Khurelsukh and Pax Mongolica at the UN

Posted on September 26, 2025 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

Pres. Khurelsukh’s speeches at the UN General Assembly have caught my eyes in recent years, in part because the UN has been the site of an at least symbolic battle between Russian President V Putin and the world over his aggression against Ukraine. Mongolia is caught up in that via its relations with Russia and China.

 

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Pres Khurelsukh has continued his attendance streak to participate in the 80th general assembly, delivering his speech on Sept 23. A full text (“check against delivery”) is also available as a PDF.

Themes

The UN

Obviously, the UN has featured prominently in all of Khurelsukh’s speeches, as it did in Pres. Elbegdorj’ speeches, while Pres. Battulga was not so keen on attending/speaking.

And, on the 80th anniversary of the UN, how appropriate that Mongolia’s role in and connection to the UN featured prominently.

Following the historical introduction to the speech, Khurelsukh moved directly to Mongolia’s UN links, emphasizing peacekeeping in particular, as he should. He emphasized Mongolia’s efforts regarding the incorporation of women into peacekeeping troops pointing to their proportion in Mongolian forces as 14%.

The SDGs were the next item to be emphasized, including a reference to the Awaza Program of Action which I was not aware of. As this Program is focused on Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs), Khurelsukh returned to a focus that also appeared in his 2024 speech. The Think Tank for Landlocked Developing Countries had been set up in Ulaanbaatar more than 15 years ago as one of the most tangible links to the UN, but my sense is that there has not been a lot of action around the cooperation between landlocked countries recently.

The next UN touchpoint was the 17th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the Convention to Combat Desertification which Mongolia will be hosting next August.

Mongolian Culture

Of course, the Great Khaan cannot be missing from a speech like this. Here, he shows up right in the second full paragraph, as does the pax mongolica as a quasi-prototype. I am not a historian, but some of this language here, including “a period of remarkable progress and flourishing for humankind”, seems a bit hagiographic, but perhaps that is just sour European/conquered grapes…

Mongolian culture and heritage was generally a strong theme. The section that followed mention of Landlocked Developing Countries thus referred to that particular relationship with nature that Mongolians have and explicitly referred to the adoption of July 11 as World Horse Day by the UN in the context of the mid-summer celebration of Naadam.

Gender

Another section of the speech focused on women. Some of the highlights here were women peacekeepers, but also the World Women Entrepreneurs’ Forum and the increase of female representation in last year’s parliamentary election.

Absence

Whereas previous speeches by Khurelsukh had contained oblique references to Russian aggression or at least elements that could be read as such, there did not seem any kind of specific reference to the Ukraine conflict even in phrases surrounding the multilateral cooperation that the UN is focused on.

Posted in Landlocked Developing Countries, Mongolia and ..., Peacekeeping, UN | Leave a comment

2026 Budget Proposal: With Failing Infrastructure, Can Mongolia Pivot From Coal to Copper?

Posted on September 21, 2025 by Marissa Smith

By Marissa J. Smith

With the end of summer and the opening of the State Khural on September 15, the past few weeks have seen statements about economic policy coalescing into patterns.

These culminated this past week in still-new Prime Minister Zandanshatar‘s unveiling of his budget proposal, currently under discussion in the State Khural. A pitch to the public is exemplified in a Facebook post, stating that the budget includes “investment in the EDUCATION SECTOR to be increased by 2 times and the HEALTH SECTOR by 5.5 times,” specifying the construction of schools, kindergartens, dormitories, a cancer research center, and a cardiovascular center. (Meanwhile, a recent podcast episode by The Great State Mural highlights teacher shortages and low teacher pay as major concerns among the Mongolian population.)

However, at the same time, the Mongolian economy faces some major challenges and is being forced to attempt major pivots. As noted by over at Mongolia Weekly, the government is shifting focus from coal to copper. The Mongolian government’s revenues have been bolstered for several years (roughly since around the transition of power from Battulga’s to Khurelsukh’s administrations) on revenues from coal exports to China. As reported by Mining Insight Magazine, prices for Mongolian coal paid by China had fallen off by as much 30% as of fall 2024, and according to a summary presented with the 2026 budget proposal itself, prices had fallen by 40% in the first half of 2025, to the lowest price in the last 15 years.

Recent announcements by the government signaling attempts to increase gains from copper include:

While this plan is more cautious than the Fourteen Megaprojects of last year when Oyun-Erdene was still Prime Minister, it does have echoes of that scheme, and opening up new ore reserves and/or constructing a smelter at Erdenet would face many of the same challenges. Mongolia’s late-Soviet-built major infrastructure — from power and transport to essential urban utilities — is only aging and deteriorating. Recent news stories have stated that seventy percent of Mongolia’s infrastructure is past its expiry date. Over the summer, one of Ulaanbaatar’s power plants suffered a major fire, and is apparently still crippled even now going into the winter (reporting from mid-August includes statements that repairs would be finished before November 1). At the start of September, a substation in northern Mongolia failed following a major fire, causing even the Erdenet Mining Corporation to halt operations. In Ulaanbaatar, a US-funded project to help “stem the impact of an impending water crisis” has been safe from the Trump administration’s chainsaw — at least for now.

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On Egg Cartons In Mongolia

Posted on September 5, 2025 by Marissa Smith

By Marissa J. Smith

Like fences, chickens (and their eggs) are seemingly “unnomadic” products. Also like fences, eggs are hardly unavailable in Mongolia, at least in urbanized areas and provincial centers.

A food shop, Egg Mart, with airag ger and khushuur shop in Erdenet, 2012.

A main course dish with eggs (өндөгтэй хуурга) in Erdenet, 2012.

While the domestic chicken (тахиа) does feature in the Mongolian twelve animal cycle, it does not of course feature among the “five snouts” or customary domestic livestock animals (horse, cow/yak, sheep, goat, camel). The Tsarist explorer Przhevalsky even wrote in his 1876 book, Mongolia, the Tangut country, and the solitudes of northern Tibet, being a narrative of three years’ travel in eastern high Asia, that:

“Fowl or fish they [Mongols] consider unclean, and their dislike to them is so great that one of our guides nearly turned sick on seeing us eat boiled duck at Koko-nor” (p. 57).

Nonetheless, according to figures from 1990, “The total population of farm birds is 376,000, 73 percent of which are found on state farms and 18 per cent on co-operative farms; 9.6 per cent are raised on subsidiary farms and by individuals.” (Information Mongolia, pg. 196). This may refer to egg-layers, with egg consumption being well established in northern Mongolian population centers, at least, by the early 2000s. As indicated by the messaging on the egg carton pictured below, eggs are considered healthy and nutritious (“For a healthy family,” эрүүл гэр бүлийн төлөө).

plastic egg carton

Mongolian egg carton, as shared in Facebook group for “Expats in Mongolia” 

Comment about use and reuse of Mongolian egg cartons, as shared in Facebook group for “Expats in Mongolia” by a user with a Mongolian forename

As indicated by this comment, in Mongolia eggs can also be purchased by the unit. I have been provided in this case with a small plastic bag, as also can be the case with yogurt, when it is distributed for sale, for transport by the consumer from the point of sale.

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Origins of Wooden Fences

Posted on August 25, 2025 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

Sometimes first-time visitors to Mongolia ask questions that I have also been asking myself, so leave me stumped and wondering.

One of these questions is the origin of the khashaa (Хашаа), or fence that demarcates a family’s property around their ger in an urban context.

These fences are ubiquitous in Ulaanbaatar as much as in provincial capitals and even soums. And, I mean ubiquitous as in really everywhere!

B Reichhardt has written a very brief note about the use of fences in Ulaanbaatar ger districts. K Brinkmann has photographed them.

 

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Below I am trying to muse out loud about some of the origins of the specific version of the xashaa fence. If anyone has any different ideas or perhaps even more well-grounded information, I would absolutely welcome that. This is a little bit like my orange-turquoise puzzle that I thought about with NUM’s Munkh-Erdene, but that we did not really reach a conclusion on. Therefore, it might even be an idea for a dissertation topic!

 

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Function

Two obvious purposes come to mind for these fences: keeping animals in, and keeping the elements and, perhaps, people and animals, out.

The counter-arguments are relatively clear, however. Obviously, Mongolian herders generally do not corral their animals except, for example, to sheer them or to catch horses to train them. So the idea of the wooden fence to contain animals seems to run somewhat counter to usual practice. However, perhaps it is the quasi-urban context where we see the fences that changes that practice? For example, in a soum centre, is a fence useful to keep animals that are about to be sold or moved somewhere else?

The one animal that might be kept in more obviously by a fence could be a dog. But there is little attention paid to dogs, their whereabouts and their well-being in the countryside, so this seems somewhat unlikely.

What about keeping animals out then? Again, when gers are sitting on the steppe somewhere, there is no obvious concern with animals coming close to the ger itself or to the cooking or slaughter areas that might be nearby. In an urban context, perhaps there is some utility in keeping herds out that are passing through, but is that enough of a need for one type of wooden fence to dominate across the whole country?

