New to Ulaanbaatar in late 2015

Posted on December 21, 2015 by JDierkes

I’ve been keeping a list of things that are arriving to/disappearing from central Ulaanbaatar: May 2015 | May 2014 | October 2013.

I’ve copied the 2014 and 2015 lists here and am adding to it. New items since previous posts appear in italics.

What has arrived?

  • sadly, Louis Vuitton, KFC, Burberry Kids and Ugg
  • Mini, Bentley
  • child seats
  • sidewalks
  • parks
  • farmers’ markets
  • yoga
  • dogs on leashes
  • Sunday morning joggers and bikers
  • coffee culture
  • river walkway along the Dund River (under construction in May 2015 but looking very promising)
  • city park along the Tuul
  • sports cars
  • organic shopping

#Organic retail has established itself in #Mongolia

A photo posted by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes) on

What has disappeared, or at least nearly?

  • stationary 80s-office-phone-looking old-granny cell phone booth
  • for-pay scales (actually, they seem to be hanging on)
  • free WiFi on Sukhbaatar, er Chinggis Khaan, er, Sukhbaatar Square
  • Sukhbaatar Square, er, Chinggis Khaan Square
  • open gullys/missing manholes
  • street kids
  • packs of dogs
  • smoking
  • the sixth-floor souvenir shop at the State Department Store (though perhaps seasonal)
  • oversized sunglasses for women that were so popular across Asia (?) some years ago
  • Nescafé (see above on coffee culture)

What will appear in the future

  • navigation systems
  • wheelchair accessibility
  • bike lanes
  • new airport (apparently)
  • subway (really, I wish they had selected light rail instead)
  • Harley-Davidson
  • urban renewal and historical restorations embracing district north of government house (National University of Mongolia, German embassy, etc.)
  • road signs in the countryside (and not just the very random, very occasional ones that can be found now)
  • street names and signs in the city
  • network of cross-country riding trails (though not in central Ulaanbaatar)
  • parking (meters)
  • Combined Heat and Power Plant #5 (yeah, right!)
  • hipsters discovering УАЗ (minivan and jeep)
  • Canada Goose, Arc’teryx.

What will disappear in the near future

I’m going out on a predictive limb here… 2-3 years is what I mean by “near future”.

  • stray dogs
  • stretched-out hand to signal for a car ride
  • that awkward extra half-step on most stairs
  • whitening make-up.

What will disappear in the medium-term future

I mean around 7 years or so.

  • new (to Mongolia) cars that are right-hand drive
  • the neo-classical Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, with its Stalinist (if that’s an architectural style) spire
  • deels in the city
  • some of the downtown university campuses
  • buildings of 4 floors or less in the urban core
  • Russian minivans (УАЗ452) but see above.
Posted in Change, Curios, Social Change, Ulaanbaatar | Tagged | Leave a comment

Learning about Development Policy in Uvs Aimag

Posted on December 15, 2015 by JDierkes

I just visited Uvs province in Western Mongolia for the first time and had the chance to meet with stakeholder representatives from government, civil society, small businesses, and the corporate sector to learn about their development policy.

One of the aspects that makes Uvs interesting is that the mining industry is merely beginning to be considered for diversification beyond agriculture, especially the famous, nutritious and delicious seabuckthorn. Generally, Uvs seems to be doing fairly well economically on the basis of its agricultural sector.

Seabuckthorn field from above near Ulaangom, #Mongolia A photo posted by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes) on

Hopes for mining development are focused on coal, gold, iron ore, oil, rare earths, and salt. A significant number of exploration licenses have been granted recently (75% of applications are being granted, 190 exploration licenses, 48 “A” licenses issued, ) and exploration at a number of projects appear to be underway. The development of a mining industry is seen as a main pillar for overall economic development.

It is clear that at some point as these projects rev up and might lead to production of some kind, demands for regulatory and inspection frameworks on the aimag government will increase significantly.

Fear the Ninja

The element that makes mining regulation a central concern for the administration as well as civil society is the arrival of artisanal and small-scale miners in Uvs, primarily prospecting for gold on the border with Khovd aimag. It’s not that the presence of ninja miners is entirely new, but the suspicion in the population towards ninja mining has grown significantly to be quite hostile now. And that even though many of the ninja miners appear to be local and not migrant miners from other regions as had been the case in several previous round of gold rushes throughout Mongolia.

Even though a number of the ninja projects have been formalized under the recent legislation that allows cooperatives of ninja miners to formalize mining rights, the administration is quite wary of ninja mining as it is an ongoing process rather than a finite business. With formal and mechanized mining, there comes a point in the project when it is finished. In contrast, at least in the view of stakeholders in Uvs ninja miners will abandon a location, but others will then move in to continue mining there leading to continuous and messy (in the absence of any rehabilitation) sites.

Related to this challenge is the observation that others across Mongolia have also made, that projects that are purportedly rehabilitating mining sites are really actually engaged in additional mining.

The fear of the impact of ninja mining leads to some of the sense of urgency in addressing mining regulation in Uvs where a formal mining industry of a significant scale is merely on the horizon

Desperate for information and education

The clearest message from all stakeholder representatives regarding needs in addressing mining was that information and education of all involved is most urgently needed. All discussions agreed that citizens at the local level have almost no understanding of the mining industry and of the impacts as well as the benefits that development might bring.

Basic introductions to industrial mining as well as a deeper understanding of the life cycle of a mining project (including the ebb and flow of investments, construction activities, employment, profits, (planning for closure) is needed at all levels in Uvs, from herders in the countryside to civil society centred on the aimag capital, Ulaangom, to local state authorities and inspectors, and the aimag administration. By all accounts, this need precedes all further technical education that is also deemed necessary particularly for the various inspectors.

In discussions of the optimal way to deliver such knowledge and training, many civil society representatives emphasized the need for in-person training, ideally by going from ail to ail on the basis of written materials that can then be explained by trainers. There are also some possibilities to target younger audiences through social media.

It was surprising to hear that there currently does not appear to be any organized environmental movement/NGO in Uvs.

Mine rehabilitation a recurring challenge

Another strong message was that mine closure is one of the most difficult topics for officials as well as residents to grapple with. It is unclear to most residents what exactly successful rehabilitation might look like and the financial tools that would make this possible also remain very murky. This even though mine closure is a topic that has been addressed by several development projects, including some targeting of Uvs. A very interesting suggestion from a civil society representative was the notion of involving herders in reclamation projects.

Transparency

Concerns about transparency of licensing and mining operations also centred on a lack of education. Without a deeper understanding of the workings of a mining industry, civil society representatives mentioned that attempts to press government officials for information have almost inevitably been blocked in part because the lack of precision in questions, and a lack of understanding of parts of government officials why transparency is an element in more inclusive and sustainable development. Civil society and business representatives in particular lamented the lack of willingness to provide information on the part of provincial and local officials.

Thanks to Oyun-Erdene Ch. and Damdinnyam G. for sharing their impressions of our visit.

An Aside: Social Media

You know that the world is run by social media when you notice that the middle-aged ladies representing civil society in a far western province of Mongolia are checking Twitter during the coffee break! I wonder if any of them follow me or if I follow them.

Posted in CIRDI, Civil Society, Countryside, Development, Mining, Policy, Policy, Regulation, Social Issues, Social Movements, Water | Tagged | 2 Comments

Contract transparency in Mongolian Mining

Posted on December 11, 2015 by JDierkes

 Unbundling contract transparency in the extractive industry: the case of Mongolia – Part I

Contract transparency is crucial in ensuring deals in the extractive industry deliver better outcomes for the host nation and community. Civil society has long campaigned for contract transparency in ‘first and third world’ traditional mining countries. Except Australia, however, contracts are not common in ‘first world’ mining countries. Instead, we find in these countries a mature licensing system embedded in a well-developed legal system.

History of Contracts in Mongolia

Contracts in the extractive industry are often a highly contested political issue in emerging mining countries like Mongolia. Here, contracts with project proponents are a preferred way to grant mineral rights—particularly for large-scale projects. The Mongolian government has established many contracts with mineral resource developers since the country adopted a market-based economy in 1990. Product-sharing agreements between the Government of Mongolia and Soco Tamsag Mongol, a USA-registered oil company, in the early 1990s and a Stability Agreement with Boroo Gold LLC, a subsidiary of Canadian registered Centerra Gold LLC in the late 1990s were among the earliest contracts. By 2015, the Government of Mongolia has established two Investment Agreements, four Stability Agreements, 24 Product Sharing Agreements, and three Concession Agreements. The number of local level agreements between local governments and project proponents is not known. Moreover, the Government of Mongolia has developed model templates for establishing Product Sharing Agreement and Concession Agreement.

