The Cluttering of Ulaanbaatar

Posted on May 6, 2014 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

Caveats: I am no city planner, nor a scholar of urban development. I also don’t have a strong sense of what’s happening in Ulaanbaatar outside the very small downtown area within, say, 4km of Sukhbaatar Square. Yet, I travel to Ulaanbaatar regularly and am thus confronted with visible changes in the cityscape that I have written about previously (Oct 2013 | September 2013 | June 2013)

May 2014

I’m back in Ulaanbaatar after about six months’ absence. The drive in from the airport makes less of an impression than it has on some previous visits, in part because the (re)construction of the highway to the airport seems to have been largely completed. It is now two lanes in both directions, at least until just before it crosses the Tuul River. There are street lanterns, bus stops and pedestrian crosswalks. The large apartment blocks that had appeared last year (I think) have not multiplied further, the Hunnu Mall looked like it had not been completed. I couldn’t quite tell in the dark how much further along the new urban district (Viva City, I think) had progressed.

Urban Clutter

On one of my last visits it struck me to what extent we can watch Ulaanbaatar develop as an urban metropolis, virtually right in front of us. When I walked around yesterday, it struck me that we are also observing a stark version of urban development without planning, at least without planning that corresponds to my layman’s aesthetic of urban development. Having grown up in Berlin where building height is tightly regulated, the variety of heights of buildings that are popping up in Ulaanbaatar is bewildering and a bit oppressive. It is also beginning to cover some of the gems of urbanity that marked Ulaanbaatar in the past.

Nostalgic Waxing

I don’t want to romanticize Ulaanbaatar’s past too much, but one of the aspects that marked the city when I first started coming regularly about 10 years ago was its openness. Unfortunately, I don’t really recollect much of the cityscape from my first visit/pass through on the train in 1991, but in the mid 2000s the four-story Ulaanbaatar Hotel seemed like a substantial building that had significant open space in front of it.

Now… the Ulaanbaatar Hotel is dwarfed even by the next-door headquarters of the MPP (at least in massive appearance if not in height) which in turn is towered over by Central Tower. At least the stretch of green in front of the Hotel now extends to the front of Central Tower along Peace Avenue as well.

Just South of the city centre, many new buildings are going up. Hotels and commercial buildings closer to the centre, apartment complexes a bit further away. Many of these reach beyond 10 stories. Few of them are architecturally distinguished (to this layman’s eyes), but most of them are inoffensive. Some of this densification is made possible by a re-rourting of traffic that has established several important East-West axes other than Peace Avenue. Yet, my limited imagination does not allow me to see how this cluttered, seemingly unplanned densification will lead to anything particularly attractive in the long run. Open spaces (even if they were dirt lots in the past) are disappearing, but there is no coherent facade to blocks of buildings bordering on city streets.

I find it especially noticeable how many residential buildings seem to be under construction now when the last couple of years looked to be mostly about commercial buildings. If the construction site down the street, across from the Japanese embassy is really going to be a Shangri-la hotel, I do have to wonder what hordes of foreign visitors are clamouring for luxury hotels.

Riverside Walk/Park

These developments make a safeguarding of the Tuul and Selbe riverfronts, and of existing open spaces that much more important.

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Rosneft Pipelines to and Through Mongolia

Posted on May 1, 2014 by mendee

Events in Ukraine create both uncertainties and opportunities in Ulaanbaatar. A changing balance of power in Europe and closer ties between two regional powers, Russia and China, certainly create new uncertainty for Mongolia. With their country’s “regionless” fate of living between two giants, politicians in Ulaanbaatar have been cautious in their remarks regarding the events in Europe’s East, though they clearly prioritize political stability. Even the US Ambassador to Mongolia’s call over social media for Mongolians to support Ukraine did not inspire much excitement within this landlocked Asian country (link). But on the economic side, Mongolians are expecting some spillover effects from increased economic activities between Russia and China because of the Russian rifts with its European partners.

Moscow and Ulaanbaatar have for years been actively engaging in dialogue to increase the bilateral levels of trade, investment and cultural exchanges. But the actual implementation of any major plans has been slow. Mongolia’s import of fuel from Russia remains the most important, though exceedingly complex issue, at any level of inter-governmental meetings between the two neighboring states. Yet, presumably, with the recent visit to Mongolia by Igor Sechin, the president of Russian oil giant Rosneft, energy talks might finally speed up.

During his three-hour stay in Ulaanbaatar on March 17, 2014, Sechin met with President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, Prime Minister Norovyn Altankhuyag and Mining Minister Davaajav Gankhuyag. The Rosneft president informed his hosts of Russia’s willingness to supply oil to Mongolia via pipeline on a long-term basis, and he even discussed the possibility of transiting crude oil from Russia to China through Mongolian territory. In 2013, Mongolia imported 700,000 tons of crude oil from Russia, equal to 54 percent of its total domestic consumption (link).

There are several clear reasons for why the Russian government has become so forthcoming to Mongolia. For one, the landlocked country is still regarded as small but growing and reliable market for Russian fuel exports because of Mongolia’s increased mining and agricultural activities in addition to a rising number of individual consumers there (meaning, mainly, vehicle operators).

Second, all previous governments in Mongolia have been attempting to reduce the country’s dependency on Russian gasoline and petroleum product imports; they have struck deals with China, Kazakhstan and others as potential sources for Mongolia’s domestic energy needs (Xinhua, May 17, 2013; news.mn, Jan 6, 2009). In addition, Mongolia’s search for new sources of energy—such as shale oil exploration—are undergoing. Russia’s sudden expanded interest in Mongolia is, therefore, likely a reflection of its unwillingness to lose any more market share for Russian gasoline exports.

Third, after much debate, Mongolia has finally begun building the country’s first oil refinery in Darkhan City, which is scheduled for completion by 2015. The new refinery will process 2 million tons of oil per year using crude oil from the Tamsag deposit in eastern Mongolia. This new refinery is also planning to import crude oil from Angarsk in Russia. In order to maintain its dominance in the Mongolian fuel market, earlier in 2011, the Russian side had offered to set up 100 gas stations in Mongolia (see EDM, November 11, 2013). But the proposal triggered sudden protectionist debates among Mongolian politicians, fuel distributors and the public. This time, the Russian side offered to deliver oil products and crude oil via pipelines because of the inefficiency of the Russian-Mongolian inter-state rail links.

Besides a pipeline to Mongolia, the Russian side also indicated it would reconsider the planned oil and gas pipeline transit route from Russia to China (infomongolia.com, March 17). At the height of joint efforts by Russian and Chinese governments to reduce the United States’ interests in Central Asia in 2005, Russia and China decided to build a pipeline that would by-pass Mongolia, even though the Mongolian route is considered shorter, safer and, therefore, more economically efficient than pipeline routes through Central Asia or via Siberia/Manchuria. Over the years, this has been one of Ulaanbaatar’s continued requests to Beijing and Moscow (link). The finalized pipeline deal was to be made this coming May during the Chinese-Russian summit.

Although Mongolia is in many ways geopolitically constrained by its powerful neighbors, any shifts, either amicable or hostile, between China and Russia, have presented both challenges and opportunities for Mongolia. During an amicable period in the 1950s for relations between Moscow and Beijing, the first ever trans-Mongolian railroad was built, which still serves as a rail link between Russia and China for the transportation of goods and people. On the other hand, in the hostile period of the 1960s for Moscow and Beijing, Mongolia was able to benefit from Soviet developmental aid—as a legacy of that assistance, the Erdenet copper mine continues to account for a substantial portion of Mongolia’s GDP (IMF Country Report No. 07/30—Mongolia: 2006, January 2007). Today, Russia urgently looks eastward for markets for its energy exports due to tensions with the West over Ukraine. And because of this, Mongolia will likely be able to position itself to host a Russia-to-China oil transit pipeline.

Note: re-posted with the permission of the Eurasia Daily Monitor of the Jamestown Foundation, for the original news, EDM (2014/05/01).

Posted in China, Infrastructure, International Relations, Mongolia and ..., Russia, United States | Tagged | Leave a comment

State-Sponsored Formalization of Household Herding in Rural Bayanhongor

Posted on April 29, 2014 by JDierkes

“A herder is master of 1000 professions.”
President Elbegdorj, printed at the top of herder diplomas

The Presence of the State in Rural Mongolia

Over the course of my dissertation fieldwork in Mongolia, I spent a considerable amount of time ‘doing the rounds’ with the bagiin darga (rural district supervisor) of district 1 in Olziit sum, Bayanhongor province in central west Mongolia. ‘Doing the rounds’ consisted of traveling to each herder household with a variety of objectives depending on the season, such as buying sheep wool, issuing livestock insurance, counting livestock numbers, administering national household surveys, traveling with vets or doctors, etc. In my field sites in rural Bayanhongor, I observed an active state presence in herder’s personal lives in both the district and provincial level and was often struck by the frequency of contact between government representatives and herding households.

Over the course of my time in the field from May 2013 – January 2014, I observed a set of practices initiated by the state that I consider to be part of an ongoing process of formalizing and commercializing the household production of rural mobile pastoralists in Mongolia. My experience is somewhat at odds with the portrayal of an absent or dysfunctional state administration in rural Mongolia; rather, the state seems to be actively involved in shaping the production strategies of herders and the nature of their citizenship.