Maybe urban social distrust is at the root of the fence? These fences are not all that solid, so they would not really keep a determined animal or human out, but as gates typically have some kind of locking mechanism, there is some attention that is paid to the capacity of a fence to keep a property private and perhaps somewhat secure. If families might be leaving a property for months at a time as they are migrating, perhaps this modicum of security is enough to motivate some fences initially and they are subsequently copied by others?

In April 2025, I had a chance to meet up with National University’s Bayartsengel B who introduced me to the lovely new café at Dashchoilin Monastery near the university.

 

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This conversation pointed me in two directions for possible explanations. The first might be that the fences might be intended to keep someone out. But, Bayar countered that hospitality norms in the countryside are so strong, that gers would generally be left open for travellers to visit, so fences to keep travellers out or prevent theft would be an unlikely explanation. This might be different for nobles, however, where a fence might signal status. Monasteries may also have had enclosures initially as my check on Erdene Zuu photographs below suggests.

History?

But when did the wooden fence arrive? I’ve got Chris Atwood’s new translation of The Secret History of the Mongols on my desk and will have to check if wooden fences are mentioned anywhere in there, particularly given his discussion about the relative lack of prevalence of what we think of as a proto-typical ger today during the Imperial period. I would be surprised to find that wooden fences played a role in long-ago history.

One obvious thought, especially when traveling in northern Mongolia where small wooden houses are much more prevalent is: are wooden fences a Russian import?

As I was pondering this without really having much of an answer, part of a negative answer presented itself in a photobook on Erdene Zuu history that I picked up in Kharkhorin.

This book is not easy to find online, but I bought it at a gift shop at Erdene Zuu. Here is the entry from the National Library: Энх тунх Эрдэнэзуую.

Because the copyright and origin information about the photos reproduced in the book is very unclear, I do not want to simply reproduce the photos here. But, in several images that are marked “Archival photo, early 1900s”, there are wooden fences that divide different parts of the temple district around Erdene Zuu. These appear to look very similar to today’s xashaa fences, although they do appear to be a little taller and perhaps somewhat more orderly, that is, made of more regular planks. But, they are definitely planks that show some of the bark on (pine) trees, standing vertically, much like today’s planks.

These photos suggest to some extent at least that the xashaa look is not a Soviet import as “early 1900s” at a Buddhist monastery is likely somewhat removed from strong Russian influences.

My conversation with NUM’s Bayar also pointed me to Marzan Sharav’s “One Day in Mongolia” paintings. These are described in many places, including on lots of Mongolia tour company sites. Jamo Grand offers one such recent description. When you look at reproductions of the paintings (many available online), monasteries are clearly walled or fenced-in. The paintings are generally dated to the early 20th century, though not to an exact date. Either way, they seem to predate a pervasive Russian influence (while there was a Russian (trading) presence, of course), supporting my conclusion that the fences are not Russian in origin. Where gers are depicted as free-standing, i.e. not on temple grounds, they do not appear to be fenced-in. Perhaps that suggests that it was monasteries that were first fenced in in this fashion and that urban, i.e. less-nomadic gers may have subsequently adopted this. If that is the case, this might have been in the early days of the MPR. But, it would be surprising if these fences had become as ubiquitous as they are in only 100 years.

In the end, the fences thus remain a bit of a mystery to me…

Further Reading

For fascinating reading on other kinds of fences, see Zoljargal E’s visual anthropology essay:

 

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Guest Post: Back in Mongolia: Buzz, Ambition, and a Bold Vision at MEF 2025

Posted on July 21, 2025 by JDierkes

By Zolzaya Jargalsaikhan

After two years abroad, my family and I have safely returned to Mongolia — just in time for the Mongolia Economic Forum (MEF) 2025. The energy was palpable — not only from reconnecting with family and friends, but also from the distinct buzz in the business and policymaking communities, the buzz that can be felt only in emerging markets.

Having been part of the MEF organizing team in past years, I understood the strategic effort that goes into programming this forum. That’s why I made it a priority to attend as soon as we landed.

MEF has long served as the go-to platform for understanding Mongolia’s socio-economic landscape — and this year was no exception. Taking place immediately after the 2024 parliamentary elections and the appointment of a new government, it offered a rare chance to hear directly from the newly elected Prime Minister and cabinet ministers on their priorities.

See full agenda and speaker list at the MEF website

A Bold New Framework: The 5D Development Policy

Prime Minister Zandanshatar G. opened the forum by unveiling the 5D Development Policy, a ten-year strategy built on five pillars:

  • Doubling the size of the economy
  • Doubling the area of green zones
  • Doubling renewable energy capacity
  • Strengthening macroeconomic stability
  • Accelerating digital transformation

What stood out wasn’t just the ambition, but the clarity: each pillar came with measurable targets.

In what might have been a symbolic gesture to international stakeholders, the Prime Minister conducted his one-on-one policy dialogue session entirely in English — signaling openness and accessibility to foreign investors. Though his English was not flawless — at times repeating similar phrases, sidestepping varied questions, or responding with “I do not want to answer that” — the effort to engage in English itself sent a deliberate message of international orientation.

Legal Clarity, Investor Confidence, and Mega Projects

Investor confidence was a central theme of this year’s MEF. One of the keynote speeches focused specifically on restoring and securing investor trust in Mongolia — a timely and necessary topic, though not a new one. The phrase “Mongolia is open for business” has been repeated by nearly every administration since 2012, and for many, it has lost credibility. Deputy Prime Minister Uchral Nyam-Osor directly acknowledged this skepticism, admitting that the long-promised Foreign Investment Law has been discussed at every forum for over a decade, without result. “I’m now embarrassed to talk about it,” he said, candidly. He pledged that the law would be approved by next year’s forum — and added, only half-jokingly, that if not, there may be no Mongolia Economic Forum to speak at.

Khurelbaatar Bulgantuya, Deputy Chairwoman of the State Great Khural, reaffirmed the government’s commitment to legal stability. Deputy Prime Minister Uchral Nyam-Osor emphasized that 14 mega projects initiated by the previous administration would not be shelved. Instead, the government has ranked them using four categories and 14 evaluation criteria. In practice, this means that five projects are actively moving forward, other five will not require funding from the state budget and will find investors, while the remaining four projects have been deferred.

Energy Sector Pivot and Public-Private Momentum

Since 2024, the government has accelerated reforms in the energy sector, with a clear pivot toward green growth. Priorities include expanding renewable energy, building data centers, and setting a path to export energy by 2030.However, skepticism remains — particularly regarding Energy Minister Choijilsuren, whose position appears at odds with the broader reform narrative promoted by other members of the new cabinet. For many in the international community, this inconsistency raises questions about whether the sector’s ambitious goals are truly credible or politically supported at the highest levels.

One of the most notable developments was the volume of public-private partnership (PPP) agreements signed during the Forum. Both public and private actors echoed a shared commitment to leveraging PPP models to accelerate infrastructure and industrial transformation. MEF made it clear that PPPs will be a central mechanism moving forward.

Sovereign Wealth Fund on the Launchpad

The newly established Chinggis Khan Sovereign Wealth Fund — established only last year and with a new CEO appointed 6 months ago — has already joined the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, adopting global governance and transparency standards.

This places Mongolia’s latest effort alongside longstanding funds such as the Future Heritage Fund and Fiscal Stability Fund, which were created in the 2000s but faced criticism for inconsistent governance. The fund now comprises three accounts — Future Heritage, Development, and Savings, all of which, as stated by the CEO, will be administered and co-managed by the corresponding Ministries.

So, is this fund more credible? It appears so, at least structurally. Unlike earlier iterations, this fund is underpinned by recent legislation, a multi-tiered internal structure, membership in the IF SWF, and real digital transparency measures like E‑Mongolia integration. While it’s still early in its lifecycle, these features signal a more robust and sincere attempt to channel Mongolia’s resource wealth into sustainable, long-term public benefit.

Economic Diversification & Critical Minerals

With 95% of Mongolia’s exports still tied to raw materials, economic diversification is not optional — it’s urgent. Of course, this has been the narrative for well over a decade, with little structural change to show for it. In that familiar context, critical minerals received heightened attention at the forum. Globally, over 30 countries have now issued national strategies on critical minerals. From one panel discussion, it was suggested that Mongolia’s Critical Minerals List will be updated and prioritized to better align with global clean-tech supply chains.

Whether this will amount to more than rhetoric remains to be seen. The ambition is there — but credibility will hinge on whether Mongolia can deliver on standards for sustainability, governance, and transparency that investors and strategic partners increasingly expect.

Sustainability Momentum: COP17 on the Horizon

Another milestone: Mongolia will host COP17 in 2026. This represents a landmark opportunity for Mongolia to step onto the global climate diplomacy stage — with leadership on sustainability, green finance, and energy transition. It’s also a powerful way to convene new partnerships around climate-smart growth — an issue I care deeply about.

