Foreign Policy Roundup #13: January 12-26, 2014

The FPR is back for 2014. Get the highlights of Mongolian foreign policy news from Mongolian-language news sources. Highlights of this week include President Elbegdorj’s trip to Liechtenstein, and Minister L. Bold’s official visit to Urumchi, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous District.

 

Neighbors

Minister of Foreign Affairs, L. Bold, traveled to China on the official invitation of the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ban Yi. During the visit, L. Bold also made an official visit to Urumchi, the capital of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous District to discuss cross border trade and cooperation.

L. Bold was presented with the credentials of the new ambassador to Mongolia from the Russian Federation, Iskandar Kobarovich Azizov. The change in the ambassadorship corresponds with the planning for the celebration of the 75 anniversary of Russian-Mongolian victory over Japan in the Khalkh River battle.

Europe

A delegation of Mongolian parliamentarians made an official visit to France, to meet with their counterparts in the French Senate, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and met with Mongolians living, working, and studying in the country.

L. Bold received the outgoing E.U. Ambassador to Mongolia, to congratulate him on his success in promoting E.U.-Mongolian relations and wished him luck in his future endeavors.

Ts. Tuvaan, Minister of Agriculture and Manufacturing traveled to Germany for an exposition on produce and agriculture called “Green Week”.

President Elbegdorj traveled to Liechtenstein, to participate in a meeting of the World Economic Forum. While at the forum, he met behind the scenes with the PM of Japan, and gave a speech on the future of the extractive industry with the president of the Republic of Guinea.

 

Asia-Pacific

The President of Mongolia held a telephone conversation with Japanese Prime Minister, Abe, to discuss the Japanese-Mongolian strategic partnership and exchange views on regional security.

 

 

For last year’s Foreign Policy Roundup postings, please CLICK HERE.

 

 

Posted in 2014, Foreign Policy Roundup, Mongolia and ... | Tagged | Leave a comment

In Defence of Twitter Diplomacy

On January 6, David Carment (Carleton Univ, @cdnfp) wrote a comment piece for The Embassy (a Canadian weekly and on-line paper focused on Canada’s international relations) that made a case for “Why Twitter Diplomacy Won’t Lead to Better Foreign Policy“.

As I’ve been very interested in the use of social media for professional purposes, including engagement with stakeholders for foreign policy, I wrote a bit of a rebuttal to this piece.

My rebuttal was published on-line by The Embassy as “In Defence of Twitter Diplomacy” on January 9.

Below is the text of my rebuttal.

David Carment  draws on years of experience in teaching, analyzing and contributing to foreign policy in Canada.  He laments two only loosely related developments: The first is the absence of a foreign policy under the Harper government. He is well-positioned to lament the lack of engagement with academic expertise on the part of the current Canadian political leadership. His comments are timely and deserve wider attention and consideration.

The second development that Carment examines is the putative rise of Twitter diplomacy, or a diplomacy that incorporates social media as an (increasingly central) tool for policy-makers in informing decisions, but also in addressing different stakeholders at home and abroad directly. Here too, Carment decries the absence of engagement between different participants in policy-analysis. While he is right in lamenting the lack of a “conversation” between government policy-makers and experts and their students, it is hardly the technology that is to blame for that.

Advocates of an intensified use of social media as a policy-analysis and policy-making tool point to different aspects: social media as a site for information gathering, for information dissemination, and for engagement. The first two aspects are essentially unidirectional communication and while social media and the information available at our fingertips via the public internet may increase the amount of data available, there may be nothing transformative about that.

It is the engagement where the promise lies and where Carment sees this promise as unfulfilled. In the absence of social media, policy-analysts were limited to deep engagement with a limited number of actors and voices. This is the situation that Carment describes as characterizing his past experience with DFAIT. Particularly given NPSIA’s location in Ottawa and its networks into the federal government I imagine that his portrayal is accurate and was to mutual benefit. Close interactions offered policy-makers efficient and extensive access to deep policy-analysis, and it allowed policy-analysts and academics access to the questions that were occupying policy-makers minds and their students access to learning experiences.

Yet, this approach also had clear limitations. A small number of deep interactions necessarily limit the overall number of interactions.

By contrast, social media hold the promise of offering policy-makers the possibility of hearing many more different perspectives, and tapping into information and analysis that may have been exceedingly difficult and costly to locate in the deep-but-limited-engagement world.

Clearly, the judgment on whether the potential for wider, faster, and more varied engagement will lead to an overall better foreign policy depends on perspective and will have to be reserved for future analyses. From my perspective, there are two aspects that I have experienced (not unlike Carment but in a different context) that do suggest some benefits to a wider engagement.

I am not a foreign policy specialist and I live and work in British Columbia, which removes me from the halls of the Pearson Building in two significant ways.  Yet, I have expertise to contribute to the formulation of Canada’s foreign policy based on my understanding of specific countries, their regional context and their relations with Canada (Japan and Mongolia in my case) and on a particular academic perspective (as a sociologist focused on public policy and institutions). This expertise does not make me an obvious choice for regular interactions with foreign policy-planning experts or strategic thinkers. But when my expertise can be of use, these policy-makers will have a much easier time drawing on this expertise through social media.

By providing expertise in a publicly accessible manner (in my case, primarily through blogs of various formats and tweets that point to these blog contributions, though this accessibility is platform-agnostic and the tools will surely change over coming years) policy-makers have the opportunity to gather information on specific topics more efficiently (thus Carment’s and my DFATD followers on Twitter who are perhaps primarily monitoring rather than engaging), but also to know where to turn when the need for deeper expertise arises.

For me, as a provider of policy-analysis, social media offer the same information-gathering and communication opportunities, but they also lead to deeper, but specific engagement in areas of my specific expertise that would not have occurred in earlier periods.

