project that would essentially aim to conduct a census of these private schools in Ulaanbaatar. Beyond producing a more accurate estimate of the actual number of institutions, I would hope to get basic information on the number of students, fees involved, curricula followed, etc.

I’m hoping to complete this census in the next 12 months and will apply for funding to do so. If there are any graduate students in North America or Europe who would be interested in such a project, I would be very happy to collaborate. Collaboration would focus on planning for data collection, data collection itself and write-up of any noteworthy results.

I will also be looking for a collaborating graduate student or junior faculty member based in Mongolia to assist in data collection.

If you’re interested, please drop me an email (julian[dot]dierkes(at)ubc[dot]ca))

Posted in Education, Primary and Secondary Education, Research on Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar | Tagged | Leave a comment

Mongolian Presidential Election Ends in Ruling Democratic Party’s Favor

On July 3, the Mongolian parliament endorsed Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj’s second term as the country’s president, based on the General Election Commission’s report (Press Release of the Mongolian parliament, July 3). The swearing-in ceremony will be organized on July 10, on the eve of the three-day national holiday, Naadam.
According to the General Election Commission, the incumbent President Elbegdorj, nominated by the Democratic Party (DP), was re-elected by a narrow majority of 50.23 percent in the first round. The opposition Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) nominee Member of Parliament (MP) Badnaanyambuugyn Bat-Erdene received 41.97 percent; and the third candidate, Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) nominee Natsagyn Udval collected 6.5 percent of votes. Turnout was 66.5 percent (http://www.gec.gov.mn/election2013/flashresults.html). The opposition parties have acknowledged the DP victory, thus creating a stable political atmosphere and ruling out any claims for a run-off election (Ugluunii Sonin, 24tsag.mn, June 28).
This was the first Mongolian election monitored by the Election Observation Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) since Mongolia became an OSCE member on November 21, 2012. Despite some areas needing improvement, the OSCE observers concluded the election was competitive and free in their interim report (http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/103142). By highlighting the areas still in need of improvement, the OSCE election monitoring mission’s report will provide extra leverage to Mongolian political leaders who are working to improve the country’s democratic political institutions. Moreover, the OSCE’s involvement will almost certainly help to enhance mutual understanding between Mongolia and its European partners.
As a result of the presidential election, the DP will dominate Mongolian politics until 2016 and continue to play a determinative role in directing major political and socio-economic policies. In addition to a majority in the parliament, DP currently holds the posts of parliamentary chairman, prime minister, as well as president. Moreover, the DP controls the governorships and boards of citizens’ representatives of most provinces as well as the capital city, Ulaanbaatar. Nevertheless, Elbegdorj’s pre-campaign strategy and actions actually highlighted his party’s internal challenges to present the DP as a transparent, responsible, and democratic political force. These challenges include a separation of legislative and executive bodies, upholding the rule of law, and overhauling the country’s mining policies.
The separation of Mongolia’s legislative and executive branches has become blurred since the end of the 1990s, as successive majority and coalition parties have had to defend their fragile cabinets. Although Elbegdorj criticized and rejected endorsing a number of cabinet members of the MPP-led governments, he has remained silent when his own party filled 17 out of 19 cabinet posts with serving parliamentarians. The opposition and the public have called on a clearer separation between the legislative and executive branches in order to improve government accountability and transparency. To satisfy their demands, just before the presidential election, Elbegdorj submitted a draft bill that would only allow the prime minister to simultaneously serve in the cabinet and as an active member of parliament. The chairman of the parliament agreed to discuss the bill, but even if passed and signed into law, the actual separation would not apply until the cabinet following the 2016 parliamentary elections (MONTSAME News, June 10). In order to hold the fragile coalition government together, the DP is unlikely to separate the legislative and executive authorities.
Another major reform initiated and strongly advocated by Elbegdorj has been judicial reform and countering corruption. Because of its politicization by the political parties, the influence of various business factions, and a lack of long-term vision since the beginning of the 1990s, the judiciary has become one of the main obstacles for the consolidation of new political institutions. Meanwhile, corruption has become a widespread social phenomenon. Under Elbegdorj’s presidency, comprehensive judicial reform has begun and the Independent Authority against Corruption began investigating high-ranking government officials, including former President Nambaryn Enkhbayar, parliamentarians, governors and officials of state-owned enterprises (e.g., Mongolian Airlines and the Erdenet copper mine). However, both the politicization of the judiciary and the targeting of opposition party-affiliated members in corruption cases have come under criticism from the opposition parties and the public. In a long overdue response, the DP took some measures to answer this criticism just before the presidential election. Prime Minister Norovyn Altankhuyag sacked one of his deputies in the Government Secretariat in light of a corruption investigation, and the General Prosecutor’s Office permitted the anti-corruption agency to investigate incumbent MP Sangajav Bayartsogt’s offshore income case (MONTSAME News, June 13; NEWS.mn, June 28). The latter’s offshore account was disclosed earlier this year by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/apr/03/offshore-secrets-owners-unmasked).
The unfinished business of Elbegdorj’s first term is the reform of mining regulations. Using his authority as the head of the National Security Council, the president suspended the issuance and processing of both mining and exploration licenses in 2010 until comprehensive revisions were made to the existing regulations (see EDM, March 6). Although the presidential administration has taken the lead in revising Mongolia’s mining regulations, its first draft encountered criticism from miners and investors for increasing the state’s involvement as well as creating unclear procedures for redistributing mining licenses. Because of the growing influence of entrepreneurs and pro-business factions in the political parties—especially of the DP and MPP—and parliament (the 2012–2016 parliament has the largest, visible representation of business leaders), the presidential office seems to be caught between business interests and public pressure for “responsible mining.” Since 2010, several officials of the Mineral Resources Authority of Mongolia (MRAM) have been prosecuted for corruption charges; but, notably, these measures were only applied to activities in the last two years and against officials affiliated with the MPP (see EDM, March 6).
These challenges will continue to test Elbegdorj during his “lame duck” term. However, with the growing importance of Mongolia’s natural resources and commitment to democracy, he will continue to play an important role in the foreign policy realm. And, thanks to the increase in state funds (particularly from the operation of major mines like Oyu Tolgoi and Tavan Tolgoi), Elbegdorj will not face major obstacles to fulfilling his pledges to provide financial assistance to students, mothers, the elderly and public servants. His fights against alcoholism, protection of the environment, and for direct democracy will earn him extra points. But the public will judge most closely how he deals with factional interests both within and outside his own party: separating legislative and executive authority, reforming the judiciary and eradicating corruption, as well as establishing a comprehensive legal regime for responsible mining.
Note: re-posted with the permission of the Eurasia Daily Monitor of the Jamestown Foundation, for the original news, Eurasia Daily Monitor (July 8, 2013) – link