Organizers Connecting the Dots

A big round of applause is due to Ganhuyag Chuluun Hutagt, Altangunii Jargalan, Undral Amarsaikhan, and the MEF team. Their leadership, honed over more than a decade of organizing this forum, was on full display this year. The agenda was coherent, ambitious, and action-oriented.

Final Reflections

Coming back from Canada to Mongolia means witnessing something crucial: I can feel the shift. There’s genuine momentum, clarity, and ambition — a buzz not unlike in other fast-moving emerging markets.

Unlike forums of the past, MEF 2025 wasn’t just about promises. It was about execution. With the 5D policy framework, critical minerals strategy, energy and digital pivots, mega projects under review, PPPs gaining traction, and COP17 on the horizon — we’re not just talking about transformation. We’re laying the groundwork for it.

As someone returning with international experience, I feel more determined than ever to contribute to this momentum. Mongolia is at a crossroads — and I’m happy to be home for it.

About Zolzaya

Zolzaya Jargalsaikhan, MBA, is a recent graduate of the University of British Columbia. She has consulted on recycling, climate, and energy transition projects in Canada and Mongolia, and previously worked in Mongolia’s capital markets for seven years.

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Guest Post: Visit to Mongolia by Japanese Emperor and Empress and Public Response in Japan

Posted on July 18, 2025 by JDierkes

By Kunio Minato

The first imperial visit to Mongolia by Emperor Naruhito and Empress Masako was undoubtedly a landmark event in Japan–Mongolia relations. The Japanese media covered the imperial couple’s words and deeds every day in newspapers, on TV and on the Internet, from their arrival at Chinggis Khaan International Airport to their return to Japan. It is fair to say that Mongolia attracted more attention from Japan than ever before during the visit.

The question is how the Japanese people viewed the visit. Was it viewed positively or negatively? What lies behind public acceptance? As no opinion polls or surveys have been conducted on this visit so far, this blog post will address the question by reviewing both traditional media coverage and social media trends.

Traditional Media

From what I could see, the imperial visit was reported positively by most newspapers, news agencies and broadcasters. They emphasised the favourable relations between Japan and Mongolia, the friendly communication between the imperial couple and the Mongolians, and how the imperial visit contributed to deepening the relations. For example, TBS (Tokyo Broadcasting System) provided news coverage shortly after the imperial couple left Mongolia. During the broadcast, a reporter mentioned that Mongolia has buildings constructed by Japanese prisoners of war, as well as schools and infrastructure projects completed in recent years with Japanese aid, for which Mongolians expressed gratitude to the Emperor and Empress on many occasions during the visit. The reporter argued that the visit had the imperial couple realise how strong the ties are between Japan and Mongolia.

Above all, the couple’s visit to the monument for Japanese detainees attracted significant attention from the Japanese media. After World War II ended, more than 12,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians in Manchuria and the surrounding area were captured by the Red Army and sent to Mongolia. They were forced to work on construction sites in Ulaanbaatar, among other places. Around 1,700 people died during labour, but this is less well known in Japan than the detentions in Siberia.

Therefore, the visit by the Emperor and Empress was an epoch-making event in commemorating the victims of detention. The media provided substantial coverage of the visit to the monument, highlighting the Emperor and Empress’ respect for the victims by noting that they observed not only a minute’s silence but also bowed deeply. Some media outlets also reported on survivors’ reactions to the visit. One example is a documentary of a former detainee by Chukyo TV, a broadcaster in Nagoya, who had longed for the Imperial visit to the site where his comrades were once buried.

Overall, the media emphasised the historical significance of the imperial visit to Mongolia. The main focus was on the friendship between Japan and Mongolia observed during the visit, and the commemoration of Japanese detainees in Mongolia.

Social Media

Positive reactions in Japan to the visit in general can be observed in social media. ChatGPT provides the results of sentiment analysis of social media posts. The analysis covered approximately 150,000 posts on X (formerly Twitter) from 1 to 15 July. According to this analysis, 72% of the posts were categorised as having positive sentiments. Among these were posts emphasising the historical and diplomatic significance of the visit. The couple’s active engagement with Mongolians and their culture, such as the emperor’s joint performance as a violist with the Morin Khuur Orchestra and participation in shagai (anklebone) game in the Naadam Festival, fostered a sense of affinity. Additionally, the warm welcome and positive reactions from Mongolians, including former Mongolian Yokozuna grand champions, generated positive responses from Japanese social media users. There was a notable increase in posts between 6 July (the day of their arrival in Mongolia) and 10 July (the day they visited Shine-Mongol School, Gandantegchinlen Monastery and the Mongolian-Japanese Hospital).

The remaining posts were mainly categorised as ‘neutral’ (20% of the total), including those that shared official announcements and media reports. Posts expressing negative sentiment (8% of the total) were in the minority and questioned the cost-effectiveness of the visit and the validity of spending tax money on it. However, it should be noted that a generational difference was evident in the results: Younger generation (30 yrs old and less) were more likely to hold negative sentiments than middle-aged and senior adults (40 yrs old and more).

Background of the Response

The tone of Japanese media and social media posts was mostly positive regarding the imperial visit to Mongolia. This can be explained by two factors. Firstly, there is a supportive attitude in Japan towards the imperial family. A public opinion poll on the imperial family conducted by NHK (the Japanese public broadcaster) in 2019 shows that 72% of respondents said they were interested in the imperial family and 71% said they felt close to the family.

The positive attitude towards the visit was influenced by a sense of closeness to the family. Although there are controversial issues surrounding the imperial family, such as the succession system to the throne, the visit to Mongolia was not related to these issues.

The second reason is the peaceful relationship between Japan and Mongolia. Unlike other neighbouring countries, Japan does not currently have any political or historical problems with Mongolia. Furthermore, Japan does not have any territorial disputes with Mongolia (obviously!). Therefore, the imperial visit to Mongolia was much less controversial and unacceptable than visits to other neighbouring countries.

Conclusion

The imperial couple’s visit to Mongolia was widely welcomed by the Japanese public. The visit was hailed as an opportunity to commemorate the victims of World War II, as well as a way to strengthen the partnership between Japan and Mongolia. Although there was some criticism, it did not cause a stir or controversy in Japanese public opinion.

With the Upper House (House of Councillors) election just around the corner, political disputes and struggles are intensifying in Japan. Against this backdrop, the imperial couple’s visit to Mongolia offered heartwarming news that many Japanese people could share, regardless of their political and social differences and divisions.

About Kunio Minato

Kunio Minato is a Professor of the Faculty of Regional Collaboration at Kochi University, Japan. He has been watching Mongolian politics, economy, and external relations since the late 1990s.

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Guest Post: “Mongolian tie demokratiaan” Photo Exhibition in Helsinki

Posted on July 16, 2025 by JDierkes

By Mend-Amar Baigalmaa

The photo and poster exhibition “Mongolian Tie to Democracy” by Finnish journalist and photographer Irja Halász opened on May 31, 2025, at the Sofia Cultural Centre Gallery in Helsinki, Finland.

 

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The exhibition features more than 150 works, including rare photographs taken by Irja Halász during the 1990 Democratic Revolution in Mongolia, along with powerful historical posters capturing the political spirit of the time. These posters include materials from the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU), the Zorig Foundation, cartoons by artist S. Tsogtbayar, and images from private archives and Poland’s Solidarity Movement (Solidarność) collection.

Through powerful photographs and rare political posters, the exhibition captures the spirit of Mongolia’s democratic awakening. It presents images of the 1985 Naadam and October Revolution parades at Sukhbaatar Square, culminating in the energized protests and hunger strikes against the MPR Political Bureau, which led to the historic democratic revolution that also centered at Sukhbaatar Square – and the establishment of a multi-party system in 1990.

Many images also show today’s political leaders in their youth, standing among the crowds that helped shape Mongolia’s future.

The posters, selected from Irja Halász’s archive and other collections, feature sharp political satire and anti-communist visuals, revealing the voice of a nation demanding democratic change.

The opening ceremony was led by H.E. Mr. Tserendorj Munkh-Ulzii, Ambassador of Mongolia to Finland, and hosted by Mr. Timo Kietäväinen, Vice Chairman of the Sofia Foundation. Congratulatory remarks were delivered by Mr. Kimmo Kiljunen, Member of Parliament and representative of the Finland-Mongolia Friendship Group, and Ms. Marja-Liisa Kiljunen, former Finnish Ambassador to Mongolia.

The exhibition was organized by the Lions Club Vantaankoski–Vandaforsen, with support from Mongolia’s Golomt Foundation, and Finnish partners including Sofia Cultural Centre, Nyblin, and eCredo. It will remain open to the public until August 31, 2025.

Irja Halász

Irja Halász is a Finnish journalist, photographer, and producer who has lived and worked in Mongolia since 1987. She originally studied Mongolian language and philology at Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) in Budapest, Hungary, before coming to Mongolia through a Finnish government scholarship to continue her studies at the National University of Mongolia.

 

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Upon arriving in Mongolia, she became one of the first foreign journalists to witness and document the historic 1989–1990 Democratic Revolution. From 1990 to 2006, she worked as a reporter for Reuters, covering Mongolia’s transition through international media outlets.

