Guest Post: Mongolian Medical Tourism Industry on the Rise

By Tsogtbaatar Byambaa

Medical tourism (MT) entails the intentional pursuit of medical care beyond the borders of a patient’s home country, privately arranged for and usually paid for out of pocket. These patients are motivated by high costs of care in their home countries, higher quality or faster care abroad, and/or the inability to access care in their home countries. Research on the potential health equity impacts of MT has generally focused on patients traveling from the Global North, thus ignoring the large numbers of patients from the Global South traveling across lower and middle income countries to access medical care. These patients represent different challenges to their home health systems that require independent investigation.

Mongolia is increasingly a source of medical tourists for nearby countries promoting medical care to foreign patients. Between 13-22 April 2012, SFU team that works on Medical tourism traveled to Mongolia to explore the impact on local health services when affluent Mongolian citizens travel abroad for health care. The aim of SFU researchers’ trip was also to develop collaborative research networks in Mongolia, which will ground future comparative research examining the impacts of MT on a diverse array of health systems. Canadians represent the second largest group of international investors in Mongolia and will benefit from a better understanding of the forces shaping the health system of the country and, by extension, the health of Mongolia’s citizens. Further to this, we may glean insights into how Mongolian officials and health care providers are coping with the continuing outflow of patients while struggling to establish and maintain an equitable health care system. These insights can serve as potential areas of innovation to be applied here in Canada, which is another known source country for medical tourists.

Patients from more economically developed countries are flocking to developing countries to receive treatment for everything from elective cosmetic procedures to complex surgeries such as organ transplants and reproductive treatments, controversial stem-cell procedures and multiple sclerosis liberation therapy.

The medical tourism industry is booming in Mongolia. But there is a surprising lack of academic research into the industry’s size, the ethics and risks of medical tourism, and the effects it can have on developing countries’ local health services.

SFU health geographer Valorie Crooks established the SFU Medical Tourism Research Group (MTRG). In 2008, she was the first Canadian researcher to receive a Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) grant to study the subject. “We found that many Canadians are relying on informal testimonies and anecdotal information from the Internet to make important decisions for surgical care,” says Crooks. “People believe Canadians are going abroad because of waiting lists and Americans are going because it’s cheaper, but our research shows that it’s more complex than that,” says Crooks.

Health inequities?

What’s happening to local health-care services in developing countries that cater to medical tourists?

“There’s a lot of speculation that medical tourism is great for the locals because it brings in money and jobs,” says Crooks. “But on the other hand it shifts the focus to high-end surgeries and facilities for treating international patients. “There’s very little evidence one way or the other to prove these two theories.”

Between 13-22 April 2012, Medical tourism team traveled to Mongolia to explore the impact on local health services when affluent Mongolian citizens travel abroad for health care.

“We looked at the health-system challenges this poses for Mongolia to see if there were any lessons we can learn about how a lower-resource environment then deals with its patients,” explains Crooks.

They met with academics and interview facilitators who are sending Mongolians abroad for health services as well as local health officials.

Mongolian health sciences grad student Tsogtbaatar Byambaa, who inspired the research, is concerned about the growing numbers of Mongolians travelling outside of the country to receive medical care. He wants to know more about their outcomes and the long-term impact on the country’s health system. The study went successfully and results are expected to be revealed within next few months.

About Tsogtbaatar Byambaa

Dr. Tsogtbaatar Byambaa is the Project Coordinator for the CIHR funded Equity-Focused Health Impact Assessment Tools and Methodologies in Mongolia: Supporting and Scaling-Up Local Experiences project. He is a PhD candidate in the Faculty of Health Sciences at Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC. He received his MSc in Health Administration and International Health Policy from University of Colorado. He is a family physician by background who has worked on several public health projects in Mongolia, including serving as a coordinator for the Global Fund supported HIV/AIDS project of Ministry of Health in Mongolia. His research interest focuses on managing the potentially adverse public health consequences of development sector in developing settings. Tsogtbaatar Byambaa is currently engaged in research projects on health impact assessment policy development, medical tourism and air pollution.

Posted in Health, Research on Mongolia, Social Issues, Tourism, Tsogtbaatar Byambaa | 2 Comments

Election Set for June 28 2012

Apparently, Thursday, June 28 has now been picked as the date for the parliamentary election in Mongolia.

That is after the dates that had been originally envisioned (June 20 or 27), perhaps to give the national election commission some more time for preparations.

Mongolians living abroad will vote June 10.

While Ulaanbaatar city elections will be held on the same day, the soum and aimag elections will not be, even though that had been proposed in the name of administrative efficiency. Ulaanbaatar city elections will be run using a mixed direct/proportional election system that is modelled on the system that will be used for the Ikh Khural.

Assuming that the three-week campaign period is still in place, that would suggest that the campaign will begin on June 7. Six weeks from today.

[Many thanks to Tsogtbaatar Byambaa for updating me on this.]

Posted in Elections, Ikh Khural 2012, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged | 1 Comment

Regulating Foreign Investment Directly?

One of the questions that is emerging out of the recent announcement of a review of South Gobi’s mining license (transparently in reaction to an announced sale of South Gobi to CHALCO) is whether we will see an increase in resource populism in the upcoming campaign and whether this will suggest that laws to regulate foreign investment directly (rather than through mining licenses which has been the pattern in the past) is on the horizon.