Stability Agreements established since 1998 were not disclosed until public discontent mounted due to some unfavourable contract terms. Three of them are available online. However, this type of contract was replaced by Investment Agreements under the Investment Law of Mongolia in 2013.

The Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement established in 2009 is available online. The Investment Agreements that Mongolian Gold or MAK LLC established with the Government of Mongolia in October 2015 are not publicly disclosed though it has been widely discussed in the media and parliament.

Under the Law on Concession enacted in 2010, several infrastructure concession contracts such as a concession agreement for the Erdenet-to-Ovoot railway with Northern Railways, a Mongolian subsidiary Australia-based Aspire Mining have been published online by government.

Full documents of Product Sharing Agreements of oil companies are not available in Mongolia. Surprisingly, the Open Oil, an international repository of oil contracts, contains three Product Sharing Contracts established in Mongolia.

Most local level agreements (as discussed in my recent GOXI post) are not publicly disclosed yet.

Discourse on Contracts in General

Contract transparency narratives in Mongolia are about these concrete agreements and potential agreements in the future such as a long-waited Tavan Tolgoi Investment Agreement. Surprisingly, the narratives are overgeneralized. Contracts in the extractive industry are often bundled as a general term that contains different types of contracts and agreement but the very nature and specifics of each type of contracts and corresponding financial and political significance for the country are not made clear. This approach to contract transparency seems common in other countries and international policy documents, except a focus on oil contracts.

A goal of contract transparency initiatives is to publicly disclose all contracts and agreements, especially through mandatory legal requirements. This goal has been achieved in very few countries. In many countries, contract transparency initiatives have often hit a brick wall of arguments for maintaining commercially sensitive information of investors and companies. Unless there is significant societal demand expressed through broad-based political and social discontent, the disclosure of contracts—particularly large-scale projects—has rarely been encouraged by governments and companies. Often such a ‘singled out’ discontent and discussion have led to better access to information and more disclosure of contracts. Similarly, discussions that single out a type of contract such as Product Sharing Agreements and Local Level Agreements or unbundle the general narrative of contract transparency may deliver better net results.

Posted in Corruption, International Agreements, Mining, Oyu Tolgoi, Social Movements | Tagged | 3 Comments

Methodology as a Methodology

Posted on December 10, 2015 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

As exhausting as all-day meetings with stakeholders can be (with a bit of jetlag, multiple languages and instant coffee thrown into the mix), I am always fascinated by how individuals present themselves, what they are looking for, and how questions and desires are framed, particularly regarding the terminology that is used.

With long stretches of untranslated Mongolian discussion that forces me to listen very carefully (as long as I am able to concentrate), I often notice many aspects of Mongolian social relations and am fascinated by these opportunities.

During recent Ulaangom meetings I noticed in particular how often the word “methodology” is used by Mongolians (арга зуй). In my experience, methodology is a word that is very rarely used outside of academic circles and universities in Canada. Why is it so common in Mongolian discussions?

Obviously I am delving into the realm of speculation here, but I hope I can stay clear of the stereotyping I often associate with discussions of “mentality” (Mongolian word for national identity or culture, worth a discussion in its own right).

It does seem to me, however, that the focus on methodology is rooted in a desire for scientific approaches with precise and definite answers that certainly was a strong element in theoretical socialism, but also in state-planning, as fake as this precision may often have been. The desire to know about a methodology might also reflect a concern about policy that may or may not be rooted in a methodology.

Of course, if the hunch that the frequent use of “methodology” is rooted in socialist discourse, it might also imply the expectation of guidance “from above” and the general respect that policy-makers of all kinds certainly command in the countryside.

No “best practice” on offer here

Stakeholder representatives are thus not at all shy about asking for instruction in a way that many audiences or interlocutors in Canada and elsewhere might be. A Canadian audience or stakeholder might be much more insistent on the process that leads to decisions whereas Mongolians are often keen on results and instructions, as long as the process by which these results are obtained is a scientific or trustworthy one.

When it comes to mining policy, this is an expectation that doesn’t match Canadian practices well. In discussions of the mining industry, we often emphasize that Canadian experiences don’t necessarily offer solutions to Mongolian challenges. This response and attitude is rooted in recognition that much has gone wrong in mining policy over many years in Canada and continues to go wrong, while some other aspects may be counted as successes. Even projects that seem to be successful by whatever yardstick they are measured don’t necessarily offer clear implications for other projects. This way of thinking regards notions of “best practice” as hubris and instead tries to offer suggestions on policy directions to avoid and some discussion of “good practice”, but always in a context that requires adaptation for local conditions, needs, and processes.

Implications for Understanding Rio Tinto Operations?

A topic that has been an almost continuous source of puzzles for me over the years has been the nature in which Rio Tinto/Oyu Tolgoi and before them Ivanhoe Mines has operated in Mongolia. It has always struck me, and most discussions have confirmed this, though some Oyu Tolgoi interlocutors have claimed otherwise, that OT is essentially run by a spreadsheet that Rio Tinto sees equally applicable to mining projects all over the world. That spreadsheet does not seem to have a lot of columns – if any – for local context, local needs, and local politics at the very local as well as the national Mongolian level. While I am generally critical of this perspective for increasing the risks of a loss of social license for a project that is so central to Mongolia’s development, I have also wondered whether this is actually not a reasonable way to run a multi-decade project on this skale. The operation-by-spreadsheet suggests a perception of local politics as “noise”, i.e. variability that cannot be controlled or addressed in an effective manner. My observations of the politics of Mongolian policy-making would actually agree with elements of such a perspective. Still, I cannot help but feel that a more concerted effort at adapting a project to local circumstances would solidify social license.

The above discussion of “methodology” now has me wondering whether the focus on some scientific precision that I think is implied in this word, is not actually well-suited to an operation-by-spreadsheet approach.

Unfortunately, as is the case for most musings about mentality, prevailing patterns of responses to questions, etc., these are questions that are very difficult to address when they involve highly complex humans and social interactions. Such questions face huge methodological hurdles to social scientists and the depth of data available for Mongolia doesn’t really make specific answers possible.

Posted in CIRDI, Countryside, Curios, Social Issues, Society and Culture | Tagged | 1 Comment

Guest Post: Mongolia 2016 – Will there be light at the end of the tunnel?

Posted on December 8, 2015 by JDierkes

By Stefan Hanselmann

If the development of the last quarter of 2015 can serve as an indicator, we can eventually expect for next year some real light at the end of the tunnel. Unfortunately, Mongolia had to learn the hard way that trust and a good reputation within the public domain is hard earned but easily lost. Whether it is Mongolian citizens or international investors – in the end both were equally disenchanted and somewhat at a loss over the question why Mongolian politicians found it so hard to rally for the common cause of keeping Mongolia´s investment story alive.

Improved economic outlook

Chances are good that 2016 will be a turning point. For one, there is the recovery of the inter­na­tional copper market. Projections for 2016 done by the International Copper Study Group indicate that the market should see a small deficit of around 130,000 metric tons as demand growth outpaces production growth. This reflects changes in market conditions over the course of 2015. After all, global production cuts are starting to turn the table in favor of the supply side. Secondly, Rio Tinto announced in December 2015 that it could secure the financing for the development of its underground mine. Although the effect on the Mongolian economy won´t be immediate and certainly not as staggering as the years 2010 to 2012, the US$2.5b USD that will be invested in the country from 2016 onwards will stabilize the economy, ease tensions on the labor market and create additional employment not only with the Oyu Tolgoi company, but also with domestic suppliers of goods and services. Projections for the labor market estimate that by 2018 at least 40,000 additional technical staff will be required in Mongolia’s mineral resource sector and in the upstream and downstream industries, particularly in electrical, construction, and mechanical occupations. However, the training market is currently unable to satisfy this need – neither in terms of quality nor quantity. Given all the construction and industrial projects the government plans to implement, it will be of utmost importance to have Mongolian experts engineer the projects and operate the machines. But creating value within the country starts with a proper education of future generations.

As some of the urgently needed foreign direct investment will return to the country, 2016 will see an improved balance of payment situation. With disputes over seized licenses settled and new exploration licenses issued, the government will continue to send a strong message that it is open for business. The inflow of foreign capital will also help to prop up the Mongolian currency, so that the Central Bank can ease its interventions on the currency market in order to keep the Mongolian Tugrik below the politically and psychologically important rate of 2000 MNT to the US Dollar.