Irja has produced in multiple visual, cultural, and publishing projects. In 2020, she published the photo book “Awakened Mongolia – Revolution” and organized a corresponding photo exhibition. In 2022, she co-authored the book “Posters of Mongolia in Transition” with researcher Mend-Amar Baigalmaa, followed by an exhibition under the same name at the Mongolian Theatre Museum in 2023.

The “Mongolian tie demokratiaan” exhibition in Helsinki marks her first time publicly presenting this historical body of work in her native Finland, offering a rare window into Mongolia’s democratic transformation through her lens.

About Mend-Amar

Mend-Amar is a cultural anthropologist and visual researcher currently completing his MA at the National University of Mongolia. With a background in Graphic Design and Multimedia, his work engages with urban photography, political posters, and the evolving visual culture of post-socialist Mongolia. His research focuses on memory, identity, and democratic transitions, using visual methods to document and interpret social change.

He has participated in international programs such as the CrossCulture Programme (ifa, Germany), JENESYS (Japan) and the Urban Walks regional project by Goethe-Institut (2023), where he represented Ulaanbaatar alongside participants from Seoul, Tokyo, Shanghai, Beijing, Taipei, and Hong Kong. He co-produced and curated The 10 Photographs Through My Lens, a visual storytelling video series that explores intergenerational perspectives on Mongolia’s cultural transformations through the personal work and reflections of local photographers.

Besides managing Mongolian Visuals NGO, he also hosts the podcast Live from Red Hero and  co-organized Unseen Ulaanbaatar, a photo exhibition developed through the ACM (Arts Council of Mongolia) Fellowship Program.

He continues to explore how anthropological research can be translated into accessible multimedia formats, with the aim of creating people-centered narratives that resonate across disciplines, urban cultures, and visual storytelling.

Posted in Art, Democracy, History, Mend-Amar Baigalmaa | 3 Comments

Acting Powerful

Posted on July 1, 2025 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

I recently engaged in some political dreaming with very good Mongolian friends. The prompt was, “If you were Grand Khaan/Prime Minister, what would be some changes you would make right away?”. We quickly abanonded the Grand Khaan line of thinking as too anti-democratic.

Obviously, a challenging question for an academic, as we deal in complexity, not decisive action. And, the opportunities that Mongolia has along with the challenges it faces are generally of a complex nature, so not easily addressed with “first act in office” populism.

But one of the answers my friend had, immediately resonated: abolish the prime minister’s security detail!

Posturing

It’s not just the PM who is surrounded by security agents, but the president and other officials as well.

Somehow, officials, i.e. almost all men, seem to believe that being protected by large men makes them look powerful. “Toxic masculinity” in some form is defenitely an element in that; the threat of physical violence in the guise of protection, as a sign of power. It’s not the power of the ideas or the persuasion of the arguments for a policy an individual is pursuing, but rather this attempt at looking powerful, that seems to be the aim here.

Unfortunately, this is a sense of power and of the display of power that seems very reminiscent of V Putin and the bare-chested photos he used to take. As is the case with Putin, there’s no substance to this pose, it’s all posturing.

Take a look at this insta-post from the late May 2025 visit of Austrian president Alexander van der Bellen.

 

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A post shared by Khurelsukh Ukhnaa (@ukhnaakhurelsukh)

What’s with the motorcade imagery and all the military parades? Recall that van der Bellen was an economics professor, active in the Austrian Green party, and holds a largely ceremonial post.

What’s Wrong with Security Details

Apart from the vacuous understanding of political office, these security details and the cocoon they seem to like to create around officials, isolates these officials from their electorate. Why do these officials need large limousines and motorcades to move around Ulaanbaatar? Why don’t they walk and perhaps encounter some citizens to discuss the challenges that government is facing or the opportunities that officials perceive?

One of the frustrations that many Mongolians report to me is that the government seems far-removed from day-to-day concerns. If you are traveling by motorcade, do you really have a sense of how infuriating the traffic situation can be? If you understood more about traffic, would you really be pursuing “solutions” in the mistaken belief that more roads reduce congestion?

This deliberate withdrawal of politicians from their voting public does not present a good image of democracy to voters who are ultimately called upon to participate in decision-making through elections and other forms.

I also have to imagine that protection is not an entirely insignificant budget item.

Why Security Details?

One of the fortunate characteristics of Mongolian democracy is that there has been very little political violence in the past 35 years. The only very real example would be the murder of S Zorig in October 1998, and even that remains unclear in terms of whether it was politically motivated. Of course, there are occasionally scuffles reported out of parliament, but none of the actual violence associated with oligarchs of the 2000s and 2010s in Russia, for example, and one of the reasons I am uncomfortable with the “oligarch” language.

But, security details and their conspicuous display of muscle and earphones, are not new to Mongolia. The impetus of my now 20-year engagement with Mongolia was the state visit of Pres Bagabandi to Canada. Even then I was surprised that there were security aspects to the visit. Sure, the  Canadian government would always want to make sure that an official visitor stay safe, but there were also Mongolian security officers. And this was in 2004. Since then, the size of these security details only seems to be growing.

But really, is there any threat of violence to Mongolian officials? Especially any threat that justifies multi-people, apparently armed security details? I’m naive on these matters and don’t claim to have ever conducted or read any kind of threat assessment. But apart from Ts Munkhbayar waving his rifle at parliament, who is this threat? There is no domestic terrorism that I am aware of. There is no separatism, a sentiment that has fuelled violence elsewhere. There is no real religious conflict. So, what are the threats that officials are being protected from? Or, is it really just the theatre of power that they are acting in.

Keep the Honour Guard

I do have a soft spot for the military honour guard. I reflected on that already twelve years ago during the state visit of Governor General D Johnston to Mongolia.

 

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A post shared by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes)

PS: Less Toxic Macho Posing

Since I used an insta-video off Pres. Khurelsukh’s feed as example of posing above, should also acknowledge that very different content is also posted there, though very occasionally.

 

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A post shared by Khurelsukh Ukhnaa (@ukhnaakhurelsukh)

Posted in Government, Politics, Security Apparatus | Tagged | Leave a comment

Zandanshatar Cabinet

Posted on June 17, 2025 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes and Marissa J. Smith

As we have done for cabinets since 2016 (Erdenebat 2016 | Khurelsukh 2017 | Khurelsukh 2020 | Oyun-Erdene 2021 | Oyun-Erdene 2022 | Oyun-Erdene 2023 | Oyun-Erdene 2024), we’re listing cabinet members below with their portfolios and brief bio sketches.

The new cabinet has still to be finalized by President Khurelsukh, but this is the lineup being presented, as reported by montsame.mn. There is now a coalition government between the MPP, the Civil Will-Green Party, and KhUN, and DP members are being replaced (as well as a few MPP members replaced or shuffled). News.mn reported that a ministry was offered to Nomtoibayar of the National Coalition, but the party had not responded to the invitation.

News.mn has reported that the number of ministers “without ministries” is to be reduced. The new ministers fit the direction of “revenge of the seventies generation;” the only new ministers not to have been born in the 1970s are E. Batshugar, son of former president N. Enkhbayar (b. 1987), Damdinnyam (b. 1982), and Undram (b. 1982). Several are multiple-term Members of Parliament. Of the new ministers, only Undram is a woman, bringing the number of female Cabinet members to two.

(new cabinet members in bold, if no party is listed in a bracket, the minister is from MPP)

Prime Minister – G Zandanshatar
b. 1970 in Battsagaan, Bayankhongor
Married, four children
Graduate, Soviet Higher School of National Economy, Irkutsk
Worked in banking sector (Mongolbank, Khaan Bank), 1996-2003
Deputy Minister of Agriculture, 2003-04
Member, MPP Baga Khural, 2005, 2007
Member, MPP Leadership Council, 2005-2007, 2015
Foreign Minister, 2009-2012
Secretary General, MPP, 2012-2013
Stanford, 2015
Cabinet Secretary, 2017-2019
Speaker of Parliament, 2019-24
Member of Parliament, 2004-2012, 2016-2024
Head of President’s Office, 2024-2025

First Deputy Prime Minister – N. Uchral, MP
b. 1985 [found 1987 elsewhere] in Ulaanbaatar
Degree in law, Ikh Zasag International University, 2007
MBA, University of Gloucestershire, 2010
Mongolian University of Education, Master of History, 2012
Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2013
General Director, Royal Academy and Royal International Institute, 2010-2016
Member of Parliament, 2016-Present
Minister of Digital Development and Communications, 2022
Cabinet Secretary, 2024-