My suspicion on both fronts is increasingly, yes, we will see more populist arguments in the campaign, and yes, legal changes regulating foreign investments may be on the horizon, but both developments are far from certain and are closely tied to the election (campaign) itself, so if they are not immediately visible during the election or in the immediate months after the Ikh Khural reconvenes with its new membership in September, this may pass.

Populism

There is no doubt that individual politicians campaigning for seats in the upcoming election will use populist arguments (à la, “the foreigners are taking our gold!”) in the campaign. Arguments of this kind have been made during previous elections and from sitting parliamentarians (though typically MPs without access to executive decision-making).

The 2008 election bidding war between the then-MPRP and DP over how large a cash payment (resource dividend) individual citizens should receive (“I’ll distribute 1,000,000 TG!” “Ha, you will receive 1,500,000 TG, if you elect me!”) is a relatively benign version of this kind of argument, but much of the rhetoric around the 1/3 share of ownership of the OT project and the decision not to sell the TT project is built on similar populism.

I still think that it is unlikely that party platforms, at least of the dominant DP and MPP, will embrace these kind of arguments, but will not be surprised at all if a number of individual candidates will turn this way to build their profile and bolster their electoral chances.

It remains to be seen and it will be highly determinant of future policies how many individual politicians embrace populist rhetoric and how openly they will do so in going how far?

Policy Changes for Foreign Investment

In the past, the mining license has been used as the main tool to regulate foreign investment. In the cases where (Canadian) investments have run into some regulatory trouble (Western Prospector, though its sale ultimately went through; Centerra Gold, now trying to move to construction/development of its Gatsuurt deposit; Khan Resources; now, South Gobi) the resources authority has relied on (revocation of) mining licenses as the primary policy tool. This is partly due to the fact that foreign investment was liberalized during the 1990s shock therapy days, but specifically in the 1997 Mining Law.

Current discussions suggest that legislative changes could be on the horizon that would regulate foreign investment in mining projects directly. Judging by their most recent press release, this is a possibility that Ivanhoe Mines seems to be foreseeing. The designation of a “strategic asset” that also provided the lever to insist on partial state ownership of OT, could be used in this regard to create a process of review for all foreign resource ownership.

This would all be quite familiar to would-be foreign investors in Canada’s resource sector, of course, as Canada has long insisted on restrictions of foreign ownership of resource assets, witness the 2010 BHP bid for Potash as one of the most prominent examples.

Conversely, any discussions of ownership restrictions may lend additional urgency to the Canadian government’s desire to conclude a bilateral Foreign Investment Protection Agreement (FIPA) with Mongolia that has been under negotiation since 2009, though with no publicly announced progress made.

As with many posts at the moment, I wish I was in Mongolia to get a more direct sense of current discussions and am very much looking forward to my visit there during the parliamentary election (campaign) in June.

Posted in Canada, Elections, International Relations, JD Mining Governance, Mining, Oyu Tolgoi, Politics, Populism | Tagged | 2 Comments

Evaluating and Classifying Developments in Mongolia

Jonathan Manthorpe is one of the most prominent voices on contemporary Asia in Vancouver as the long-time international affairs columnist for the Vancouver Sun. Today he wrote a story that portrays many of the current developments in a very – and in my mind – unduly negative way: “Miner’s Motherlode Mongolia Faces Instability Ahead of June Election“.

Instability? For sure! Is there anything factually wrong with Mr Manthorpe’s article? No! In fact, I would say that the article is well worth reading, in part because it takes a different – in this case, more negative – view of political developments in Mongolia.

“[S]ince […] 1990, Mongolia’s early successes with creating a vibrant democracy have subsided into bitter factionalism, outrageous corruption and incompetent government.”

What are “bitter”, “outrageous” and “incompetent” doing here? More than factionalism, I would argue that Mongolian democracy has been characterized by patronage politics, that is attempts – often blatant, and more often than not linked to corruption – by politicians to exploit decision-making authority for (financial) gains for themselves, their families/supporters, or regional affiliations. Factionalism? I haven’t seen very much of that. Mongolian members of parliament of both parties certainly have had an independent streak, particularly parliamentarians who have not been members of cabinet and have seen benefits in an appeal to populist sentiments, possibly for electoral gain.

Manthorpe is surely right in linking the recent arrest of former president Enkhbayar to electioneering, certainly in its timing, but “extreme partisan politics”? Are robo-calls “extreme partisan politics”? Would we label them as such?

Some of the rivalry between Enkhbayar and the leadership of the Mongolian People’s Party, including Prime Minister Batbold, is rooted in his perception that the party (then still known as the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party) abandoned Enkhbayar during his campaign for re-election in the 2009 presidential election. What Manthope doesn’t mention or – more likely – doesn’t have the space to mention is that Enkhbayar has become more and more of a loose cannon with relatively wild accusations of other politicians, including current PM Batbold, and previous PM Bayar. Some of these accusations have come in the context of the trial of four senior police officers for the deaths of five demonstrators/rioters on July 1 2008, the unrest that Manthorpe mentions in his article as well. The arrest of Enkhbayar has come in the context of a reinvigorated Anti-Corruption Agency and a long-standing investigation of Enkhbayar and his wife for corruption. Calling the split between Enkhbayar and his former party-mates “bitter factionalism” is making this split sound like more of a systemic issue than it really is.

While there have also been some criticisms of PM Batbold within the MPP recently, I do not see these as evidence of the emergence of factions that are organized under a policy-view or a leader within the party. To the contrary, factions that have formed in the past have tended to leave parties to start their own, and the recent changes to the electoral system that have proposed to introduce an element of proportional representation would benefit such separate parties and encourage their formation.