The same arguments would apply even more to NGOs who address topics of occasional focus for policy-making. Their voices can be heard much more efficiently when policy-makers are able to scan them on an on-going basis and to draw on them directly, ideally engaging in deep conversations at that moment, when the time comes.

Carment is right, of course, that the contributions to improving foreign policy through such wider or more specific engagement presuppose a desire on the part of policy-makers to be informed. I see that desire clearly with DFATD officials and even with individual Conservative policy-makers. On the whole, however, the public impression that the government makes is very much in line with what Carment describes, namely of a lack of interest in subject-matter expertise. The absence of a broader conversation between the government and experts (or the public) thus is also likely to preclude the benefits of an intensified engagement that might come through social media.

Posted in Canada, Foreign Policy, Social Media | Tagged | Leave a comment

Symposium: Mongolian Responses to Globalization

Department for Mongolian and Tibetan Studies
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn

January 15-17, 2014

Organizer: Ines Stolpe

The event is designed as a workshop in order to foster lively discussions on issues and topics concerning contemporary Mongolia – including their historical backgrounds. Our primary goal is a productive exchange of ideas. We will focus on: processes of social, economic, political and cultural change within shifting global contexts and horizons, new orientations (partially caused by foreign/new influences), changing normative ideas (including new ideals, neo-traditional tendencies), as well as processes of ‘mongolisation’. As framework we will use the multiple and entangled relations between pre-socialist, socialist and post socialist notions of globalisation.

Symposium Website

Posted in Conferences, Research on Mongolia | Leave a comment

My Sources on Developments in Mongolia

I am sometimes asked how I keep up with developments in Mongolia from afar. I take that question as a compliment on the quality of the analysis we provide.

Social Media

Twitter has become an invaluable tool for keeping up with Mongolia, especially because many Mongolian politicians and commentators are not only active on social media, but are less guarded in their comments than politicians in Canada, for example. I thus follow a number of prominent individuals and try to scan their tweets regularly. When a specific term/policy comes up repeatedly, I try to find out what this discussion is about to understand what role it might play.

My “Secret Weapon”: B Erdenegarid

But, there are sources beyond social media, of course. One of my “secret weapons” is B Erdenegarid. Mr. Erdenegarid provides a daily summary of articles in the Mongolian press to subscribers in German. His meticulousness and good selection of articles and coverage make this invaluable for knowing what topics and views are showing up in the Mongolian print media.

I can’t recommend his press summary more highly. Mr. Erdenegarid can be reached at berdenegarid@gmail.com for subscription inquiries.

Because I rely on his work, I have been meaning to interview him for some time.

Baatar Erdenegarid has been involved in Mongolian trade relations and especially in its relationship with the Germanies since his student days at the Hochschule für Ökonomie (Berlin-Karlshorst) in the early 1960s. Following the completion of his studies (Diplom-Volkswirt Fachrichtung Außenhandel) he held several positions in the Mongolian state’s export business, Mongolexport from 1965 to 1988, eventually rising to deputy chairman (Stellvertretender Vorsitzender). From 1988-1992 he served as the economic counselor at the Mongolian embassy in Belgrade. Since 1992, Mr. Erdenegarid advises numerous private enterprises in Mongolia and abroad focusing on investments and projects in different industries.

Below are his responses to some questions we exchanged by email.

Interview with Erdenegarid

You have been observing Mongolian-German relations for 50 years. Can you divide this period into specific periods.  Surely, 1990 was the most significant watershed, but were there other significant divides?

The German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and Mongolia initiated diplomatic relations on April 13 1950. Even though the Soviet Union supported Mongolia economically, it also pursued highly egoistical policies. Just across the Soviet-Mongolian border six large slaughterhouses were built. The Mongolian government started construction of a meat processing facility in Ulaanbaatar with East German financial and technical help in the middle of the 1950s. This slaughterhouse started operations in 1961. With Bulgarian support a further slaughterhouse was build in Darkhan as well as one in Choibalsan supported by Hungarian aid.

These facilities drastically reduced the export of cattle. Instead of live animals, Mongolia was now able to export meat products and to retain skins, pelts, and innards for further processing. This lead to the construction of a leather industry in the 1960s and 70s. Mongolia thus became a significant exporter of leather, and of leather and sheepskin clothing.

A large carpet factory was set up at the same time and carpets became an export item instead of sheep’s wool. Further carpet factories were set up later in Erdenet and Choibalsan. The gold deposit at Boroo was discovered by German geologists. Gold was produced here and the proceeds were split between Mongolia and the GDR.

From Spring 1965 on Mongolian furs were sold for hard currency in Leipzig and at international fur auctions. This hard currency was desperately needed for the Mongolian economy.

The Federal Republic of Germany took over the GDR embassy and some of the employees. Humboldt University offered Mongolian Studies and continues to do so. This provided Germany with a sufficient number of experts with good knowledge of the Mongolian language and milieu.

Around 30,000 Mongolians were educated at universities, technical and professional schools in East Germany. German was the second-most spoken foreign language after Russian in Mongolia.

As a specialist on Mongolia’s trade you have a good sense of developments of this business over the past ten years. What are particularly interesting developments?

Export opportunities have not been explored to their possible extent. Objective reasons for this are geographic isolation and the relative proximity of the giant Chinese market that sucks everything up.

The extraction of Mongolian natural resources has been financed in past years by aggressive foreign FDI and will be so in the future. With the exception of the economic crisis year of 2009, FDI into Mongolia and the percentage of GDP these represent have been increasing steadily on an annual basis.

The foreign investment law has recently been revised and this might spur more investment again.

At the end of the first half of 2013, overall foreign investments to Mongolia added up to US$17.8 billion.