Economic diversification

The government will continue to pay close attention to the diversification of the Mongolian economy and improved competitiveness of the agricultural and meat sector. More agreements with additional meat processing plants in export markets such as Russia and China can be expected. This will help to promote private investment for agriculture and the dairy and meat industry. More importantly, it will help to expand and diversify the labor market that, like the economy as a whole, overly depends on the mining industry. In this regard it will be also very interesting so see if and how the Chinese “New Silk Road Initiative” will be incorporated into the Mongolian economic diversification strategy. And of course, which economic potential can be unlocked in Mongolia´s western region once the new road connecting Mongolia´s Bayan Ulgii and Hovd aimags with Urumqui in China and Bysk in Russia will be completed.

Political change is looming – once again

So, will everything be good next year? Like so often in Mongolia, the answer will wholly depend on the political process which will once again be shaped by parliamentary elections in June 2016. Much is at stake for the established political parties. Having seen 13 governments come and go within 23 years, the electorate is acutely aware of the need for political stability. So are foreign investors. The next government will be once again a coalition, hopefully born from a true spirit of national unity. The people of Mongolia deserve it, the country needs it.

About Stefan Hanselmann

Dr. Hanselmann is director of the German development assistance program Integrated Mineral Resource Initiative. The program advises on sustainable social and economic development on a national as well as regional level. He works in Ulaanbaatar since 2008. His special areas of interest are development of resource-driven economies and regional economic integration.

Posted in Bilateral Aid, Business, Development, Diversification, Economics, Foreign Investment, Ikh Khural 2016, Inflation, Mining, Oyu Tolgoi, Policy, Politics, Stefan Hanselmann | Leave a comment

EITI in Mongolia at the Tipping Point

Posted on November 26, 2015 by mendee

The EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative) is no longer a stranger in the Mongolian resource governance discourses as witnessed at the First National Forum and 5th National Corporate Social Responsibility Forum, both organized in November, 2015.  The debate now focuses on how legalize this international initiative (a norm) and how to make it simpler, useful for media and general public.

A tiny office, funded by the EITI, has made substantial contribution to localizing the initiative with enthusiastic support from the Ministry of Mining and more importantly, a numerous mining-focused civil society organizations along their funders like the Open Society Forum and Natural Resource Governance Institute.

The national council, chaired by the Prime Minister, was established, the memorandum of understanding with government, private, and civil society organizations was concluded, and the standard operating procedures for the national council, local council, and secretariat were developed.  The EITI is now reflected in the State Policy in Mineral Resource Sector until 2025 and other executive directives. The secretariat of 3 staff coordinates with the Prime Minister’s Office, government agencies, provincial authorities, mining companies, and about 30 non-governmental organizations (i.e., Publish What You Pay network, Civil Council of Natural Environment).  The other important task of the EITI is the data collected and validated by the independent auditor for discrepancies from 2006.  By 2015, about 1800 companies provided their data for the public usage.  From this perspective, it might be safe to conclude that the EITI norm for transparency has arrived at the tipping point to become a local norm.  However, there are numerous challenges remain for passing the tipping point.

First, the EITI lacked support from the parliament and senior bureaucrats in the government. Despite the endorsement letter and ceremonial type of appearing of Prime Minister’s senior advisor, who are the secretary of the National Council and Mining Minister, the EITI has lacked a strong political will and support from the parliament, especially those members in favor of responsible, transparent mining.  Even though the bill on extractive industry transparency submitted to the parliament, the working group has not even submitted to the respective standing committee.  The main debate at the working is whether to keep EITI as a voluntary standard or mandatory one.  Given the political upheaval and upcoming elections, it is unlikely that MPs devote their efforts and resource to the EITI bill.

Second challenge is what would happen if the international funding from the World Bank, Open Society Forum, and limited funds from the government stops.  This is the most critical challenge for localizing the EITI.  Unless the government somehow finds ways to fund the EITI and its secretariat (or some other forms), the EITI would lose the momentum and remain only on the paper.

Despite these pessimistic observations, some companies, especially Western or Western-oriented Mongolian companies look at the EITI as a tool to increase their credibility in terms of responsible, transparent mining companies.  In the similar line, the Ministry of Mining and some government officials also understand its benefits of positive signalling to foreign investors and domestic audiences.  Once the Ministry of Mining and mining associations endorses this initiative, Chinese, Russian-Mongolian joint, and Mongolian state-owned enterprises submit their reports regularly, if not enthusiastically.  And, importantly, civil society actors and interested public now begin to ask how to use this new tool effectively.  Of course, this puzzle is not only occurring in Mongolia, but in all states joined in the international initiative.

 

 

Posted in Corruption, EITI, Mining, Mining Governance, Politics, Social Issues | Tagged | Leave a comment

UN Human Rights Council

Posted on November 19, 2015 by JDierkes

I recently wrote about President Elbegdorj’s address to the UN General Assembly this September and his statement that he is seeking UN recognition for Mongolia’s status as “permanently neutral”. Elbegdorj ended this speech with a call for support from other UN members for Mongolia’s candidature for membership in the UN Human Rights Council.

On Oct 28 172 (of 192) UN members voted Mongolia onto the Human Rights Council with the highest number of votes for any candidate in the Asia/Pacific region where the election was actually competitive with seven countries vying for five spots.

There are two aspects that make this interesting: a) what does election onto the HRC mean for Mongolia’s foreign relations?, b) what does this mean in terms of Mongolia’s human rights record and substantive engagement with a human rights agenda?

Mongolia’s Foreign Policy and the UN

I argued that the claim for “permanent neutrality” was a natural outgrowth of Mongolia’s overall foreign policy, particularly the Third Neighbour Policy.

[Perhaps I should start referring to the Third Neigbour Policy as “3NP” since I write about it fairly regularly. That offers the possibility of establishing #3NP as a more specific hashtag alternative to the generic #MGLfp.]

Likewise, election to the human rights council is a measure of the success of Mongolia’s attempt to engage the rest of the world beyond Third Neigbours and specifically to engage the UN.

Leaving aside speculation about Elbegdorj’s post-presidential-retirement planning and whether that may involve a UN position, the UN has been a focus of various Mongolian initiatives.

  • UN peacekeeping: According to UN Statistics, there are currently (30 Sept 2015) 933 troops and 14 military experts from Mongolia involved in peace-keeping operations. That puts Mongolia ahead of populous countries like France (866 troops) or Japan (272 troops)
  • UNEP: Mongolian MP S Oyun serves as the president of the UN Environment Assembly, and Mongolia hosted World Environment Day in 2013
  • Security Council acceptance of Mongolia’s status as a nuclear-free power
  • I recently had a chance to learn more about the International Think Tank for Landlocked Developing Countries which is being established in Ulaanbaatar

What does Mongolia gain from all of these activities? Most significantly, a prominence in international affairs that belies Mongolia’s population or economic significance.

Does that prominence translate into material benefits? Possibly. Mongolia, after all, has been the recipient of generous donor activities by various development programmes. But the 3NP is ultimately meant to balance the somewhat overbearing influence that Mongolia’s two neighbours have or might chose to exercise more directly at some point.

In this area, I would note that election to the Human Rights Council is a milestone for the 3NP and for Mongolian visibility on the world stage.

This election is also a stepping stone to a successful run for membership in the UN Security Council for 2022 as mentioned in Elbegdorj’s address to the UN General Assembly in 2014.

Human Rights in Mongolia

The question of the human rights situation in Mongolia is a difficult one. There are two aspects to this question: a) what has Mongolia committed to (in part in the context of its HRC candidacy), b) what is the actual situation.

Commitments

Mongolia’s commitments have been detailed in its statement ahead of the HRC election. This lists various conventions that Mongolia has signed up for (too numerous to list here, particularly since I lack the UNology background to be able to say much about the relative significance of these), but also includes action items derived from the human rights report. These recommendations appear on p. 4 of the document and include:

1. Abolition of the death penalty;
2. Measures against torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment;
3. Protection of the rights and interests of vulnerable groups, including children, women, the elderly and persons with disabilities;
4. Increasing women’s participation at the decision-making level;
5. Combating domestic violence;
6. Protection of the rights of the child;
7. Combating human trafficking;
8. Ensuring full respect of the right to freedom of expression;
9. Accession to international treaties and reflecting them in domestic legislation, and the improving of reporting on the implementation of those treaties;
10. Strengthening the mandate of the National Human Rights Commission;
11. Organizing trainings on the application of international human rights treaties, and others.

Voluntary pledges and commitments (pp. 5-6) include:

International

  • principles of non-selectivity, universality and indivisibility of human rights
  • continued support the United Nations High Commissioner for
  • strive to promote non-discrimination, gender equality and women’s empowerment and the rights
    of persons with disabilities, combat violence against women and children, fight human trafficking in all its forms,
    protect freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of religion and belief, and freedom of assembly and association, and promote the protection of human rights defenders.
  • consider ratifying the Kampala Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and consider making a declaration under article 22 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. It will also consider accession to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.
  • support international efforts towards the elaboration of a legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.

