Early Projections: Landslide Victory for MPP

By Julian Dierkes

Preliminary results are all suggesting a landslide win for MPP, nay, complete rout of DP. Projections are suggesting a majority of over 60 seats for MPP with the DP held to around a dozen seats. Early returns are also suggesting that many DP grands are going down in defeat.

If these results hold, they obviously lead to four years of a MPP majority. Given the significant party discipline in the MPP (much more unified than the DP, even when factional disputes also arise), that suggests stability in the government over the coming four years.

The biggest question the MPP will have to address: will it choose to take “revenge” on the DP (especially on appointments to public service positions, an on the politicization of the security apparatus, and the courts), or will it restrain itself in the name of the good of the country?

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Tales of Election Observation

By Julian Dierkes

As Mongolia votes today on June 29, I’m feeling a bit left out. I was an election observer in the last four national elections, but am unable to be in Mongolia this time around.

Role of Observers

I do think it bears remembering that election observers can play an important role. Mongolia continues to suffer from a lack of trust in election procedures that has unfortunately not been alleviated by the introduction of the electronic vote counting machineries. What’s worse, however, in my mind, is that many politicians and even many ordinary Mongolians often repeat allegations of electoral fraud without offering any evidence. I think that is corrosive and undermines democracy.

Party Observers

Election observers participate in the election in part to build trust and confidence in the results. That is true for party observers, by far the most numerous group in most polling stations, whose role is focused on assuring their party that nothing untoward was happening in the polling station. These party observers often spend the entire day glued to a rickety chair, carefully noting the number of voters and watching what happens to voters as they present their id, are handed ballots and deposit these ballots. Later they then compare their notes with officially reported totals for voters, etc. They are doing an important job and do it diligently. They deserve other Mongolians’ thanks for participating in the election machinery in this way.

Domestic Observers

Independent domestic observers are getting more numerous with each election. They are intended to report on the election and thus build general trust in the process or, in the unlikely event of observable fraud or irregularities, to report on these. They are often also very dedicated and spend long hours during the election day as well as in days leading up to this day. They also deserve some thanks.

International Observers

International election observers offer yet another layer of independence that is meant to reassure Mongolians about procedures, but also have a secondary mission to report on the election to the rest of the world. They probably also deserve some thanks.

Some international observations have the advantage of being highly organized and also having a developed methodology at their disposal. That is certainly true of the OSCE Election Observation Mission deployed to Mongolia.

So, hug an election observer today, or at least thank them and take note of the contribution to democracy that they’re trying to make.

Joys of Observers

Of course, the role of an observer is also very attractive and rewarding, particularly to a researcher like myself. Observing the election is also an opportunity to observe voters and to learn about how they feel about the process. Asking voters about any infractions against election laws or irregularities in the procedures adds a nice, somewhat random element of observation, but also is a chance to hear about voters’ concerns and hopes.

I have been an observer in Ulaanbaatar three times and once in Uliastay. When I’ve been in Ulaanbaatar I have tried to get around to different districts and often out into Tov Aimag as well. In fact, my sense of Ulaanbaatar as a city largely stems from these drives around the outer districts to visit polling stations.

My Funniest Encounter

There are also very funny moments in election observation.

In 2012 I was observing with then-MAAPPS student Brandon Miliate. We ended up heading out into Tov Aimag past Nalaikh somewhere.We ended up in a Soum centre that had a very nice cultural hall/theatre at its centre where the polling was taking place.

We walked in, I think it was a little after lunch. Often times, in rural polling stations, there isn’t the constant stream of voters that is more typical of the urban ridings, so everyone in the polling station tends to look up when someone walks in. We dutifully displayed our election observers IDs.

Typically, party observers are sitting along a back wall of the polling station at desks. Often times, they would scoot over on their benches or kindly offer us a chair when we come to observe for some period.

In this case, we sat down next to a very old-looking, but definitely elegant lady in a fancy deel with a couple of medals pinned to her chest. Her ID identified her as an MPRP observer.

After a while she asked Brandon where we were from. He answered, “Canada.” To which she replied, “Oh, so your from the Canadian party!”

🙂

That was an interesting thought that we passed on to the Canadian ambassador, Greg Goldhawk, to encourage him to investigate the potential for forming a Canadian party.

 

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What I’m Watching for on Election Night

By Julian Dierkes

Whether or not we’ll see a result already in the night of June 29/30 will depend a bit on how many close races there will be and whether any constituencies will come close to the minimum 50% participation required.

Just because votes are counter electronically, don’t expect instant results. Having been in a vote count in Mongolia before, I know that even after the polling station closes, there will be some delays in terms of preparation for the count, especially in the urban polling stations where there will be many domestic and party election monitors who will be filming, recording, and closely examining every step of the process. Then there are some delays in the votes getting communicated to district/provincial election commission and from there to the General Election Commission. While some results will come more quickly (perhaps around midnight or even a bit before) it may well be that other constituencies won’t report until the early morning hours.