What role could sea-buckthorn play in Mongolia’s exports?

The Mongolian government is currently pursuing a national program for sea-buckthorn cultivation. Sea-buckthorn products will be exported in significant quantities in coming years.

For your coverage of Mongolia media, you follow the press very closely. Here are a couple of questions about Mongolian print media.
What do you see as a particular strength of the Mongolian press?

There are several newspapers, TV stations, and press agencies that are owned by journalists.

By contrast, where are the press’ weaknesses?

Some mass media are owned by politicians and wealthy businessmen who abuse these outlets to attempt to influence public opinion.

What about the state of economic reporting?

Reporting of economic and business is sufficient.

How good is reporting about developments abroad?

Many Mongolians are fluent in foreign languages and can thus obtain information directly. Bloomberg TV is now reporting whole day and night in Mongolian and English about economic developments around the world.

Many TV stations are now clearly identified with a specific politician/political party. Has this tendency increased among print media as well?

Citizens can elect what to read, listen to and watch. Most mass media have a steady readership.

Do you ever get an itch to write as a journalist yourself when you spend so much time in translating others’ writing?

I follow the maxim: cobbler stay with your lasts. [German proverb to mean that one should do what one knows best how to do.]

What will be the most interesting development in Mongolia in 2014.

I am optimistic about the short-term future. Experts are expecting foreign investments of around US$25billion in the coming 5 years. This is quite significant relative to the US$18billion that have been invested so far. The prioritization of manufacturing and processing industries would be very important.

Posted in Media and Press, Research on Mongolia, Social Media | Tagged | Leave a comment

Export peacekeeping training to Central and East Asia

This op-ed is first appeared in The Embassy, Canada’s foreign policy newsweekly (12/19/2013)

Canada, a co-creator of United Nations peacekeeping, has a substantial comparative advantage in transferring peacekeeping knowledge to Central and East Asian countries, including former communist states, as it has done for generations of peacekeepers from Africa, Latin America, and Central and Eastern Europe.

The transfer of peacekeeping knowledge is a unique Canadian addition to the Canada-United States Asia-Pacific Defense Policy Cooperation Framework that both countries’ defence ministers signed in November.

Although the operational map of the Department of National Defence has not changed much since the end of the Cold War, formerly socialist Mongolia, unexpectedly, has appeared on the DND map. Canadian military assistance there has been repeatedly highlighted by political leaders of both nations, most recently by Governor General David Johnston during his state visit to Ulaanbaatar in October.

In March 2001, DND hosted four Mongolian delegates. Presentations at the Pearson Centre and the Peace Support Training Centre in Kingston, Ont. opened the eyes of Mongolian officials to peacekeeping.

It was knowledge offered at just the right moment when the Mongolian military was trying to explain its vision to political leaders and the public.

In 2003, Mongolian artillery trainers were stationed at the Canadian-run Camp Julien just outside Kabul. Here, the Mongolian military became familiar with the rules of engagement, organization, structure, equipment and even culture of Canadian forces serving in Afghanistan.

From 2006 on, Mongolian military personnel officially began participating in Canada’s foreign military help initiative, the Military Training Assistance Program. It was recently renamed Military Training & Cooperation.

Since 2006, almost 100 Mongolian military members have participated in peacekeeping training courses, including those of the Pearson Centre, and other professional and language courses.

The foreign military help program provides an excellent environment for Mongolian military personnel to learn the complexity of contemporary peace support operations, and a venue for understanding Canadian culture and civil-military relations.

Mongolian forces now offer their unique experiences of coalition operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo as well as UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. The Canadian model and experience are more applicable than the US model for states like Mongolia.

Diplomacy of knowledge

This help has prompted Mongolian political and military leaders in encounters at regional events (like the Shangri-La Dialogue, and the Chiefs of Defense Conference) to request more slots in the Canadian military co-operation program, to organize a workshop on peacekeeping strategy and plans, and to invite Canadian forces to attend the annual Mongolian-hosted peacekeeping exercise Khaan Quest.

With support from the US and other NATO members, especially Germany and Canada, Mongolia is now one of the largest contributors for UN peacekeeping operations from Central and East Asia (with 1,200 to 1,500 deployments per year) and operates the only peacekeeping training centre with annual multinational and bilateral exercises. Canada has played an important role to help Mongolia overcome challenges in embarking on this new peacekeeping journey.

Governor General and Commander-in-Chief David Johnston has used the term “diplomacy of knowledge,” which he says is “our ability and willingness to work together and share our learning across disciplines and borders.” Even DND’s limited engagements with Mongolia have proven Canada’s ability to transfer knowledge to a newly found friend in Asia.

The Canadian defence attaché office in Beijing has administrated Canadian military training assistance for Mongolia and participation in multilateral exercises. The results were visible and applauded by the Mongolian military. And they didn’t even require Canada to set up new defence attaché posts. The Canadian experience with the Mongolian military could be extended to other states in the region like Cambodia, China, Laos and Vietnam, some of which have communist-style political and defence structures but are open to new ideas.

Despite the increasing peacekeeping contribution of the People’s Republic of China and Cambodia, both are encountering numerous challenges, including training (from individuals to contingents), organizing logistics of deployments, sustainment, and redeployment, dealing with international and host nations’ laws and culture, and educating politicians, military personnel and the public.

Vietnam has declared its intention to participate in peacekeeping operations starting in 2014. Laos is attending all US-hosted events toward peacekeeping, while North Korea is not objecting to any UN peacekeeping operations. All Central Asian states, especially Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are inclined to participate in peacekeeping operations.

Canada seems to be in a better position to disseminate its peacekeeping knowledge in Central and East Asia, because its contender, Australia, appears to be focused on Southeast Asia.