Herders’ Diplomas During an Election Campaign

The individually packaged red stamps were distributed to herders along with a diploma and medal. The stamps have the name and registration number of a head of household on the face to be used during economic transactions such as the selling of fiber or meat products.

For this entry, I would like to focus on one initiative in which I was an active participant. About a week before the presidential election in June 2013, I accompanied the bagiin darga (district administrator) and two others as they distributed three objects to each herder household in my field site in Olziit sum. I actively assisted them in this process and documented the families as they received these objects. The objects were: an official diploma for herders, which was presented in an red folder with the diploma title ‘Mongolian National Herder Diploma’ (Монгол улсын малчин үнэмлэх) embossed in gold letters on the cover, a medal titled ‘Mongolian National Herder’ (Монгол улсын малчин), and a red colored personalized official stamp (тамга) with the name of head of the household and registration number carved into its oval rubber shape.

The diploma is about 8.5 x 11 inches and divided into two sections. The left side of the page reads (rough translation):

This photo features the heads of household with their diplomas and medals.

Diploma of the Profession of Herder
Registration number XXXX
Sangi Ochir Monkhbat of Bayanhongor aimag’s Olziit sum
“The professional herder certification is being presented to you in accordance with your mastery of the methods, skills, and knowledge of a herder”
Government registration number XXXX”

At the bottom of the left side are the seals and signatures of the Ministers of the Department of Labor and the Department for Agriculture.

The right side of the page reads:

“This is to certify that Sangi Ochir Monkhbat is carrying out and maintaining the traditional practices of animal husbandry of which he has mastered and for which he knows the knowledge and methods.”  Following this statement is a bullet list of thirteen points summarizing the knowledge and skills that comprise the work of a herder.

The day that we were distributing diplomas, this man’s relatives were preparing food and setting up a new ger for a wedding. I learned a few months later that the young man who was married subsequently got in a motorcycle accident during the wedding festivities and now can barely write his name and walk.

These diplomas were distributed to the male and female heads of households along with a medal featuring the title “Mongolian National Herder” with the five types of livestock in an inverted V shape with the horse at the pinnacle. As we distributed these items, the bagiin darga jokingly said to the herders, “Now you have a profession, congratulations.”  As we traveled over the alternatively sandy and rocky dirt roads of the district, the bagiin darga would tell me the name of the next family that we were going to visit and I would locate their individually wrapped and labeled stamp from a flimsy blue and white plastic bag, tearing at the seams and jammed up on the shelf above the dusty seat of our tough Honda excel. When we arrived at a household, we would sit down for the customary tea and taste from their hospitality plate and the darga would explain the purpose of the visit. Then he would gesture for one of us to give the diploma, medal, and stamp to the heads of household. Depending on the household and our timing, I would snap a few photos of the herders with their certificates. These items were being distributed to every fulltime herding family regardless of age. A few of the families were quite elderly and others received the diplomas with infants and young children looking on. Many families asked what they were supposed to do with the stamp, and the bagiin darga explained that it was to be used when they sold their produce, especially wool and cashmere.

The process is especially interesting if looked at vis-à-vis the efforts that herders are making to ensure that their children participate in formal school-based education in rural and provincial centers. My colleague, Dr. Bumochir Dulam and I, found that herders in Northern Bayanhongor province invest a considerable amount of their wealth generated from livestock produce as well as resources such as time and social capital to provide school-based education to their children. Over the course of my time in Mongolia, herders constantly referred to themselves as “unskilled” or “uneducated,” and used the Mongolian term “мэргэжилгүй,” which translates as “without a profession or unskilled” to describe themselves. I have heard these terms used frequently in Ulaanbaatar as well and they seem to comprise a general discourse on herders as formally uneducated and unskilled individuals. Formal education, in many ways, seems to be the primary quality that many Mongolians I talked to used to differentiate herders/rural work from non-herders/non-rural work.

The State’s Perspective on Herding

I spent the day distributing diplomas with the district ‘boss,’ Luvsantseren. A herder walked us to an area with cell phone service, and one of our company tried to capture a bar or two.

In this context, the government initiative to distribute diplomas to herders appears to be a way to formally acknowledge and value the work of mobile pastoralists as a valid profession with a set of skills that contribute to the idea of the Mongolian nation. The idea that herders play an essential role in maintaining the traditional culture and environment of Mongolia is listed in the bulleted list of herder skills highlighted on the diploma. All three objects include the term “Mongolian National Herder” which emphasizes the role of the herder in a national project. Although these objects invoke the socialist past (the red color, the symbolic qualities of a medal and a stamp), the type of citizenship that they put forth is one based on an entirely different logic of production and political participation.  This logic includes a discourse of personal responsibility and initiative, which I observed the Bayanhongor administration use multiple times with herders in a variety of formats (from sum meetings, conversations, speeches by the provincial governor, to a “relationship” notebook that is kept in the herder ger as a way to communicate with state representatives).

It is interesting to see how the distribution of these materials is playing out. In August, I visited Gurvanbulag sum, which is about 240 km north of the Bayanhongor aimag center and my primary field site of Olziit sum. (I did not take part in the distribution of the diplomas in this area). As I was talking to an older herder in his late 50s, an active and vocal member of the community who often presents long critiques of government initiatives during sum meetings, he stood up to show me the long banner of medals hanging from the north side of his ger. He explained many of them to me, but stopped at the recently distributed Mongolian National Herder medal, a shiny piece at the end of a long display of tarnished socialist awards, to say that it is the medal that he is most proud of. He removed it from the banner and held it up to emphasize that this medal was the most important of them all, and in comparison the rest did not matter. On the other hand, some herders appear to be a bit ambivalent towards the diploma. The bagiin darga himself awarded me with a diploma and issued me a registration number for his district in what appeared to be a humorous act of everyday resistance.

Why is the State Making Its Presence Felt in the Countryside?

The herders registered in the first district of Olziit sum of Bayanhongor aimag were given a “National Herder of Mongolia” diploma and medal.

How can we understand these state initiatives? Is this simply a tactic to gain more votes? Is it an initiative to be more inclusive of rural society by encouraging participation after economic collapse and the rapid post-socialist privatization of the 1990s rendered the paternal state largely absent and ineffective? The overt economic quality of these initiatives, especially in the context of Bayanhongor’s effort to revitalize its sums with funding from the World Bank, calls attention to the larger development project that the Mongolian state is carrying out. These initiatives are occurring alongside the privatization of winter and spring camps and the increasing reliance of herders on annual bank loans to finance their household (education, household expenditures, health care, livestock care). To gain further insight on how these measures might play out in Mongolia, it might be useful to look at places in Africa and Chile and the development model of value-chain driven agriculture playing out among smallholding farmers. Phil McMichael’s 2013 piece in Third World Quarterly titled “Value Chain Agriculture and Debt Relations: Contradictory Outcomes,” provides a potential starting point for looking at how the Mongolian state is moving toward managing the agricultural sector. One aspect of this model is the focus on ‘Mongolian made” fiber products, which encourages herders to sell their fiber to the local government rather than Chinese traders. The bagiin darga, who referred to himself not as a “boss” but as a servant of both the government and the district herding community, explained that prior to the government purchasing of sheep wool from herders, locally produced wool would go directly to China. He sees the government purchasing initiative as being more systematized and reliable, and contributing at least superficially to Mongolian economic and cultural sovereignty.

Contrary to an absent state in rural Bayanhongor, I observed a local administration that was very involved in managing herder affairs with frequent contact via sum meetings, phone conversations, and home visits. Government representatives are often active, absentee or former herders and play multiple roles in the community. The paternal state of the past may have given birth to a commercial one, and there needs to be more research focusing on how its institutions manifest within household units and are influencing the nature of citizenship. The formalization of household herding though the distribution of diplomas should be seen as part of this wider process of governance and the changing nature of rural work in Mongolia.

About Ariell Ahearn

Ariell Ahearn is currently a Ph.D. candidate in the School for Environment and Geography at Oxford University, where she is working on an ethnography of changing rural work practices among semi-nomadic herders in central-west Mongolia. She spent the last year working and living with herders in order to understand the conditions for practicing nomadic pastoralism in her field sites located in the region of Northern Bayanhongor province. Originally from rural upstate New York, Ariell is passionate about rural livelihoods, local knowledge, and livestock husbandry as it is practiced around the world.

Posted in Ariell Ahearn, Countryside, Education, Nomadism, Presidential 2013, Research on Mongolia | 1 Comment

Foreign Policy Roundup #16: April 14-27, 2014

Posted on April 27, 2014 by miliate

After a bit of a hiatus, Foreign Policy Roundup is back, and I am expecting to restart bi-monthly postings from here on out. Highlights for this week include the Myanmar delegation’s visit to Mongolia and Saudi Arabia’s decision to open an embassy in Ulaanbaatar.

 

…

 

Asia Pacific

After arriving in Ulaanbaatar on April 12, the director of the Myanmar Parliament was received by Z. Enkhbold, his counterpart in the Mongolian Parliament. Mongolia and Myanmar established diplomatic relations in 1956, but this is the first state visit by an acting head of Parliament. During his official visit, Tura U Shwe visited the Mongolian Election Commission. This year Myanmar is the chair of ASEAN. See my previous article on the potential of Myanmar-Mongolian relations, here.