“[Enkhbayar’s] arrest led swiftly to a large demonstration by supporters”

I have been struggling to find out more about these demonstrations over the past week. As far as I can tell from Mongolian press reports and contacts, these are not “large demonstrations”, but seem involve some hundreds of core Enkhbayar supporters. This would confirm my sense that Enkhbayar personally and through the re-formed MPRP has taken on a bit of a fringe existence.

Manthorpe says as much himself in the next paragraph, “Hundreds of people gathered in central Sukhbaatar Square in the capital Ulaanbaatar and mounted a noisy but peaceful demonstration outside the parliament building.” That does not sound like a “large demonstration” to me.

Manthorpe does refer to the July 1 2008 events. I would emphasize that almost all Mongolians were startled by the events four years ago and would argue that they were an aberration, not part of a development toward political violence. In fact, I would emphasize that compared to other post-state socialist countries, not just in Central Asia, but Russia as another example, the apparent rampant corruption in Mongolia has not been linked in any way to political violence or the development of any kind of organized crime, at least I have not heard about any indications of such developments.

Manthorpe believes that “Enkhbayar’s MPRP is set to do well in the June parliamentary elections.” I am not sure that I would agree. The re-formed MPRP will win seats, no doubt, in part because some current MPs look set to defect to the MPRP. Also, there are some attempts for the re-formed MPRP to usurp party structures that “belonged” to the old MPRP. While this will most likely not result in the transfer of any material resources, allegiances may well transfer, particularly with older voters and voters in the country. Though I hesitate to make specific predictions about the election outcome (hopefully, I will get a better sense of likely outcomes when I will be in Mongolia in June), the MPRP will likely reduce the MPP share of votes and possibly take some DP seats as well, but I would be very surprised if these seats amount to a significant portion of the 76 seats in the Ikh Khural. If the MPP loses significantly, of course, the MPRP might emerge as a possible coalition partner.

June’s elections are approaching at a time when Mongolia is facing a host of contradictions stemming from its transition to democracy. There are also the tectonic tremors in its economy as it shifts from a basis in agriculture and semi-nomadic herding on the country’s vast grassland steppes to one based on mining.

Political leaders have wrestled with the horrendous problems of trying to develop mining policy and regulations. They continue to struggle with fashioning a mining industry that benefits the country and its people even as hordes of mining company carpetbaggers from Australia, Europe, the United States and Canada clamour at their doors for concessions.

All fair enough, but “incompetent government”? While I certainly believe that there are areas where Mongolian politicians could be more strategic in developing their economy and ensuring sustainable benefits from such development, I am also very sympathetic to their struggles in managing an almost unimaginably rapid economic development that calls for policy-analysis and policy-making in so many different, but interrelated areas. Would I be able to handle these developments more competently? As a benevolent dictator, perhaps, but maybe not. Within a maturing democracy? Hardly! My personal emphases might be different, but then I might not get elected in Mongolia.

Is there a Canadian link/perspective on all of this? The strongest commercial link has been Vancouver-based Ivanhoe Mines and the Oyu Tolgoi project that it has been developing. However, Ivanhoe Mines gradual withdrawal (cashing out) from Mongolia is accelerating and within some months that link will practically disappear. There are some other projects under development, perhaps most prominently Prophecy Coal’s proposed power plant, but these are not on the scale of the Oyu Tolgoi project.

As the commercial relationship declines, the Canadian government seems to have taken more and more of an interest in Mongolia starting with the establishment of an embassy there and running through the visit of PM Batbold in Ottawa in September 2010, and repeated discussions of the possibility of further official Canadian visits to Mongolia, though much more likely after the June election.

Substantively, some of the areas that Manthorpe has identified (with a bit too much hyperbole, I would say) are open to Canadian initiatives. Offers should certainly continue to go to the Mongolian government that Canadian officials would be willing to share experiences particularly in resource development and regulation. While these are difficult areas where even long Canadian efforts have hardly produced clear solutions, there is a lot of experience on this available that Mongolian could draw on if they thought this might help them in their own policy analysis and policy making.

Posted in Corruption, Democracy, Elections, Governance, Ikh Khural 2012, Media and Press, Politics | Tagged | 2 Comments

Politics Heating up Ahead of Election?

It does seem like (political) things in Mongolia have been getting more exciting over the past week. Clearly this is linked to the proximity of the beginning of the election campaign.

By the changes to the electoral law that were enacted in December, the parliamentary election is due to be held on June 20 or 27. That would suggest a beginning of the official campaign on May 31 or June 6. However, some of the changes initiated by the changes to the electoral law are still under judicial review. Also, the goal to hold local elections on the same day as national elections (primarily to reduce administrative costs significantly) is threatened by inter-party squabbling. If any of the changes to the electoral law are struck down, by default the election would be run under the previous election system. Recall that this was a bit of a mess of multi-member, multi-vote districts that proved to be difficult to count and also a challenged for voters and parties to wrap their head around.

While the exact nature of the campaign and election procedures remains to be determined, a number of political events suggest that the atmosphere is heating up a bit.