The peacekeeping knowledge transfer would enable countries like Mongolia to become active members of the international community and open more constructive political channels for Canada with these prospective friends. While Canada would not do the UN peacekeeping, Canada would help others become peacekeepers, not troublemakers.

The well-targeted, efficient peacekeeping knowledge of the Canadian Armed Forces will contribute to changing the mindsets of Asian military personnel and help them internalize the norms of professionalism, multilateralism, and most importantly help them become contributors to the global peacekeeping endeavour.

Posted in Canada, Central Asia, Military, Mongolia and ..., UN | Tagged | Leave a comment

Visas, Medicine, Education: Feeling Chinese Soft Power in Mongolia

China has been gradually increasing its soft power in neighbouring Mongolia, from offers of visa-free travel to access to its medical facilities, and most recently, growing educational opportunities in China for Mongolians. These policies have gone far in diminishing deep-seated anti-Chinese sentiment among Mongolians, feelings hardened during the era of Sino-Soviet tensions between 1960 and 1986, even as they have contributed to growing Chinese influence over its neighbor.

The travel patterns of Mongolians have changed dramatically since the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolia rapprochements of the late 1980s, following which the Soviet Union imposed visa requirements on Mongolians (which have persisted under the Russian government), while China offered Mongolians 30-day visa-free travel.  In comparison to 5  -7 days train ride and about 7 hours flight to Moscow, Beijing is approached by train within 12 hours and by air in 2 hours.

In addition to shorter travel hours, visa-free travel arrangements have benefitted Mongolians in a number of tangible ways, including allowing Mongolians to access foreign embassies not represented in Ulaanbaatar and facilitating the import of scarce goods from China.  Like the Chinese traders currently shuttling goods to Pyongyang, Mongolian shuttle traders operating in China have helped meet consumer needs in Ulaanbaatar and even operated along the trans-Siberian routes up to Poland during the economic hardships of 1990s.

Another effective use of Chinese soft power has been the preferential access granted Mongolians to Chinese medical facilities.  As the public health system continues to struggle in Mongolia, Chinese medical facilities have become very beneficial for those Mongolians with urgent medical needs.  Because of cost, distance, visa hurdles, and linguistic challenges, very few Mongolians can seek medical services in South Korea, Japan, Thailand, and the United States, making Chinese medical facilities very attractive.

Chinese educational assistance to Mongolia is also on the rise.  During the Mongolian Prime Minister’s visit to Beijing this October, China promised to increase annual scholarship numbers for Mongolians from 400 to 1000 over the next five years.  Despite historical anti-Chinese sentiments among Mongolians, Chinese schools are becoming the choice of many young Mongolians. As such, the number of Chinese private schools in Ulaanbaatar is also on the rise.  With China’s imminent rise as an economic powerhouse and its proximity to Mongolia, education may become the most effective form of Chinese soft power in the coming years.

On one hand, Chinese visa exemption policies, access to its medical facilities, and educational assistance are contributing to mutual understanding and good neighbourly relations between Mongolia and China, but on the other, Mongolians may find themselves increasingly dependent on Chinese infrastructure and lured into a China-centred orbit. However, Mongolia is still being considered politically and culturally less welcoming environment for Chinese investment, businesses, labor (esp., construction workers), and travellers.

A shorter version was published as the Asia Pacific Memo (#256) on December 13, 2013.

Posted in Asia Pacific Memo, China, International Relations, Publications | Tagged | 1 Comment

Subscribing to Mongolia Focus Updates

We’ve posted over 250 updates to this blog in the past 2 1/2 years. Any volunteers out there to edit a compilation? 😉

You’ve asked frequently about notifications for new posts recently. All along, I’ve tweeted about new posts @jdierkes and will continue to do so.

We’ve now created some new mechanisms for you to receive notifications:

I hope these are useful to our readers, please let us know if there are other notification services that we should add.

Posted in Research on Mongolia, Social Media | Tagged | Leave a comment

Foreign Policy Roundup #12: November 25-December 8, 2013

Highlights for the last two weeks include the 17th meeting of the Russia-Mongolian Joint Governmental Commission, meetings with the Japanese Ministry of Defense, and new relations with Rwanda and Micronesia.

 

 

Neighbors

The Russia-Mongolia Joint Governmental Commission met for the 17th time to discuss cooperation in trade, transportation, science and technology, as well as joint ventures such as the Erdenet cooper mine. They also discussed regional and border issues.

 

Asia-Pacific

Political Secretary of the Mongolian Ministry of Defense, Z. Boldbaatar, traveled to Japan to meet with his counterpart in the Japanese Defense Ministry. Following the meeting, they announced a new initiatitve to increase cooperation in military engineering and hospitals.

Dr. Julian Dierkes published a very informative chart comparing Mongolia and Myanmar. Following which, Brandon Miliate released an article on the potential for Mongolia-Myanmar relations in The Diplomat.

Mongolia attended the Asia Cooperation Dialogue held in Bahrain.

Diplomatic relations between Mongolia and the Federated States of Micronesia were established.

President Elbegdorj continued his tour of Southeast Asia, meeting with the PM of Singapore, before departing for Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, he attended the Hong Kong-Mongolian Business Forum.

 

Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East

PM Altankhuyag met with the outgoing Indian Ambassador to Mongolia, thanking the ambassador for his work in furthering Indian-Mongolian relations. Following this meeting, he received the incoming Turkish Ambassador to the country. 

Mongolia’s newly assigned ambassador to Uzbekistan, B. Batkhishig, presented his credentials to the Uzbekistani Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Europe

Mongolia’s new ambassador to Ireland, N. Tulga, presented his credentials to the Irish President.