National

  • pursue the comprehensive implementation of its international obligations on human rights and enhance the promotion and protection of human rights at the national level through expanded collaboration with all stakeholders.
  • ongoing legal reform covers an extensive list of rights to justice and due process of law, including the rights of suspects, accused, defendants, advocates, victims and witnesses.
  • strengthen its ongoing efforts to promote human rights education, gender equality and the empowerment of women, including in rural areas, implement measures to ensure the protection of the rights of the child, of the elderly and of people with disabilities and to address violence and discrimination against women, and intensify its fight against trafficking in persons and its prevention.
  • will implement measures directed at protecting the rights of nomadic people with regard to the use of land and traditional natural resources and at ensuring a conducive legal framework for the protection of human rights defenders.
  • values people’s participation as a key element of human rights and democracy and to this end, if elected, will work closely with national civil society organizations in relation to its deliberations as a member of the Council.

[My selection of total number of commitments listed.]

As one might expect in a candidate’s statement, the rhetoric is flowery and dripping with aspirations, “Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, justice and equality are at the heart of all policies pursued by the Government of Mongolia.” (p. 7)

Actual Situation

The two areas where questions about the human rights situation in Mongolia are raised most commonly are a) arbitrary detention and violence in policy custody and prisons, and b) the alleged existence of North Korean labour camps.

For both of these topics, I have found it very difficult to find concrete evidence over the years.

To most Mongolians, it does seem very plausible that detention can be somewhat arbitrary and possibly at the behest of a powerful person. There do seem to be a number of cases that many people interpret as a form of political harassment where the Anti-Corruption Agency in particular seems to be instrumentalized through its investigative powers. That would be arbitrary detention in the case of relatively prominent, visible victims.

When it comes to more anonymous “regular” Mongolians, the allegations of arbitrary detention and some violence also seem plausible. This is an area where I’ve been asked to offer an expert opinion in various asylum procedures in North America and Europe. Some of these claims centre on the asylum applicant’s conflict with some powerful person who is then able to mobilize the police to harass the claimant. This, as well, seems entirely plausible, though I am never able to speak to the specifics of a case, more to the general plausibility.

Arbitrary detention is thus a regular entry in international human rights reports, such as those by Amnesty International.

The second issue that keeps being mentioned and that I also receive somewhat regular questions about by journalists is the alleged existence of labour camps filled with North Korean forced labour. The plausibility of this allegation rests on the historically close links between North Korea and Mongolia that are rooted in the Korean War and the safe-keeping of a large number of Korean children in Mongolia during this time. A situation where the North Korean government proposes the contract employment of North Koreans in significant numbers, presumably in construction, is thus entirely imaginable, and the assertion that a number of these North Koreans may be forced into this role, is also plausible. This allegation appears to be rooted in a 2008 Human Rights Watch report. As far as I can tell, this allegation has been recycled/resurrected periodically by journalists. I am not aware of more concrete evidence for this situation.

Other human rights issues that are mentioned periodically are violence against women, some ethnic groups (most frequently, ethnic Chinese), and LGBT discrimination. Again, when these are mentioned as potential problems, there is a certain face validity to that, but allegations of actual cases of abuses remain unsubstantiated to my knowledge.

In discussions of these allegations there are always international and domestic perspectives. Internally, some Mongolians get quite frustrated with the flowery rhetoric of human rights and democracy from their government when they are also aware of violations or at least overly flexible interpretations of some laws. But when comparing Mongolia to many other countries in the world, the extent and nature of abuses seems somewhat reduced in significance. In the case of the UN HRC it is very clear that there are and have been MANY members of the Council that have significantly worse human rights records than Mongolia does, so I would certainly not for a moment suggest to question the legitimacy of Mongolia’s participation in this UN forum.

Posted in Human Rights, International Relations, Mongolia and ..., UN | Tagged | Leave a comment

Thoughts on Constitutional Reform

Posted on November 11, 2015 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

I am not a constitutional scholar. My observations on the constitutional reform proposals that are being considered by the Mongolian parliament are thus based on my understanding of Mongolian politics on the one hand, and my experience of living as an informed and engaged citizen under different constitutional regimes (parliamentary democracies of sorts Germany, Japan, UK, Canada; presidential democracy U.S.).

Reforms in Principle

I do think there is a good case for pursuing reforms in Mongolia. That case rests primarily on the observation that the hybrid presidential-parliamentary system continues to raise practical challenges for Mongolian politics, and that successive prime ministers have felt somewhat hamstrung by competing for power with presidents, but also by not having full control over their cabinet, even when they are backed by solid majorities.

25 years after the establishment of democracy and 23 years after the promulgation of the constitution seems like a fine moment to review provisions in the constitution that do need a review and a reconfiguration of the system to rebalance the powers of the president and prime ministers.

On the other hand, it is also important to remember that constitutions everywhere have been framed to make them durable and to make constitutional changes very rare. The basic structure of the U.S. constitution has thus been in place for over 220 years and has only been changed in some details (though of course it, like many other constitutions, has been reinterpreted during this history).

While some of the proposals that are circulating now in Mongolia are rooted in long-standing questions about the overall balance of power, other proposals seem more recent in nature and I would be concerned about a process that seems potentially hasty as it may be unfolding now.

On the positive side, the proposals do not seem to have a specific partisan slant to them, i.e. they do not seem to be designed to expressly benefit one party over another. Yes, the MPP may be more likely to emerge from the parliamentary elections in 2016 as a winner and thus the next MPP PM might benefit from the proposed changes, but there does not seem to be anything in these proposals that benefits the MPP or any other party permanently.

Size of Parliament and the “Double Deel”

Some of the challenges that some Mongolian observers associate with the constitution are not obvious to me as a foreign observer. The simmering “double deel” debate is one of those elements. In Canada and Germany, for example, all ministers wear the double mantle of being members of parliament and serving in cabinet. Yes, the relatively small number of parliamentarians in the Mongolian State Great Khural does pose some challenges, but is not far from the numbers one would find in state legislatures of more populous countries. Here, in the Canadian province of British Columbia, for example, a population of 4.6mio is represented by 85 MLAs (Members of the Legislative Assembly), and cabinet includes 21 members, all of whom are MLAs. With a roughly comparable population, that is a comparable number of members of parliament, and a significantly larger number of members of cabinet compared to Mongolia. This has not led to questions about parliamentary accountability or the manageability of cabinet.

In Germany, the state of Schleswig-Holstein with 2.8mio is closest in population to Mongolia. The Landtag in Schleswig Holstein has 69 members. Including the premier, the cabinet has 8 members, all of whom are members of parliament.

Yes, clearly a provincial or state legislature does not have some tasks and powers that a nation does (defense and foreign affairs, most notably), but Canadian and German federalism means that provinces and Bundesländer do have significant powers, so the comparison seems at least informative.

Election of the President

In my interpretation of the proposal for an election of the Mongolian president, this looks similar to the German Bundespräsident as s/he is elected by the Bundesversammlung. That federal assembly is only called for the election of the president. It is composed half by members of the federal parliament and half by elected members of state legislatures. Why? Because this is yet another important element in a federal structure that safeguards regional rights. Other prominent elements in this federalism are the balance of power between parliament (Bundestag) and the federal council (Bundesrat) that includes the state premiers, and certain areas of policy-making that are expressly left to the states’ decision-making, like education. This federalism is rooted in a desire for regional balance, but also for checks and balances against national power that results from Germany’s historical constitutional experience.

By contrast, Mongolia is not a federal state, but fairly centralized with a state-socialist heritage that is also more unitary than federalist. There are few areas of policy-making that are expressly assigned to the aimags, though recent initiatives are devolving more decision-making power to the aimags. The exception to this general pattern could be the rights accorded to Kazakhs in particular, as they dominate the population of Bayan-Olgii.

An assembly to elect the Mongolian president that would include representatives of aimag khurals would thus be a step toward federalism without a clear argument (that I am aware of) for why this step should be taken.

By contrast, the proposal to have aimag governors nominated by the prime minister rather than letting aimag khurals elect their governor is a weakening of the regions.

Countries that are similar to Mongolia with its 21 aimags include Japan with its 47 prefectures and France with its 96 départements in France propoer. But the 知事 in Japan is directly elected as a governor of a prefecture. The French department is presided over by departmental councils that elect a president. While the French and Japanese administrative units might thus seem closer to an aimag than a German state or a Canadian province, they are governed by directly or indirectly elected officials.