Late last week, frm. prime minister, speaker of the Ikh Khural, and president Enkhbayar was arrested for failing to appear before an inquiry of the Anti-Corruption Agency. Recall that he has been the first very prominent politician to appear in the trial of four senior police officers for the July 1 (2008) riots that followed closely on the last parliamentary election. Recall also that Enkhbayar lost the 2009 presidential election to current incumbent Elbegdorj, but Enkhbayar certainly felt like he was abandoned by his then-party, the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party, since re-named Mongolian People’s Party by Prime Minister Batbold, but re-formed as a splinter party with its original name by Enkhbayar. In his trial appearance and other public statements, Enkhbayar is increasingly slinging mud in all directions, focused on July 1, corruption, and some of his political rivals. Now, he’s being detained and looks to remain in detention for the remainder of the week at least.

Some protests have occurred regarding his detention, but the numbers of people involved in these protests continues to be relatively low.

As if domestic politics wasn’t exciting enough, the Mineral Resources Authority (MRAM) held a press conference announcing the suspension of South Gobi Resources’ mining license. It had been surprisingly quiet after the announcement of a takeover of South Gobi by Chinese aluminum giant CHALCO, so perhaps this reaction was to be expected. Predictably, this press conference sent various share prices tumbling and produced angry statements from various foreign investors.

Posted in Corruption, Elections, Ikh Khural 2012, JD Democratization, Mining, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged | 9 Comments

Монголын Жиргээчдэд hashtag-ыг санал болгох нь

Сүүлийн хэдэн жилд Монголд жиргээчдийн хүрээ өргөжжээ. Улс төрчид жиргээчдийн эгнээнд нэгдэн, нээлттэй хэлэлцүүлэгт ч оролцох болж. Миний хувьд Твиттерээр Монголын улс төрийн тухай мэдээлэл авахад маш дөхөмтэй байдаг.

Харин Монголын жиргээчид hashtag төдийлэн хэрэглэдэггүй бололтой. Энэ нь жиргээчдийн мэтгэлцээн, хэлэлцүүлгийг олох, ангилахад бэрхшээл учруулдаг.

…poli төгсгөлтэй hashtag-ыг Хойд Америкт өргөн хэрэглэдэг. Би Монголын улс төрийн тухай жиргээг (гол төлөв Англи хэлээрх) тэмдэглэхэд #mngpoli-ыг хэрэглэхээр боллоо. Бусад жиргээчид мөн ингэж ангилаж эхлэнэ гэж найдаж байна.

Хэрэв танд Монголтой холбоотой жиргээнд одоо хэрэглэж байгаа болон өөр, шинэ hashtag-ын санал байвал @jdierkes рүү илгээнэ үү.

Ирэх УИХ-ын сонгууль дөхөж буй үед энэ тухай жиргээг #mngelect болон #2012сонг-аар тэмдэглэвэл ямар вэ?

Posted in Elections, Ikh Khural 2012, Mongolia and ..., Politics, Social Media | Tagged | Leave a comment

Hashtags for Vibrant Mongolian Twitterverse

Twitter has been widely adopted in Mongolia over the past two years or so. Many politicians are very active on Twitter, often even engaging in conversation that are thus open to the public. I find this a very useful way to keep up with politics in Mongolia.

However, the use of hashtags has not been very common in these tweets making it difficult to find/organize these debates.

Hashtags ending in …poli seem to have gained currency in North America, so I am beginning to use #mngpoli to mark tweets (probably primarily in English) about Mongolian politics, hoping that others may adopt this to help categorize information.

If you have suggestions for alternative/additional hashtags for Mongolia-related tweets, please share them or tweet to me @jdierkes

In the run-up to the June parliamentary election, a hashtag to mark tweets about this will also be very useful. #mngelect perhaps?

Posted in Elections, Ikh Khural 2012, Media and Press, Politics, Social Media | Tagged | Leave a comment

MoU: Ministry of Education and UBC

On March 26, 2012, Mongolia’s Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the University of British Columbia’s Norman B Keevil Institute of Mining Engineering and Institute of Asian Research signed a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at intensifying cooperation between UBC and Mongolian universities.

The MoU specified a number of areas of potential cooperation including the exchange of visiting scholars, joint organization of conferences and the eligibility of Mongolian students for UBC’s International Partial Tuition Scholarships.

Existing links between UBC and Mongolian institutions, particularly the Mongolian Univ of Science and Technology, focus on the area of mining.

 

Posted in Canada, Research on Mongolia | Tagged | 1 Comment

Mongolian Parliament Election and Uncertainty on an Electronic Vote-Counting System by Otgonbaatar (Waseda University)

The election is drawing close attention from both domestically and overseas residing Mongolians, not only because there are many pending issues that are holding their solutions in the Mongolian society.

But also, this is because the State Great Khural (Parliament)[1]  is the highest organ of state power as explicitly stated in article twenty of the Mongolian constitution[2]  and it holds many important authorities over, for example, supervising the state annual budget, appointing the prime minister and cabinet, and defining the basis of domestic and foreign policies. Basically, the State Great Khural is the highest decision-making unit of the Mongolian political system.

As the Great Khural’s election is approaching in just a little more than three months away from today, implicit and explicit election propagandas has started to heat up in Mongolian media these days. From voters standpoint, the below mentioned issues would likely be the biggest concern when Mongolians decide whom they vote for in the upcoming parliament election.

  1. Problems in good governance – corruption, a lack of transparency and an injustice in judiciary system,
  2. Livelihood problems – air pollution, traffic and disorganization of city planning in Ulaanbaatar,
  3. And more general problems – rapidly growing income disparity and environmental degradations.