L. Bold attended the OSCE Ministerial Council in Kiev, Ukraine.

 

Latin America

The Mongolian Embassy in Brazil opened last week.

 

Africa

Mongolia established diplomatic relations with Rwanda.

 

Multilateral

Minister of Foreign Affairs, L. Bold, attended the NATO ISAF meeting.

 

For previous postings of the Foreign Policy Roundup in 2013 CLICK HERE

 

 

 

Posted in 2013, Foreign Policy Roundup, Mongolia and ... | Tagged | Leave a comment

Results from the Corruption Perception Index 2013

On Dec 3, Transparency International released its annual Corruption Perception Index.

Previous Posts

Last year, I wrote two blog posts that specifically focused on the CPI score for Mongolia:

Last weekend, I wrote a post that looked ahead to the release of the 2013 CPI.

2013

In 2013, Mongolia’s score came in as 38. That puts Mongolia at 83rd least corrupt among the 177 countries that are included in the CPI.

Elements in the CPI

Some hours after the initial release of the CPI, TI also provided the complete data set of component scores on its website.

For the 2013 CPI, the following sources are listed as sources:

  • Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation Index 2014
  • Economist Intelligence Unit Country Risk Ratings (no date)
  • Global Insight Country Risk Ratings (n.d.)
  • Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide (n.d.)
  • World Bank – Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 2012
  • World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey (EOS) 2013
  • World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2013

Here is a summary of the CPI scoring for Mongolia:

Rank Score Surveys Used S.E. Lower 90% CI Upper 90% CI Min Score Max Score
2012 94 36 7 2.6 32 40 26 47
2013 83 38 7 2.2 34 42 31 47

Here are the individual component scores on a normalized scale out of 100 as calculated by TI:

BTI ICRG WB WEF WJP EIU GI
2012 32 31 47 26 37 38 42
2013 40 31 47 32 33 38 42

The WEF’s Executive Opinion Survey contributed by far the lowest score to the overall CPI in 2012. This score has moved up significantly to 32 this year. Given that this score reflects an annual opinion survey, movement in the score seems plausible and may well reflect some of the perceptions of corruption that I discussed previously. Likewise the Bertelsmann Transformation Index has moved up significantly to 40. These two increases are somewhat balanced by the drop in the score from the World Justice Project. Though even if the WJP score had remained the same, the overall score would not have changed, so the 2-point increase for the score is driven by the rise in the BTI and WEF scores.

Countries with an Identical Score to Mongolia

Burkina Faso, El Salvador, Jamaica, Liberia, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Zambia

Scores for Select Post-State Socialist Countries

Estonia (68), Poland (60), Armenia (36), Vietnam (31), Russia (28), Tajikistan (22), Uzbekistan (17)

Select Scores in Mongolia’s Neighbourhood

Singapore (86), Japan (74), Taiwan (61), S Korea (55), China (40), Indonesia (32), Kazakhstan (26), Kyrgyzstan (24), Myanmar (21)

The average score for the Asia Pacific region (TI includes Mongolia in this region, though I have simply picked countries in some geographic proximity to Mongolia for the listing above) is 43. While below the average, Mongolia comes in above the median score for the region (36).

 

Posted in Corruption, Governance, Media and Press, Policy, Social Issues | Tagged | Leave a comment

Corruption in 2013

The imminent release of Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (Dec 3) is as good an occasion to think/write about corruption in Mongolia as any.

Of course, it is especially important in the context of the CPI to emphasize that this is an attempt at measuring perception of corruption, not corruption itself. Likewise, much of what I can comment on is my perception of corruption, not acts of corruption.

Hopes for the DP

With the parliamentary election victory in 2012 and the re-election of President Elbegdorj in 2013, there was some reasonably hope that corruption would be addressed in a more serious way. Most importantly, the DP’s campaign emphasis on “clean government” promised an attack on corruption “at the top”, rather than the petty corruption that may be a feature of daily life. Simply out of the hope that corruption would be addressed and a (perhaps gullible) belief in DP campaign rhetoric, I had high hopes for the DP government in this regard.

The greatest achievements in the fight against corruption have been the persecution of former president Enkhbayar (to whatever extent this may have been politically motivated in its timing, Enkhbayar has been pardoned since then, of course), and some of the greater specificity and enforcement of conflict-of-interest legislation and judicial reforms that have been pushed by Minister of Justice Temuujin with the apparent strong support of Pres Elbegdorj.

A number of foreign and domestic companies (South Gobi, MIAT, etc.) have been or under investigation, suggesting that there’s some “cleaning of house” in this regard as well.

However, it is also noticeable, that the current government has not been particularly active in investigating or stamping out corruption in its own ranks. Most prominent is the case of S Bayartsogt here who was revealed to hold funds off-shore by an international investigation conducted under the auspices of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. The context of this case suggests that it may have been naiveté more than anything that led to these off-shore accounts, but the fact that Bayartsogt has clung to his seat in parliament with the apparent support of the DP leadership certainly doesn’t send a strong signal.

Enforcement vs. Perception

When it comes to the perception of corruption in Mongolia then, one of the main questions is whether the public sees stepped-up enforcement of anti-corruption and conflict-of-interest measures (even when it appears to be somewhat one-sided) as a positive step that is likely to reduce corruption, or as evidence for the endemic nature of corruption. The sensationalistic reporting of corruption-related rumours in Mongolia is likely to stoke the flames of perceptions of the endemic nature of corruption further.

I do not have a strong sense of which direction perceptions might be moving in this regard.

CPI Methodology and Likely Implications for the 2013 Ranking

The Corruption Perception Index is calculated as an index of a number of (standardized) other indicators coupled with survey information produced by Transparency International itself. It involves neither any expert judgement, nor a measure of portrayals of corruption in the media.

