Is Udval in it for Real?

Posted on June 6, 2013 by JDierkes

Here are some speculative musings from around the international ger stove…

When the MPRP was deciding on whether to run a candidate in the election some weeks ago, there was a fair bit of speculation that this decision was a calculated one to extract concessions from either the DP or MPP in return for not running a candidate. This is what happened with the MNDP which first announced that it would run a candidate but then endorsed Elbegdorj. One might imagine that the DP offered concessions in cabinet or parliament.

However, the MPRP was unable to strike a deal at the time and nominated N Udval.

Now, there is some talk that perhaps Udval might not really carry through with her candidacy.

How Udval Might Withdraw

It’s still unclear to me what that means as a formal withdrawal is expressly prohibited by the election law (27.8), but I imagine that there could be some announcement of, “Oh, we’ve changed our mind, now we’re endorsing Elebgdorj/Bat-Erdene” from the MPRP. Udval would still appear on the ballot and probably receive some votes, but would not continue to contest the election.

Why Udval Might Withdraw

Such a withdrawal clearly only makes sense if the MPRP is able to strike a bargain with either the DP or the MPP.

Bargaining with the MPP

As the MPP is in disarray and out of power, the MPP currently has relatively little to offer, unless the MPRP was bargaining under the assumption that an MPRP endorsement for Bat-Erdene would be very likely to produce a Bat-Erdene election victory. If this were to come about, the victory will have hinged on the MPRP endorsement and concessions might be substantial.

Clearly, some kind of pardon for Enkhbayar is in the mix of discussions here.

However, as the president does appoint officials to a number of functions, especially in foreign policy and the judiciary, a significant number of positions could be at stake as well. Presumably, securing the presidency would offer a lot of potential appointments for the MPRP.

The longer term potential offer could also be some kind of re-merger of the MPP/MPRP with an eye toward the 2016 parliamentary election, though probably not much sooner as such a re-merger would imply either a grand coalition in parliament joined by the MPP or an awkward continuation of the current coalition despite a party realignment.

What would be the downside to the MPRP? Only the cabinet complications if Bat-Erdene wins. If Elbegdorj still wins despite an MPRP endorsement for Bat-Erdene, the DP would obviously be very displeased with the MPRP. That might mean no pardon for Enkhbayar (which Elbegdorj may be contemplating in any case, independent of any negotiations with the MPRP), and marginalization in cabinet, though the DP can’t really kick the MPRP out of the coalition.

Bargaining with the DP

The DP could obviously offer an Enkhbayar pardon (if that is not already a done deal). Beyond that most likely concessions would have to do with presidential appointments (as in the above scenario with the MPP), and possibly some realignment in cabinet.

By initially running Udval as a candidate, the MPRP would also have laid the groundwork to emphasize its independence for the 2016 Ikh Khural election, though that seems far off and whether voters will still remember this act of seeming defiance is unclear.

Concessions from the DP would also very much depend on Elbegdorj’s perception of his campaign chances. If he feels pretty confident, why offer any concessions to the MPRP and why not take his chances with voters? In a run-off, his chances would probably still be good, even if the MPRP were to endorse Bat-Erdene in this run-off. So if Elbegdorj is happy with his chances, he would seem unlikely to offer concessions.

This is especially true as Elbegdorj may not have much to offer in terms of concessions in parliament. While the DP appears to be united behind Elbegdorj, that might not mean that he has a lot of power to persuade other parts of the party, especially the parliamentary factions, to offer concessions on his behalf.

This speculation is further complicated by the on-going whispers about a post-election replacement of Altankhuyag as PM either in a negotiated fashion or through a party revolt. Given the precarity of the current cabinet arrangement, why would another faction leader saddle himself with a strengthened MPRP in cabinet just to support the president?

Another scenario would be that anyone who is scheming to replace Altankhuyag may try to secure the support of the MPRP in this scheme. In such a scenario this schemer might well be happy to offer concessions in a package for an Udval withdrawal & support for a run on the prime minister.

If Elbegdorj is worried about his campaign, of course, then concessions to the MPRP become much more likely.

MPRP Miscalculation

There is also an interpretation of the rumours about an Udval withdrawal that looks at her nomination as a miscalculation on part of the MPRP, namely that such a nomination would extract concessions, but in the end neither DP or MPP has bitten on that bait.

There may be some realization within the MPRP that Udval as a surrogate Enkhbayar may not be a very strong candidate, that concessions are not forthcoming and that some kind of withdrawal is thus a way to avoid an embarrassing showing in the election.

Conclusions?

In the above, I’ve tried to think through some of the political logic of various scenarios after running these thoughts by some trusted fellow observers of the political scene. I’m not (yet) in Mongolia to be able to pick up direct political vibes and thus can’t offer an assessment of the likelihood of any of these scenarios unfolding, but though that these discussions were worth sharing to offer more of an understanding of the current political dynamics.

Posted in Elections, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Party Politics, Politics, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | 2 Comments

Presidential Election Platforms

Posted on June 5, 2013 by JDierkes

[This post was researched and co-written by Brian White at The Mongolist blog.]

A cursory examination of the platforms of all three presidential candidates (incumbent Ts Elbegdorj, Member of Parliament B Bat-Erdene, and Minister of Health N Udval) gives the impression of considerable overlap in policy positions.

All the candidates intend to fight corruption, reform the judiciary, reduce partisan influence and improve services in governance, protect the environment, make effective use of natural resources, reduce alcoholism, promote investment in schools and hospitals, and continue a foreign policy of good relations with Russia and China and an active courting of “third neighbours.”

Note that of these general topics, it is only the areas of the judicial system and foreign relations that fall under the direct powers of the president, while the other policy areas frequently mentioned are areas where the president has at most persuasive powers.

There is so much overlap between the published platforms that it makes it difficult to pick out how these campaigns are different. But, examining the platforms point-by-point, they are not exactly the same. Each candidate emphasizes some areas more than others producing a distinct tone for each platform.

In terms of tone, Elbegdorj’s platform can be summed up by paraphrasing his opening campaign remarks with “we have done a lot, and we have much more to do.” It does not come across as negative or scary, and it is outward looking and future-oriented. This, obviously, is the campaign pitch of an incumbent who has had a relatively successful four years in office, not suffering any major scandals, and seeing his own party win the 2012 parliamentary election.

Bat-Erdene and Udval both start their platforms by outlining the many problems and dangers facing Mongolia. Minister Udval goes as far as outlining “five dangers” she’ll address as president. In general, both of the two challengers see uneven economic development, insidious foreign influence, corruption, a deteriorating environment, and social degradation as dangers to the future of the country.

It is easier to conceptualize the platforms by thinking of them as arranged on a spectrum from the most positive about the current state of affairs to Mongolia, to a more critical assessment. Elbegdorj is enjoying the benefits of incumbency by employing high-minded and positive (yet not terribly specific) rhetoric intended to inspire on one end. Bat-Erdene is then a few paces down the spectrum. He is using his public persona and status as a sports celebrity to express an inspiring message in safe policy areas like national pride but also employing a darker, scarier tone for more controversial policy areas such as the environment and mining. Udval is then at the other end predominantly focusing on the challenges and failures of the country and framing the future as full of dangers.

The considerable overlap in policy positions lends credence to arguments that the election will hinge on personality and perceptions of leadership ability. President Elbegdorj has the advantage of incumbency with a record of experience in national leadership positions. Mr. Bat-Erdene has much less experience, but has the advantage of personal charisma and celebrity. Minister Udval has much more professional and managerial experience than Mr. Bat-Erdene having served multiple times as a cabinet minister and the head of national organizations, but she lacks the benefit of President Elbegdorj’s incumbency and Mr. Bat-Erdene’s personal charisma and celebrity.