Mongolian democracy has already been recognized by international community, although it is not one of the well-established democracies of the world. Indeed, there is an urgent need for further improvements.

On the 14th of December of 2011, the Great Khural passed amendments to the electoral law. One of the notable changes was introducing a new electronic way of vote-counting system. So, for the first time in Mongolian election history, the new amendment has introduced “a mixed-member quasi proportional election system” which is widely expected to solve previous election incidents, like five people were killed in the demonstration against electoral fraud on July 1, 2008.  Nonetheless, the new one is not out of questionings. It seems it also has a long way to be implemented as Mongolians wanted.

The general election committee of Mongolia (GEC) has been the highest organizing body of the elections in Mongolia since 1992. In other words, whether an election goes without incidents or not, is depends upon how the GEC works, in principle. Moreover, by the new electoral law, the GEC has been assigned responsibility for introducing a new electronic vote-counting system, however, its insufficient preparedness and inexperience of handling the electronic machine, have been under a heavy criticism from general public, as well as some MPs.  Dissatisfied voices on the GEC’s action have increased in the major media.  For instance, due to the low reliability of the proposed machines, the GEC’s first proposal on the electronic system has failed in the Parliament discussion on January. But, as reported in newspapers, the Great Khural has screened the GEC’s later proposal of buying electronic vote-counting machines from the U.S in the early February. The machines will be brought to Mongolia by late May, just a month before the election. Thus, it is really questionable that the GEC will be able to train staff to run the machines properly.

To sum up, many of the previous election entanglements were mainly caused by vote-counting incidents after balloting.  A lack of capable human resources who needs to run the electric vote-counting machines, would lead an uncertain situation despite a promising amendments to the electoral law. Since an electronic vote-counting system is considered to be the one of the fundamental components of the new electoral law in order to have cleaner parliament election in Mongolia.

About the Author:
Otgonbaatar Byambaa, a Ph.D. Candidate at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, has been conducting a research on Chinese energy security and its state-owned enterprises. He has a Master’s degree in IR from International University of Japan.  Otgonbaatar is one of many young Mongolians who are educated in overseas and he has visited to UBC.

[1] The Parliament – The State Great Khural have one chamber and consist of 76 members that directly elected by citizens eligible for election.

[2] See http://www.mfat.gov.mn

 

Posted in Democracy, Elections, Ikh Khural 2012, Otgonbaayar Byambaa, Politics | 1 Comment

Is Mongolia Fighting or Preparing to Fight Corruption?

By Mendee Jargalsaikhan

Mongolia seems succeeding to create the legal environment to tame the corruption by institutionalizing its efforts.  But, these laws and any agencies will be powerless in the absence of political will and interest to clean up the Mongolian public service before massive mining revenues appear from 2013.

The Transparency International’s corruption perception index of Mongolia again regressed from 116 to 120 in 2011.  It was 43 in 1999. Of course, we can argue there might be some deficiencies in the measurements or analysis of the Transparency International.  Because some may argue, Mongolia is doing so well in eradicating the corruption – joined all international endeavors, passed laws, established a special organization to deal with it.  In January, Mongolia adds another new bill on preventing conflict of interests into the collection of laws to tame the corruption.

It seems these laws powerless without political will and commitments.  Or just, attempts by shrewd politicians to ease the public outcry domestically and international pressures, if there is any.  Many politicians (not all) seem to be concerned about slices of larger pies, which will be generated from the mining revenues.  Therefore, they are not ready to fight against corruption, but ready, albeit reluctantly, to approve the laws with lesser penalty and potentiality of execution.   Two examples could be the laws on anti-corruption and conflict of interests.  Both laws were passed by the parliament, but only a handful members of the parliament pushed for passage with strong public support.  These pressures created an atmosphere for legislators that they can not oppose these laws.

The Law on Anti-Corruption established the Anti-Corruption Agency.  The international and particularly domestic audience perceived this agency as the frontline law enforcement agency in fight against corruption.  But, one looks carefully the law, it will be clear that legislators did not want to give law enforcement powers to this organization.  It looks like a corruption study think tank to develop corruption index, policies, programs, and to do analysis.  Or, an educational institution to increase public awareness of corruption and to teach public servants to compile their incomes. Maybe an archive to collect income reports of public servants. And, a little investigative power is given to the agency.  Can a small agency fulfill all of these tasks – which are certainly belong to other government agencies?  Civil Service Commissions can do compiling of income reports of public servants.  The Ministry of Education can do enlightenment tasks.  Any non-governmental organization do the research and indexing.  So, let this agency just conduct independent criminal investigation and eradicate corrupted officials from the public services.  Because they haven’t given this important power and politicians (un)intentionally crowded their “to do list,” now they are easy target for the “blame game.”  The first chief of the agency died in Australia – the case remain unsolved.  The second director ousted for doing surveillance, although the parliament never endorses the Prosecutor’s Office’s decision.  Now a new team is in position.  In addition, it has a 15 member board appointed by the President advises the Agency.  Although any judiciary and Presidential posts should be apolitical, but the President is nominated by the political party and then gets power to nominate the Prosecutor General, who has enormous power over the Anti-Corruption Agency.