Deputy PM [no portfolio specified] – S. Amarsaikhan, MP
Born 1973, Nalaikh, Ulaanbaatar
Linguist and Lawyer, Fresno College (California) 1996;
English Metropolitan College, 1998
Los Angeles College, 2000
Master’s degree in law from Southwestern University
Staff at Science and Information Technology Center 1992-1994
Attache at the Embassy of Mongolia to PRC, 2000-2004
Manager of Investment and Foreign Trade at American Trade and Development, 2004-2007
CEO, President and Director of BOD, Oyunii Undraa Group LLC, 2007-2017
Member of the Citizen’s Representative Council, 2012-2020
Head of the budget, finance and economic committee of the Citizen Representative Council, 2016-2017
Chairman of the Citizen’s Representative Council, 2017-2019
Mayor of Ulaanbaatar, 2019-2020
Member of Parliament, 2020-Present
Deputy Prime Minister, 2021

Deputy PM for [no portfolio specified] – T. Dorjkhand, MP [KhUN – List]
Born 1977 in Ulaanbaatar
Bachelor in Public Finance, MUST in 1995
Master, Public Economic Policy, Hitotsubashi University, Japan, 2004
Trained in Public and Private Partnership in Infrastructure, Harvard University, USA, 2010
Trained in Financial Theory, Oxford University, UK, 2012
Specialist in the Fiscal policy in Ministry of Finance, 1999-2002
Intern in the Ministry of Finance in Japan, 2003-2004
Acting head, Loan and aid department, Ministry of Finance, 2005-2012
Head of the Financial policy and loan management department, Ministry of Finance, 2012-2015
Advisor to the Executive Director, Asia Pacific Region, International Financial Corporation, Washington, USA, 2013-2015
Co-founded the KhUN, headed the BOD, 2016-2020
Member of Parliament, 2020-Present

Cabinet Secretary – S. Byambatsogt, MP
Born 1974
School No. 2 of Jargalant soum, Khovd aimag, 1992
Higher School of Finance and Economics, 1999
Maastricht University, Netherlands, Economics, 2005
Mongolian State University, Law School, Law Faculty, 2014
General Director of “Khovdyn Ingoo” LLC, 1998-2000
Director of “New Progress” LLC, 2000-2006
Chairman of the Board of Directors of “New Progress” Group, 2006-2008
President of “New Progress” Group, 2008
Member of the Mongolian State Great Khural, 2008-2020
Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs, 2016-2017
Minister of Road and Transport Development, 2022-2024
Minister of Defense, 2024

Finance – B. Javkhlan, MP
Born 1975 in Darkhan
Economist, graduated from MUST in 1997
University of California, Riverside, 2008
Indiana University, 2009
Controller, Mongolbank 1997-1999
Plenipotentiary Mongolbank Representative to Agricultural Bank 1999-2000
Senior Controller, Mongolbank, 2000-2004
Deputy Director of the Trade and Development Bank 2004-2007
Elected to MPP Little Khural, 2013
MP since 2016 to Present (Govi-Altai, Zavkhan, Khovd, Uvs)
Head of Parliamentary Subcommittee for Local Leadership, 2016-2020
Deputy Vice President of the Bank of Mongolia 2010-2016
Minister of Finance, 2021-

Defense – D. Batlut, MP
Born 1974
Employee, “Erdenet Carpets” LLC, 1994-2000
Executive Director at “World Vision Mongolia” International Organization, 2003-2006
Deputy Governor of Bayan-Ondur soum, Orkhon aimag, 2008-2012
Representative, leader, and group leader of the Orkhon aimag Local Government Committee, 2008-2020
Governor of Orkhon Aimag and Mayor of Erdenet City, 2016-2020
Member of Parliament, 2020-2024 (Orkhon [Erdenet])
Member of Parliament, 2024- (Bulgan/Khuvsgul/Orkhon)

Justice and Internal Affairs – L. Munkhbaatar, MP
Born 1977
Ministry of Law, 1999-2008
Head, State Center for Citizens’ Registration and Information/Main Directorate for State Registration, 2008-2011
Legal Advisor to Prime Minister, 2012
Legal Advisor to MPP Chairman, 2013
Member of Parliament, 2016-2024 (Khuvsgul)
Member of Parliament, 2024- (Bulgan/Khuvsgul/Orkhon)
Head of MPP parliamentary caucus 2024-

Education – P. Naranbayar, MP [KhUN]
Born in 1976
Bachelor in International Relations, MUST, 2000
Master in law, Kioto University, Japan, 2007
PhD in International study, MUST, 2015
Specialist/officer in the Collaborative Relations Unit, Ministry of Environment, 2000-2002
Assistant to the Minister of Environment, 2002-2004
Head of the Japan Ecological Foundation Representative Office, 2002-2004
Officer in the Innovation Department, National Development and Innovation Committee of Mongolia, 2009-2011
Acting Head, Tourism Department, Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 2011
Director of the Shine Mongol Secondary Education School 2012-2020
Chair of the party’s Ulaanbaatar committee, KhUN Party
Representative of the Citizen’s Representative Khural, Head of Human Development Committee, 2020-2024
Member of Parliament, 2024-Present
Minister of Education, 2024-

Roads and Transport – B. Delgersaikhan, MP
Born in 1964, Dornogobi
Bachelor in law, University of Law Enforcement, 1987
Detective, Dornogobi Police Unit, 1987-1989
Lead detective and Head of the unit, Police Office of Dornogobi, 1989-2002
Founder and director of “Dorniin Gobi” LLC, 2002-2016
Director, “Bold tomor Eroo gol”LLC, 2004-2015
Member of Parliament (three terms), 2014-2020, 2020-2024, 2024-Present
Minister of Roads and Transport, 2024-

Culture, Sport and Tourism – Ch. Undram, MP
Born 1982
Secondary School No. 23 of the capital, 1998
High School in US, 1999
Business School of the International American University in London, 2004
PhD degree from the School of Economics, Nagoya University, Japan, on the topic “Project Management and Simulation Analysis of Mining and Iron Ore Processing Plants”, 2010
Marketing Manager at MCS International LLC, 2005-2006
Coordinator of the Institute for Competitive Macroeconomics at Harvard Business School, 2010-2020
Department of Management, School of Economics, National University of Mongolia, 2010-2013
Various roles, National University of Mongolia, 2014-2019
Deputy Director for Administration and Internal Cooperation of National University of Mongolia, 2017-2018
Member of the Economic Policy Council of the Prime Minister of Mongolia, 2017-2020
Professor at the School of Business of National University, 2019-2020
Member of the Mongolian Parliament, 2020- (currently Darkhan-Uul/Selenge/Tuv)

Environment and Climate Change – B. Batbaatar, MP [CWGP – List]
Born 1973
Ulaanbaatar School No. 10, 1991
Graduate of Higher School of Economics (2000) and Higher School of Law, NUM (2002)
Head of the Democratic Party of Ulaanbaatar city, Chingeltei district, 2003-2013
Member of Parliament, 2004-2008 (Motherland-Democracy Coalition)
Head of the Budget Control Committee of the People’s Representatives’ Khural of Chingeltei district, UB, 2012-2016
Full-time advisor to the Prime Minister, 2015-2016
Member of Parliament, 2024- (Party List)

Foreign Relations – B. Battsetseg, MP
Born in 1973 in aimag center of Bayankhongor province
Graduated secondary school, Darkhan
Graduated from International Relations School at MUST in 1996
Directors of publishing houses Az Khur LLC, and Munkhiin Useg LLC 1996 to 2004
Institute of Finance and Economy 2000; Maastricht University of Management in 2005
Unit Director at Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency, 2005-2007
Chairman of the board, Munkhiin Useg 2007-2015
Advisor to MPP Secretary-General, 2010-2011
Administration office, and Head of Foreign Relations and Cooperation Department of MPP, 2010-2012
Director of the Board of Directors of Munkhiin Useg Publishing, 2020 to Jan 28, 2021
Advisor to the Minister of Finance, 2015-2016
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2016-2020
Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2021-present
Member of Parliament, 2024-present

Mining & Industry – G. Damdinnyam
Born 1982
First Mongolia Focus co-author to become member of cabinet
Darkhan-Uul aimag secondary school No. 7, graduated 1999
Mongolian University of Education, teacher of sociology and law, 2004
Mongolian University of Education, master of political science, 2005-2007
University of British Columbia, master of mining governance and policy, 2013-2016
Advisor to the Minister of Environment, 2008-2009
Advisor to the Minister of Higher Education, 2009-2010
Vice-Rector of Social Development, Mongolian University of Science and Technology, 2010-2013
Researcher at the University of British Columbia, Canada, 2015
CEO of “Procon Mining Mongolia” LLC, 2017
Member of Parliament, 2020-

Family, Labor and Social Protection – T. Aubakir, MP
Born 1976
Secondary school of Tsagaannuur soum, Selenge aimag, 1992
“Otgontenger” Higher School, International Law, 2000
Deputy Director of “Selenge Tariya” LLC, Selenge aimag, 2000-2005
Director of “Tarian Tsatsal” LLC, 2006-2015
Head of the Internal Audit and Monitoring Department of the General Department of Customs, 2015-2016
Deputy Head of the Buyant-Ukhaa (International Airport) Customs Department under the General Department of Customs, 2017-2019
Member of Parliament, 2020- (Bayan-Ulgii)