Mongolia’s ambassador to South Korea participated in the 2014 Trilateral Summit held in Seoul, between China, Japan, and South Korea.

Member of Parliament and Director of the Mongolian Legal Commision, Sh. Tuvdendorj, received South Korean economic representatives. During the representatives’ visit they announced out plans to expand technological cooperation and establishing a continent-wide railway network.

Mongolia and Thailand held a consultation meeting, during which they discussed cooperation in tourism, education, and general political/economic affairs.

Mongolian MP, R. Amarjargal, participated in the Institute Fund Summit 2014 Asia event in Hong Kong. During his address, he said that Mongolia welcomes investment, making specific reference to the new investment law.

 

Europe

Mongolia’s newly appointed ambassador to Croatia presented his credentials to the country’s president, Ivo Yosipovich. Mongolia has managed to maintain good relations with many of the Balkan states as a result of its previous relations with communist Yugoslavia.

Minister of Foreign Affairs, L. Bold, met with the French Ambassador to Mongolia. France and Mongolia have expanded political and economic relations in recent years, increasing cooperation in such sectors as tourism and education.

 

Middle East

L. Bold made an official visit to Saudi Arabia, where he met with his counterpart in the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was the first such meeting between these two countries. During the visit, Saudi Arabia announced that it would be opening an embassy in Ulaanbaatar.

 

United Nations

Mongolia was elected to become a member of 2 UNESCO divisions: Population and Development; and Women’s Issues.

…

For previous postings, please CLICK HERE.

 

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Foreign Policy Implications of Mongolian Crony Democracy

Posted on April 21, 2014 by mendee

Though considered a healthy—albeit developing—democracy, Mongolia has in recent years become dominated by the competing interests of its political and business factions, whose collective actions undermine the country’s democratization trends as well as complicate Ulaanbaatar’s foreign policy. For now, Mongolia resides in a stable and largely friendly neighbourhood, its democratic system is peaceful, and it boasts valuable natural resources. But the intense competition among its domestic political and business factions welcomes assertive Russian interests, increases Chinese dominance, and discourages Western investors.

Recently, powerful businesses and wealthy entrepreneurs have come to dominate Mongolia’s major political parties—the ruling Democratic Party (DP) and the opposition Mongolian People’s Party (MPP)—as well as the parliament and the executive branch. This business sector dominance encourages profit-maximizing competition among party-affiliated businesses and discourages any legislative or judicial efforts to constrain their influence in politics. Such competition appears to slow down under coalition governments (e.g., 2004–2008 and 2008–2012), but expands unchecked when one party establishes a majority government (e.g., 1996–2000, 2000–2004, 2012–2016). Under a majority government in Mongolia, the ruling party routinely cancels the previous government’s projects, names party-affiliated politicians or businessmen to key posts in the government bureaucracy and state-owned enterprises, and influences judiciary and law enforcement organizations. For instance, today, 74 members of parliament (out of 76) hold wealth equal to 7.6 percent of GDP, and only 4 members of parliament account for 64 percent of this net wealth (link).

Given the inherent economic uncertainties in Mongolia’s commodities markets and rates of foreign investment, profit-maximization strategies appear overtake all other political issues that divide the country’s political and business factions. Consequently, the ideological lines between Mongolian political parties have become blurred, and these parties remain vulnerable to ever-changing short-term coalitions or dissolutions based on convenient business deals. Since 2005, the natural resource boom has intensified this competition by creating expectations of business opportunities (e.g., the growing market need for supply and support businesses) and the influx of funds (e.g., investment, fees, royalties). And this domestic phenomenon, in turn, affects Mongolia’s foreign relations with Russia, China and the Western democracies.

Mongolia’s historical sensitivity to China provides a favorable climate for Russian business groups. Although Russia’s geo-strategic interests in Mongolia have declined somewhat since the fall of Communism, Russian business groups have been influential in reviving interest in Mongolia. A recent interview by Russian goldmine owner Sergei Paushok, who contested Mongolia’s imposition of a windfall profit tax, triggered quick debates among the country’s politicians (Zuunii Medee October 26, 2013; Medee.mn, October 28, 2013).

Another example of Russia’s powerful impact on Mongolian internal politics has been the railway debate—whether to use the Chinese standard gauge domestically to link Mongolia’s mining sites to the Chinese rail network, or the Russian standard gauge to link to the Trans-Siberian Railroad (Asia Pacific Memo, February 12, 2013). While the parliament decided on the Russian standard gauge in June 2010, Mongolia’s various business factions are still debating and attempting to cancel each other’s projects to overturn this decision. Of course, the Russian side has been supportive of those Mongolian factions advocating the Russian standard gauge. But as a result of this increased Russian interest and influence, Mongolia lost $188 million in assistance from the US Millennium Challenge Account, which in turn discouraged some Western mining companies (e.g., Khan Resources in uranium mining) from investing in the country and complicated the bidding process of the Tavan Tolgoi coking coal mine (link). Finally, the Mongolian economy is still vulnerable to Russian petroleum exports (see EDM, November 21, 2012). Therefore, growing Russian business interests will certainly reduce Ulaanbaatar’s ability to make independent decisions on major mining and infrastructure projects if Mongolian political parties and their business backers continue to allow themselves to be coopted in this way.

China, with its vast manufacturing base, remains the primary outlet for Mongolian natural resources, as well as a transit corridor for Mongolia’s entry into other East Asian markets. However, Mongolia’s ability to benefit from the growing Chinese economy is being constrained by two major factors. One is the prevailing, although changing, anti-Chinese sentiment among Mongolians. The exclusion of Chinese bidders in major mining investment projects and the foreign investment law excluding foreign state-owned enterprises were mostly driven by Mongolia’s traditional anti-Chinese sentiments (see EDM, January 17, 2013). The other factor is factional fighting within domestic politics to advance party-affiliated business interests while cancelling previous deals with Chinese enterprises made by opposing political groups. Because China is not dependent on Mongolia’s resource exports (esp., coal), Mongolia’s short-term political populism and factional competition endangers the country’s economic and trade relations with China, which, in turn, hardens China’s position in subsequent economic negotiations. To assuage Chinese concerns over economic uncertainty, succeeding governments in Ulaanbaatar will likely need to commit to strategic partnership agreements and to promise more opportunities for Chinese state-owned enterprises. For instance, long-term coal export quotas and investment opportunities for Chinese energy companies were agreed during the Prime Minister Norovyn Altankhuyag’s recent visit to Beijing (Press Release of the Government of Mongolia, October 25, 2013). But these deals will likely again become vulnerable as the balance of political power in Ulaanbaatar changes or if Mongolian populist politicians again start to invoke anti-Chinese rhetoric.

The turbulent competition among Mongolian political and business factions, the success of populist politicians, and the growth of domestic civil society activists and environmental movements, as well as growing interests of Russian and Chinese state-owned enterprises in Mongolia are increasingly turning away Western investors. In particular, government agreements with Anglo-Australian Rio Tinto and Canadian Ivanhoe Mines in 2010 are still under pressure from the Mongolian side and becoming the hostage to its domestic politics. Indeed, meetings between Mongolian political leaders and high-level dignitaries from member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) frequently revolve around Mongolia’s mining investment environment. However, the damaging conflicts between its various political-business factions, as well as public discontent over corruption and domestic social-economic challenges—especially related to the mining sector—are almost certain to continue to complicate Mongolia’s foreign policy decisions.

Note: re-posted with the permission of the Eurasia Daily Monitor of the Jamestown Foundation, for the original news, Eurasia Daily Monitor.

Posted in China, Democracy, Foreign Policy, Mongolia and ..., Party Politics, Russia | Tagged | Leave a comment

Is the Altankhuyag Government Teetering?

Posted on April 15, 2014 by JDierkes

Prime Minister Altankhuyag has been leading the government for almost two years. To an outside observer like me, he has remained a puzzle in how he has been able to keep a coalition and a divided party united first for the presidential election, and then under his leadership as prime minister.

Throughout the past 1 1/2 years rumours about the imminent end to the Altankhuyag government have come and gone frequently. With the MPP in a period of redefining the party, its platform and leadership, most of the speculation has focused on factions within the DP.

At the moment, the rumours of a likely change in government seem to be picking up again. Some pressure might be linked to the on-going economic challenges, lack of foreign investment, and lack of transparency in spending of funds from foreign bonds.

Why Now? Proposal to Redefine Cabinet Membership

President Elbegdorj has initiated a law that would restrict membership in cabinet to non-MPs contrary to the current practice where almost all ministers are MPs. A draft of this law was proposed earlier this year. The original proposal suggested that the law would take effect after the 2016 parliamentary election. However, the MPP, as well as the DP’s coalition-partner MPRP and some individuals including Ganbaatar and even some DP members (such as Amarjargal, Batchimeg), have rejected the notion of delaying the implementation of this law until the next parliament.

Because the division of power between the president, the prime minister, and parliament has been left somewhat unclear by the Mongolian constitution, this proposal is another round in the battle to divide power. Even though MPs would lose the opportunity to serve in the cabinet, they would gain power over ministers by having to approve their appointment.

It’s unclear what might motivate Pres. Elbegdorj to push for this change, but Prime Minister Altankhuyag and the DP have delayed discussions of this proposal.