The second law was indeed a success – because this was the first time Mongolia succeeded at least on the paper to disconnect business and political interests.  Politicians are now aware of the existence of the conflict of interest law.  If we get lucky to have many politicians with political will and interest, the law is ready although the punishment is soft.  Because it was just before the upcoming parliamentary election, members approved the law; otherwise, there will be consequences.  The initial bill was intended to be valid from July 15, 2012 – which means people who get elected in the parliament or public posts would not dodge from this bill.  However, the President veto-d that date and suggested to implement the law before the upcoming parliamentary election in June.  Now, again, parliament members reluctantly received the Presidential veto – agreed to accept its implementation before the election.  The law also changed the term for public servants.  The public servants were legally labeled as “state servants,” but they will be called as “public servants” who are serving for “public interests.”  One would see it as a conceptual change, but only a few members of the parliament like Temujin explains the essence.

These are indications of tightening, if not at least, setting the trap, for corrupted officials to survive and misuse public money.  However, enforcement is not coming alone.  The Parliament Member Kh. Battulga, a former member of the coalition government, reported on several occasions about domination of the major business groups.   A former President N. Enkhbayar and incumbent Member of Parliament and Minister of the Justice and Internal Affairs Ts. Nyamdorj engaged in dyad recalling each other’s connections in corruption through several media interviews. [Also, there is a new dyad between Kh. Battulga and Ts. Nyamdorj in regards with infrastructure projects and the growing MCS’s influence in politics.]  A Korean newspaper reported the current government officials sold a land to Korea, but reported in Mongolia as leased.  Japanese and Mongolian media are disclosing about secret negotiation involving the Mongolian, Japanese, and the US governments on creating nuclear waste dump in Mongolia.   None of these issues explained properly to public, except Mongolia’s stance on non-nuclear principles.

The positive note is that Mongolians freely criticize the government, but the sad note is the public officials are not responsive and reactive to public inquiry and for their actions.  Some politicians may be just waiting for the good time to bust his/her opponents – so they need to get a hold of key government institutions, which could serve for their purposes.  Only way ahead is to give more power to government law enforcement agencies and judiciary rather than politicizing them.  Professionalism must succeed the populism and corruption.

Posted in Corruption, Democracy, Global Indices, Governance, Law | Tagged | 2 Comments

Survival of New Defense Minister and Other Issues of Controling the Security Forces

One of the youngest cabinet members, J. Enkhbayar, has survived a “no-confidence” vote in parliament on March 9, 2012 after filling the Defense Minister’s seat in the post-Coalition government.  At a quick glance, it could be easily interpreted as an election campaign tactic by the Democratic Party – raising accusations over the newly-appointed Defense Minister’s careless statement about the possibility of using the military during a state emergency.   A senior member of parliament of the Democratic Party, R. Gonchigdorj, and other key Democratic Party members called for the resignation of the Defense Minister, but it was clearly impossible for the Democratic Party to succeed with this motion considering the majority of the Mongolian People’s Party in parliament.

At the same time, the Civil Service Commission intervened in the Defense Minister’s attempt to influence in appointing the State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense – the highest professional military and bureaucratic post at the Ministry of Defense. The Civil Service Commission appointed the new State Secretary from the short-listed four potential applicants.  This closes ongoing attempts to bring a party-affiliated officials to the Ministry’s important bureaucratic post.  Surprisingly, it happened in the military first – which indicates the growing influence of the Civil Service Commission.

The recurring trial of police chiefs related to July 1 (2008) event has now been postponed in order to call all high-ranking officials, including the former President, Prime Minister, and Minister of Internal Affairs and Justice in 2008 as witnesses. Upon request, former President N. Enkhbayar officially asked the Chairman of the Parliament to change the status of government materials to unclassified on March 9, 2012, so that he could attend as a witness in an open (live) trial.  [On July 1, 2008, five people were allegedly shot to death by the police during the post-election demonstration.]

Related to Mongolian security institutions, the Government’s proposal to amalgamate three different schools – the Border Troops Academy, the National Intelligence Academy, and the Police Academy under the name of the Internal Security Academy caused a round of criticisms from the public.  The most outspoken criticism came from the President’s national security advisor, Batchimeg.  She warned the Government to re-consider this decision and opposed to empower the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Justice as same as the Internal Security Ministry during the communist regime.  Although the government’s logic may be in line with the its attempt to reduce the number of universities and to improve efficiency and effectiveness.

Although these events might be explained in the context of heated political campaigning toward elections, they also tell us the different story.  The trial of the police officials of the July 1 event, no-confidence vote over the newly-elected Defense Minister, appointment of the State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense, and backlash against empowerment of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs and Justice are signs of healthy democratic society, where the public and politicians are concerned over the use of and politicization of the security institutions.  Like many post-communist states in Eastern and Central Europe, Mongolian security institutions played a quite constructive roles toward democratization process – none opposed or challenged the democratically-elected public officials.  However, there are always been attempts by political parties in power to insert their influences in those institutions for their short term political goals.  These events revealed attempts of political parties – certainly calling for more clear-cut institutionalization of the security forces – away from the political influence.

 

 

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Mongolia – Without Vodka, Cheers With Milk

By Mendee J

Having lived through a two-decade democratic transition, people now recognize behaviours of politicians and distinguish the false promises from the practical ones.  Therefore, it is also becoming difficult for political entrepreneurs to find something achievable in highly competitive political environment.  But, they are always good in engaging in the “blame game”.