Strengthen the regions in the election of a president, but weaken them in their day-to-day decision-making? Why?

Also note that many German citizens would be hard pressed to explain the nature and composition of the Bundesversammlung if stopped on the street. While the limited powers of the German president mean that democratic legitimacy may not be at a premium, why create an election that is difficult to understand for Mongolians when they previously were able to elect a president directly and in a very clear manner?

Implications of a Symbolic Presidency

Foreign policy is one of the areas where confusion between presidential and parliamentary/prime ministerial powers has been a challenge. It would seem that the proposals under discussion would resolve this challenge by relegating the president to a ceremonial and symbolic role.

In its aims to balance the importance of its two immediate geographic neighbours, Mongolia has long pursued its Third Neighbour Policy. Beyond relations with China and Russia, this policy has been very successful at raising Mongolia’s profile internationally and the country thus plays a more visibly role on the world stage than it might based simply on its population, economic or geostrategic importance. Some of this success is due to the efforts of Mongolia’s presidents. For recent successes at the UN, for example, this has been an era of particular entrepreneurialism by Pres. Elbegdorj and has met with some success.

Even an activist prime minister with foreign policy decision-making power would not be able to replicate that success, I think. A head of state who also holds executive functions is a more likely summit partner than a symbolic president, or a powerful prime minister. [I wonder if there’s any empirical evidence for this, i.e. are prime minister representing parliamentary systems less likely to be invited on state visits than presidents in presidential systems?] By transforming the presidency into a largely ceremonial role and adding powers to the prime minister’s portfolio, the constitutional reforms envisioned might thus be reducing Mongolia’s potential impact and visibility on the international stage.

Posted in Aimags, Constitution, Democracy, Foreign Policy, Governance, JD Democratization, Politics | Tagged | 3 Comments

Constitutional Revision

Posted on November 9, 2015 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

It appears that all of a sudden the push for constitutional revision is alive and becoming more concrete with a multi-party submission of a draft in parliament that appears to have the support of 60% of MPs.

It appears that some of the proponents are hoping to organize a referendum (based on proposed revisions to the law on referenda) on changes to the constitution in time to be able to make these changes before the six-month deadline for the election law, as well as a provision in the constitution that changes have to be enacted at least six months before the next election.

Below is my quick summary of proposals for constitutional change based on the parliamentary draft as summarized by news website ikon.mn.

  1. 1/3 of the members of cabinet can be “double deel”, i.e. MPs and serve in cabinet
  2. president to be elected by a combined vote of heads of provincial assemblies (amaig khural) and parliament members. This appears to be similar to the German Bundesversammlung that elects the (largely ceremonial) federal president (who just visited Mongolia recently).
  3. The government is made up of nine ministries: finance, interior & justice, foreign affairs, nature & development, defense, education, health & social development, agriculture, and infrastructure.
  4. The prime minister can name an additional three ministers without portfolio to cabinet.
  5. The prime minister would name cabinet, but ministers would not be subject to parliamentary approval.
  6. Darkhan and Erdenet would be given special status as cities different from aimags.
  7. The State Great Khural would be expanded to 99 members from the current 76.
  8. The State Great Khural would serve for five years (rather than the current four).

There are additional specifics in the parliamentary draft pertaining to the PM’s involvement in appointing judges and the state attorneys, and the governors of aimags and soums.

Comments

These proposals appear to address some of the long-standing challenges built into Mongolian democracy, especially the unclear status of presidential vs parliamentary power, and would turn Mongolia into more of a parliamentary democracy, rather than keeping elements of a presidential system.

That clarification would most likely be useful and productive. The president would be reduced to a largely symbolic role as heads of state have it in Westminster democracies or some continental European versions (such as the Federal Republic of Germany).

Some of the proposals speak to issues that have captivated Mongolian debates, even though it is not always clear to observers why these issues are so important. An example would be the “double deel” concern that has animated political discussions for the past two years.

Other proposals may just take the occasion of constitutional change to also implement an update, for example recognizing the growing role of Darkhan and Erdenet as cities.

These revisions strengthen the prime minister’s position quite significantly and it is not clear to me, for example, why appointment of aimag governors should shift from the aimag assemblies to the prime minister.

Surely, many of these specifics will be debated in parliament in coming weeks.

As the draft has been submitted by a multi-party group of parliamentarians, it seems like it should be taken seriously as an initiative toward constitutional revision.

Also, since Pres. Elbegdorj is on his second and thus final term as president, he has little to loose personally from a reduction of presidential power. Under other scenarios a sitting president might be unlikely to support a shift towards a parliamentary democracy. If the changes were to be enacted as proposed, Elbegdorj, will have been the last powerful president.

Constitutional Revision

The constitution (according to its Chapter 6) can be changed either by a 3/4 majority of all members of parliament (i.e. 57 MPs), or by a 2/3 majority a popular referendum can be initiated. If a majority of eligible Mongolians participates, and a simple majority of those participating approves the changes, these changes are enacted directly (Art. 25).

Comments Please!

This post was written somewhat hastily as I could make sense of some of the drafts with some help, so I’m sure I’ve missed or misunderstood aspects of the proposals and would welcome all information in the comments below!

Posted in Aimags, Constitution, Democracy, Governance, International Relations, JD Democratization, Judiciary, Politics | Tagged | 1 Comment

Countryside Impressions

Posted on November 1, 2015 by JDierkes

On recent visits, I have generally been stuck in Ulaanbaatar. In late October, however, I had the opportunity to travel out to Arvaikheer, the capital of Uvurkhangai and to collect some impressions from this brief foray into the countryside.

https://instagram.com/p/9PRVLPBJin/

As far as I recall, this is also the first longer trip I’ve taken by car into the countryside outside of the summer months other than a mine site visit some two hours out of Ulaanbaatar.

As is the case with my recent Ulaanbaatar impressions (Sept 2015 | May 2015 | Nov 2014 | May 2014 |Nov 2013), this post is quite impressionistic and not an attempt at a deeper analysis, rather a record of things I noticed.

Roads and Traffic

The expansion of the network of paved roads throughout the country is almost as astonishing as the number of intact sidewalks in central Ulaanbaatar these days. However, the road to Arvaikheer has been in good shape for some time, I recall driving along this way in 2009 already.

Roads in the countryside still offer many surprises. My favourite are the seemingly somewhat random signs that appear in odd spots, like no passing signs after many kilometers of no such signs. Sometimes these signs seem similar to some of the new intersections in Ulaanbaatar (for example Seoul St/PM Tserendorj St), i.e. the overactive graduating thesis of a traffic engineer.

Cars in the countryside can be divided into three broad types:

  • minivans and minibusses (most common: the large Hi-Ace models, old Russian minivans (Purgon), and some Delica)
  • SUVs (large Landcrusiers still dominate the Mongolian landscape, though there seem to be more Mercedes G-Wagen these days; curiously, Range Rovers are quite visible in the city, but don’t seem to venture into the countryside, perhaps because of their reputation of being too high-strung for Mongolian reality)
  • various sedans: Hyundai accents are still quite common in the countryside, though they seem to have been replaced by Prius’ in the city as the most common model

SUVs are always passing the other types at high speeds.

The other category of traffic is motorcycles. Mongolians living in the countryside really must have thick (facial) skin for motorcycle riding. They are often bundled up with their entire body and hands, but the cheeks typically remain bare. Yes, motorcycles are exactly flying along at 100+ km/h, but still in temperatures near zero, my face gets quite cold even on my bicycle.

Somewhat surprisingly, there seems to be a boom in gas station construction. While my sense on previous trips had been that there were just about enough gas stations to make it possible for everyone to drive from one population centre to the next (aimag or soum centre), now there seem to be many more gas stations, many of them newly constructed. Clearly, there are more cars in the countryside now, but still, why so many gas stations and often in clusters?

Another area where obedience of traffic laws has increased, is that Mongolians seemingly don’t seem to try to avoid the toll booths any more by going off-road just before the booth and getting back onto the road just after. Perhaps this is only the case for the Ulaanbaatar-Arvaikheer route, but still.

Animals

The contrast with summer drives to/through the countryside was clear in that there were far fewer goats/sheep herds close to the road and many more horses. Some of that is probably the particular route I took (Uvurkhangai being famous for its race horses, of course), but most likely this is because smaller animals are kept closer to winter residences which are typically tucked away in the shelter close to Southeastern hillsides that are more protected from Siberian winds. Larger animals, especially horses, roam on their own much more and thus appear in greater numbers close to the road.

If you’ve ever seen vultures by the road in Mongolia, you will recall that they appear to be roughly person-sized. They are huge!