To think about Mongolia’s 2013 score, I looked at the component indicators to get a sense of whether the score might go up and down. More than a sense is not possible as the exact weighting of different scores is not known (as far as I can tell). Also, note that any prediction would hold (if at all) for the score, not for the ranking which is obviously relative to other countries’ ranking.

For the 2012 CPI, the following sources are listed as sources:

  1. African Development Bank Governance Ratings 2011
  2. Bertelsmann Foundation Sustainable Governance Indicators 2011
  3. Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation Index 2012
  4. Economist Intelligence Unit Country Risk Ratings
  5. Freedom House Nations in Transit 2012
  6. Global Insight Country Risk Ratings
  7. IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2012
  8. Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Asian Intelligence 2012
  9. Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide
  10. Transparency International Bribe Payers Survey 2011
  11. World Bank – Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 2011
  12. World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey (EOS) 2012
  13. World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2012 

Obviously, only some of these are relevant to/available for Mongolia: 3 BF (BTI), 9 ICRG, 11 WB, 12 WEF , 13 WJP,  4 EIU, 6 GI. Presumably, updated versions of these will be used for the 2013 index.

BTI: steady (there were 2008, 2012 rankings, not sure which would have been used for 2012 CPI)

ICRG: As far as I can tell the results are proprietary, so I have no information on the trend for Mongolia.

WB: For 2011, the CPR for Mongolia was 3.49. This was up significantly from 2.84 in 2010. I imagine that it is Mongolia’s Economic Management scores that are driving these shifts. Prominently, this includes macroecon mgt, fiscal, and debt policy. Mongolia’s recent struggles in this regard are unlikely to have entered any new ratings if such ratings are available (2011 remains the most recent on the WB website).

WEF: Details of the Global Competitiveness Report, including results of the Executive Survey, do not seem to be publicly available.

WJP: Data is really difficult to compare across different years.

EIU: These ratings are proprietary.

GI: These ratings are proprietary.

Bottom line: I find it very difficult to figure out what data exactly may be flowing into the score ahead of time, and therefore am unable to offer a prediction of what Mongolia’s score is likely to be.

Posted in Corruption, Governance, Media and Press, Politics, Public Service, Social Issues | Tagged | 1 Comment

Mongolia – Myanmar Comparison

We are currently enjoying a visit by Dr. Aung Tun Thet to our Institute of Asian Research. Dr. Thet has worked in the UN system for a long time and is now centrally involved in policy-making in Myanmar as the chief economic advisor to the president among a number of other roles.

His discussion of the “Paths and Challenges” for reform in Myanmar had me jotting down a table that compares Mongolia and Myanmar in a number of different ways.

This follows on a number of discussions I’ve had with Mendee and Brandon who have been interested in this comparison as well as with Otogonbaatar who is currently visiting from Waseda Univ and is focused on Myanmar in his dissertation work. Brandon in particular wrote an Asia Pacific Memo on “The Politics of Mining in Mongolia and Myanmar” earlier this year. Also, President Elbegdorj was just on a state visit to Myanmar earlier in November.

After publication of this post, Brandon also wrote on Mongolia-Myamar relations for The Diplomat.

The table below is more stream-of-consciousness than a thought-out classification, so I would be delighted to hear comments/additions/disagreements about this.

 

 

Mongolia

Myanmar

Similar?

History

Post-colonial: China resentment, neutral/amity with Russia

Post-colonial: Britain

Defeat of Japanese military (1939), but planned for inclusion in Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

Invasion by Japan (1942) and battleground

Brief period of some post-colonial hints at democratic prospects (1911-24)

Post-colonial democracy (1948-61)

+

Democratic revolution

Particular state socialism then military authoritarianism and democracy out of enlightened self-interest

Democratic institutions established before resource boom

Resource boom during uncertain transition to democracy

Population

3 mio

60 mio

High literacy

High literacy

+

Mongols and Kazakhs

Multi-ethnic

Ethnic and civic peace

Ethnic and civic strife

Buddhism and shamanism

Buddhism, Islam and Christianity

Location

Landlocked

Bordering on Indian Ocean and active shipping routes

Transcontinental train lines

Train, road, and shipping networks

Isolated between China and Russia

Many direct neighbours: Bangladesh, India, China, Laos, Thailand

Extreme cold

Susceptible to extreme weather (floods, tsunami, cyclones)

International relations

No threats

Security threats primarily domestic

+

Two large neighbours (CHN & RUS)

Not only two large neighbours (IND & CHN)

No regional context/NE Asia not an active regional context

ASEAN

Significant Japanese involvement (aid, some investment)

Significant Japanese involvement (aid, investment)

+

Pres Elbegdorj becoming visible internationally

U Thant very prominent as UN Gen Sec (1961-71)

+

WTO member since 1997

International sanctions until recently

3rd neighbour policy

“Keeping the same distance”, playing various neighbours off against each other

+

Politics

Charismatic democrats in polity (Elbegdorj, Bat-Uul, etc.)

Aung Suu Kyi, Thein Sein, U Nu

+

Military thoroughly democratized

Future role for military still unclear

Centralized

Importance of regions/federalism

Economy

Mineral wealth

Mineral wealth

+

Ivanhoe Mines as early pivotal investor

Ivanhoe Mines as early investor

+

Manufacturing unlikely

Export-driven manufacturing, low cost

Food production: meat domestic, other food imported (mostly from China)

Food production: strong focus on rice

 

Posted in Economics, Foreign Investment, Mongolia and ..., Myanmar | Tagged | 2 Comments

Foreign Policy Roundup #11: November 11-24, 2013

Highlights in this edition of the Foreign Policy Roundup: President Elbegdorj’s trip to Southeast Asia, new ambassadorial appointments, and meetings with the Queen of England.