One successful and touching initiative is the fight against the vodka, a drink inherited from the Soviet past that has dominated Mongolia during the economic transition of the 1990s because the only successful light industry and business was the distilling business and vodka was included in the family ratio.  President Elbegdorj proposed a toast with milk in the New Year’s eve (December, 2010) live to the country and initiated the Vodka Free Mongolia campaign.  He asked Province Governors not to serve vodka in any activities where he is present and encouraged the public to join in the campaigns.  Now people are beginning to embrace the “Vodka Free Wedding”, “Vodka Free Graduation Ceremonies”, “Vodka Free Women’s Day Celebration of March 8”.  This campaign has received support from the public and seems to be gaining momentum.

Although this might be linked to political ambition, an influential Member of Parliament, “Jenko” Battulga, has pushed a draft bill to prohibit alcohol and cigarette manufacturers and people connected with drug (narcotics)-related crimes from running in parliamentary elections.  He submitted his draft for the third time for consideration of the parliament.

These are the most practical initiatives to reduce the impact of vodka on Mongolian society.  According to the Police Department statistics, about 70 percent of crimes were perpetrated by unemployed people and 20-30 percent involved intoxication (Reports of the General Police Department of Mongolia).

The military has been successful in strengthening anti-alcohol policies; for instance, any alcohol-related incident during deployment will now result in discharge or severe demotion.  Now these initiatives need to be endorsed by the government and reflected in the legislation rather being used/perceived as political legacies of Elbegdorj or Battulga.  Can the state prohibit the parliament and government to use taxpayers’ dollars to procure and to serve alcohol?  The State of Alaska has done it, why not Mongolia – public officials can pay for their alcoholic treat from their own pocket if needed, but not from ours.  Then, Mongolia can present its official disconnect  from the detrimental Soviet practice – shine as an example for many others.

Posted in Social Issues | Tagged | 2 Comments

Guest Post: A Young Democracy Seeks Investors

Adam Simpson is a Master’s student in the Human Security and Peacebuilding program at Royal Roads University. As a change management specialist and project manager with the Aga Khan Foundation, he is currently overseeing the development of a healthcare infrastructure programme in northern Afghanistan.

This post is based on a policy update to the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute which also covered the regulatory framework of resource management for Afghanistan.

Mine-golia: A Young Democracy Seeks Investors

Mongolia has vast and largely untapped mineral deposits of copper, gold and coal, but until recently, has remained largely impoverished. With several big mining projects on the horizon, however, there is promise of an economic boom that will present the government with a very real challenge: how do you manage to successfully exploit these resources without further destabilizing the economy? And how will their proximity to China factor into the equation?

The International Monetary Fund foresees a double-digit annual-growth rate in Mongolia for the next several years, and a quadrupling of GDP per head – from a mere $2,000 – by 2018 (Anonymous, 2010). Two mines in Mongolia’s southern Gobi region – Oyu Tolgoi, a copper and gold deposit, and Tavan Tolgoi, a coal mine – are expected to provide much of the new wealth, both of which will include road and rail links to Mongolia’s hungriest customer: China (Anonymous, 2010).

Legal Constructs

Currently, the Mongolian government stands to profit handsomely from Oyu Tolgoi, of which they own one third (Anonymous, 2010). But in a country where politics is based on patronage, such a windfall could spell disaster. With swollen government coffers, vote-buying and corruption could thrive, and even “virtuous public spending” could push up inflation (Anonymous, 2010). Further, if their economy becomes too dependent on mining, Mongolia becomes highly vulnerable to price shocks and market fluctuations. One recent construct is the adoption of fiscal stability law that sets indices for commodity prices for budgeting purposes. When prices go above the index, excess revenue will be stored in a “stability fund”. If prices fall, the government can tap the fund to cover its costs (Anonymous, 2010).

Other measures are also being implemented to curb the risks, including the passing of new anti-corruption legislation, as well as promises to help boost investments in non-mining sectors, including tourism, finance and outsourcing so that the country does not become dependent on a single industry.

Proximity to China

Mongolia’s neighbour China is one of the largest global consumers of coal and rare earth minerals (Anonymous, 2010). With healthy diplomatic ties established between the two countries, Mongolia is uniquely positioned to start undercutting China’s existing coal suppliers such as Australia and Indonesia, pending the development of appropriate infrastructure.

Analysts estimate that when the Tavan Tolgoi mine opens, Mongolia could deliver coal to China for under $100/tonne, less than half of the $220/tonne for Australian coal (Anonymous, 2010). The main concern, however, is whether or not Mongolia can avoid becoming too economically dependent on China and their insatiable appetite for resources, and grow their mining industry in a sustainable way. To date, they have not been able to establish a solid foundation to achieve this.

Foreign Direct Investment: Shifting Frameworks

Mongolian mining frameworks have historically been poorly defined, shifting dramatically between a keen focus on FDI and a state-protectionist model. After the fall of the Soviet Union – its primary trading partner until the early 1990’s – Mongolia recognized the need to attract new investors (Anonymous, 2011).

Mongolia’s 1997 Minerals Law aimed to attract FDI by reducing investment taxes, strengthening land tenure rights, and increasing transparency, and in 2002, the government further lowered royalty payments on all minerals to 2.5% (Anonymous, 2011). As a result, FDI in Mongolia grew 2,200% to an annual total of $344m in 2006. This economic boom was highlighted by the discovery of the world’s largest copper and gold deposit at Oyu Tolgoi in the south Gobi Desert (Anonymous, 2011), but the government was starting to get nervous about the increasing foreign dominance in the mining sector.