Platforms, of course, exist on paper, and each candidate’s position and areas of emphasis may evolve in the course of the campaign as they challenge each other publicly on specific issues. It is also important to remember that the president’s constitutional power is limited, and a candidate’s support of or opposition to issues in policy areas does not necessarily imply (s)he would have any ability to act on those preferences as president. The platforms are interesting reflections of the candidates’ personalities and the political parties’ priorities, but their effectiveness as a guide to how each will govern is arguably weak.

The candidate’s platforms are available here:

 

Posted in Corruption, Democracy, Democratic Party, Education, Elections, Foreign Policy, Health, Mongolian People's Party, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Party Politics, Policy, Politics, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | 6 Comments

I’m Still Thinking Run-Off…

Posted on June 3, 2013 by JDierkes

Mendee has posted some very good reasons why he thinks a run-off following the June 26 presidential election is unlikely. At least until we see another Sant Maral poll (I’m hoping there will be one more before the June 19 ban on further polling) that indicates tendencies and directions about voter preferences, I will stick with my earlier expectation (not prediction) of a run-off.

What Triggers a Run-Off?

There are actually two conditions under which additional voting is triggered, one that is focused on participation by electoral district, one that is focused on the vote share garnered by the winning candidate.

1. If fewer than 50% of the eligible voters in a given electoral district vote, there will be additional voting one week after the initial vote (ie July 3). [Article 61.7, Law on the Presidential Election of Mongolia] No matter whom voters have voted for in a given district (= roughly 800 to 3,500 voters), 50% of them have to cast a vote to validate that district’s result.

2. If no candidate receives more than 50% of the votes cast in the entire country, a run-off between the top two candidates will be held two weeks after the initial vote, i.e. July 10. [Article 62, Law on the Presidential Election of Mongolia]

I am interested in the second kind of run-off here, i.e. the leading vote-getter on June 26 only gets a plurality of votes, not a majority, triggering a run-off between the top two vote-getters, i.e. Ts Elbegdorj and B Bat-Erdene, unless something really dramatic (and unlikely) happens in the campaign.

Electoral Math

 Third (and more) Candidates

In my post previewing the election for the Financial Times’ ‘beyond BRICS’ blog, I had initially mistakenly written that N Udval was the first third candidate in a presidential election because the 2009 election when I was an election monitor only involved N Enkhbayar and Ts Elbegdorj.

Let’s quickly look at the vote share of 3rd and 4th candidates in previous elections (I’m taking all the figures below from the nicely organized Wikipedia pages on Mongolian presidential elections).

1997: 6.8% (J Gombojav, Mongolian Conservative United Party)
2001: 3.6% (L Dashnyam, Civil Will)
2005: 14.1% (B Jargalsaikhan, Republican Party); 11.5% (B Erdenebat, Motherland Party)

If we assume for a moment that there is some continuity in voters’ behaviour when faced with a choice of more than two candidates, independent of the party affiliation and the party candidates themselves, we would expect Udval to receive some share of the votes that lies between 3 and 15%, roughly. [If there are any election specialists out there, I would welcome comments on whether such an expectation of consistency across elections is reasonable.]

Thinking purely about the numbers then, every percentage point of votes that Udval receives, means that one of the two other candidates has to win that many more votes relative to the other candidate. If Udval wins 10% of the votes, for example, Elbegdorj would have to win over 56% to Bat-Erdene’s 44% among the remaining 90% of voters who didn’t vote for Udval in order to avoid a run-off. The number of votes Udval can garner thus has a significant impact on the likelihood of a run-off.

Put another way, winning candidates in multicandidate elections in the past have been able to avoid the run-off by decisively beating the 2nd place candidate.

1997: N Bagabandi’s 62.5% vs. P Ochirbat’s 30.6%
2001: N Bagabandi’s 59.2% vs. R Gonchigdorj’s 37.2%
2005: N Enkhbayar’s 54.2% vs. M Enkhsaikhan’s 20.2%

1997 and 2001 seem particularly relevant here as both elections involved three candidates and the 3rd candidates received relatively few votes, a scenario that is likely this year. In both elections, Bagabandi received around 60% of the votes.

Udval Candidacy

The question of how strong Udval will be as a candidate is what I devoted the first post in this series to. The early days of campaigning have not given any indication that she is building any significant momentum by turning out to be a candidate that holds a (surprising) appeal to any specific groups of voters. I will thus stick with my guess of a result of more than 3%, but probably less than 10% for her for the moment. Obviously, that is quite a range when taking the electoral math above into account.

Let’s look at results from last year’s parliamentary election as a guide. Udval appears to be widely perceived as a stand-in for Enkhbayar so we might assume that she will receive a good portion of the Enkhbayar loyalist vote. I also assume that most Enkhbayar loyalists are fairly motivated to vote as they are disgruntled about Enkhbayar’s fate. They may also be concentrated in the countryside where participation rates are higher.

To estimate the share of Enkhbayar/MPRP loyalists, it is the share in the popular vote in the parliamentary election that is relevant as direct mandates in specific ridings might be subject to a different dynamic. The Justice Coalition received 22.3% of the popular vote in the 2012 parliamentary election.

Obviously, these are not all MPRP or Enkhbayar loyalists as the Coalition also includes the Mongolian National Democratic Party and I don’t see any obvious way to take a guess at the share of the 22.3% that might have been MPRP vs. MNDP voters. However, my above estimate of 3-10% for Udval looks low when we look at the Justice Coalition’s 22.3% as that would suggest that as few as 10% or only as many as 40% of Justice Coalition voters were MPRP voters.

Despite the lack of excitement around Udval or her “Five Dangers” platform, the above does lead me to expect that she will get a share of the vote that might well force a run-off unless Elbegdorj can really outpoll Bat-Erdene.

Elbegdorj Candidacy

This is the part that makes me hesitate to actually predict a run-off rather than to merely think it likely. I think that Mendee is absolutely right that Elbegdorj may well campaign very effectively and simply win the election, no matter what mathematical hurdle the Udval candidacy throws in his way.

He could win the election by a) running a very strong campaign himself, b) Bat-Erdene’s campaign faltering, or c) (perhaps most likely) some combination of a) and b).

Obviously, Elbegdorj has been in Mongolian politics for a long time and has a lot of experience campaigning. He continues to be a rousing speaker, and Mongolians seem to find him engaging (if not personable) when they see him from afar or on TV, as well as more up close. His presidency has not seen any major scandals or disasters that are tied to him in any way. There are some areas where he will point to achievements. In the absence of any mistakes during his first term, Elebgdorj will presumably enjoy some incumbency bonus.

Bat-Erdene Candidacy

Unlike Elbegdorj, Bat-Erdene is relatively untested as a candidate. Yes, he’s been elected to parliament, of course. But, even in 2012, he was elected via the Khentii aimag constituency. In some local races, the campaign may well amount to perceptions of a candidate as strongly rooted locally (I imagine that Bat-Erdene’s wrestling career helped here, as wrestlers often seem to be closely identified with their aimag of origin), as well as face recognition. His election and re-election in Khentii thus doesn’t necessarily signal that he’s a strong campaigner in the way that Elebgdorj’s involvement in multiple national campaigns does.