Another development threatening PM Altankhuyag is that his daughter, A Saranzaya, has been implicated in the Anti-Corruption Agency’s investigation of the Clean Air Program that has led to the recent sentencing of Khurelsukh, a former advisor to the Prime Minister and director of the Clean Air Program. Because the Anti-Corruption Agency is seen to be guided by the President in some cases, Saranzaya’s investigation suggests that there has been a split or at least some tension between Elbegdorj and Altankhuyag.

What Might Happen?

In principle there are three ways for a government to fall:

  1. resignation of the PM
  2. a majority of cabinet members withdraw their support for the PM
  3. parliament has a vote of non-confidence (potentially initiated by the president)

It does not appear likely that PM Altankhuyag would resign. However, if he feels threatened by the current situation he might respond with a cabinet shuffle. In such a reshuffle he would likely try to sideline four of the most powerful and querulous ministers: Batbayar (Econ Development), Ganhuyag (Mining),  Gansukh (Transport) all from the DP, and Ulaan (Finance) from the MPRP.

However, discussion of cabinet membership would precede a decision about the Prime Minister. And the question of whether the law – if passed, or if a compromise like the previous maximum of one third MPs as cabinet members is adopted – would apply now or in 2016 would obviously determine the nature of any cabinet moves.

Public Perceptions

The proposal to end dual responsibility (ie MPs serving in cabinet) is generally seen as an attempt to clarify the relationship between parliament and the government. Elbegdorj’s decision in late 2000 to appoint one third MPs to cabinet is now seen as problematic for giving cabinet greater power over parliament.

While the DP is enjoying strong approval ratings, PM Altankhuyag’s reputation is suffering quickly.

The public has been very supportive of Pres Elbegdorj’s initiative to restrict dual responsibilities.

Scenarios

In order of likelihood these seem to be the looming scenarios:

  1. Altankhuyag stays as PM with the support of DP, MPRP and CWGP as before, but with a cabinet of non-MPs
  2. The coalition falls apart and a grand coalition of the DP and MPP forms, probably under the leadership of Altankhuyag
  3. A new prime minister is supported by the DP, MPRP and CWGP coalition
  4. No change in PM, coalition, and cabinet.

[This post drew on discussions with UBC graduate students G Damdinnyam & J Mendee]

Posted in Democratic Party, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged | 1 Comment

Mongolia in the 2014 Social Progress Index

Posted on April 8, 2014 by JDierkes

[This post was written jointly by Undral Amarsaikhan and Julian Dierkes]

On April 2, the Social Progressive Imperative released its 2014 Social Progress Index. For the first time, this included Mongolia.

The Social Progressive Index is an index of indices that measures “the multiple dimensions of social progress, benchmarking success, and catalyzing greater human wellbeing”. It is compiled by the Social Progress Imperative, as US-based non-profit funded by foundations and corporations.

Ranking Mongolia

Overall, Mongolia ranks 89th of 132 countries with a score of 58.97 on a 0-100 scale, higher scores indicating more social progress. That score breaks down into three dimensions:

  • Basic Human Needs 53.67 (102nd)
  • Foundations of Well-Being 63.67 (85th)
  • Opportunity 59.56 (42nd).

SPI classifies Mongolia’s rank as belonging to a 4th tier of countries with scores from 70.66 (Kuwait, rank 40) to 58.01 (Morocco, rank 91) that also includes the BRICS, save India. Like many of the countries in this tier, Mongolia’s score varies significantly across the three dimension with an Opportunity score that ranks at the top of this tier, but Foundations of Well-Being and Basic Human Needs ranking much lower.

Ranking Mongolia vs Neighbours and Other Comparisons

Here are the scores/ranks for a small number of other countries that make for useful comparisons with Mongolia:

  • China SPI 58.67 (90th) HumNeeds 73.02 (69th) Wellb 63.78 (84th) Opp 39.21 (110th)
  • Indonesia SPI 58.98 (88) HumNeeds 63.65 (87) Wellb 69.42 (61) Opp 43.86 (92)
  • Kazakhstan SPI 59.47(86) HumNeeds 75.14 (62) Wellb 54.80 (111) Opp 48.47 (74)
  • Kyrgyzstan SPI 57.08 (93) HumNeeds 64.42 (86) Wellb 60.54 (83) Opp 46.26 (83)
  • Philippines SPI 65.86 (56) HumNeeds 66.76 (81) Wellb 69.17 (63) Opp 61.63 (39)
  • Russia SPI 60.79 (80) HumNeeds 72.15 (72) Wellb 63.66 (87) Opp 46.58 (81)

By the measures of the Social Progress Index, Mongolia is thus pretty similar to China, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. Its Basic Human Needs score puts it closer to countries like Ghana (52.39 = 103rd), India (54.48 = 100th), or Namibia (59.01 = 96th). By contrast, Mongolia ranks with countries like Latvia (59,85 =41st), the Philippines (61.63 = 39th), or South Africa (61.19 = 40th) on the Opportunity dimension.

What’s Driving Mongolia’s Score?

The SPI is calculated as an average of the score on the three dimensions. The dimensions in turn are scored on normalized 0-100 scales of three-six indicators per dimension.  These indicators “are selected because they are measured well, with consistent methodology, by the same organization, and across all (or essentially all) of the countries in our sample”. The weights of the indicators within the dimension are determined by a principal components factor analysis.

Let’s look at the dimension where Mongolia is ranked highly first.

Opportunity in Mongolia

This is meant to measure the “degree to which a country’s population is free of restrictions on its rights and its people are able to make their own personal decisions, and whether prejudices or hostilities within a society prohibit individuals from reaching their potential”.

Personal Rights

Not surprisingly, as an exemplary country of democratization certainly in an Asian context, Mongolia registers a higher score in the “personal rights” indicator than in the other three components of the opportunity dimension. The personal rights indicator includes electoral process, political participation and the functioning of government as sub categories.

Mongolians have witnessed six parliamentary and president election since the transition from one-party state-socialism. Those elections were largely conducted in a fine and calm fashion except for the case of 2008, and recognized as successful by foreign observers. There are no restrictions on establishing and registering a political once 800 signatures from supporters have been gathered. Therefore it can be said degree of political rights and freedom of speech is relatively higher in Mongolia as well as freedom of movement and private property rights since it is protected by law. Also it’s worthwhile to notice that Mongolia possesses a relatively strength compared to countries of similar GDP per capita in freedom of movement, freedom of assembly/association and political rights and ranked 35th in the world.

Personal Freedom and Choice

The next component of the opportunity dimension, “personal freedom and choice” consists of four really interesting but different indicators in terms of its performance in Mongolia. The population of Mongolia currently enjoys a high degree of freedom of religion. Most of the bigger religious groups are settled in Mongolia and there is no discrimination for individual’s choice at all. The same can be said for freedom over life choice which was calculated by a scaled question given by Gallup Poll.

But in terms of corruption, Mongolia ranked 83th in Corruption Perspective Index by Transparency International which is used for SPI. Although there is encouragement for fighting against this phenomenon from the president and government, there are still huge gaps to fill and lack of confidence in society in this topic. Transparency and good governance issues are crucial factors of social progress, but it is not applied well enough in Mongolia.

Now, let’s turn to the other two dimensions.

Basic Human Needs of Mongolians

This is the dimension that Mongolia scores lowest in. The Mongolia page identifies the following indicators as a “relative weakness” for Mongolia: water and sanitation and shelter. Within these indicators, all indicators for water and sanitation (access to piped water, rural vs. urban access to improved water, access to improved sanitation facilities) are identified as weak, as are the availability of affordable housing and indoor air pollution under shelter.

It seems then that the low score here is driven primarily by the somewhat nomadic nature of country-side living (no piped water, no improved water or sanitation facilities), and the challenges inherent in life in the ger districts in the periphery of Ulaanbaatar.

Improvement in some aspects of these scores would thus come most easily by settling pastoral herders into permanent dwellings, but this would not only be anathema to the Mongolian exultation of nomadic life, but it would be difficult to see this as social progress in a Mongolian context. That is not to say that these are not valid indicators of social progress in broad cross-national comparisons, but simply to say that there are aspects of life in Mongolia that are not well-matched by the indicators.

By contrast, the two aspects of shelter that constitute a weakness may be more obvious to address by Mongolian policy-makers. Air pollution clearly is one of the foremost challenges that has a very real impact on Mongolians’ lives.

The availability of affordable housing is measured by the Gallup World Poll. As far as I can gather there were waves of surveys in 2009 and 2010 that asked, “Have there been times in the past 12 months when you did not have enough money to provide adequate shelter or housing for you and your family?”.

I find it difficult to interpret this in a Mongolian context. The emphasis on “having enough money” suggests that this question may not mean much for the 30% or so of Mongolians who live as pastoral herders and would thus have access to a ger through their families, though a herder who might have lost his herd due to a dzud might end up not having the resources to make repairs on a ger, for example.

For residents in soum and aimag centres, it’s not entirely clear whether this question might be answered primarily in terms of “adequate shelter/housing” or in terms of the money required for such housing. Likewise for much of Ulaanbaatar, I imagine.