 

 

Neighbors 

Mongolia’s Deputy Minister of Parliament and Director of the Mongolian-Russian Parliamentary Group attended the International Parliamentary Forum hosted by Moscow.

 

Asia Pacific

A new society-organization has been created to highlight Mongolia’s good relations with Japan: The Japan-Mongolia International Friendship Society. The organization is focused on culture and the arts and was established by Japanese morin huur/horse-head fiddle players and students.

Mongolian President Elbegdorj is traveling in Southeast Asia from November 18-29. The focus would seem to be on improving relations with Myanmar, Vietnam, and Singapore. His visit to Myanmar was particularly productive, with the release of a joint statement (in English), delivered a speech at the University of Yangon, and met with a number of officials in Naypyidaw. A detailed account of the itinerary can be found here.

The 5th Mongolian Investment Forum was held in Hong Kong. With pending major investment reform in the country, investors are eager to (re)enter the Mongolian market.

 

Central Asia

The General Secretary for Administration of the Mongolian Parliament, B. Boldbaatar met with the organizer for the Eurasian division of the Revenue Watch Institute to exchange views on the implementation of transparency initiatives from natural resource investments.

Europe

The political secretary of the Polish Ministry of Defense made an official visit to Mongolia. Poland is looking to increase defense cooperation with Mongolia as part of NATO outreach activities. During the meeting with L. Bold, Poland was cited as a key third neighbor for Mongolia in Europe.

Mongolia’s Ambassador to Great Britain, N. Tulga, was invited to an audience with the Queen.

President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barrozo, made an official visit to Mongolia. This is the highest-ranking visit from the E.U. to visit Mongolia. During the visit, he officially extended an invitation for Mongolia to join the GSP+ process, which would allow Mongolia to pay lower duties on exports to the E.U.

 

North America

The Mongolian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, D. Gankhuyag, attended the ninth meeting of the United States-Mongolian consultation process.

 

Middle East and Africa

Mongolia’s secretary for security affairs consultation, Ts. Enkhtuvhsin, traveled to Turkey to meet the Turkish Minister of Internal Affairs, and discuss security cooperation.

Formal diplomatic relations between Mongolia and Uganda were established on November 20.

Multinational

The newly appointed ambassadors to Mongolia from Russia, Kuwait, and Turkey presented their credentials to the Mongolian President.

UNESCO has announced its support for the Mongolian proposed initiative for democratic education.

 

For previous postings of the Foreign Policy Roundup in 2013 CLICK HERE

Posted in 2013, Foreign Policy Roundup, Mongolia and ... | Tagged | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Mongolia in the OSCE – One Year On

Paul Bryce

Further Expansion of the OSCE

In the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the membership of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) appeared to have expanded as far as it could. If this, the world’s largest regional organization, were to grow beyond its 56 participating States, the assumption was that any new members would come from the secession of a sub-national unit within the existing boundaries of the OSCE. When Montenegro broke off from Serbia in 2006 and joined the OSCE the same year, the regional limits of the organization certainly seemed well-entrenched. Yet, on 21 November 2012, Mongolia defied these expectations and became the 57th participating State.

This announcement did not entirely ‘come out of the blue’. Mongolia has been a kind of observer state in the OSCE since 2004, becoming one of the Asian Partners for Cooperation together with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and Afghanistan. In addition, a formal letter was sent by the Mongolian authorities to the Lithuanian Chairmanship in October 2011, indicating Mongolia’s desire to join the OSCE and the country’s willingness to comply fully with the terms of the OSCE’s foundational agreements: the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, and others.

But nearly a year after the accession, how has Mongolia met its obligations as a new member? How active has Mongolian participation been in the months following the country’s admission?

Mongolia and OSCE Obligations: Elections

One of the chief obligations OSCE participating States is to hold ‘free and fair’ elections. To this end, countries are also generally expected to invite relevant bodies – namely the Parliamentary Assembly, and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) – to observe and report on the election activities. Not all of the founding members comply with these expectations, however; Russian authorities have frequently interfered with the conduct of OSCE election observer missions, while Canada has not invited observers since 2006. But Mongolia complied by inviting OSCE institutions to observe the June 2013 presidential election. In its final report, OSCE/ODIHR positively assessed the election, but noted that there were some administrative shortcomings which advantaged the Democratic Party candidate and victor, Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj. The report sets out a series of interesting legislative remedies which could further enhance Mongolia’s democratic process. Fortunately, Mongolia will have plenty of time to consider these proposals prior to the next parliamentary elections in 2016.

Mongolia and OSCE Obligations: Human Rights

Mongolia has also demonstrated a strong commitment to upholding OSCE obligations regarding the protection of human rights. In 2011, months prior to the formal application for OSCE membership, Mongolia adopted a ‘Law on the Promotion of Gender Equality’. This legislation prohibits gender-based discrimination in the workplace, but goes further by setting out clear incentives for political parties and other government institutions to actively involve women in decision-making processes. For example, Article 8 specifies that “representation of any one sex in any central or local body of a political party shall not be lower than 25%.” The country also enjoys an independent National Human Rights Commission, which was originally established in 2001 and fulfills the role of an ombudsman in multiple fields. The Constitution, which was amended in 2007 with input from the aforementioned Commission, also extends protection for human rights in line with OSCE standards.

Mongolia and OSCE Security Cooperation

However, with regard to security cooperation, Mongolian participation is (understandably) limited. For example, Mongolia does not seem to be engaging in the exchange of military information mandated under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. But the only OSCE participating State which Mongolia shares a border with is the Russian Federation, which suspended its participation in the CFE Treaty in 2007. The capacity for Mongolia to project its military power elsewhere in the region is also limited; demonstrative of this point, the Mongolian Air Force currently consists solely of one squadron of attack helicopters and one squadron of transport helicopters. In April 2013, the Air Force expressed interest in acquiring three C-130J transport planes from Lockheed Martin, mainly to support the deployment of Mongolian troops as part of international peacekeeping missions. As such, the CFE Treaty has limited applicability for Mongolia.