It thus remains to be seen whether Bat-Erdene runs into any scandals or gaffes along the way in the campaign that seriously hurt his chances. And, as is evident from previous elections, a weak second choice can certainly propel a frontrunner past the 50% hurdle.

DP Strength

Finally, Mendee’s argument about the strength of the DP organization and its strength in various state bodies is very interesting and perhaps most worrying. This will be one of the important aspects to watch about this election. Policy differences between Elbegdorj and Bat-Erdene might not amount to very much, but an Elebgdorj win would clearly cement DP domination for the next three years. Mendee’s reference to the winner-take-all aftermath of the 1996 or 2000 elections is thus a warning sign of what may be going on at the moment. This surely deserves a post of its own, in addition to a focus on this topic on this blog and by election monitors.

Posted in Democratic Party, Elections, JD Democratization, Mongolian People's Party, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Party Politics, Politics, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | Leave a comment

Run-off Is Unlikely

Posted on May 28, 2013 by mendee

Politics in Mongolia is always interesting, dynamic, and puzzling – especially, towards  elections.  I like to challenge Julian’s earlier post about the potential for a run-off in the presidential election and argue that the incumbent has a strong likelihood of winning outright; therefore, runoff is unlikely.

Elebgdorj’s Popularity

First, President Elbegdorj, despite the small margin of victory over the MPP candidate in 2009, still leads the public opinion polls – regarded one of the strongest politicians.  Of course, with doubts in public opinion polls (without clear understanding of their methodology and degree of objectiveness), Elbegdorj appears to hold a relatively high ratings.

Second, Elbegdorj didn’t made any visible mistakes in last four years.  His attempts to strengthen the mining regime, to increase  public participation in the policy-making processes (e.g., Citizen’s Hall), to advocate the devolution of power to locality, to discourage alcohol consumptions, and to promote Mongolia’s international image (e.g., extensive travels, visibility in foreign media and forums) were important contributions to our democracy, governance, and sovereignty.

Third, his critical approach to the MPP-led government was appealing.  However, as the election nears, he seems to be caught up in constraints of the current political and economic structures.  He became noticeably silent about questionable behaviours of his former party (technically, he must be politically neutral when he is holding the power of presidency).  On these three points, he would easily get enough votes to secure his second term.

DP Dominance of the Political Structure

Then, there are reasonable beliefs about the DP dominance in the political structure – which provides protection at minimum and support at maximum.  Clearly, the DP is not playing by  key governance principles (e.g., rule of law, transparency, equal opportunity).  Following the MPRP’s ‘winner take all’ principle of 2000, the DP has already used similar tactics. Now we see repeated pattern of ‘winner take all’ from the DP take-over in 1996, the MPRP in 2000, and now in 2012.

First, the DP and its coalition didn’t consult with other political actors and public when changing the key electoral laws (Law on Local Elections and importantly, Law on the Presidential Election).

Second, the DP now took over all key agencies in charge of organizing, monitoring, and enforcing the elections.  DP-affilliated politicians are now heading the General Election Commission, the Police Department, the General Intelligence Agency, and Chief Prosector’s Office.  The DP has already taken over key state-owned enterprises and  financial institutions.  All these institutions, in principle, should be politically neutral and professionally administered.

Third, the majority of provinces are now lead by the DP-affilliated politicians.  Although it is difficult to know how much influence these DP-affilliated politicians are asserting at the local level, the likelihood is very high when one looks at behaviours of the DP politicians in the national government.

With his own mostly positive profile of the last four years and the DP’s dominance in  domestic politics, Elbegdorj is likely to win a  second term presidency; therefore, run-off appears to be unlikely – especially, when the economy is enjoying growth and bonds.

 

 

Posted in Democracy, Democratic Party, Elections, Mongolian People's Party, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Party Politics, Politics, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | 2 Comments

New Book: Does Everyone Want Democracy? Insights from Mongolia

Posted on May 28, 2013 by JDierkes

Does Everyone Want Democracy? Insights from Mongolia by Paula L.W. Sabloff. Left Coast Press 2013. 266 pp., 282 pp. / 6.00 x 9.00 / Apr, 2013, eBook (978-1-61132-719-9), Hardback (978-1-59874-565-8)

Do all people desire democracy? For over a century, the idea that democracy is a universal good has been an article of faith for American policymakers. Anthropologist Paula Sabloff challenges this conventional wisdom about who wants democracy and why. Starting with the psychological literature, she explains that certain values (personal dignity, self-determination, and justice) appear to be universally esteemed today, partly because they match up with some universal human such emotions as hope and fear. She argues that people can live these emotions and values better under democracy, which promotes economic and political freedom, than totalitarianism, which does not. Thus the principles of democracy may, indeed, be universal. However, the data collected from 1,283 interviews of Mongolian citizens suggest that how people want their government to act is idiosyncratic. Mongolians’ culture, history, current circumstances and future aspirations influence how they want government to support them and how they view their role in maintaining democracy.

The book begins with an historical chapter, for one cannot talk about governance in Mongolia without understanding Chinggis Khaan and his place in the hearts of Mongolians today. Photographs from the archives of the National Museum of Mongolian History illustrate the historical chapter.The book then describes people’s changing attitude toward human rights, political rights and freedoms, economic rights and freedoms, government’s responsibility toward its people and citizens’ responsibilities toward their government. Tables and original photographs illustrate this part of the text.

This fascinating study of Mongolia – feudal until it became the first country to follow Russia into communism and now struggling with post-socialist democratization – is a model for investigating how everyday people around the world actually think about and implement democracy on their own terms.

Paula L. W. Sabloff is a professor at the Santa Fe Institute. She is a political anthropologist who has conducted research in Mexico, the United States, and Mongolia. She has taught at the University of Pittsburgh and the University of Pennsylvania. She curated the exhibition “Modern Mongolia: Reclaiming Genghis Khan” at the University of Pennsylvania Museum and the National Museum of Natural History (Smithsonian Institution). She is editor of several books including Modern Mongolia: Reclaiming Genghis Khan (2001), Mapping Mongolia (2011), and Higher Education in the Post-Communist World (1998). She is currently applying network theory to Mongolian and Mexican databases.

Posted in Democracy, Elections, Governance, Politics, Publications, Research on Mongolia, Society and Culture | Tagged | Leave a comment

Foreign Policy Roundup #1: May 12-25, 2013

Posted on May 25, 2013 by miliate

This is the first in a bi-weekly to weekly series, that I am calling the Foreign Policy Roundup. In every roundup, I offer a very brief 1-2 sentence  summary of foreign policy news, followed by a link to the original article. Most of the articles are from Mongolian-language sources. As a non-native Mongolian speaker, I welcome comments on any mistakes, especially if I incorrectly translated ministry names or other governmental institutions. Future posts will include commentary on important developments and stories.

…………………..