A 2006 revision of the Minerals Law shifted the country to a significantly more protectionist model (Anonymous, 2011). The new regulation doubled royalty rates, imposed a Windfall Profits Tax of up to 68% on copper and gold, and reserved the right for the government to claim ownership of “strategically important” deposits (Anonymous, 2011). It also allowed the state to take up to a 50% equity stake in deposits discovered with government assistance or 34% for privately explored deposits (Anonymous, 2011). But investor backlash, coupled with the spread of the 2008 global financial crisis drove down demand and prices for Mongolian commodities, and in 2009 legislators repealed the Windfall Profits Tax and replaced it with a sliding scale of royalties, effective early 2011 (Anonymous, 2011).

The Role of China: What Should it Be?

The extent of China’s role in the context of growing Mongolia’s national mining industry is far too complex to be intimately addressed in the scope of this paper, but by using China at a high level to illustrate the influence foreign direct investors will have in the future of this emerging economy was worthy of a brief analysis. As Mongolia will continue to rely heavily (if not almost entirely) on FDI to exploit its mineral wealth, regulatory reforms and governance will largely revolve around the relationships with these foreign actors, whether they be private consortiums or state-run companies. Systemically, it is the question of to what extent will FDI govern the future of this industry, and can Mongolia grow and open their mining opportunities to an internationally diverse group of investors?

Mongolia’s Mining Future

Mongolia’s current mining regulatory framework is still a work in progress. While the Mineral Law allows 100% foreign ownership of businesses, only individual Mongolian citizens can own the real estate under mineral deposits to be exploited (Anonymous, 2011). The current tax code is an improvement over its predecessor and provides more opportunities for capital investment deductions, but in a country that is expanding at such a frenetic pace, not only must foreign companies ensure they are well informed of planned regulatory changes before they become law to ensure the viability and long-term stability of their projects (Anonymous, 2011). Perhaps most importantly though, Mongolians themselves must ensure that they keep their mining industry and reliance on China in check by establishing equally viable markets in other industries such as tourism, finance, and outsourcing.

References:

Anonymous (2011). Mongolia rocks. Industrial Minerals, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?did=2259607981&Fmt=2&rqt=309

Anonymous (2010). Nomads no more; Mongolia’s mining boom. The Economist, 397(8705), 52.

Posted in Adam Simpson, Development, Mining, Research on Mongolia | Leave a comment

Call for Proposals: 2012 Central Eurasian Studies Conference

Central Eurasian Studies Society (CESS)

Annual Conference

Bloomington, IN: Oct 18-21, 2012

Deadline for Submission of Proposals: Apr 1, 2012

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The Effect of Mongolia’s Mining Boom on the Tourism Industry

Guest Post by Tye Ebel

Tye Ebel is a member of the 2010/2011 cohort in the Master of Arts Asia Pacific Policy Studies at the University of British Columbia. While at the University of British Columbia, he focused heavily on sustainable tourism development and promotion, with a secondary focus on international trade. As the capstone requirement for his degree, Tye spent 10 weeks working at the Mongolian Ministry of Nature, Environment and Tourism, where, among other things, he produced a report on the state of sustainable tourism in the country. tyeebel [at] gmail com

The Effect of Mongolia’s Mining Boom on the Tourism Industry

While I was completing my practicum with the Tourism Department at the Ministry of Nature, Environment and Tourism, I had the opportunity to meet with many of the major stakeholders in the industry. On several occasions, the relationship between the country’s rapidly expanding mining sector and the tourism sector came up in the conversation.

Without question, the recent mining boom has strained the tourism industry. Attention has been diverted from tourism, making it harder to mobilize the political will and donor funds needed to implement significant improvements. Meanwhile, the promise of more lucrative and stable contracts with mining companies has lured away many of the tourism industry’s best drivers, cooks and guides. This has particularly been the case in the Gobi region, which, in addition to being a top tourist attraction, is also the site of the country’s largest mining project. As a result, tour operators have had to increase wages in order to retain top talent. These wage increases are in turn recouped through higher tour prices. The problem is further amplified because speculation has driven up the value of the national currency, thus reducing the attractiveness of Mongolia as an international tourist destination by significantly raising the cost of travel. In addition, expansion in the mining sector threatens to degrade the country’s top tourist attractions, namely its nomadic culture and vast, unbroken terrain.

However the tourism industry can mitigate these problems. First, it can position itself as a training ground where students can improve their communication and language skills and hence, improve their chances of securing lucrative mining jobs in the future. While many young people seem to recognize the beneficial training that work in the tourism sector can provide, this link between tourism and mining does not appear to be well marketed within the industry. That is a shame, because this approach could increase the pool, and hence quality, of the student staff during the industry’s high season. Second, the anticipated mining boom in Mongolia has resulted in increasing numbers of expats and business travelers and has created a small upper class in the country. While little has been done to study and target these new markets, they could prove to be a real asset, particularly when it comes to increasing revenue during the shoulder and low seasons. And third, the increasing buzz over Mongolia’s mining boom has expanded international awareness of the country. The industry should find ways to use this awareness to highlight Mongolia’s attributes as a tourist destination.

While the country’s mining boom has created several new threats for the tourism industry, these threats can be mitigated by a forward looking tourism policy. However, first stakeholders need to recognize that the industry cannot grow by maintaining the status quo. They need to work together to find solutions to the human resource drain, inflation, and cultural transformation that the mining boom is creating. Fortunately, many stakeholders recognize the need to adapt, and have already begun looking for solutions.

Posted in Mining, Tourism, Tye Ebel | Leave a comment