Clearly, housing is an urgent need in Ulaanbaatar’s city planning and in an urban context it seems fair to guess that at least some Mongolians would prefer an affordable apartment to living in a ger in the ger districts, so in that sense a greater portion of respondents in such a poll who think that they do have the funds to afford adequate housing would constitute a measure of social progress.

Foundations of Well-Being for Mongolians

When we examine the specific indicators that make up the foundations of well-being dimension, the ones that constitute a weakness are “health and wellness” and “ecosystem sustainability” virtually across the board, except for the “life expectancy” and “obesity” indicators of “health and wellness”, and the “biodiversity” indicator for “ecosystem”.

“Non-communicable disease deaths between the ages of 30 and 70” and “Outdoor air pollution attributable deaths” are based on WHO data.

Obviously, air pollution is a severe problem. However, it is also a problem with a particular context. It is primarily a problem in Ulaanbaatar and thus affects approximately 40% of the population. It is also a seasonal problem. While pollution levels are worse in the winter than in Chinese cities which have been reported on so much in the past two years, pollution is much reduced in the summer. Christa Hasenkopf looked at the Beijing-UB comparison in more detail in January 2013.

The primarily regional and seasonal impact of air pollution does not negate the utility of comparing Mongolian data to other countries, however, unlike the sanitation and water examples above and below, for example. Pollution in Ulaanbaataar can be addressed without an immediate and direct impact on nomadism, for example, and the health benefits would be immediate.

The suicide rate is given by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation. I was puzzled by this last factor as I had not previously heard of Mongolia as possessing either a high or low suicide rate, in fact this had not been mentioned to me as a factor at all.

The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation is based at the University of Washington in Seattle, WA. Oddly, a search for “suicide” on their webpage yields only two results, neither of which suggest themselves as a source of data. The website offers a “Causes of Death” visualization tool, but when I select Mongolia and “self-harm” as a cause, there is no data available. It looks like I will have to turn to some advice from health experts to find out more about the suicide rate in Mongolia. Tsgotbaatar B (PhD candidate at Simon Fraser University) pointed me to the website WorldHealthRatings. The data reported there is claimed to be based on WHO statistics and reports a suicide rate of 13.74/100,000 for Mongolia ranking it 36th highest in the world. The figure that is used in the SPI is slightly lower, 12.2 ranking Mongolia as 92nd for this category which is puzzling given the WorldHealthRatings comparison of suicide rates across countries. Life expectancy is listed at 67.1 years ranking Mongolia 94th in the world which also seems low.

Under the “ecosystem sustainability” header, “greenhouse gas emissions” and “water withdrawals as % of resources” appear as weaknesses. Green house emissions reference to the World Resources Institute in Washington DC. On a per capita basis, Mongolia’s emissions do seem to be high at 8.66 tCO2 (excluding “forest and land-use change activities”). Comparable figures for Indonesia and the Philippines are 3.42 and 1.59 tCO2, respectively. Given that these are 2010 figures, I can only assume that the use of coal for personal heating and also for power generation must account for these relatively high numbers. Unlike many other countries, for Mongolia, there seems to be a big difference between emissions excluding “forest and land-use change activities” and those including these activities.

The Aqueduct Country and River Basin Rankings assign Mongolia an “extremely high” water risk score based on baseline water stress, interannual variability, seasonal variability, flood occurrence, and drought severity. I suspect that Mongolia’s risk here is driven by the scarcity of water more than by any social policies and policies will have a hard time addressing this scarcity so that this factor seems to be a bit of a permanent handicap.

Global Benchmarks vs. Local Realities

Global indices like the Social Progress Index are intended to give policy-makers a point of comparison for the success of their policies, but also to inspire thinking about future directions for policies.

By necessity, such indices are dependent on comparable data and on consistent definitions of terms. This dependence inherently weakens conclusions for specific countries.

In the case of Mongolia, for example, the association of water and sanitation with progress would suggest that the government of Mongolia ought to pursue policies of settling pastoral herders (as the Chinese government is in Inner Mongolia), but few in Mongolia would see such settlement policies as “progress” even if they did lead to a higher rate of access to improved sanitation.

Global benchmarks therefore need to be interpreted in a national context.

A more complex indicator like the SPI certainly offers opportunities for much more sophisticated and interesting interpretation than GDP does for example. At the same time, just like the Human Development Index certain forms of economic, political and social development are clearly privileged over other forms by such indices.

By contrast, the water and sanitation indicators would need a more nuanced response that acknowledges that the Mongolian rural context is different and calls for different policies. But, an improvement of access to water and sanitation seems to be very much on the agenda for development of Ulaanbaatar ger districts in any case.

Greenhouse gas emissions are mostly caused by the use of coal for heating and energy production which in turn link to air pollution, so a focus on reducing air pollution would seem to address a number of issues associate with notions of social progress.

Some of the health indicators may also be impacted by the very low population density outside of Ulaanbaatar which clearly stretches a health system thinner than would be the case in more dense population scenarios at similar levels of expenditures.

Policy Implications

Assuming for the moment that there would be broad agreement over the goal of social progress and many of the aspects of social progress that are included in the SPI and that a higher ranking is therefore desirable, what lessons does the index hold for Mongolian policy-makers?

Obviously, different strategic responses are plausible. A focus on remedying weakness or further building on strengths would be one approach, while a broad alternative might be to try to aim for across-the-board improvements.

Yet, some indicators in the SPI are more easily subject to improvement by policy than others and some of them perhaps take on more local importance than others.

Air pollution would seem to be a factor that clearly stands out as a weakness for Mongolia and also as a factor that is perceived as detrimental by many Mongolians though obviously more so by residents of Ulaanbaatar than rural Mongolians.

Likewise the indicators under health and wellness suggest areas for improvement to bring Mongolia more in line with its increasing level of income and associated level of availability of resources.

Other Comparisons

For a general sense of how Mongolia fares relative to other countries on many dimensions, see our Mongolia Scorecard.

About Undral Amarsaikhan

UNDRAL Amarsaikhan has a background in economics and journalism. He is currently official delegate of Mongolia in Asia Pacific Youth Parliament for Water and World Student Community for Sustainable Development. He tweets @uundaa.

Posted in Air Pollution, Corruption, Development, Economics, Education, Global Indices, Governance, Nomadism, Policy, Policy, Primary and Secondary Education, Research on Mongolia, Social Change, Undral Amarsaikhan, Water | Tagged | 1 Comment

Fellow Mongolia Focus Bloggers Marching Along in Academic Careers

Posted on April 7, 2014 by JDierkes

Congratulations to two Mongolia Focus grad student bloggers!

  • MENDEE Jargalsaikhan passed his comprehensive examinations in Political Science at the Univ of British Columbia last week. The next step for him will be to write and defend a dissertation proposal to advance to candidacy for the PhD.
  • Brandon Miliate was awarded a US Dept of Education Foreign Languages and Area Studies (FLAS) fellowship to study Burmese this summer while continuing his graduate studies in Political Science at the Univ of Indiana.

While continuing their focus on contemporary Mongolia, Brandon and Mendee are pursuing comparative research, so let’s all hope to read and learn more from them in the future as they deservedly revel in these important steps/successes.

Posted in Brandon Miliate, Mendee Jargalsaikhan, Research on Mongolia | Tagged | Leave a comment

Book Reviews: Change in Democratic Mongolia

Posted on March 20, 2014 by JDierkes

The edited volume, Change in Democratic Mongolia: Social Relations, Health, Mobile Pastoralism, and Mining has been reviewed in the following academic publications:

  • Morris Rossabi (2013) in Pacific Affairs 86 (3): 642-644.
  • Jeremy Swift (2014) in Nomadic Peoples 18 (1): 152-155.
  • Tjalling Halbertsma (2014) in Journal of Asian History 48 (2): 12-14.
Posted in Book: Change in Democratic Mongolia, Research on Mongolia | Tagged | Leave a comment

Mongolia-Australia Mining Partnership

Posted on March 20, 2014 by JDierkes

During FM Lu Bold’s visit to Australia, there has now been an announcement of a grand “Mining Partnership” between Mongolia and Australia to the tune of A$20m over 5 years.

From Julie Bishop, Australian Foreign Minister’s website:

Mongolian Foreign Minister Luvsanvandan Bold and I today announce a five-year, $20 million program to assist the sustainable development of the resources sector in Mongolia.

Like Western Australia, Mongolia’s economy is driven by mining and resources. The Australia-Mongolia Extractives Program will utilise Australian expertise in Mongolia to help ensure the benefits of the mining sector are spread across its entire population.

[…]

Australia is pledging to support the Mongolian Government with financial assistance and expertise that will improve governance in the mining sector, opening their economy up to international investment and development opportunities.

The program will also improve access to technical and vocational education and training in disadvantaged communities in Mongolia so they are better equipped to gain employment in the mining industry.

[…]

1. I’m Jealous

Obviously, this is a very public announcement of commitment to Mongolia by the Australian government and I wish there was a similar commitment from the Canadian side.

From the high point of the Governor General’s visit to Mongolia last Fall, relations currently are in a bit of a funk.

While Australia announces a A$20m program, Canada’s less ambitious bilateral aid program remains in unannounced limbo.

The Canadian government appears to be stalling on accepting the nomination of R Altangerel as new Mongolian ambassador to Ottawa following the departure of T Zalaa-Uul in late 2013. While nothing has been said publicly, one can only guess that there is some kind of a stall in relations.