5/12: Ts. Jambaldorj was named Mongolia’s representative to ASEAN. http://politics.news.mn/content/143834.shtml

5/12: The President of “Russian Railways”, V. Yakunin arrived in Mongolia and met with President Altanhuyag and Minister of Transportation, A. Gansukh, to discuss joint projects and planning. http://politics.news.mn/content/143838.shtml

5/13: Foreign Minister L. Bold met with the General Secretary of the OSCE, L. Zannier. During the meeting Zannier expressed his happiness that Mongolia had become an official member of the OSCE, and L. Bold thanked the organization for their help in organizing the Community of Democracies meeting.  http://www.mfa.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2436%3A2013-05-13-09-31-03&catid=43%3A2009-12-20-21-55-03&Itemid=62&lang=mn

5/13: State Secretary J. Bayartsetseg represented Mongolia at the UN General Assembly on the question of Human Trafficking, where he presented Mongolia’s legal measures to stop human trafficking. http://www.mfa.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2436%3A2013-05-13-09-31-03&catid=43%3A2009-12-20-21-55-03&Itemid=62&lang=mn

5/13: Mongolian Minister of Labor, Sanjmyatav signed an MOU with his South Korean counterpart on an official visit to the ROK. http://politics.news.mn/content/144145.shtml

5/14: Ministry of Justice State Secretary J. Bayartsetseg met with the director of the UN Drug Department Yu. Fedetov. During the meeting they discussed options to jointly address technical and legal issues on this topic. Drug trafficking’s connection to human trafficking and corruption was also mentioned. http://www.mfa.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2438%3A2013-05-14-07-04-59&catid=43%3A2009-12-20-21-55-03&Itemid=62&lang=mn

5/14: The Mongolian consulate in Eren, China (Inner Mongolia) met with Chinese officials to discuss a recent attack on a Mongolian citizen in the city. http://www.mfa.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2439%3A2013-05-14-08-12-43&catid=43%3A2009-12-20-21-55-03&Itemid=62&lang=mn

5/14: Mongolia’s Parliamentary Director, Z. Enkhbold received the North Korean ambassador, Hon Gyu. http://politics.news.mn/content/144164.shtml

5/14: Foreign Policy reported on a Mongolian-led project with Myanmar at Mozambique to form an group of resource-rich countries bordering on BRICS nations. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/14/mongolia_myanmar_mozambique_alliance_m3

5/20: The Senate Marshal of Poland’s Parliament, B. Borusevic, made an official visit to visit with members of the Mongolia’s Ikh Hural. This was his second visit to the country, and he commented on the remarkable changes he observed on Ulaanbaatar since 1999. Both sides noted the importance of Parliament-to-Parliament relations.  http://politics.news.mn/content/144851.shtml

5/21: During B. Borusevic’s visit, he signed off on four projects, dealing with Mongolia’s natural environment, child welfare, and “green development”. http://www.mfa.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2445%3A66-4-&catid=43%3A2009-12-20-21-55-03&Itemid=62&lang=mn

5/21: Deputy Minister D. Terbishdavga attended the 13th Mongolia-China Government Relations Commission in Beijing. http://politics.news.mn/content/144989.shtml

5/22: Parliament Director Z. Ekhbold met with CEO Mike Jones of Jenny Oil, where they discussed recent surveys in Mongolia. Survey research results indicated that Mongolian resources might be of higher quality than Arabian oil reserves. http://politics.news.mn/content/145199.shtml

5/22-5/24: Mongolia’s Minister of Transportation, A. Gansukh, was in Germany for the International Transport Forum. http://politics.news.mn/content/145461.shtml

5/24: Mongolian Minister of Energy, M. Sonompil, discussed energy issues in Vienna, Austria at the Austrian National Parliament. http://www.mfa.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2453%3A2013-05-24-07-23-16&catid=43%3A2009-12-20-21-55-03&Itemid=62&lang=mn

5/24-30: Vice President of the German Parliament, Edward Oswald, is on an official visit to Mongolia, during which he will be meeting with the Mongolia-Germany Parliamentary Working Group. http://politics.news.mn/content/145281.shtml

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Udval Candidacy

Posted on May 21, 2013 by JDierkes

It appears that the MPRP is pressing on with the nomination of Health Minister N Udval for the presidential election.

There had been some doubts about the sincerity of the nomination and speculation that the MPRP was merely trying to use the nomination as a bargaining chip with the DP and MPP, just as Enkhsaikhan had earlier in the month. While the official announcement from the General Election Commission won’t come until May 23, it now looks likely that the announcement will point to three candidates, Ts Elbegdorj (DP), B Bat-Erdene (MPP) and Udval (MPRP)

Significance of Udval Candidacy in Campaign and Election

While this is very significant in that Udval will be the first woman to run for president, what does her candidacy imply for the election?

The most likely impact may be that it will make the necessity of a run-off election between the top two candidates very probable.

Why? If past election results offer any guidance, Elbegdorj and Bat-Erdene are likely to be  close in the votes that they will garner. There’s nothing about either candidate that suggests at this point that this will be otherwise in this election.

In 2009, for example, Elbegdorj won with just over 51% of the votes against N Enkhbayar in an election where Enkhbayar clearly didn’t have the full support of the then-MPRP. The current scenario is similar in that Bat-Erdene has the full support of the MPP, but Udval will collect some of the votes that Enkhbayar received in 2009. These votes will come disproportionately from the MPP, rather than the DP, but there may also be some DP and coalition-supporters who could conceivably vote for Udval.

Support for Udval

How many votes will Udval get? This has to be a very speculative discussion at this point, in part because Udval had not really been anticipated as a likely candidate (the Sant Maral Foundation did not include questions about her in the PolitBarometer, for example) and in part because a three-way race may well change the dynamics of the campaign in a significant way. Also, it’s unclear whether Udval’s candidacy might attract significant support from women voters. In the past, there don’t seem to have big blocks of women voters for one candidate or another, but that may not be a reason for such a block or voting differentials to emerge in this election. Not only is Udval a female candidate, but she is the Minister of Health, an issue that is ranked higher in importance by women around the world. Of course, she has been a relatively quiet member of cabinet and is really primarily seen as a stand-in and loyal supporter of Enkhbayar.

Given the perception of Udval as a stand-in for Enkhbayar it is to be expected that Enkhbayar loyalists will vote for her, especially if a run-off is likely. If the campaign leads to an expectation of a run-off then an Udval vote is low-risk for an Enkhbayar supporter who might otherwise prefer Bat-Erdene to Elbedorj.

Given the MPRP’s electoral success in last year’s parliamentary election and other potential supporters for Udval, it strikes me as unlikely that she would received fewer than 5% of the vote.

Electoral Math

It seems to me that Udval is likely to gain more than 5%, but that a share much beyond 12% is unlikely. That, however, implies the necessity of a run-off.

Why? For argument’s sake, let’s assume that Udval wins 10%. That leaves 90% of the votes to be distributed (to avoid a run-off, a candidate needs 50% +1 votes of the valid votes, I believe). For Elbegdorj (who continues to look like the likely winner) that would imply he would have to win approximately 55% of the remaining votes vs. Bat-Erdene’s 45%.

Given past differentials and the current look of the Elbegdorj-Bat-Erdene race, it strikes me as somewhat unlikely (but entirely possible) that Elbegdorj would receive that many of the non-Udval votes. The campaign seems set to unfold primarily on personality issues and here it seems unlikely that either Elbegdorj or Bat-Erdene is going to make enough headway to really distance himself from the other candidate.

While they are very different personalities, Elbegdorj primarily ran on his oratory skills and “clean government” claims in 2009 along with a Obamaesque message of hope and change. He is gearing up for a very similar campaign now.

Bat-Erdene, on the other hand, is largely relying on his wrestling-fame and reputation as someone who is in touch with and supportive of “traditional Mongolian values”. His only major policy initiative has been the “Law with the Long Name” which remains mired in implementation struggles.

Neither of these profiles currently, i.e. ahead of the beginning of the official campaign, looks like it will produce a margin of victory that would avoid the run-off.

This in turn would lead me to conclude – tentatively and for the moment – that a three-way race under the current circumstances looks to make a run-off election (on July 10) very likely.