We did also see a sand-coloured fox scurrying through some low brush, as well as some few camels closer to Arvaikheer where the landscape begins to shift to a drier, more brush dominated form already as one approaches the Gobi. We also saw some pigs which are a somewhat rarer sight in Mongolia.

Even after a good number of trips to the countryside, one of the most impressive (i.e., making an impression) “sights” is still the absence of fences. In North America and Europe domesticated animals are closely associated with some method of keeping them in place, typically fences. We are not even supposed to walk our dogs “off-leash”. By contrast, Mongolian domesticated animals roam freely, unencumbered by fencing, and often not terribly bothered by passing cars either.

Arvaikheer

There are a number of aimag capitals that are quite attractive. Uliastay and Tsetserleg come to mind, right away. Both are nestled up against mountains (Tsertserleg) or surrounded by mountains (Uliastay, also quite close to the majestic Otgontenger) and they have nice central town areas.

Arvaikheer, the capital of Uvurkhangai is not situated in a particularly pretty spot. Most Mongolian towns are situated in spots where there was a monastery at some point, though many of those were destroyed in the 1930s of course, so that the reason for a location in particular spots is not always apparent. Arvaikheer has some small hills behind it and does look out over a vast valley, a location that many monasteries also favour.

It was home to a Soviet military base, and a Mongolian base is still located close by. That base in turn is somewhat famous for its giant analog calendar. On a reasonably high hill next to one part of the base, near the top, white rocks are assembled to read out today’s date. It is very visible and quite impressive a sight from the road. If you’re wondering who “sets” that calendar, I wondered the same thing some years ago and was told that it is army recruits who climb up at dawn everyday to change the date.

[I digress, but… Military hazing that is also the subject of the recent Mongolian movie “Top Secret” (Маш нууц). It chronicles an incident in Darkhan in the 1970s that most Mongolians seem to “know” about while it remains undocumented where army recruits took over a base after battles between different cohorts of recruits (military service at the time was mandatory for 3 years), and the army ultimately had to intervene. Good film! And, coincidentally, the actor who played the general in the movie was on my flight ULN-INC)]

The other main attraction to Arvaikheer is the horse shrine/monument nearby that is a tribute to Uvurkhangai’s reputation for race horse breeding and some of those horses.

https://instagram.com/p/9GnEP3BJmK/

One much less attractive feature of Arvaikheer is the lack of a central heating plant. It seems that Sukhbaatar (Selenge aimag) is the only aimag capital with such a plant. In Arvaikheer – as in other aimag and soum centres – heat is supplied by neighbourhood heating plants. Apparently, the filtration technology employed at these plants is not even rudimentary.

The fact that Arvaikheer sits on a relatively open spot means that much of this black smoke blows away fairly quickly.

I’m delighted that I am now involved in a project with the Canadian International Resources and Development Institute that probably means that I will have a chance to visit other aimags more regularly as well. The Mongolian countryside really is gorgeous!

Posted in CIRDI, Countryside, Curios, Development | Tagged | Leave a comment

Permanent Neutrality

Posted on October 8, 2015 by JDierkes

At the UN General Assembly, on Sept 29 2015, Pres. Ts Elbegdorj included a very brief statement in his address that,

Mongolia has pursued an peaceful, open, multi-pillar foreign policy. This stance enabled us to declare Mongolia in a state of permanent neutrality. Our national laws and international commitments [?] are consistent with neutrality principles. Therefore I kindly ask your sympathy and support for Mongolia’s peaceful, open, neutral and active foreign policy efforts. I am convinced that Mongolia’s status of permanent neutrality will contribute to the strengthening of peace, security, and development in our region and the world at large.

(http://webtv.un.org/watch/mongolia-general-debate-70th-session/4518058614001 16′:42″ – 17′:23″)

Is Permanent Neutrality a New Star in the Firmament of Mongolian Foreign Policy?

It seems that the discussion of some kind of declared and recognized status as permanently neutral is a new initiative for Mongolian foreign policy, but at the same time, it appears to be a logical extension of the Third Neighbour policy rather than a real departure from this.

In short, permanent neutrality takes one of the main motivations for the Third Neighbour Policy – the desire to balance two overbearing neighbours by turning to virtual neighbours – to a next step by permanently declaring Mongolia to remain in between these two neighbours, not siding with one or the other, and not aligning militarily with any outside party to neutralize any – admittedly somewhat absurd – notion of threats against these neighbours emanating from Mongolia.

It is also partly a defensive maneuver to counter pressure from Russia toward a customs union, and from China toward membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

It is an extension of the Third Neighbour Policy by endearing Mongolia further to virtual neighbours like Canada, India, or Germany by not only enshrining democracy, but also enshrining an underdog status vis-a-vis its neighbours.

Finally, this declaration is aimed at the UN where Mongolia is a candidate for membership in the Human Rights Council and where Pres Elbegdorj may well be hoping for a future field of activities beyond his final term as president.

A Brief Chronology

The notion of Mongolian permanent neutrality seems to have arisen very quickly. Pres Elbegdorj seems to have first mentioned this idea in an editorial published on Sept 8 2015.

Following this public announcement, the National Security Council took this topic up on Sept 9 and charged the president with initiating a bill to parliament that would enshrine neutrality permanently.

Since then the idea has been pushed by the President, but also by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I was thus sent a precis on the notion of neutrality on Sept 10 suggesting that planning for this initiative had preceded the Sept 8 editorial.

So far, this proposal culminated in Pres Elbegdorj’s speech to the UN General Assembly, though it was included toward the end of that speech in an off-hand manner.

What Does Neutrality Mean

Formally, the concept is enshrined in the Hague Convention’s 1907 Sections V (land) and XIII (sea). In sum (my interpretation), neutral status trades protection of territory for non-involvement in conflicts, i.e. I will stay out of all (military) conflicts and return expect everyone to not invade me.

Neutral powers can still maintain a military for defensive purposes or (I assume and with some relevance to modern Mongolia) for peace-keeping purposes, though some neutral powers have disbanded their military (Costa Rica, for example).

Why? Strategic Thinking

Vis-a-Vis Third Neighbours

Mongolian neutrality reinforces perceptions and sympathy for the “plucky democracy”. The club of declared neutral countries is not a bad club to be a member of with leaders such as Switzerland and Costa Rica, countries that – like Mongolia – have and aim to have a greater impact on international affairs than their economic significance or population size would suggest.

Vis-A-Vis Russia

By appealing to the world community to safeguard Mongolia’s status as neutral, any threats to Mongolia or any Russian attempts to draw Mongolia closer into a Russian sphere of influence (for example the Eurasian Union, etc.) can be resisted. This may be parallel to Turkmenistan’s intention in declaring neutrality in 1995.

Since the future will likely hold ever-closer (economic) relations between Mongolia and China, the neutrality declaration may assuage Russian fears that Mongolia might become a staging ground for aggression toward Russia, as absurd as that might seem at the moment given Mongolian popular antipathy toward China.

Vis-A-Vis China

Given Mongolian antipathy, any kind of military alignment with China is unlikely, but neutrality would offer a quasi-guarantee that Mongolia will not turn into a Russian buffer state against China in a military sense again.

In turn, the neutrality claim may well offer a “defense” against continuing Chinese attempts to coax Mongolia into membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, given the security-focused nature of that organization.

At the UN

Mongolia has embraced a number of global security initiatives through the UN. The abolition of capital punishment comes to mind, but also recognition of Mongolia’s nuclear-free status. Roles in more limited bodies (chairing Community of Democracies, OSCE membership, hosting Freedom Online Coalition, hosting ASEM, etc.) have similarly bolstered Mongolia’s credential as an actively engaged member of the international community.

For Elbegdorj

One of the questions that may present itself to Pres Elbegdorj is to find a role after the end of his final term, i.e. in summer 2017. Presidents Ochirbat and Bagabandi have become relatively quiet in their public roles (though Ochirbat continues to serve on Mongolia’s Constitutional Court). President Enkhbayar has (in)famously re-entred the daily combat of party politics. While some have speculated that Pres Elbegdorj may harbour ambitions to “do a Putin” and somehow stand for re-election as president in 2021, his active engagement of the international community seems to suggest much more strongly that he may be on a low-key campaign for some kind of role at the UN, perhaps heading up a UN body or agency.

Opposition

There have been some dissenting views in Mongolia. Disagreement has focused on two aspects,

  1. If push came to shove, Mongolia should side with Russia
  2. What does it mean to be permanently neutral and does this not limit options in the future massively.

Ambassador J. Enkhsaikhan (a preeminent expert on Mongolia’s security, especially institutionalizing the nuclear weapon free zone status) has probably been the most vocal critic of the neutrality initiative.