Construction and Urban Development – E. Bat-Amgalan, MP
Born 1977
Secondary School No. 1 of the capital, 1994
Department of International Relations, German Studies, International Diplomacy, National University of Arts, 1998
Law School of the National University of Arts, Lawyer, 2004
“Bayan Hadat” Tour LLC, Executive Director, 2002-2008
Head of the Production and Services Department of the Capital City Tourism and Tourism Administration, 2008-2010
Representative of the Capital City Tourism and Tourism Administration, 2008-2012
Deputy Head of the National Parks Department, 2010-2012
Head of the Foreign Relations Department of the “Chinggis Khaan” International Airport of the State Administration of Tourism, 2015-2020
Representative of the Capital City Tourism and Tourism Administration, 2016-2020
Member of Parliament, 2024- (Bayanzurkh district of Ulaanbaatar)

Health – J. Chinburen, MP
Born 1972
Secondary School No. 23, Ulaanbaatar, 1990
University of Health Sciences, senior physician, 1991-1997
Switzerland, University of Lausanne, researcher, 2001-2002
Tokyo University of Medicine and Surgery, Doctor of Medicine, 2013-2015
Medical Institute, scientific assistant, 1997-1998
National Cancer Center, general surgery department, surgeon, 1998-2008
National Cancer Center, head of the hepatobiliary and pancreatic surgery department, 2008-2016
Shymkent Cancer Center, Republic of Kazakhstan, trainer
Mongolian Head of the Hepatobiliary and Pancreatic Society, 2015
Chairman of the Ministry of Health, Cancer Professional Branch Council, 2016
General Director of the National Cancer Center, 2016-2019
Consultant Physician of the National Cancer Center, 2020
Member of Parliament, 2020- (Bayanzurkh district of Ulaanbaatar)

Food, Agriculture, and Light Industry [right portfolio?] – J. Enkhbayar, MP
Born 1973, Ulaanbaatar
Graduated from the Military school in 1991
Studied law at the MUST, 1999
MBA, Maastricht University, Netherlands, 2005
Director at “Gazar”LLC, and BOD at “Nekhii” LLC, and “Suljmel” LLC, 1992-2000
Director and Deputy Director at the Monitoring unit, Ulaanbaatar Customs Authority, 2002-2004
Advisor to the General Customs Authority, 2004-2006
Deputy director and Secretariat General at the General Agency for Specialised Inspection, 2006-2008
Member of Parliament, five terms, 2008-2012, 2012-16, 2016-20, 2020-24, 2024-Present
Minister of Defense, 2012
Min of Food, Agriculture and Light Industry, 2024-

Energy – B. Choijilsuren, MP
b. 1970, Tes, Uvs province
Automation and telemechanics, Urals Higher Polytechnic, Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinberg), graduated 1993
MPRP/MPP Little Khural, 2005-2015
Member of Parliament, 2012-Present
Minister of Finance, 2016
Minister of Energy, 2022-

Digital Development, Innovation and and Communications [exact portfolio] – E. Batshugar, MP
Born 1987
son of former President N. Enkhbayar
Ulaanbaatar School No. 14, 1994-2000
Bentley University, USA, 2004-2008
Employee, JP Morgan, 2008-2010
Director, Sod Margad Company, 2011
Mongolbank Vice President, 2012-2016
Chairman of Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (party since merged with MPP)
Member of Parliament, 2024- (Songinokhairkhan district of Ulaanbaatar)

(References include Alan J. K. Sanders, The Historical Dictionary of Mongolia, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017 and parliament.mn)

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PM Zandanshatar

Posted on June 12, 2025 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

So, Mongolia has a new prime minister. Parliament elected G Zandanshatar in the early hours of June 13. Initial reporting indicated that only 108 members were present, but it seems to have turned out that 108 members was the number of MPs that supported him out of 117 present. As has happened in the past, it is frustrating how imprecise the information coming via Mongolian media sites often is in these kind of situations.

As I would have predicted, Zandanshatar has previously graced the pages of our blog:
We first mentioned him in a post listing candidates in the 2012 election. He was not reelected as an incumbent from Bayankhongor in that election. With that post, he has been mentioned by name 12 times in our posts. Most recently, he showed up in Marissa and my post last week, listing candidates who were getting frequent mentions in the Mongolian media.

You can also find Zandashatar on Insta.

As a politician, he is most notable to me for the following reasons:

  1. Not only not a current MP, but lost election in District 1 in 2024
  2. Born in 1970
  3. Relatively quiet as speaker from 2019-2024, not associated with any particular policy arena
  4. Rare – esp. for MPP politicians – democratization initiative in 2017

Zandanshatar was not elected in 2024 election

The Mongolian constitution does not require any particular qualifications to be nominated or elected by parliament as the prime minister. Mongolia is similar to some parliamentary democracies in not specifying that the PM must be an MP, but there are others where this is required.

Prior to Zandanshatar, the most prominent PM who was not an MP at the time would have have been Ts Elbergdorj, when he became prime minister in Aug 2004 and served until Jan 2006. During this time, he tried to run in a by-election in Aug 2005 but the MPRP, his coalition partner, prevented him from doing so. He headed up a grand coalition of DP and MPRP. Of course, he had previously served as PM when he was also an MP in 1998, and subsequently to his second term as PM became president from 2009-17.

[Apologies to early readers: when I had initially scanned the lists of PMs, two names escaped as not being MPs at the time. My only excuse is that they were/are such prominent politicians that their lack of a seat in parliament did not occur to me. My thanks to an alert reader for letting me know.]

There were two other prominent MPP PMs who were not MPs at the time. When U Khurelsukh became PM in 2017, he was not an MP but was elected in 2020 to continue on as PM until 2021. S Bayar became PM in 2007, was elected as MP in 2008 and served until 2009.

Zandanshatar was an MP previously, from 2004-2012 and again, 2016-2024.

In 2024, as an incumbent and the incumbent speaker of parliament, he ran for election in District 1, Arkhangai, Uvurkhangai and Bayankhongor. He came in 1oth in voting in the 9-member district with 53,649 votes behind D Tsogtbaatar who received 55,935 votes, so Zandanshatar lost by 2,300 votes. In an enlarged parliament it is difficult for me to imagine that having lost in the election puts Zandanshatar in a particularly powerful position to lead the government.

Revenge of the 70s

I am not aware that Zandanshatar has a fondness for bell bottoms or floral print shirts, but he was born in 1970 (and is thus my age). That is significant because Oyun-Erdene’s ascent to the premiership was interpreted by many (including Bolor L and me) as a generational turnover to MPP leaders championed by the 1960s and born in the 1980s, 1980 in Oyun-Erdene’s case. Most of the rumoured candidates for the premiership were born in the 1970s, as Marissa and I noted some days ago. This “revenge of the 70s” is most likely a sign of factional deals and another indication of a loss of intraparty power by Oyun-Erdene and his associates.

Quiet Speaker

Zandanshatar was speaker for roughly five years. I would classify his term as relatively quiet. Unlike some of his predecessors, he did not spring many surprises on parliament and the public. This may have been aided by this being the highpoint of MPP supermajorities, MPs thus requiring relatively little reigning in, though I have also previously noted the surprising challenges associated with a supermajority.

I also do not associate Zandanshatar with any particular policy field or any particular proposals.

If his ascent is the result of factional bargaining, giving him a relatively weak personal mandate, and there are no areas of particular interest to him, this would add further to my sense that whatever government he appoints will not substantially differ from the previous one.

Deliberative Pollster for Democracy

However, there is one aspect of Zandanshatar’s trajectory that has made him noteworthy as the only initiator of any activities that are aimed at deepening democratization among MPP politicians through his efforts to institutionalize deliberative polling. While this may have also carried an element of mutual aggrandizing between Zandanshatar and Stanford academics, it was a genuine attempt in 2017 at deepening democratization. For more background on deliberative polling see Stanford’s Deliberative Democracy Lab and don’t be too put off by the Trademark attached to the term “deliberative polling®”. While you are on their site, you might also note that Stanford Prof. Fishkin was awarded the Friendship Medal by none other than Zandanshatar at an Ulaanbaatar conference on deliberative polling this May.

The implementation of deliberative polling in 2017 under the leadership of Zandanshatar always seemed very much like a personal pet project of his to me. For a deeper sense of the merits of this attempt and its criticism, see Fishkin/Zandanshatar’s portrayal and constitutional legal scholar O Munkhsaikhan’s criticism. At this point and even though the deliberative polling law remains on the books, I would argue that this experiment has had none to very little impact either on democratization, nor on specific policy.

However, despite my skepticism about the implementation of deliberative polling, I do note Zandanshatar’s explicit efforts on behalf of democratization and would hope that he would continue on the basis of similar convictions at a time of global democratic backsliding and concerns about the actions of the Oyun-Erdene government in this regard.

Kind of curious to note that the other PM who was not MP (Elbegdorj) is also the architect of another democratization initiative, citizen halls.