Note

Note that my fellow bloggers disagree with some aspects of this analysis. I would therefore particularly welcome comments, especially on the potential power of Udval’s campaign as well as the math involved in a run-off.

Posted in Elections, Gender, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Party Politics, Politics, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | 2 Comments

Book Chapter: Democracy and Risk

Posted on May 14, 2013 by JDierkes

Democracy and Risk: Mongolians’ Perspective

Paula Sabloff in J. Dierkes, ed. Change in Democratic Mongolia – Social Relations, Health, Mobile Pastoralism, and Mining Leiden: Brill.

Brill: Change in Democratic Mongolia“Democracy and Risk” uses statistical analysis to suggest correlation between Mongolians’ evaluation of democracy and their concerns about the future. Those who say that democracy is good for Mongolia or that Mongolia will be able to sustain democracy also say that they expect their country and their family to survive or thrive in the new capitalist system. Those who state that democracy has bad traits or that it will not work in Mongolia are frequently pessimistic about the country’s economic future. Based on a subset of 1,283 open-ended interviews conducted among voting-age citizens in 1998 and 2003, this analysis contradicts other social scientists’ and policy-makers’ idea that democracy can only survive in a nation that has already reached a certain level of economic development. Maintaining democracy seems to be linked more with education level than economic level. And socialism left Mongolia with a very high literacy rate (ca. 98 percent).

Paula Sabloff writes further:

Since writing this chapter, I have had two thoughts about the relationship between democracy and risk. First, I wonder if some Mongolians were optimistic because they expected the country’s rich mineral deposits would soon boost the Mongolia’s GDP and all citizens would benefit. And second, the more I read, the more I believe that risk is another human universal–like a sense of fairness and resistance to dominance. If all humans have the innate ability to project into the future (which they do), then we all think about the future, and future thinking is one mode of thought that permeates our ideas of governance.

Posted in Book: Change in Democratic Mongolia, Democracy, Governance, Public Opinion, Research on Mongolia, Social Issues | Tagged | 1 Comment

The Mongolian Presidency

Posted on May 13, 2013 by JDierkes

As three parties in the Ikh Khural have now nominated candidates for the presidential election to be held on June 26 (DP: Ts Elbegdorj; MPP: B Bat-Erdene; MPRP: N Udval), it might be useful to review the role of the president in Mongolia’s democracy to understand the nature of the looming campaign.

Powers of the President

When a new constitution was adopted in 1992, it set up a bit of a mixture of a presidential and a parliamentary system.

To offer some quick comparisons, the Mongolian president is less powerful than the U.S. or French president, but more powerful than the German president or the Canadian Governor General. The Mongolian prime minister is less powerful than a German chancellor, or a Canadian or British prime minister, but more powerful than the French prime minister. The Mongolian semi-presidential system is more similar to hybrid systems in Central and Eastern European, and the Baltic states.

The Mongolian presidency is endowed with a symbolic, ceremonial role as a head of state and at the same time, with ‘checks and balance’ responsibilities in legislative, executive, and judicial affairs of the state.  In legislative affairs, the president has ceremonial duties (e.g. summoning the first openning session of the parliament) as well as significant powers over the legislative process.  The president has the right to initiate legislation, to veto (partially and fully), to bring any issues concerning domestic and foreign policies to the parliament (at any time), and to dismiss the parliament if it fails to appoint a Prime Minister within 45 days of the initial nomination).

Although the President has a limited powers over the executive, parliament requires consent (endorsement) from the President to appoint the Prime Minister,  and members of the cabinet.  The President has a unique entitlement to give directions to the Prime Minister on issues pertaining to national security, foreign policies, national unity, and other areas, to require the Prime Minister’s reports on implementation of his directives, and to attend Cabinet meetings.

If the President perceives the Prime Minister and his cabinet to be pursuing policies contravening parliament-approved domestic and foreign policies, or the government action plan and/or fail to implement Presidential directive, the President has the right to introduce a motion of no confidence to the parliament.

Presidential power is most significant when it comes to the judicial system.  These powers include the nomination of three out of nine members of the Constitutional Court,  the Prosecutor General and Deputy Prosecutors to the Parliament, to appoint/relieve members of the General Council of the Courts as well as judges at all level.

In addition, three other domains increase the President’s responsibility significantly.  The first is the position as Head of National Security Council, which is the highest consultative body of the government to discuss issues pertaining to national security matters.  The President, as a head of this consultative body, which includes the Speaker of the Parliament and Prime Minister, calls for meetings and issues directives for any government entities.  It also adds an institutional capacity for the President through the Office of the National Security Council and by requiring key government officials to report to the Council.

Second, the President is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.  This includes the right to appoint the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (in consultation with the parliament), to maintain control of the Armed Forces during war time and national emergencies, to declare national emergencies and mobilization, and to approve key documents concerning the structure and employment of the military force.

The final area of presidential power is foreign policy.  As head of state, the President represents the state in the international arena, appoints ambassadors, and recognizes foreign ambassadors.

Election Procedures

Posted in Democracy, Foreign Policy, Governance, JD Democratization, Judiciary, Law, Politics, Presidential 2013, Public Service | Tagged | 3 Comments

Major Revision of Mongolian Mining Regulations Is Underway

Posted on May 11, 2013 by mendee

The first public debate on the proposed revisions of Mongolia’s mining regulations was conducted at the Citizen’s Hall of the Mongolian government on January 18, 2013. Although the revisions are long overdue, legislators appear to be in agreement that more deliberations are necessary in order to reflect the concerns and suggestions of miners, investors and the public prior to submitting the final bill to the parliament. As stressed by Tsagaan Puntsag, the head of the presidential office, lawmakers avoided politicizing the revisions, opting instead to push for a more comprehensive, long term regulatory framework (Minutes of Debate, Citizen’s Hall of Mongolia, www.irgen.org).

Since 1994, the Mongolian parliament has revised the mining regulations several times to attract foreign investments in the 1990s and later to ameliorate domestic concerns over corruptions and irresponsible mining activities in 2000–2010. Although the Mongolian government concluded the first major investment agreement with the Western companies Rio Tinto and Ivanhoe Mines Ltd. over the Oyu Tolgoi copper deposits in 2009 (Press Releases of the Mongolian Government, Rio Tinto, October 6, 2009), the country’s mining sector has experienced three major challenges.

The foremost issue of concern is environmental damage. Due to loose environmental standards and limited bureaucratic capacity to enforce environmental laws and regulations, artisanal mining—which began with the government’s “Gold program” in 1990—as well as exploration and mining activities by domestic and foreign companies have caused extensive environmental harm. In particular, herders experienced increased pollution of their normal water sources and pastures. Pushed by demands from environmental and local activists, the parliament quickly approved the Law on the Prohibition of Minerals Exploration in Water Basins and Forested Areas (known as Law with the Long Name) in 2009. Under the law, the government cancelled over 200 mining and exploration licenses that operate within 200 meters from water and forest sources (http://politics.news.mn/content/110242.shtml). However, this sudden measure caused intense opposition from miners while raising public expectations for stricter enforcement and revisions in the major mining and environmental legislation.