As has been outlined here, Mongolia is meeting the obligations of OSCE membership with enthusiasm. The invitation to observe the presidential election just seven months after joining is a clear demonstration of Mongolia’s commitment to the values and principles on which the OSCE was founded. If the recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR observers can be implemented gradually before the 2016 parliamentary elections, Mongolia will have entrenched itself as an example to the region and a reinvigorating force for the wider OSCE.

About Paul Pryce

Paul Pryce is a Research Fellow at the Atlantic Council of Canada. With degrees from the University of Calgary and Tallinn University, he has previously worked at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

Posted in International Relations, Mongolia and ... | Leave a comment

Foreign Policy Roundup #10: October 28-November 10, 2013

Here are the highlights from the last two weeks in Mongolian foreign policy news, including: Elbegdorj’s trip to North Korea and L. Bold’s attendance at the recent UNESCO forum.

 

 

Asia Pacific

President Elbegdorj made an official visit to North Korea, where he was met by the head of the People’s Parliament, Kim Young Nam and Mongolia’s Ambassador to North Korea, M. Ganbold. Official talks were later held between Kim Young Nam and President Elbegdorj. In the second day of the visit, Elbegdorj was invited to a number of non-military locations and paid his respects to the mausoleum of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Later in the trip he had an audience with the North Korean Prime Minister, and with the head of North Korea’s Upper House of the People’s Parliament. He concluded his trip by giving a lecture at Kim Il Sung University. During his lecture, he spoke about Mongolia’s commitments to human rights and multilateral engagement with the international community. During the trip, an agreement on increased economic cooperation was signed. For Bloomberg’s analysis on this agreement, click here. The Diplomat also offered analysis of the visit, here. Foreign Policy noted the oddity that President Elbegdorj was not able to meet with Kim Jong Un during the first visit by a foreign head of state to North Korea since he took over command. Finally, Julian Dierkes and Otgonbaatar Byambaa published a piece in East Asia Forum of the possibility of Mongolia mediating on the issue of North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens.

Mongolia became an official member of the Asia Pacific Trade Agreement Negotiations.

Deputy Director of the Mongolian Parliament R. Gonchigdorj participated in the Bali Democracy Forum VI.

 

Central Asia

Z. Enkhbold met with a the director of the Kazakhstan-Mongolian Parliamentary Forum and his accompanying delegation in Ulaanbaatar, to mark the 20 year anniversary of the Agreement on Friendly Relations and Cooperation between Mongolia and Kazakhstan.

 

Europe

Z. Enkhbold along with the director of the Mongolian-German Parliamentary Forum received the German Ambassador to Mongolia. During the meeting, Z. Enkhbold congratulated the Ambassador on Germany’s successful parliamentary elections.

A.Ganbaatar, Mongolia’s newly appointed Ambassador to Latvia, presented his credentials to the Latvian President.

On the invitation of the Mongolian Ministry of Defense, Hungary’s Minister of Defense made an official visit to Mongolia. The brief trip finished with the signing of an MoU on mutual cooperation between the two ministries.

At UNESCO, L. Bold presented on the importance of literacy education.While attending the UNESCO meeting, L. Bold met with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. He also marked the 851st birthday of Chinngis Khaan with Mongolian expats in France.

L. Bold visited Serbia, where he was received by Serbian PM Ivitsa Dacic. During the visit he participated in the Mongolian-Serbian Business Council and discussed ways to refresh the traditional friendship between Mongolia and Serbia.

 

Middle East

Z. Enkhbold received Turkey’s Ambassador to Mongolia to express his appreciation for the historical and cultural connections between their two countries. Later in the meeting they turned to joint development projects and economic relations.

Africa

The Vice President of South Africa made an official visit to Mongolia, where he met with the Deputy Director of the Mongolian Parliament, R. Gonchigdorj. The primary purpose of the visit seems to have been to discuss how to strengthen cooperation in the mining sector.

 

 

 

For previous postings of the Foreign Policy Roundup in 2013 CLICK HERE

 

Posted in 2013, Foreign Policy Roundup, Mongolia and ... | Tagged | Leave a comment

November 22 Event in Vancouver: Canada-Mongolia Relations

Celebrating 40 Years of Diplomatic Relations between Canada and MongoliaProgram on Inner Asia
Institute of Asian Research
UBC

Friday, November 22, 2013
17:30-19h
UBC Robson Square, Room C400

On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of Canada-Mongolia Diplomatic Relations

Canada-Mongolia Relations and Mongolian Foreign Policy

Introduction

Tobin ROBBINS
Honorary Consul for Mongolia

Keynote Address

“The Next 40 Years: Why Mongolia Should and Will Matter for Canada”

Gregory GOLDHAWK
Canadian Ambassador to Mongolia

Panel Presentations

1. “The State of the Mongolian Economy and Future Paths”

Charles KRUSEKOPF
Faculty of Management
Royal Roads University

2. “Key Drivers of Mongolian Foreign Policy”

MENDEE Jargalsaikhan
Political Science
UBC

3. “Diplomacy of Knowledge – The Future of Canada-Mongolia Relations”

Julian DIERKES
Institute of Asian Research
UBC

As always, the event is free and open to the public, but please register to help us in the planning.

Posted in Canada, Events, Mongolia and ..., Research on Mongolia, UBC Mongolia Lecture Series | Tagged | Leave a comment