The only obvious item that could be stalled is a bilateral Foreign Investment Protection Agreement about which little has been heard in years. Whether this is out of a lack of focus on the Mongolian side or actual objections is unclear, but the Canadian ambassador to Mongolia, Greg Goldhawk, is scheduled to be replaced this summer, so if a Mongolian nomination is not accepted by Ottawa, one might imagine that the Mongolian government might similarly stall on a Canadian nomination. That would be a serious and unfortunate stall, obviously.

So that’s why I might be a bit jealous of this Australian announcement.

I hope that this announcement will benefit colleagues in Australia (especially at the ANU’s Mongolian Studies Centre and perhaps at the U of Queensland’s Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining) not least by signalling a certain prominence and thus public attention to Mongolia in Australia.

I also hope that the projects that will be undertaken under this program will involve some colleagues with Mongolia expertise rather than some of the many subject area experts (as opposed to area specialists) who seem to be jetting around the world dispensing their wisdom.

2. Did Someone Leak my EAFQ Piece?

Curiously, the ANU’s Crawford School of Public Policy will be publishing an issue of the East Asia Forum Quarterly later this month which will include some focused discussions of Asia’s “fringe”, including Mongolia.

{Note that my piece was posted on East Asia Forum on March 23}

My own contribution will take a brief look at Mongolian foreign policy, note its success in building political friendships, but urge Mongolian policy-makers to re-focus their efforts on economic relations, particularly in Northeast Asia. If only this issue had appeared before the present announcement, I might wander the earth claiming that my article had an impact. As it will appear after the announcement that trajectory is unlikely.

However, this mining partnership is not what I had in mind in urging a greater economic focus. Yes, this partnership clearly involves a substantial financial commitment to Mongolia and the apparent focus on governance and vocational education implies economic concerns, but it is not a partnership that is focused on trade or the development of bilateral ties per se. Should Australia be successful together with its partners in the pursuit of a comprehensive multilateral free trade agreement around the Pacific (TPP), Mongolian would be frozen out of yet another free trade project raising the spectre of a future when Mongolian will not be able to diversify away from the export of raw materials in part due to a web of trade agreements that excludes it.

Of course, Australia is among the few developed countries that actually have significant investments in Mongolia. These investments are nowhere near the volume of Chinese investments, but they have surpassed Canadian engagement, for example, as Turqoise Hill (by far the largest nominally Canadian investment) has become a mere conduit for strategies pursued by Anglo-Australian Rio Tinto. In this, at least Australia does offer an economic partnership through the private sector that is bolstered by political support as evidenced in the present announcement.

3. What Does This Partnership Mean?

Few details are available at this point. It appears, however, that this is a formalization and re-packaging of Australian aid that has been assumed to be revving up for some time, at least in conversations in Ulaanbaatar. While the announcement is thus quite significant, it appears that it may not be an announcement of anything particularly new.

A focus on governance questions and vocational education is not only very plausible but has been recognized as such by many other aid organizations from the WorldBank to the German-Mongolian Institute for Resources and Technology.

Perhaps, there will be more that’s novel to the programs that are being pursued under this partnership once more details become available, but for now I welcome the news of this very public commitment to Mongolia by Australia and wish the projects to be pursued every success.

I wonder if an Australian embassy to Mongolia (currently, there is a general consulate with bilateral affairs being managed in the Australian embassy in Seoul) can be far behind…

Posted in Australia, Bilateral Aid, Development, Foreign Policy, Governance, Mongolia and ... | Tagged | Leave a comment

Foreign Policy, Mining & Development

Posted on March 3, 2014 by JDierkes

I happened to catch a segment of CBC’s “The 180” radio show that included an interview with Erin O’Toole, the Canadian Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of International Trade. The segment focused on the “marriage” of foreign policy, development aid, and the extractive industry which the government has been arguing for in terms of a strategic advantage in mining (policy) on the one hand, and an integrated foreign policy that coordinates foreign policy goals with development aid.

This discussion comes in the context of this week’s meeting of the Prospectors and Development Association of Canada (PDAC). The PDAC meeting also included a Mongolia Day, of course.

Conservative Government is Engaging!

I was genuinely surprised to hear Mr. O’Toole discuss the connection between foreign policy, aid and mining quite openly with Jim Brown, the program’s host. Why surprised? Because it seems so rare that any members of this government (political or bureaucratic) engages in any discussion in the media that is anything other than a press release.

While I thought that Mr. O’Toole deflected most of the (very important) questions that Mr. Brown raised, I very much appreciated the fact that he engaged in this discussion at all. I voiced this view in a tweet last night.

To my great surprise (and further appreciation), Mr. O’Toole responded this morning.

So now, I’m on the hook, of course. I have previously made the case for the use of social media for engagement by the government with various stakeholders and experts. I surely can’t just complain, but when given this opportunity, I will offer my version of engagement, that is to try to think about Mr. O’Toole’s discussion and the broader policy he was speaking about, in light of my expertise on Mongolia. This is a narrow context that I’m thinking about, but I think that Mongolia is a reasonably good case to examine the linking of foreign policy and development aid with (private) interests of the extractive industry.

Points Discussed in the Interview

The interview can be found through links on the CBC’s The 180 website and via the CBC Audio Player. It begins with brief conversations with Frederico Guzman, a deputy justice in Colombia, and with Jennifer Moore, Latin America Program Coordinator with MiningWatch.

The segment with Mr. O’Toole begins at about 8min into the interview. A transcript of this exchange (which was condensed from a longer conversation) seems like the easiest way to comment on it, so I offer this below. I have made minor edits in good faith for the purpose of ease of understanding and have largely marked these by [square brackets].

I have send an email to The180@cbc.ca in the hopes of getting some guidance whether such a transcript violates any of their rights, but have not received a reply. If I am violating any rights/laws, I apologize and will gladly be educated on that and will respond accordingly immediately.

Jim Brown’s Question1: We’ve heard […] that Canadian mining companies are exacerbating human rights abuses. How do you respond?

Erin O’Toole’s Answer1: Generally there is a lot of confusion about our resource and extractive industry around the world. Industry is in many cases the largest employer in impoverished areas of the [developing] world. Those areas have many challenges from a governance and institution-building capacity [perspective]. There’s often a mixed message from projects [meaning industry?]. I’ve heard from all sides of the[se] debates how much of an impact [these projects] make on employment, on creating a local supplier network in the country, building capacity over time. There are others that say that economic activity in these areas causes disruption. But […] it is our firm belief that [economic activity] actually allows parts of these challenged areas of [developing] countries to actually develop their own local economy. So, there is a lot of different viewpoints on this. We’re trying to work with our Corporate Social Responsibility Office to make sure that – if there are any valid issues – they are addressed.

Q2: I’m sure you’ve heard the concern, the emphasis on economic diplomacy – which has been highlighted by your government recently – makes it hard for Canada to exert the kind of pressure that perhaps should be exerted when it comes to things like human rights concerns. Let me ask you: how can diplomats push for trade and business opportunities for Canadian companies on the one hand, and then on the other hand pressure those companies to respect human rights.

A2: You’ve asked a great question. In a lot of ways our previous approach to foreign policy didn’t recognize the obvious: if there is a Canadian company operating somewhere around the world, bringing positives and some potential issues, we have to recognize that Canada is there, we have a presence, our global brand is there through one of our corporate players. So why would we not orient some of our aid work, and some of our diplomatic work, to not only address some of the issues that might arise, but to try and help develop and lead to longer-term sustainability for the countries those companies are operating in.

Q3: There’s another element to this that people point to: the fact that many of the countries that mining watch is concerned about have very young and often very unstable democracies. Corruption can be a problem, citizens don’t always get the kind of due process that we would expect here in Canada. What’s your government doing to ensure that Canadian companies aren’t exploiting those conditions?

A3: Well, that’s another great question. We work on capacity-building in some of those countries. So, DFATD with the total approach to diplomacy we have now will actually work on capacity-building so there’s countries in South and Latin America, we we’ve actually used some of our aid funding to build local capacity of the country’s judiciary. And that is a much better long-term solution than what was done in the past which was short-term aid delivered and then no capacity built within that country for a sustained prosperity or a sustained institution-building presence. What some of the groups like MiningWatch complain about is that they don’t like that there’s been a change, but they don’t seem to recognize that these changes will actually lead to better governance and better institutions in those countries in the long term.

Q4: The specific concern from Jenn Moore of MiningWatch that she expressed to us was that the government puts all of its lobbying into making rules in countries like Honduras suit Canadian companies without consulting with the affected communities.

A4:  Honduras is a case in point. We have signed a Free Trade Agreement with Honduras. [Honduras] is at a critical turning-point where there is a new government in place with elections that were monitored and fair to try and build a stable democracy in that part of the world. Canada has a choice. We can do what MiningWatch and the NDP want and not trade and engage with these countries, or we can try and trade, help them actually grow their GDP which on a per capita basis is astonishingly low and that leads to social unrest. By focusing our economic diplomacy not just on trading but bringing aid and institution-building to a country like Honduras we’re actually going to increase our direct relationship with them, promote security, and hopefully help them build their own capacity to safeguard everything from human rights to the environment.