Corruption is the second challenge. As a result of the politicization of the public service and transitional difficulties experienced by the judiciary and bureaucracy, corrupt practices became widespread in the government agencies—in particular, the provincial authorities as well as the Mineral Resources Authority of Mongolia (MRAM), which oversees mining licenses. According to various corruption assessments, the mining sector was regarded as one of the sources for corruption (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADE136.pdf). A recent trial of a number of MRAM officials illustrates this widespread corruption. After a yearlong investigation, the former director and officials of MRAM were sentenced for illegally issuing 120 mining licenses, including the extension of four licenses of the SouthGobi Sands Company (News.mn, Bloomberg, January 31). Although some suspect the investigation was one sided and politically motivated—and clearly only addressed activities from the last two years—it will certainly appease the public’s call for transparency and accountability in mining licenses.

Local communities as well as domestic businesses have generated the final challenge. Under current mining regulations, local communities who are most affected by mining activities are left out of the decision-making process. Moreover, small- and medium-sized mining companies contribute less to local economic development, but their activities cause more local damage given the weak environmental protection regime and limited state capacity to deal with irresponsible mining practices. In comparison to the 1990s, domestic business entrepreneurs and entities have increased their demands that the government support their initiatives to play a broader role in the mining sector. For example, a consortium of Mongolian companies was established in 2010 to participate in major mining projects such as the Tavan Tolgoi coal deposit (Unuudur, November 24, 2010). Furthermore, the Mongolian business community increasingly demands legal mandates that would force foreign investors to contract with local businesses.

In response to these challenges, President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj suspended the issuance and processing of both mining and exploration licenses in 2010, until comprehensive revisions were made to the existing regulations. The presidential decision was subsequently endorsed by members of the National Security Council and the parliament (Parliamentary Resolutions to Extend Suspension of License Issuance in 2010, 2011, 2012, Legal Data Base of the Government, www.legalinfo.mn). Consequently, the earlier working group on mining law revision was expanded to include parliamentarians, government officials and experts and began to work under the auspices of the presidential office from 2011.

Unlike earlier mining legislation, the current law-making procedure has several unique features. First, Mongolia is relying heavily on its own experts and experience of mining in comparison with its reliance on foreign experts in the mid-1990s. The lawmaking capacity of the government bureaucracy was also noticeably enhanced by the inclusion of professionals educated in developed countries, in particular Australia. Moreover, the government has accumulated substantial experience in dealing with both foreign and domestic investors at different scales. Second, as indicated by the president and working group members, Mongolia has studied the practices of resource-based economies like Australia, Canada and Scandinavia, in addition to the examples of Chile and other developing states (http://president.mn/eng/newsCenter/viewEvent.php?cid=&newsId=711&newsEvent=). Third, the lawmaking process has been very inclusive and avoids the dangers of politicization. By comparison, the Windfall Profit Tax Law (2006), the strategic deposit amendment to the Mining Law (2006), the Law with the Long Name (2009), and the Strategic Entities Foreign Investment Law (2012) were passed with little deliberation and limited consultation from miners, activists and the public because the law-making process was driven by the political calculations of parties and politicians. This time, the draft was debated at the National Security Council, parliamentary standing committee and, importantly, the Citizens’ Hall since April 2011. The Citizens’ Hall, established by the presidential office in 2009, is a key venue to facilitate public deliberations on the revision of the mining law. Meanwhile, in order to address public concerns, the working group has engaged civil society activists, local governments, government agencies and various professional organizations.

The new mining law will introduce stricter environmental requirements (in particular relating to mine closures and rehabilitation), increased local participation by delegating the initial approval authority to local communities, improved control and enforcement by the government bureaucracy (especially in license issuance), and greater requirements for local development and local sourcing. Broad agreement exists on the need for comprehensive revisions to the mining law, although some criticism remains over the new proposed license classifications and increased role for government as well as local community participation. Nevertheless, the government is finally responding to public discontent over the consequences of decades of weak mining regulations. Consequently, Mongolia will likely avoid both resource nationalism as well as the resource curse.

Note: re-posted with the permission of the Eurasia Daily Monitor of the Jamestown Foundation, for the original news, Eurasia Daily Monitor (March 6, 2013) – link

Posted in Corruption, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Governance, Law, Mining, Oyu Tolgoi, Social Movements | Tagged | 2 Comments

Electing a President in Mongolia

Posted on May 10, 2013 by JDierkes

Campaigning

Parties cannot spend more than T5bil (approx. C$3.5mil), candidates no more than T3bil. Individuals may donate up to T10mil (approx. C$7,000), corporations up to T50mil.

The public broadcaster provides free of charge time slots to candidates for election messages.

Campaigning ends at midnight starting the day before the election, i.e. there is no campaigning for the final 32 hrs. before polling stations open.

The Election

Mongolian voters, i.e. citizens over 18 years old, pick a presidential candidate directly. 1,900,487 voters are eligible to vote. They will identify themselves using biometric id cards which have been issued for the past three years and should be nearly universal by now. Voters vote in their place of residence.

Electronic vote counting machines will be in use again for this election, as they were for last year’s parliamentary election.

Highlights of Voting

The candidates must be at least 45 years old and only parties represented in parliament can nominate candidates.

A run-off election between the top two candidates (if there are more than two) is held if neither received a majority of votes (i.e. 50% + 1). The run-off is held two weeks after the first round.

At least 50% of registered voters must turn out to vote to validate the election. This is a requirement by polling station, not for the nationwide vote. If this 50% threshold is not reached at a given polling place, additional voting seven days after the first round by voters who had not voted in the first round will be added to the result of the first round.

See an earlier post for the timetable of the election.

Posted in Democracy, Elections, Governance, Party Politics, Politics, Presidential 2013 | Tagged | 1 Comment

Turkish Prime Minister’s Visit to Mongolia

Posted on May 9, 2013 by mendee

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Mongolia last month (April 11–12) is likely to result in closer bilateral economic cooperation in addition to the two countries’ already well-established cultural, educational and security ties. As is traditional for Turkish high-level guests to Mongolia, Prime Minister Erdogan visited the Tonyukuk monuments near the capital city. He also opened the Konya Cultural Center and Mosque and attended the opening ceremony of Ankara Boulevard in Ulaanbaatar (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia, Press Release, April 12). During Erdogan’s visit, both sides agreed to increase the number of direct commercial flights between Istanbul and Ulaanbaatar (with a stop-over in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan), to implement a reciprocal visa exemption (within 30 days) policy, as well as to expand their cooperation in construction (i.e., housing and highways), leather processing and tourism (Joint Statement, April 18). The visit and resulting set of agreements demonstrates Ulaanbaatar’s desire to expand its bilateral relations with Ankara—which it regards as one of Mongolia’s most important “third neighbors” that can support its commitment toward democracy and development.

Even though both countries had recognized one another in 1969, Mongolian-Turkish bilateral relations were essentially non-existent until the end of the Cold War. Following Mongolia’s political and economic liberalization, relations developed gradually in several areas—particularly in politics, security, culture and education. The exchange of high-ranking dignitaries, including presidents, prime ministers, and parliamentary speakers, has become normalized. Resident ambassadors were posted in 1996–1997. These concrete government-to-government contacts opened up the possibilities for reciprocal political support between the two countries in the international arena. Illustratively, Turkish support was instrumental in bringing Mongolia into the post–Cold War international system, which is largely dominated by developed democracies. The most recent example of this was Turkey’s political support for Mongolia’s full accession to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2012 (http://www.osce.org/cio/97372).