 

Posted in Democracy, Elections, Party Politics, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | Leave a comment

Vote Shares by Regions

Among the data that the General Election Commission has made available quickly is the breakdown by Aimag and Ulaanbaatar ridings.

It’s quite clear from a glance that Elbegdorj has won this election on the strength of his showing in the capital, but there are other patterns in the regional distribution as well.

[In the discussion below, I have rounded some figures resulting from re-calculations. I have based these calculations on the data supplied by the GEC and would be happy to send the spreadsheet that I’ve assembled to anyone to check my calculations.]

MPRP – Udval

Let’s first look at Udval’s result for the election. With just over 80,000 voters, Udval received 6.5% of the votes nationwide.

Udval received the most votes in Arkhangai (12.98%), Bulgan (10.29%), and Selenge (9.79%). This shows a bit of a regional concentration in that these are neighbouring aimags to the West and North of Ulaanbaatar. She received the least votes Khentii (2.55%), the Bagakhangai district of Ulaanbaatar (3.02%), and Zavkhan (3.04%). Noticeable among these is Khentii, Bat-Erdene’s home province where he did extremely well. This relationship suggests that Udval and Bat-Erdene split votes in many jurisdictions.

In terms of the absolute number of votes – the only figure that matters for the outcome of the election – Udval received the most votes in the Ulaanbaatar city districts of Songinokhairkhan, Bayanzurkh, and Bayangol. If we add up her votes from the big six city districts, these amount to over 30,000 out of her total of over 80,000.

MPP – Bat-Erdene

 Bat-Erdene received by far the greatest share of the vote in his home province of Khentii with 62.5%. In the home province race, he thus beat Elbegdorj for whom 61.17% of his fellow Khovd-ians voted. Surely the MPP supporters in Bat-Erdene’s hometown of Omnodergel – shown here at their final rally on Monday evening on a hill overlooking their broad valley – were among those Khentii voters supporting Bat-Erdene.

After Khentii, Bat-Erdene’s highest vote shares were from Sukhbaatar aimag (54.49%), and from Dundgobi (53.81%). Note that Bat-Erdene received high shares of votes all across the Gobi desert, that is across the South of the country.

In addition to his top three vote getters, he won a majority of the vote in Dornogobi, Bagakhangai, and Tov, six electoral districts in total. But these districts where Bat-Erdene won a majority only add up to 76,500 votes.

Beyond these six districts, Bat-Erdene won a plurality of votes in Gobi-Sumber, Baganuur, Bulgan, and Gobi-Altai. If we add these to the districts where he won a majority, these votes total 109,000 or less than 20% of his nation-wide vote total.

Numerically, Bat-Erdene (like the other candidates) won the most votes in the six big city districts. These total to 205,000 or roughly 40% of his nationwide votes.

DP – Elbegdorj

Elbegdorj received his highest share of votes among the diaspora, at 64.57%, followed by Khovd (61.17%) and the Bayangol city district (57.08%). He won a majority in these three districts and 11 more: Bayanzurkh, Sukhbaatar district, Khan-Uul, Songinokhairkhan, Chingeltei, Bayan-Olgi, Dornod, Khuvsgul, Orkhon, Nalaikh, and Darkhan-Uul. These majority districts add up to 427,000 votes just over two thirds of his total of 623,000.