My Observations on the Answers Offered

Perhaps it is unfair to expect answers in an interview that directly speak to the questions raised. I’m certain that the few people that may have heard me interviewed in the past could also point to answers that did not directly speak to the questions. Yet, in this interview, Jim Brown raised questions that have been behind some of the reactions to the government’s announcement regarding foreign policy and development, so the fact that Mr. O’Toole was willing to engage in this discussion raised the hope in me that he would address some of these questions directly. I don’t think he did.

Are Mining Companies Exacerbating Human Rights Violations?

On Q1, Mr. O’Toole offered no response on the question of whether mining companies may be exacerbating human rights. Instead, he argued that (private) economic activity is generally a good thing by providing employment and building economic capacity.

This strikes me as broadly true, but it doesn’t answer the question of whether human rights violations are exacerbated by the presence of foreign mining companies.

I don’t have much of a view on this question myself, as human rights concerns are rarely raised about mining activities in Mongolia where the main challenges revolve around environmental concerns, corruption, and strategies to avoid the “resource curse”.

I am a little surprised to see that Mr. O’Toole in this answer seems to suggest that the government of Canada should be involved in sending clearer messages about mining projects. The mixed messages that he refers to would seem to be the responsibility of private interests and investors, not of the government in my mind.

Economic Diplomacy and Canada’s Ability to Speak on Other Issues

I don’t think that Mr. O’Toole provides any answer to the question of “how  diplomats can push for trade and business opportunities for Canadian companies on the one hand, and then on the other hand pressure those companies to respect human rights”. I think this is one of the crucial elements in the shift in foreign/development policy that is being pursued by the government.

Perhaps we’re guilty as analysts of taking the government too much at their own word in a substantive manner, rather than in rhetorical fashion. When the Global Markets Action Plan was released in November 2013 or when Mr. O’Toole speaks of a “total diplomacy” (in A3) my impression was that this implied a primacy of economic concerns (including private Canadian interests) over other areas of diplomacy, presumably including such areas as the promotion of human rights. Maybe this hierarchy of emphasis is less strict than some of the rhetoric implies? Mr. O’Toole seems to suggest as much when he discusses capacity building and judicial reform as a target of development aid, reforms that are aiming at a general benefit to the local population, not an advantage to Canadian investments, I presume.

More specifically, this question did not ask why the government or DFATD would or would not want to developer longer-term sustainability, but whether this would be possible if diplomatic activities were driven primarily by economic interests.

The other part of the answer focuses on the presence of Canada through private investments and the need to recognize that presence. In my mind, that was a strong argument for the establishment of a Canadian embassy in Mongolia when this decision was made. At the time, it seemed like representatives of Canadian investments were arguing for an embassy to help protect their interests and that may have been part of the motivation. From my point of view, however, the presence of Canadian investments necessitated an embassy to safeguard broader public Canadian interests. Not that any Canadian investors in Mongolia were necessarily endangering the value of the Canada brand, but the potential was certainly there. It’s not entirely clear from his answer here whether Mr. O’Toole might share such a view.

Operating in New or Unstable Democracies

I think that the contrast that Mr. O’Toole draws with “what was done in the past which was short-term aid delivered and then no capacity built” is unfair not only to the decision-makers involved in those policies (presumably Mr. O’Toole means Liberal governments of the past here), but also to the professionals engaged in Canadian development work as well as the many academics who have offered contributions to these efforts in the past. To claim that the Conservatives have discovered the secret to long-term capacity building strikes me as a bit more political rhetoric than a substantive point and it doesn’t really address the question about operating in new/unstable democracies.

Excursus on Mongolia

For some, Mongolia is such a context of a new democracy. I tend to see this somewhat differently in that over 20 years of democratic institutions and several national elections that have led to peaceful changes in government more Mongolia out of the “new” category and certainly remove it from the unstable category. That is not to say, of course, that Mongolian democracy doesn’t face challenges. This is a point I’ve written about recently in the context of the Freedom in the World scoring for Mongolia. But there are no legacies of civil war, autocrats, or involvement by the military to contend with in Mongolia.

This doesn’t make the question asked less relevant, but this discussion wasn’t really the context in which Mr. O’Toole might have spoken to the role of foreign policy/development in a context like Mongolia.

In this specific context, I actually happen to agree with some of the logic of the foreign policy that the government is pursuing. Institutional capacity and corruption are areas of major challenges not just to Mongolia’s economic development, but to Mongolia’s democracy as well.

Canadian jurisdictions (the provinces more than the federal government) have wrestled with questions around the community, economic, environmental, and social impact of resource projects for some decades, and have done so in the context of well-established (though never perfect) democratic institutions. This experience is not just an economic comparative advantage to Canadian policy and investments, but is an obvious area for a focus of development work as seems to be recognized by the government as well. Such development work is not built around the straight-forward export of solutions and lessons, but can certainly revolve around a sharing of experiences (including mistakes and dead-ends) and a collaboration with an interpretation of those experiences for a different context like Mongolia.

If such development work contributes to more equitable and environmentally sound, sustainable development, Canadian private investments will be free to compete for investment opportunities and will be in a good position to do so. I don’t think that they will need any direct lobbying from the government to succeed if the rules of the game are well-constructed which is what development work would aim at.

In this context, I have to lament that the bilateral aid program focused on Mongolia appears to be in place de facto, but remains unannounced by the government.

Returning to Interview

Honduras

I claim no expertise on Honduras or Canada’s involvement there.

However, Mr. O’Toole’s response on “focusing economic diplomacy not just on trading but bringing aid and institution-building” reinforces my impression that the portrayal of economic and private investment interests as a driver of foreign policy may be overstated for political rhetorical purposes (the dynamic of which I don’t claim to have any particular insights on), but not in fact as stark as these statements suggest. Mr. O’Toole seems to link development and institution-building to a trade agenda in a more equal relationship that then prioritization of the economic over all else in public announcements seems to suggest.

Bottom Line

I was genuinely surprised by hearing a Conservative parliamentary secretary actually discussing (rather than announcing) policy. The specific shifts in foreign and development policy pursued by the government need (much) more discussion not just to help the public (or at least me) understand this policy better, but also to allow the government to make their case for this shift in a more complete and complex fashion that moves away from press-release-engagement.

It appears that Mr. O’Toole is willing to engage in such a fashion and thus also follow up on Foreign Minister Baird’s announcement of a greater focus on Twiplomacy by the government some weeks ago. One of the aims of Twiplomacy may be the involvement and engagement of a broader spectrum of voices, I’ve tried to offer such a voice here.

Comments are open!

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Foreign Policy Roundup No. 15: Feb. 10-23, 2014

Posted on February 23, 2014 by miliate

The last two weeks have witnessed a major turning point in South Korean-Mongolian relations as well as some interesting developments in Mongolia’s evolving relationship with New Zealand.

 

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Asia-Pacific (including Oceania)

Minister of Foreign Affairs, L. Bold, made an official trip to South Korea to discuss developments in the two countries’ “Comprehensive Partnership”. During the negotiations, several sticking points in the relationship were discussed, including visa requirements and technological investments. The visit was a recognized success in Mongolian foreign policy, with the establishment of a new South Korean-Mongolian Business Forum and a new commitment to increasing investment.

L. Bold held a dinner for the out-going Vietnamese Ambassador to Mongolia, in recognition of his role in furthering the traditionally friendly relations between these two countries.

A delegation of the Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made an official trip to Ulaanbaatar, including the Australian Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade, John Lantry. This visit comes before Minster L. Bold’s up-coming trip to Australia.

Mongolia and New Zealand held their first consultative meeting in Ulaanbaatar to discuss the two countries’ bilateral and multilateral relations, and exchange views on regional issues. The Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that the consultations were especially useful given their similarities as two relatively small countries with small populations and economies based on agricultural production.

 

Multilateral (UN)

The Mongolian Minister for Popular Development and Social Welfare, S. Erdene, participated in the UN Forum on Social Development in New York. During his presentation to the Forum, he noted Mongolia’s efforts at increasing employment and decreasing cash handout systems through the “Prosperously Employed Mongolian” program.

Mongolian Parliament members M. Batchimeg and N. Nomtoibayar participated in the OSCE meeting in Vienna, Austria.

Mongolia’s Permanent Representation to the UN in Geneva, V. Purevdorj, met with UN High Commisioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillai.

The UN announced that the 32rd Small Assembly meeting for the Food and Agriculture Organization in the Asia-Pacific will be hosted by Ulaanbaatar this March.

…

 

For previous postings, please CLICK HERE.

 

 

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Здравствуйте!: Why It’s Not about -Stans

Posted on February 9, 2014 by miliate

By Brandon Miliate

I recently came across and article in The Atlantic, which reported that Kazakhstani President  Nursultan Nazarbayev had suggested that perhaps the suffix –stan was responsible for Kazakhstan’s supposedly low global profile. He mentioned Mongolia, as a country that continues to attract international attention despite its small economy and population. Perhaps a name change would help Kazakhstan develop a stronger international profile, he mused.

There is really only one good Russian response to this: Здравствуйте! (‘hello’ or in this case more like a saracastic ‘good morning’). On the one hand this could just have been a interesting idea that the President was playing around with, which has no serious implications for the future of the country or his perception of its position in world affairs. On the other hand, it could point to some serious misconceptions on Nazarbayev’s part.