Closely related to their bilateral political cooperation, Turkey also provides significant assistance to Mongolia’s military and police forces. Since 2003, the two countries have institutionalized their defense cooperation through various joint agreements. Today, both militaries carry out annual high-ranking military exchanges, staff talks, peacekeeping/counter-terrorism exercises, and military training and educational assistance programs. Since 2000, 70 Mongolian military personnel (Author’s interview with Mongolian Ministry of Defense, April 18) and 42 police officers graduated from various Turkish military and police academies; 36 Mongolian police officers are currently training in Turkey. Additionally, 332 Mongolian police personnel attended various short-term training courses in Turkey since 1997 (Embassy of Mongolia in Ankara—Press Release, December 22, 2012). The Mongolian police forces had been in dire need of Western-style training and education because Western states provide less educational assistance for local law enforcement forces than the military. Consequently, Turkey is one of the greatest contributors to Mongolian police reform and education.

Moreover, as one of the largest land force contributors to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Turkey is a vital source of knowledge for the Mongolian military as it seeks to adopt NATO operational and training standards. Turkey was one of the key supporters, along with Belgium, Luxemburg and Germany, of including Mongolia in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program (Author’s interviews, Ulaanbaatar, June, 2010). Lately, Turkey has also played a supporting role for Mongolia to become a partner in NATO missions across the globe, and in 2012, Ulaanbaatar signed the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program with the Alliance (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_85430.htm). Today, Mongolia is a force provider for the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan; therefore, there is an operational need for Mongolia and Turkey to collaborate more often.

Perhaps the most readily apparent connection between Mongolia and Turkey is a shared cultural history. Many monuments recovered in Mongolia attract Turkish visitors due to their mutual significance for both nations. Among the best known include the monuments in memory of Gokturk Empire rulers Bilge Kagan (684–734 CE) and his brother Kul Tigin (684–731), located near Kharkhorin, the capital of the 13th-century Mongolian Empire. Likewise, the monument to Tonyukuk, a military and political figure of the Gokturk Empire, located near Ulaanbaatar, similarly annually draws tourists from Turkey (Today’s Zaman, April 22). To help preserve this common heritage, since 1994, The Turkish Cooperation and Developmental Agency (TIKA) provided over $30 million of assistance for various projects to preserve and to study the historical Mongolian monuments that are also linked to Turkey’s past (Turkish Foreign Ministry—Background Notes on Bilateral Relations).

While this shared cultural heritage contributes to warm bilateral relations, Turkish assistance and cooperation in the area of education has played the most critical role in bringing understanding and awareness between the two distinct societies (notably, unlike Turkey’s majority Sunni Muslim population, Mongolia is dominated by a Buddhist and shamanistic culture, albeit a small percentage of the population is Muslim). In 1994, During Mongolia’s early period of transition from a Soviet-style educational system to a Western-oriented one, Turkish educational entrepreneurs opened several high schools that offer a Western-standard educational curriculum in English as well as Mongolian and Turkish. Although Soviet-run secondary schools were considered the most prestigious high schools in Mongolia during the Communist period, Turkish high schools in Ulaanbaatar, Darkhan-Uul province and Bayan-Olgii province have today become among the most valued high schools in the country. Over 3,000 Mongolian children have graduated from the Turkish high schools and pursued advanced degrees abroad, in Turkey and in English-speaking countries. As recorded by various sources, about 1,000 Mongolian students are currently enrolled in undergraduate and graduate training programs in Turkey; and many of them receive scholarships from the Turkish government (Today’s Zaman, April 22).

Due to geographic distance, economic cooperation between the two countries is low. Bilateral trade is less than $40 million and is lopsided in favor of Turkish exports. Recent talks between high-level dignitaries and joint economic commissions, however, revealed a desire to expand economic cooperation in housing development, highway projects, leather processing and tourism by the Mongolian side, as well as in the energy sector by the Turkish side. But unresolved trade-related complexities stand in the way of closer economic cooperation except in tourism (www.president.mn/mongolian/node/3296; www.parliament.mn/news/categories/83/pages/4683). Indeed, the planned increase of daily flights between Istanbul and Ulaanbaatar may allow both countries’ respective populations to discover the wonders of Inner Asia and Asia Minor. Though, a more robust trade relationship will be difficult to achieve quickly. Still, Ulaanbaatar recognizes that Turkish support and recognition of Mongolia’s commitment to democracy, development, and international peace and security is vital to gain better access to those regional organizations where Turkey maintains strong profile.

Note: re-posted with the permission of the Eurasia Daily Monitor of the Jamestown Foundation, for the original news – link.

Posted in Bilateral Aid, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Foreign Policy, International Relations, Mongolia and ..., Turkey | Tagged | 1 Comment

Mongolian Cashmere on Kickstarter

Posted on May 7, 2013 by JDierkes

I recently came across an announcement of the first Mongolia-linked Kickstarter project (at least as far as I’m aware). Kickstarter, of course, is the website that offers entrepreneurs and others an opportunity to crowd-source funding for projects and business ideas. The project is called Naadam Cashmere and they are still raising funds for their initial production on Kickstarter. Fascinated by the project, I asked Matthew Scanlan, one of the founders, a couple of questions about their project:

– Why Mongolia? What’s your connection with Mongolia?

We were philanthropists before we were designers. My business partner Diederik (and college roommate) was traveling around Asia while studying economics in Beijing  during a semester abroad. He eventually made his way to Mongolia where he stayed with a family of Nomadic herders…and thats where it started. He fell in love with the country and the people but he also learned the struggle of the nomadic Mongolian herder. Their lives depend on their herds and their herds depend on the climate conditions. Unfortunately the climate it changing drastically and its becoming harder for them to sustain this nomadic life style. Mongolian herders herd goats that produce the best natural cashmere fibers in the world. Their superiority is largely due to the climate and the cultivated expertise of Mongolian herdsman. It was a perfect storm from which Naadam Cashmere grew organically out of.

– Conventional wisdom on Mongolian cashmere (manufacture) is that a) Mongolian raw cashmere is the best in the world, but b) Mongolian cashmere manufacture was destroyed by Mongolia’s WTO entry in 1997. Do you share that analysis?

I think that in 1997 the cashmere manufacturing industry went through some major changes and for a time was inferior to other great cashmere manufacturing countries such as Italy or Scotland; however, a lot has changed in a decade. Our Mongolian manufacturing partners produce extremely high quality, luxury garments. The technology around the world has innovated and Mongolia, maybe not as a whole but certainly its major players, have adapted. The garments that come out of Mongolian manufacturing are on par with Italian manufactures. They are different garments though, employing differentiated techniques.

– Cashmere manufacture is always mentioned as one of the potential economic diversification strategies for Mongolia beyond natural resources, but then typically dismissed with, “It’ll never work.”. What makes Naadam Cashmere different?

The manufacturing side of the cashmere industry in Mongolia is relatively small, there are only a few players and even within that small group only a few have the capacity to compete on an international level. For Naadam Cashmere our manufacturing partners operate on the perfect scale. There is a lot of opportunity to grow using current logistics. It is our goal to brand ourselves as Mongolian made. It is important that we expose the capacity and capability of their operations. We support vertically integrated manufactures and the Mongolian economy.

– How are Mongolian herders involved in the project and, ultimately, the manufacture and fortunes of Naadam Cashmere?

Mongolian herders make up the very base of our supply chain; all our raw cashmere fibers are sourced in the outer planes of Mongolia. These are the herders that Diederik lived with while he was there and these are the people (beautiful people I might add) we vowed to protect with our micro-economic investment strategy. We use 10% of our profits to buy livestock insurance premiums for the herders we buy our raw fibers from. So, our business model works cyclically, where we take from the top to support the bottom. It is good business but more importantly it’s about helping people maintain their values and traditions, the very essence of their culture. At Naadam we diversity our investment strategy by working to educate nomadic herders on the market landscape but also the physical landscape. We support programs that use satellite and people on the ground to show herders what areas are over grazed. We also work with educators who show herders the intricacies of cashmere market values.