Thanks

Mendee J contributed significantly to my thinking and information about this issue.

Posted in China, Foreign Policy, Military, Mongolia and ..., Russia, UN | Tagged , | Leave a comment

The Contested Politics of the Presidential Veto

Posted on September 16, 2015 by mendee

In August,  parliament (State Ikh Khural) passed two separate amnesty bills: the first provides a one-time amnesty for all unregistered wealth from  criminal investigations and taxation. The other applies to first-time offenders, minors, women with small children and people who haven’t committed violent crimes.  This wasn’t new for the parliament.  On the occasion of major anniversary, the state is used to issue the amnesty.  The criminal amnesty bill was passed in 1991, 1996, 2000, 2006, and 2009 whereas the economic amnesty was introduced in 2008.  For this time, both bills were passed in honour of the 25th anniversary of the first democratic election of the country’s legislature.

But this time, both bills triggered interesting rounds of politicking and contestation.  The economic amnesty bill (Economic Transparency Law) was quickly began to be implemented by the government (executive branch) in spite of  political opposition and public call for transparency – to disclose the amounts of declared wealth and names of wealth holders.  The criminal amnesty bill revealed strong disagreements among political institutions, elites, parties, and factions as well as public.

On the same day of the passage, former president, prime minister, and speaker N Enkhbayar returned from South Korea, where he was undergoing medical treatment, and declared his commitment to establish a new coalition government with the DP.  Under the amnesty law, his corruption related criminal case would be exonerated.  On the following day, the current president Elbegdorj announced his intention to veto the criminal amnesty bill, which included crimes related to corruption, during his speech at the 85th anniversary of the prosecutors’ office.  At the same time, some DP members (esp., Kh Temuujin), MPP parliament members, three independent members, and Civil Will Green Party members expressed their objections to the inclusion of  corruption crimes in the amnesty bill.

On August 17, the President vetoed articles concerning  corruption and related crimes in the criminal amnesty law.  Parliament accepted the presidential veto during its special session of August 3-11.  Here are several observations:

First, the quick, non-transparent vote on and implementation of the economic amnesty law demonstrates the power and influence of oligarchs, kleptocrats, and business factions.  Given the difficulties of maintaining off-shore accounts and remaining under threat from their competitors, state institutions, and population, it appears to be a practical solution for the state to collect taxes incoming years and for property owners to be protected from further criminal investigation and potential expropriation.

Second, the law-making process is becoming too loose and vulnerable to interests and influences of various groups.  As indicated by MP Temuujin (DP) and Ts Nyamdorj (MPP), the initial (draft) bill, which was introduced by the government (Prime Minister), was completely changed at the standing committee and parliamentary deliberation.  This process was dominated by members with strong conflict of interests (esp., Justice Coalition).

Third, parliament members are appealing to the public (esp., social media and press).  The media listed pro and against votes of members in regards with the presidential veto and parliament members (esp., those were in support of the presidential veto) pressured the speaker to release minutes and recordings of the parliamentary deliberation on the amnesty bills.  Yes, on one hand, all members and parties are concerned with public ratings and upcoming elections; but, on the other hand, it pressures politicians, parties, and factions who were not willing to present their standings on important issues like fighting against the corruption.

Finally, political institutions remain vulnerable and have lost their steam because of unruly competition of the ‘winner takes all‘ variety.  The presidential veto added a bit of steam into Mongolia’s politics to strengthen democratic institutions and to uphold the principle of  transparency and accountability.  But, dangers for democracy are out there.  Political-economic factions continue to weaken the state institutions as each wants to take-over important ministries, agencies, SOEs, and provinces – for either wealth defence or accumulation.  The politicization of the security institutions (esp., intelligence, anti-corruption, police, marshal service) and judiciary (including prosecutor’s offices) become more visible than it was earlier years of the democratic transition.  Key political institutions are bureaucratically weak; therefore, influential and charismatic agents could easily use for their parochial interests.

Posted in Corruption, Governance, Judiciary, Law, Party Politics, Politics, Populism | Tagged | Leave a comment

Cabinet Reshuffle

Posted on September 8, 2015 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

Roughly a month after MPP members were kicked out of cabinet, we now appear to have a Saikhanbileg II cabinet forming.

Cabinet Composition

The new cabinet members are:

  • G Bayarsaikhan (DP), Min of Labour
  • B Bolor (DP), Min of Finance
  • M Zorigt (DP), Min of Roads and Transport
  • N Battsereg (JC), Min of Environment , Green Development and Tourism
  • Z Bayanselenge (JC), Min of Construction and Urban Development
  • Ts Oyunbaatar (JC), Deputy PM

Note that these are all current MPs. The ambition to not appoint a majority of members of parliament to the cabinet (avoiding the “double-deel”) has thus apparently been abandoned even though it was one of the issues that animated political debates in 2014, and was emphasized by PM Saikhanbileg in announcing his first cabinet. The only non-MP members of cabinet are now D Dorjiglav (Justice), R Jigjid (Mining), L Purevsuren (Foreign Affairs), and G Shiilegdamba (Health and Sports).

Note also that neither S Oyun nor S Demberel from the Civil Will Green Party have joined the cabinet suggesting that this is not quite a return to the coalition under PM Altankhuyag pre-Nov 2014 as it does not appear to include the CWGP. Instead, cabinet now includes six ministers nominated by the Justice Coalition suggesting their increased clout within cabinet.

Last November we had offered mini-bios and the faction affiliation of Saikhanbileg I cabinet members, here’s a limited update (DP faction/ Justice Coalition party membership).

  • G Bayarsaikhan (DP: Falcon faction)
  • B Bolor (DP: Mongolian National Progressive Party faction)
  • M Zorigt (DP: Mongolian Democratic Union faction)
  • N Battsereg (JC: MNDP)
  • Z Bayanselenge (JC: MPRP)
  • Ts Oyunbaatar (JC: MPRP)

Cabinet Politics

Given the continuity in the Prime Minister and the fact that the super coalition has simply been reduced to a coalition, there is no reason to expect any major shifts in policy. The previous MPP members of the cabinet did not seem to differ in any specific policies from the PM and his other colleagues, so their forced departure should not lead to any redirection of efforts or review of previous decisions.

Of the major resource projects that would continue to jump start the Mongolian economy again, Tavan Tolgoi is the obvious remaining challenge. However, it strikes me as quite unlikely that this (or any future cabinet, before or after the election) will have much luck with that particular project. The first (almost insurmountable in my mind) hurdle is the fact that multiple private Mongolian investors are vying for variously large pieces of the TT project. While more private sector involvement may be a good thing in some people’s eyes, I see it as ultimately leading to a stalemate between different efforts to lobby for a particular domestic investor to gain the upper hand. As a resource, the thermal coal that might be produced at TT is increasingly unattractive on the international market as even China may be moving away from coal in the long run. In the medium term there may still be plenty of a market, but this is not exactly a future-oriented investment. Coking or metallurgical coal by contrast is likely to continue to find buyers into the future.. The decline of the use of thermal coal may make TT less of a prize possession than it seemed some year ago.

Beyond Oyu Tolgoi and the economy, I had included a number of other policy arenas that I was hoping Saikhanbileg I might address: anti-corruption, public service, higher education, long-term research to promote diversification, strengthening policy-making capacity, a role for repats, support for aimag centres, and nurturing democracy (incl. democracy as an important pillar in foreign policy). I don’t really expect movement in any of these areas (though the topics have lost none of their urgency in my mind).

It is relatively unclear how long this cabinet might last. The DP continues to be rife with vaguely suicidal factional battles which might erupt at any moment again. The tug-of-war about the MPRP-demanded amnesty law suggests that that party and the Justice Coalition might also become less attractive as a partner as the election approaches. But whatever permutation of DP-led coalitions might arrive, the looming election probably will prevent both, any significant change of policy direction, and – sadly – any real policy achievements.

Posted in Democratic Party, Government, Ikh Khural 2016, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Party Politics, Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Ulaanbaatar Impressions

Posted on August 31, 2015 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

Yes, another periodic visit to Ulaanbaatar, yes once again too short a visit, but here are some immediate impressions along the lines of observations on previous visits that I noted down: May 2015 | November 2014 | May 2014 |November 2013.

Cityscape and Traffic

– I arrived in the middle of the night and flew out before first light, so I didn’t see the airport road during the day, but it seems to change almost as quickly as the immigration and departure hall at Chinggis Khaan (of course!) airport. For the airport changes, Tsogoo suggested “nomadic reformism” as an explanation. I think we might have to expand our policy series to feature this perspective! Back to the airport road, development along this road is continuing though the large mall certainly looked quite dark. Lots of gas stations, too. And, a new row of trees along the southside to complement that poor stand of JICA-planted trees that have been more or less alive on the northside of the road for seemingly decades.