Conclusion

I do find it somewhat surprising that Zandanshatar has been chosen as PM despite not having won his seat in parliament last summer. I have a hard time imagining that this puts him into a strong position as incoming PM and thus have no reason to believe that he would depart from the policies of the previous government in any significant way.

Posted in Government, Mongolian People's Party, Politics | Tagged | 4 Comments

The Mongolian People’s Party: A Glossary

Posted on June 12, 2025 by Marissa Smith

By Marissa J. Smith

As demonstrated by the still-unfolding process of presenting a new Prime Minister for confirmation by the Ikh Khural, it has become difficult to follow Mongolian politics without an understanding of the internal structure and processes of the now again super-dominant Mongolian People’s Party.

In his Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire, Christopher Atwood summarizes the socialist era-MPRP’s structure and relationships: “Despite the party congresses, at no time did the party’s membership actually exercise control over the leadership. While the congresses supposedly elected the Central Committee, which in turn elected a small standing body called either the presidium or (after 1940) the political bureau (or Politburo), all elections were decided beforehand by the existing leaders.” (Atwood 2004, 381)

Other references are to Alan J. K. Sanders’ Historical Dictionary of Mongolia, 2017, pgs. 559-577.

The Executive Council (Удирдах Зөвлөл)

As noted by Sanders, this body was formerly known as the “Presidium” (Төв Хорооный Тэргүүлэгчид). Sanders refers to the post-March 1992 incarnation as the “Leadership Council.” “Steering Council” is another English translation. The “Politburo” (Улс Төрийн Товчоо) ceased to exist in 1990 (though four of the five members of the “Politburo” transitioned to become four of the five members of the new “Presidium”).

The number of members has varied but steadily increased from approximately ten members in the 1990s to over twenty in the late 2000s. At the time of writing, i.e. the selection of G. Zandanshatar for submission to the General Assembly for approval on June 8, there are thirty-two members (news.mn).

General Assembly (Бага Хурал)

This party structure was formerly referred to as the “Central Committee” (Төв Хороо). “Бага Хурал” literally translates to “small council.” Sanders refers to it as the “Little Khural.” It includes three hundred and thirty-three members, according to this article in itoim.mn, while this article from gogo.mn states that at the meeting in March 2024 (just prior to the 2024 Parliamentary Elections), there were four hundred and seventy nine members (thank you for pointing this out, Manlai Chonos!). The Baga Khural approved Zandanshatar’s nomination on June 9 and it has now moved to the floor of the Parliament.

Party Congresses ([Намын] Их Хурал)

According to Sanders (2017, 563) the Congress of all members of the Party elect the chairman (дарга) and the Baga Khural. The Baga Khural, in turn, elects the Executive Council. The last of these meetings was held in 2021, naming L. Oyun-Erdene as party Chairman. During the socialist period, Party Congresses met every five years and confirmed Five-Year Plans. Oyun-Erdene’s “Vision” plans are a descendant form of these.

 

Posted in Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged | 1 Comment

Mongolia’s Next PM: Media Mentions of Possible PM Nominees

Posted on June 5, 2025 by Marissa Smith

By Marissa J. Smith and Julian Dierkes

With L Oyun-Erdene’s resignation as prime minister, obviously, there is a lot of speculation and media mentions of possible PM nominees whom the MPP might nominate to succeed him.

Before we look at that speculation, just a quick reminder that the choice of PM is unlikely to have a significant impact on policies. Yes, “Vision 2050” will likely wane as a touchstone document that has to motivate all decisions, but that’s partly because it never actually motivated any particular decisions.

To summarize the speculation in the Mongolia media, let’s look at the frequency with which names are mentioned. We do this relying on the “Politics” sections of the June 4 and June 5 editions (which includes articles published between June 3 and June 5)  of Robert Ritz’ Mongol Beat AI-generated selection and translation of news articles drawing on the following publications: news.mn, isee.mn, unuudur.mn, ikon.mn, montsame.mn. While there are clear limitations to this procedure in the selection of sources to include, i.e. the AI-generated selection of articles, we believe it is useful for putting together a snapshot of who is getting mentioned as a possible candidate.

After feeding a text (.txt) file of all “Politics” articles from Mongol Beat for June 4 and June 5 and a comma-separated list of the names of all MPs into an on-device LLM (Llama 3.2 3B Instruct, using Nomic AI’s GPT4All software), Marissa prompted “Who is being considered for the PM position?” She also utilized Python to enumerate occurrences of names of all current MPs in the .txt file. The number of mentions found using Python (table below) correlated well with the names suggested by the LLM. She searched the text for where these names occurred and identified four articles by three different publications specifically addressing the question of who will be the next Prime Minister. These were then given a close reading.

The four articles are: “Who Will Be the Next Prime Minister?,” “An Agreement Has Been Made to Choose the Next Prime Minister From the Generation of the 1970s, with Candidates Including B.Battsetseg, J.Enkhbayar, and G.Zandanshatar Being Discussed,” “Who is the Prime Minister Who Won’t “Play Games With The Country?” ,” “The MPP Leadership Council Will Meet Today to Select the Next Prime Minister.”

Prospective PMs (including Zandanshatar, long-time MP, but didn’t win a seat in 2024) with more than one mention, in more than one article, include:

Name Frequency Current Position Year Born
Javkhlan 7 Minister of Finance 1975
Zandanshatar 7 Head of the Presidential Office, Former Speaker of Parliament 1970
J. Enkhbayar 6 Agriculture and Light Industry J.Enkhbayar 1973
Uchral 5 Chief Cabinet Secretary 1985
Battsetseg 4 Minister of Foreign Affairs 1973
Temuulen 2 Security and Foreign Policy Standing Committee Chair
Amarsaikhan 2 Deputy Prime Minister 1973
Nyambaatar 2 Governor of the Capital City and Head of the Ulaanbaatar City Administration, Head of the Capital City MPP 1978

 

As perhaps best indicated by the headline, “An Agreement Has Been Made to Choose the Next Prime Minister From the Generation of the 1970s,” the list of candidates include established MPP politicians. Several are ministers, and only one is a woman (Battsetseg).

There have been some discussions in the media that the next PM might be the return of the 1970s generation. Recall that Oyun-Erdene’s ascent to PM was seen as the arrival/takeover of the generation of politicians born in the 1980s. They were championed by the 1960s politicians in the MPP cadre tradition of alternating decades of politicians taking over. Current discussions are that perhaps the 1970s are back. Not with bellbottoms, but with 6 of the candidates whispered about having been born in the 1970s.

We will continue to monitor these conversations and update on the blog as we are able!

Posted in Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged | 3 Comments

End of the Oyun-Erdene Era?

Posted on June 3, 2025 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

Of course, the one time, my frustration at endless speculation about political machinations and alliances actually gets to me, something happens, namely Prime Minister L Oyun-Erdene’s era appears to be ending. In the early morning of June 3, Oyun-Erdene lost a vote of confidence in parliament, with only 82 MPs voting, and only 44 MPs voting for confidence.

Let me quickly consider what this change means in policy terms, for the coalition, and for the MPP.

Policy

I would stick with one of my conclusions from that recent post: in policy terms, it will make very little difference who serves as the current prime minister. That is the case, because Mongolian politicians largely lack a political orientation, i.e. some kind of theme to the action they want to take.

Oyun-Erdene in my mind is a prominent example of such non-political politicians, along with Pres Khurelsukh and former pres Battulga. It has never been entirely clear to me, why they have become politicians, other than to hold power. Given the valorization of “pragmatic” solutions in Mongolia and the belief in legislative power to change the world, perhaps this makes sense to them, but it does not make sense to me, since voters do not really have a chance to predict what kind of decisions these politicians (or their parties) would make and to thus select this pattern in decision-making.

This absence of a political problem was curious in the case of Oyun-Erdene since he publicly set out and claimed to have such a program, the “Vision 2050”. But to me, that program never amounted to much more than a listing of all the various plans. There is no overall political theme in that program, like marketization, justice, equality or sustainable development. Even though it has become increasingly routine to refer to Vision 2050 as a touchstone of sorts, I am not sure that that document ever had much actual meaning.

So, if Vision 2050 somehow fades into the background as Oyun-Erdene steps away from power, I do not foresee this to make a real difference in terms of the policies pursued by the government.

Coalition

If this is the end of MPP-DP cooperation in government and the DP ministers leave cabinet, I do not find that surprising. Given the majority that the MPP holds in parliament, the “grand coalition” has not made a lot of sense to me. Publicly, the reason has been the need to build a consensus on mega projects, meaning 14 major infrastructure projects, but it is unclear why these infrastructure investment decisions require a consensus and most of the projects appear to be largely pie-in-the-sky and unlikely to be completed any time soon in any case. So, real reasons seems to have been to include opposition parties to buy them off and reduce their opposition actions. Now, in the past week of protests around Oyun-Erdene’s son’s girlfriend’s Chanel bag (yes!), some DP MPs have been very involved, especially some list-MPs, so perhaps this bargain “party gets to name ministers and reduces noice in return” did not work out for the MPP and they have decided to cancel the bargain.