– Do you have Mongolian business partners? Why? Why not?

Technically, we have no law binding partnerships in Mongolia. We like doing business the old way…on a handshake. However, we work exclusively with our Mongolian manufacturer. Additionally, we work  on a local level with banks and the IBLIP (the Index Based Livestock Insurance Program) to pay out insurance premiums and continue to protect the nomadic lifestyle. There is no particular reason for not have official Mongolian partners. I think down the line we work to make our arrangement more official. It has more to do with the stage of our business rather then the state of Mongolia.

– One of the challenges for Mongolian cashmere has been branding. Industry and fabric experts know about the qualities of the raw wool, but there is no strong brand presence for cashmere sourced from Mongolia. Do you see this as a challenge? How do you distinguish yourself from other Mongolian cashmere brands?

I actually view this as a strong positive. We have an opportunity here to differentiate through our supply chain. We are using the best fibers in the world and produce amazing quality garments using a vertically integrated Mongolian manufacture and supply chain. I don’t think that this is a challenge at all because at the end of the day the products will speak for themselves. Naadam Cashmere will distinguish through our branding and design concept. We are developing a contemporary brand built on contemporary ideas that resonate with a generation of people that are beginning to demand more from the brands and products they buy and support. Are key design differentiators will be knit, color, and style and we are in the process of working on a new collection. There are no other Mongolian cashmere brands that work off of a triple bottom principle and a cyclical business model but that is who we are and why we exist.

– The designs of your initial collection strike me as fairly conservative (as much as I personally welcome the arrival of the cashmere hoodie) and don’t hint at Mongolia with any design references. Why not?

We designed our initial collection in response to our friends; the style was never going to be linked exclusively to Mongolia. That just was not our idea or aesthetic. To expose the issues and promote the Mongolian cashmere industry we wanted to make things that were inspired by the people that would buy them, a different type of nomad, and Urban Nomad.

Posted in Business, Cashmere, Fashion, Nomadism | Tagged | Leave a comment

Deepening Canada-Mongolia Relations

Posted on May 6, 2013 by JDierkes

On April 25, just ahead of the ministerial conference of the Community of Democracies that was attended by Canadian Parliamentary Secretary to the Foreign Minister Deepak Obhrai, I published the following comment in Embassy – Canada’s Foreign Policy Newspaper.

How to leverage a growing relationship with Mongolia
The foreign minister’s parliamentary secretary heads there this week. Canada should set up an active bilateral aid program and find ways to encourage people-to-people exchange with the Asian country.

Parliamentary Secretary to the Foreign Minister Deepak Obhrai is heading to Ulaanbaatar to attend the ministerial conference of the Community of Democracies in the year that Canada and Mongolia are celebrating 40 years of diplomatic relations.
In Mongolia he will find is a vibrant democracy with all the turmoil and party shenanigans that democracy brings with it. He should take particular note of Mongolia’s efforts in coming to terms with its mineral wealth and recognize the productive role that Canada can play in these efforts.
Mongolia is an ideal candidate for the Conservative desire to pursue its values through diplomacy, commercial relations, and reformulated international development assistance. Setting up an active bilateral aid program as well as finding ways to encourage people-to-people exchange will leverage a growing relationship.
This summer, Mongolia will hold its sixth democratic presidential election likely pitting incumbent President Ts Elbegdorj against an as-of-yet-unnamed candidate nominated by the opposition Mongolian People’s Party. This presidential election will follow on last year’s parliamentary election that brought about a peaceful transition from an MPP minority government to a Democratic Party-led coalition government under Prime Minister N Altankhuyag.
Earlier this year, Mongolia’s political rights score in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report moved from 2 to 1, the highest mark. How many developing resource economies are there out there for whom these statements would hold? Mongolia is certainly the only member in the club of post-state socialist democracies in Asia.
Given the Harper government’s focuses on democratic values, free trade, and Canada’s role as a resource power, there are few countries that offer more attractive characteristics. This is especially true with recent announcements of a refocus for Canadian development assistance. If such assistance is to be integrated into broader foreign policy objectives and if co-operation with (mining) companies and concentration on resource development is to be the focus, Mongolia again emerges as an attractive partner.
Mongolia has long been one of the rare countries in the world where Canada figures very prominently as an investor. Following massive Chinese investments, Canadian investments come second largely through the involvement of Vancouver-based Turquoise Hill Resources, which is a by-now-junior partner to Rio Tinto in the massive Oyu Tolgoi mine project. This commercial link is one of the factors that led the Harper government to establish an embassy in Mongolia in 2009 at a time when it has been cutting the Foreign Affairs budget on all other fronts.

Bilateral aid program deserves more attention

So far, Canadian engagement with Mongolia is limited to a few specific projects supported through various CIDA funds. But the development of a modest bilateral aid program for Mongolia has long been rumoured and a CIDA officer has been stationed at the Canadian Embassy in Ulaanbaatar since last fall. This bilateral aid program should be announced and should be focused on drawing on Canadian experience in wrestling with the environmental and social challenges that resource projects produce in remote communities.
Commercial relations can be further enhanced through long-term assistance in building a stable and equitable regulatory regime that sees sustainable benefits accrue to Mongolians. This is probably more urgent than the Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement that has been under (stalled) negotiation since 2009. Such efforts also need to acknowledge that the past actions of some mining investors in Mongolia have tarnished Canada’s image.
Finally, an active engagement with Mongolia needs more support for people-to-people exchanges. There are fewer than 1,000 Mongolians living in Canada and vice-versa. Student exchanges, but also community links between cities in regions that face similar climatic challenges to Mongolia would support growing intergovernmental links.
It is time for Mr. Obhrai to take a good look around Mongolia, note the opportunities, and for the government to develop a fresh and expanded approach to engaging this emerging resource nation.

Note: There have been no reports or press releases on Mr. Obhrai’s visit to or impressions of Mongolia.

Posted in Bilateral Aid, Canada, Democracy, Development, Foreign Policy, Julian Dierkes | Tagged | Leave a comment

MPP Confirms Bat-Erdene As Nominee for Presidential Election

Posted on May 5, 2013 by mendee

The opposition Mongolian People’s Party (MPP), announced its candidate for the upcoming presidential election after series of internal party nomination elections.  A well-known wrestling champion and long-time Member of Parliament (from Khentii Province), Badnaanyambuu BAT-ERDENE, will run against the incumbent President Elbegdorj.

With his continued stance on environmental protection, particularly from mining consequences, he is a strong candidate in this election.  He demonstrated staunch support of the controversial [depending on analysts’ perspectives] “Law with the Long Name” (The Law on the Prohibition of Minerals Exploration in Water Basins and Forested Areas of 2009) and even has contradicted the previous governments of his own party.  Obviously, environmental protection and improvement of legal frameworks and enforcement concerning mining will be one of the main issues in the upcoming campaign along with fighting corruption and reducing government inefficiency.

As the party announced its nominee, President Elbegdorj tweeted his congratulations. The  MPP started campaigning for Bat-Erdene as the “Emissary of Unity” [Ev Negdeliin Elch] through social media.  The impact  of social media in the election will be an interesting aspect to watch.

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