Let’s start with the statement that Mongolia has somehow benefited as a result of not being called something like Mongolistan. For every available economic indicator, Kazakhstan greatly outperforms Mongolia. This is, naturally, to be expected. Kazakhstan is a oil exporting state, has a much larger population, and was more developed at the dissolution of the Soviet Union, giving it a stronger starting point. Just looking at FDI, Kazakhstan hosts a huge figure at $111.5 billion, while Mongolia stands at just $4.5 billion! Anecdotally, it is more that clear enough that many more businessmen, students, policy makers, and analysts take a direct interest in Kazakhstan than in Mongolia when it comes to current affairs (naturally, I would suspect that Mongolia can command more than its fair share of historians). While it is beyond the scope of this casual blog post to offer a full comparison, I feel confident in saying that Kazakhstan’s international profile is significantly more pronounced than Mongolia’s.

That said, I would suspect that Nazarbayev was more concerned with a different kind of indicator, namely something more related to soft power. (I detailed Mongolia’s «small power» here). In this case, Mongolia is certainly outperforming Kazakhstan, and it has nothing to do with a little Perso-Turkic suffix. Mongolia is a proven democracy, and has consistently shown its committment to engaging with the international community and improving its own democratic credentials. While Mongolia has eshewed further deepening its relationship with the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan is part of the Eurasian Custom’s Union and CIS, tieing it to the Russian Federation. While Mongolia has sought to further its relationship with the European Union and North America, Kazakhstan remains a difficult partner because of its authoritarian political system and continued abuses of basic civil/human rights. Even with these limitations, Kazakhstan does enjoy good relations with the E.U. and the United States, but the relationship remains limited, largely as a result of Kazakhstan’s own domestic and foreign policy choices. While Mongolia has sought to rise above its own geographical position, Kazakhstan’s leadership continues to avoid a more balanced relationship with the Russian Federation, to the direct detriment of its other foreign policy goals. (In fact, Kazakhstan’s political system is also a key reason for the underdeveloped nature of Kazakhstan-Mongolian relations, outlined here).

At the end of the day, Kazakhstan’s economy is stronger and its economic ties to North America and Europe outperform Mongolia on most indicators. If Kazakhstan has any lessons to learn from Mongolia it is that democratization is not only beneficial as a domestic policy, but also as a lever for diplomatic relations. Democracy matters, names and suffixs don’t. 

Posted in Central Asia, Democracy, Governance, Inner Asia, International Relations, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and ..., Politics | Tagged | 1 Comment

Foreign Policy Roundup #14: January 27-February 9, 2014

Posted on February 9, 2014 by miliate

The last two weeks have shown Mongolia’s commitment to furthering its relationship with the European Union, and its ability to use past Soviet-era relationships to fulfill that goal.

 

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Neighbors

President Elbegdorj arrived in Sochi on February 7, to attend the 2014 Winter Olympics. 

The president of the Mongolian Organization for Peace presented a medal to the Consul-General of the Russian Federation in Darhan-Uul for his role in Mongolian-Russian relations over the past 30 years.

  

Asia-Pacific 

Upon returning to Ulaanbaatar, Minister L. Bold met with the Korean and Japanese Ambassadors to Mongolia.

Two Mongolian citizens have been transferred from South Korea to Mongolian custody to stand trial under the “Treaty on the Exchange of Criminals” between the two states. 

 

Europe

Minister of Foreign Affairs, L. Bold, made his first official visit to Latvia, to discuss the expansion of trade relations between the two countries. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mongolian-Latvian relations were stronger, with many Mongolians studying in Riga.

Following his visit to Latvia, Minister L. Bold traveled to Lithuania. With his Lithuanian counterparts, he discussed how Lithuania could be a key country for Mongolia’s evolving partnership with the EU, and that Mongolia could serve as a gateway for Lithuania into the Northeast Asian economy.

After his tour of the Baltics, Minister L. Bold made an official visit to Poland, where he met with the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs. In recent years, Mongolian-Polish diplomatic and economic relations have expanded rapidly.

The 2014 Mongolian-Hungarian Business Council was held in Veszprém, Hungary to discuss the facilitation of investment, economic, and trade relations.

Mongolia’s newly appointed Ambassador to the Malta, Sh. Odonbaatar, presented his credentials to the Maltese President.

 

Middle East

The newly appointed Mongolian Ambassador to Lebanon, B. Odonjil presented his credentials to the Lebanese President.

 

Multilateral

Mongolia’s Permanent Representative to the UN made a speech at the recent small assembly meeting in Geneva, in which he focused on the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons.

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For previous Foreign Policy Roundup postings, please CLICK HERE.

 

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Subscores: Freedom in the World Report

Posted on February 2, 2014 by JDierkes

When the 2014 Freedom in the World report was released on January 23, it came with the following map:

At the time I tweeted, “That dot of hopeful green in a see of authoritarian purple is #Mongolia #FIW“. I also quickly added this rating to the Mongolia Scorecard.

Apart from the obvious and embarrassing typo using “see” for “sea”, this tweet generated a lot of re-tweets, but also some reactions. Several Mongolians replied with comments disparaging the state of democracy and freedom in Mongolia.

Most of these comments were very general.

Details on Mongolia’s Subcategory Scores in the Freedom in the World Report

At the time I urged those who find fault with Mongolian democracy to think about this a) in a comparative perspective, but b) also to look at the details of the scoring to see whether they disagreed with any specific aspects.

Comparative Democracies

It’s important to emphasize that few democracies, even those with high ratings in a comparative effort like that run by Freedom House, are perfect by any account of citizens of those democracies or observers. By whatever standard (empirical, philosophical, moral, ethical) one might apply, democracies fall short in functioning as an expression of the political will of the people in all kinds of ways. This is obviously true of Mongolia as well.

Whether it is the declining participation in elections in Mongolia, or the lack of policy options presented by parties, or the amount of corruption in Mongolian politics, there is much than Mongolians might choose to improve about their political system which – like other democracies – remains a work in progress. But this is true of Canada, as it is of Germany or Japan, just to list other democracies that I am most familiar with.

If we look at the more detailed scores for Mongolia that are available from Freedom House, we might look at a category like “Electoral Process”, for example, where Mongolia scores 11 out of 12 points. Examples of other countries with a score of 11 here are: Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Taiwan, and the U.S. Mongolia’s neighbours receive much lower scores here (as in other categories): Russia: 1, China: 0. The only full score of 12 in Asia is for Japan.

In another subscore where Mongolia’s ranking is much lower, “Rule of Law” (12/16) it is comparable to Ghana, Italy, Slovakia, for example. Asian countries with higher scores include: Japan (15), South Korea (13), Taiwan (14).

Corruption as an area for concern when it comes to democracy and freedom in Mongolia is included under C, “Functioning of Government” where Mongolia is ranked 9/12. This is a ranking that correspond to such countries as Croatia, Jamaica, and Namibia. Asian scores here range from Uzbekistan’s 0 to Japan and South Korea’s 10.

Scoring Freedom in Mongolia

For anyone who disagrees with the rating provided for Mongolia in the Freedom in the World report, I would urge them to turn to the subcategory scores that are provided at http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores. The links provided here lead to Excel spreadsheets that provide much more detail on the Mongolian scores than the summary of Political Rights: 1, Civil Liberties: 2 = “Free” does.

In this spreadsheet, the following subcategory scores are recorded for Mongolia: A = 11, B = 16, C = 9, D = 15, E = 11, F = 12, G = 12.

What does this mean? All the categories are explained in the FIW Methodology.

From here, the subcategories take on more meaning.

Political Rights
A = Electoral Process: 11/12
B = Political Pluralism and Participation 16/16
C = Functioning of Government 9/12
Subtotal: 36/40

Civil Liberties
D = Freedom of Expression and Belief 15/16
E = Associational and Organizational Rights 11/12
F = Rule of Law 12/16
G = Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights 12/16
Subtotal: 50/60

Note that for all these scores, Freedom House “assesses the real-world rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals, rather than governments or government performance per se”. For ratings the question is thus not whether the electoral process is successful in channelling the political will of the people, but whether this process enshrines and guarantees rights within this process.

The individual ratings are based on a series of criteria and questions that is also listed in the FIW Methodology.

As is listed in the FIW Methodology, the cut-off for a Political Rights ranking of 1 is 36 which Mongolia reaches exactly. For Civil Liberties, category 2 is assessed for subtotals for 44-52, so Mongolia’s score of 50 puts it toward the upper end of this range. The relatively low scores that were assessed for Rule of Law and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights thus keep Mongolia in category 2 for Civil Liberties.

With an average between the Political Rights and Civil Liberties of 1.5, Mongolia falls firmly in the “Free” category.

These scores for 2014 are identical to those for 2013 when Mongolia had made a big jump in the rankings.

That jump was somewhat confirmed by the OSCE election observation mission report which reinforced the generally positive impression of procedures and regulations around national elections, the presidential election for 2013.

Previous Discussion

I had written about the 2013 Freedom in the World report when Mongolia moved up from 2 to 1 in the Political Rights section.

Full disclosure: I have acted as a consultant to Freedom House on the Freedom in the World report for Mongolia.

Posted in Corruption, Democracy, Elections, Governance, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged | 1 Comment