This could mean that the DP (re)grows a backbone and acts more like an opposition.

It is unclear what this might mean to KhUN participation in government. Continue to cooperate and you increasingly look like that, i.e. staying in bed with the MPP, being bought off with some ministerial posts. This does not seem like an obvious route to electoral success in the 2028 parliamentary election.

MPP

Even though Oyun-Erdene came into government as a representative of the 80s generation and brought with him a whole crew of youngish policy types, to me it seems like he has never really built a party power base to rival established factions. I find it noticeable in that context, that talk about an Oyun-Erdene faction is rare, even under some fanciful name. And perhaps this is also why there has been so much speculation about Oyun-Erdene’s relationship with Khurelsukh as his own position within the part may have depended on Khurelsukh very much along the way.

If my impression of the lack of a real powerbase for Oyun-Erdene is right, perhaps he will simply fade away, along with Vision 2050, having completed a relatively long and largely successful term. That success I would point to has included steering the country through much of the COVID pandemic and signing another OT agreement that has led to the cancellation of some debt. Or, he might reinvent himself as an MPP power broker in coming months.

Posted in Democratic Party, Ikh Khural 2024, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Government Confusion

Posted on May 30, 2025 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

A bit of confusion in Mongolia at the moment regarding the state of the coalition government and the fate of L Oyun-Erdene as prime minister.

Last week, it was reported that a) the DP had been removed from government, and b) PM Oyun-Erdene would resign, be removed?

Yet, a week later and with some international reporting, some of which has engaged in the kind of idle personnel speculation that I decried in April, nothing concrete has happened. Mongolian media are generally not helping very much in providing concrete news.

I tried to offer my analysis to NPR’s The World on May 29, but suspect that that will be outdated relatively soon.

Posted in Democratic Party, Government, Media and Press, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Change in the Countryside 2025

Posted on May 27, 2025 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

For some years, I have now traced visible changes in Ulaanbaatar on my periodic visits.

I’ve kept a similar list for countryside changes, somewhat less regular as extended visits to the countryside don’t come nearly often enough for me. This April 2025 visit was merely a weekend, but some things did jump out at me. Earlier notes appeared in September 2024 | August 2023 | July 2023 | June 2019 | October 2017 |  June 2017 | October 2015. Additions/edits to that list are marked in italics below, candidates for omissions in strikethrough.

P Bolormaa has also offered her 2024 observations on changes in the countryside in a guest post.

Visible Manifestations of Social Change in the Countryside

What has Arrived?

  • Guardrails in some curves on major cross-country roads
  • While street signs (speed limits, warnings of curves, etc.) used to be a curious rarity (“when there hasn’t been a sign for 100km, why this one?”) they now seem to appear in clusters. I saw a campground sign for the first sign!
  • Fences around large parcels of lands. As far as I can tell these are hayed for winter fodder as nothing seems to be planted there. Fences keep out animals in this case to let grass grow.
  • Pretty significant agricultural activity, esp. around Darkhan and Erdenet, but also towards Kharkhorin. Many locations and huge fields that I don’t remember seeing on first visit to the area in 2008. Entire valleys dedicated to wheat and rapeseed in particular in 2023.
  • Not all fences around xashaa (property lots) are wood anymore. There are some prefab concrete slabs, corrugated metals, etc. Some residents are also integrating shipping containers into their fence.
  • Virtually all aimag centres now seem to have at least one tall building (8+ stories).
  • New, modern houses are appearing in soum centres. Only buildings in towns that don’t have a big wooden fence around them.
  • “No littering” signs.
  • Motorcycle helmets. Perhaps a greater attention to personal safety more generally as some of the boats we rode offered life vests. Riding helmets for tourist horse/camel rides as well.
  • Even soum centres have significant tree planting programs going on. Freshly-planted trees in so many public and private spaces.
  • Bike infrastructure in towns and many kids riding around on bikes.
  • Very communicative drivers. For example, signal right means, “it’s clear, you can pass” and signal left “no, don’t pass”. Sometimes you get flashing hazards as a thank you, but they can also mean “animals in the road”. It was less clear to me what the flashing headlights mean. Sometimes they seemed to be the oddly-universal, “speed trap” ahead, but sometimes there wasn’t a speed trap after that. While you’re passing, flashing headlights mean, “cutting it a bit close there, buddy”.
  • Thule-style roof boxes in cars travelling between cities and towns. Roof-mounted canopies to roll out for camping have also appeared.
  • Real coffee has appeared at ger camps.
  • Some ger camps have also embraced green houses.
  • There are Khushuur (Хушуур) stands everywhere along the big roads.
  • We actually witnessed sun screen being applied to a Mongolian child!
  • I had heard mention of herders using their Prius to move a herd, but actually saw that. Highlight was when the door of the Prius opened to bark at a recalcitrant sheep. Now there are rumours of herding-by-drone, but I have not witnessed that.
  • Herders listening to podcasts. Well, at least I saw some herders with earplugs.
  • Ger-customized wall carpets. Generally, inside curtains on gers seem more common.
  • Ger bed & breakfast, ger buudal. It is not clear to me whether some enterprising printing shop has simply delivered many printed signs for such ger rentals in the countryside or if they are a new phenomenon. I have yet to stay at one.
  • I noticed more monasteries in soum centres across Arkhangai, Khuvsgul and Bulgan.
  • Starlink receivers on car roofs. Perhaps these have replaced satellite phones (see below).
  • Paved roads to soum centres. With all aimag centres connected, some soum centres are bound to follow. For example, I saw a very smooth road from Bulgan to Orkhon Soum.
  • Capsule coffee machines. Given the volume of garbage they produce, this does not seem like a good development…
  • On the Darkhan road, I came across a cut-out cardboard police officer. It made me slow down!
  • Modernist one-room dachas
  • Powered ger-roof window

 

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What has Disappeared, or at least, Nearly Disappeared?

What will Appear in the Future?

  • Much more directional street markers.
  • Cross-country biking, hiking, and riding routes away from major roads. Drives designated as scenic routes.
  • Some kind of ultra- or other sonic device that will scare herds away from roads.
  • Straight dirt paths. Currently, some kind of path-is-better-over-there logic turns all tracks into slalom tracks. I will miss that passenger prince mental game of guessing which track the driver will take.
  • Women drivers. Yes, of course women drive, but I have never seen a woman as a professional driver.

What will Disappear in the Future?

  • Roughly in the 2000s, I would guess, more cars were beginning to show up in the countryside, but road-construction was not revving up yet. That meant that on big cross-country routes, entire valleys were scarred by multiple parallel tracks. Along the paved sections of major roads, these scars are slowly disappearing in the landscape. That is a very slow process, however, so even in spots where new roads now provide a good way of driving through valleys/over passes, the scars remain. In some areas the grated tracks that mark some inclines towards passes especially are now overgrown next to paved roads, still visible as ridges, but melting into the landscape slowly.
  • At construction sites, the paved roads are often simply blocked with large dirt heaps across the lanes. Effective, but scary at night.
  • Greeting of official visitors at city gates.
  • Fancy streetlight design must be a state socialist heritage somehow along with other forms of public art. There are vaguely futuristic designs throughout Mongolia, but they are even more surprising in provincial towns than in Ulaanbaatar. Somehow, I don’t think that they will continue to be built.
  • Lumber bridges on major roads. As roads are being built across the country, these – somewhat scary – bridges appear to be disappearing, though they are sometimes visible just up or downriver from newly constructed bridges.
  • Roadside sales of airag, pine nuts, berries, etc. Airag is inevitably offered in reused large soda bottles while the pine nuts are often filled into small plastic bags. Berries in particular seem to typically be offered by younger children, standing by the road.
  • People huddling with animals under bridges.
  • Much of the dacha belt around Ulaanbaatar will merge into the periurban city
  • Shipping containers as building elements
  • Plastic garbage floating across the steppe, I hope
  • Used toiled paper going into the garbage rather than the toilet (concern for septic tank/system). This will make “Mongolia old-timers” like me, i.e. fellow travellers will be disturbed to see used toilet paper in garbage.
  • The nighttime driving injunction. No one drives at night, too dangerous. That will change.
  • The aluminum foil wrapper on the tops of large tea/water thermos bottles. Apparently, it’s meant to keep the top from taking on content odours.

What won’t Disappear in the Medium Term?

  • Composite electricity poles. In the countryside these consist of a concrete base to which a wooden pole is tied with wire/brackets which ends in a triangle that has space for three attached cables. Metal poles have appeared, but I know similar composite poles from the Yukon and Alaska, so they  must be well-adapted to extreme temperatures and will thus last.
  • Litter. Growth in domestic tourism will make the countryside more littered, but awareness of littering will ultimately build. Such a blight on Mongolia!
  • Buried tires to mark property lines. It seems that there are so many practical reasons (cheap, indestructible, visible to off-roading drivers) that this practice will continue.
Posted in Change, Countryside, Curios | Tagged | 1 Comment