Districts were Elbegdorj won a plurality of votes are: Zavkhan, Bayankhongor, Selenge. Majority and plurality districts added together contributed 479,000 votes or more than 3/4 of his total.

Beyond the city districts, Elbegdorj did particularly well in the West (Khovd, Bayan-Olgi, Khuvsgul, though not in Gobi-Altai where the DP has never fared very well.

The lowest share of votes for the DP came from Khentii (33.37%), Dundgobi, and Dornogobi.

Ulaanbaatar vs. Countryside

The DP has done far better in the city than in the countryside in past elections. While there are pockets of DP support outside of Ulaanbaatar, the large number of voters in the city (even outpacing turnout in the countryside) helped Elbegdorj to his overall win. If we add all the Ulaanbaatar city districts together, these contributed roughly half (306,000) of his overall votes. This compares with 218,000 votes for Bat-Erdene and 32,000 votes for Udval. The difference between Bat-Erdene and Elbegdorj amounts to 88,000 votes nearly totalling the overall differences between their votes (102,000). If we compare vote shares for all the city districts combined, Elbegdorj received 55%, Bat-Erdene 39.19% and Udval 5.8%.

If we add all the non-Ulaanbaatar districts minus the diaspora, respective shares are 47.36% for Elbegdorj, 45.4% for Bat-Erdene, 7.25% for Udval. Using this same definition of country vs. city, 54.23% of all votes were cast outside of Ulaanbaatar.

While Elbegdorj clearly performed better in the city, he still won a plurality of countryside votes, beating Bat-Erdene by 13,000 votes.

Posted in Democratic Party, Elections, JD Democratization, Mongolian People's Party, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Party Politics, Politics, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | 1 Comment

Digesting the Results of the Presidential Election

I will be updating, changing, adding to and deleting from this post continuously this morning (June 27 in Ulaanbaatar) as I sort my thoughts and understanding of the result of the presidential election.

At 8:30h it seems like the GEC is set to announce preliminary (I presume) results that make Elbegdorj a just-barely winner at 51% with Bat-Erdene getting 42% of the votes, and Udval 7%. All this on a low participation of record-low participation of 64%.

Predictions

In the run-up, I was quite hesitant to make predictions, in part because there is no systematic basis for such predictions in the absence of polls and social statistics. I did suggest some outcomes and here’s my brief list of I-told-you-sos:

  • Elbegdorj won, but barely
  • Udval would show around 8%
  • turn-out was a real issue

Puzzles

  • Turn-out: even lower than I expected and higher in Ulaanbaatar than country-side
  • Udval: result on the low end of expectation
  • Elbegdorj support: what worked in campaign, though absent exit polls, we won’t know

Results

I’ll try to pull together the actual figures as the GEC posts them or as they get picked up on-line.

A news.mn post offers numbers – though still incomplete – from this morning’s GEC announcement. A number of aimags were still missing and there now seems to be a GEC press conference planned for 11:30h.

It’s immediately obvious that Elbegdorj won big in Ulaanbaatar (with big numbers of citizens, of course). If we add the big six city districts (Bayangol, Bayanzurkh, Songinokhairkhan, Sukhbaatar, Khan-Uul, and Chingeltei) together, they gave Elbegdorj 530,000 votes compared to Bat-Erdene’s 290,000.

Implication

Stability, stability, stability! Isn’t that what happens when an incumbent is re-elected?

The very close result is not one that will obviously embolden Elbegdorj, nor his fellow DP leaders who may have an eye on the 2016 parliamentary election already. On the other hand, Elbegdorj hardly seems like a leader who will let himself be pushed into a lame duck position, just because this is his final term.

The most likely trajectory in the medium term is thus that Elbegdorj will continue to focus on the areas that he’s been somewhat focused on for the past four years and that are within the purview of the presidency: foreign relations and the judiciary. He will also continue to insert himself into governance questions at the highest level (especially Oyu Tolgoi), but also at a grass roots level through the citizens halls he has created.

Posted in Democratic Party, Elections, JD Democratization, Mongolian People's Party, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Party Politics, Politics, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | Leave a comment

Investigating the Rural Vote

Over the past weekend, I was very fortunate to have the chance to travel to Khentii Aimag and to speak to a number of locals. I was particularly interested in how the campaign messages of the three candidates played in the countryside and to what extent Mongolians in rural areas perceive politics to be focused too much on Ulaanbaatar.

Here, I am specifically investigating the views of two of the (reportedly) 50 million livestock living in Mongolia who are still disenfranchised by the Ulaanbaatar and androcentric election system.

Polling the Yak Vote

Photo by Marc Tasse, photo manipulation by Tillman Dierkes
Posted in Curios, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | Leave a comment