– I don’t think I had previously been in Ulaanbaatar just before/on the beginning of the academic year. There was a noticeable and seemingly overnight increase in traffic to celebrate the beginning of the school year. This also coincided with the introduction of jaywalking fines for crossing the street outside of crosswalks. According to Y Otgonbayar, an individual from the province he represents in parliament, Bulgan, had beat me to the punch in becoming the first person fined, but oh my, how the world has changed when you see Mongolians waiting for a pedestrian light to turn green even though traffic is jammed in front of them. The jaywalking fine threat is unfortunate, of course, as the return of traffic makes downtown Ulaanbaatar safer for pedestrians who can cross in between stopped cars.

– With increased traffic and the disappearance of open areas in downtown Ulaanbaatar, parking is growing scarce. I noticed for the first time that the small hotel where I like to stay now charges hourly for use of its (very central) parking lot.

– There still is an astonishing number of hotel and commercial buildings under construction in central Ulaanbaatar. Hard to imagine what hordes of conventioneers, businesspeople and tourists are meant to fill all these buildings. The Shangri-La appears to be sort of open, couldn’t say that it looks particularly attractive from the outside, but early reports are of high quality on the inside.

– The beginning of the school year is clearly treated as a holiday and it was wonderful to walk in central Ulaanbaatar between appointments. Lots of kids on the hands of their (grand)parents in brand-new school uniforms, the girls with fancy hair, chattering away excitedly, reporting on the first day of school, I imagine. Teenagers also walking along in newly uniformed groups, looking like they were deep into catching up on events that may have occurred over the summer. Wonderful atmosphere.

Politics

– In several conversations I found general astonishment and surprise about the removal of MPP ministers from cabinet earlier in the summer confirming my own sense of the current political landscape. The consensus on identifiable causes/explanations: DP in-fighting. The tug-of-war between УИХ Speaker Enkhbold Z and PM Saikhanbileg Ch. continues, now focused on the naming of new ministers in front of parliament. Apparently, the DP caucus is demanding that these are all double-deel DP MPs.

– While the electoral system for next year’s УИХ election appears to be on track for some continuity (28 proportional, 48 first-past-the-post with some multi-member districts), there is some speculation about an early (March) or late (October) election instead of the usual late-June date. The argument for early centres on the DPs inability to govern (with the common expectation that we will see more changes in government until the election). Speculation about moving the election to a later date is in part rooted in the July ASEM summit which will clearly have much of the government (and Ulaanbaatar) preoccupied from some time in the late Spring with preparations.

– Several conversations highlighted the deepening governmental engagement with China, beyond the symbolically important and visible participation of Mongolian troops in the Sept 3 military-triumphalism-event in Beijing.

Posted in Change, Curios, Ikh Khural 2016, Politics, Ulaanbaatar | Tagged | 2 Comments

Politics in Late Summer 2015

Posted on August 28, 2015 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

I’m about to head to Ulaanbaatar for a very brief visit. While summer is a time of parliamentary recess and Naadam, it has been a bit more eventful than usual with the de facto dissolution of PM Saikhanbileg’s super coalition. About 10 months away from the next parliamentary election, I wonder what’s to come and what political mood I will find in Ulaanbaatar.

Coalitions

The end of the DP-MPP-Justice-CWGP super coalition was not entirely surprising, even if the timing this summer already did surprise me.

Two big reasons make this not terribly surprising:

  1. the single most important purpose of the coalition was to get resource projects and thus ultimately foreign investment and the economy back on track. This was the first item on my personal Saikhanbileg wishlist, and the announcement reasserting Rio Tinto’s and the Government’s commitment to Phase II of Oyu Tolgoi construction seems to have granted that wish and fulfilled that purpose. Note the parallel here with the grand coalition of 2009 under PM Bayar and the initial signing of the OT investment agreement.
  2. Grand and super coalitions are a political strategic headache going into elections as they muddy opportunities for parties to make a case for their contribution to government and negate the role of an opposition. Note the parallel to the break-up of the grand coalition under PM Batbold in January 2012.

But why already in the summer of 2015, rather than late this year or early next year?

Current Coalition Possibilities

Since the removal of MPP ministers from cabinet, there has not been an announcement of a re-formed government and new ministers. That would suggest that negotiations with coalition partners are on-going. The two most viable alternative constellations would seem to be either a) a return to a coalition like the one that supported PM Altankhuyag (DP + Justice + CWGP) or b) an MPP-led coalition. Given their crucial seats, this might give Enkhbayar and his Justice Coalition a fair bit of leverage in negotiations with the DP, particularly since the super coalition reduced the MPRP’s role somewhat.

Electoral Strategy

I tend to dismiss the analyses of Mongolian politics that always point to upcoming elections as a deciding factor. Why am I not so happy with these explanations? To paraphrase German football coaching legend Sepp Herberger (“Nach dem Spiel ist vor dem Spiel”), after an election is before an election, meaning that there is always another election coming, so that the fact that there is an election coming explains very little. Sure, MPs might be thinking more about the coming election 10 months out (i.e. now) than 40 months out, but many politicians (in Mongolia as in other democracies) seem to think in terms of coming elections all the time.

However, electoral calculations in Mongolia may have shifted in the past six months.

DP

When Ch Saikhanbileg took over as PM from N Altankhuyag, this seemed like a suicide mission. The DP seemed to be committing very public suicide through factional fighting after they’d made a mess of the economy through decisions on foreign investment and also failed with a number of other reforms projects (judicial reform, anti-corruption). Saikhanbileg was taking a bullet for the party knowing that chances in the 2016 election looked dire and perhaps hoping that this would give him political credibility in a future election as the DP leader that righted the ship and set it on a new course knowing that electoral defeat was coming.

Now, that electoral defeat doesn’t look as certain any more, though still likely. What’s changed? Well, that Oyu Tolgoi announcement primarily. The measurable economic impact until the June 2016 parliamentary election will be negligible, but it has changed perception. The tugrik might well continue to slide, the government still has no money and will struggle to begin repaying bonds (though cleverly playing Indian and Chinese desires for influence off against each other will likely allow them to stall on payments), many people will struggle with inflation in daily lives given lack of employment, but at least there seems to be a light at the end of the tunnel.

Construction at OT will be under way and that means that production will ramp up in five-seven years’ time suggesting at least a future cash flow even if there are struggles at the moment. That decision can also be one element in reviving domestic supply chains and employment as well as in regaining the interest of foreign investors, maybe. [The on-going situation surrounding the Khan Resources arbitration award and Centerra’s Gatsuurt project cast a shadow over any likely revival of FDI from a Canadian perspective, of course.]

This will obviously be the case that Saikhanbileg (or any DP prime minister or Z Enkhbold as party chairman) will make in next year’s campaign.

MPP

For the MPP this continues to be a situation of damned if you do, damned if you don’t. If the MPP stays out of government, this makes it easier for the DP to argue that they’ve corrected their past errors and are on the right track, claiming the shift in sentiment due to the OT announcement as their achievement. If they stay in some kind of government, it makes it more difficult to emphasize their own contributions.

This quandary presents itself at a time where there also seems to be some turmoil within the MPP. While the party always represents itself as unified at election time, the split of the reformed MPRP under N Enkhbayar is only the most obvious indication that the MPP is not free from factions either.

Others

Much has been made of the apparent popularity of independent MP S Ganbaatar, but more in terms of a potential presidential bid and someone that might shift debates ahead of the parliamentary election toward populist demands. To have a chance in any presidential contest, Ganbaatar would have to be nominated by a party sitting in the Ikh Khural, of course.

This need has led to speculation about any new parties, perhaps especially the HUN Party that seems to be in formation. We provided a quick sense of this National Labour Party in a post in early June, but I’m eager to learn more about their agenda and potential role in politics on this upcoming visit (not to support their effort, of course, as my interest as a foreigner is in analysis not in influencing politics).

Electoral System

There have been some discussions of a new party law and of changes to the electoral system in recent months. It appears that the latter have become muted somewhat. Proposals had included a shift to 76 newly-created electoral ridings with first-past-the-post voting or a number of other alternatives. For now, it seems that the most likely outcome would be continuity from the 2012 election (for once), i.e. a mixed system of proportional representation and first-past-the-post electoral ridings with the twist of multiple candidates in some ridings. The women’s quota for political candidates also seems to be likely to remain.

Posted in Democratic Party, Elections, Foreign Investment, Ikh Khural 2016, JD Democratization, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Politics, Public Opinion | Tagged | Leave a comment