If the result is very close, that might mean, of course, that exact numbers of MPs won’t even be known until some days later (manual recounts, etc.).

Voter Turn-Out

In the last couple of days before polling day, many of my interlocutors have spoken about the resignation and frustration, especially among younger, urban, professional voters. I was expecting as much when I wrote about my fears regarding any protests after the election.

One early sign of whether this frustration is limited to the fairly small demographic of my contacts will be voter turnout. In 2012, 65% of 1,833,000 voters participated. 1,856,000 voters were registered for the presidential election in 2013 of whom 67% participated. In this election, just over 2mio voters have been registered.

Over the last three elections, turnout in parliamentary elections has declined significantly. 2004 82%, 2008 74%, 2012 65%. Obviously, it would be silly to extrapolate from these declines, but given the current mood, I do expect a further drop in turn-out on the scale of these previous declines. That might bring the rate to under 60% which raises the spectre of some constituencies not reaching the 50% quorum.

I would interpret turnout under 60% as a clear sign of frustration with the choices offered in this election, including the lack of choices beyond the two large parties given the exclusion of smaller parties through changes in the election law. Voter turnout below 58% I would see as a sign of serious trouble for the election itself, but more importantly for democracy, given the frustrations that Mongolians have expressed with political institutions in polls.

Coalition Constellations

Ahead of the election, my ranking of resulting coalitions in terms of their likelihood would be:

  1. grand coalition led by MPP
  2. MPP + MPRP/independents
  3. MPP
  4. grand coalition led by DP
  5. DP + MPRP/independents

Independents

I will be surprised if any non-incumbent independents manage to win a seat. I would also interpret this primarily as a sign of frustration with MANAN (as MPP [MAH] and DP [AH] are referred to in combination).

Women Candidates

One of the changes that came late in the revisions of the electoral system (and was not mandated by a court decision), was a reduction of the women candidate quota from 30% – 20%. With this, the two big parties ended up right where the quota required them, i.e. with 16 female candidates. Of the total 498 candidates 129 are women, or 26%.  There are 27 constituencies that don’t have a single female candidate.

Given these numbers, it seems unlikely that the next State Great Khural will include more women than the last one and an actual decline in the number doesn’t seem out of the question.

If there’s no increase in women’s representation (or possibly even some loss of numbers), that would be especially unfortunate, as the non-partisan Women’s Caucus has been fairly active and effective during the past four years.

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Guest Post: Reflections of Mining in 2016 Campaign Platforms

By Enkhbat A

Different Approaches to Mining

The Mongolian parliamentary election will take place on June 29, 2016. There are 13 parties and 3 coalitions campaigning for the upcoming election. A brief analysis has been conducted on the four political entities, Mongolian People’s Party (MPP), Democratic Party (DP), Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) and “Independence and Unity” coalition.  All these entities are campaigning with more than 39 candidates and hoping to qualify to establish a government.  Their platforms were reviewed and commented by the National Audit Authority and were posted on the Mongolian Election Commission’s website.

Mining industry development and policy were not reflected in the MPRP platform. But the objective section has a declarative statement that says that Mongolian mineral reserves are the foundation of the happy life of the public. On the other hand, the “Independence and Unity” coalition included a quite general objective of establishing mining and metallurgical complex, transferring the strategically important mining projects to state ownership, justly monitor the Oyu Tolgoi project, leave Tavan Tolgoi deposit to public ownership,  and to implement principles of environmental “pollutant as payers” and “users are protectors”

Platforms of MPP and DP

As for the two biggest political entities, the election platforms of the MPP and DP introduced mining development and policy in details in particular. The MPP platform’s Chapter 2 (Economic Policy) and section 2.4 (Mining Development) and the DP platform’s Chapter 3 (Mining) were devoted to parties’ discussions of their mining development and policy.

The MPP concluded that the current investment in mining is reduced by 4 times and proposed their solution. As for the DP, they proposed to sustain the stability and growth in the export income from mining sector.  The following table illustrates the difference and main objectives of the two parties.

MPP DP

2.4.1 To create the most favourable legal and economic environment for inviting the well-known global companies and to produce value-added, final products from the natural resources destined for the global market.

2.4.5 To improve the operations of the State-Owned Enterprise “Erdenes Mongol”; to create conditions to distribute benefits of the large companies like Oyu Tolgoi, Tavan Tolgoi, and Erdenet to every citizen.

2.4.7 To keep the state’s involvement in mining projects at the proper level and to prioritize policies to collect taxes and royalties.

2.4.8 To streamline the legal coordination and policy for citizens cooperate in artisanal mining sector as stated in the article 3.1.2 of the “State’s Policy for the Minerals Sector”.

·  To develop human resources and to increase employments in the mineral sector.

· To increase the deposits of strategically important mines such as Tavan Tolgoi coal and Erdenet copper and molybdenum; to start mining operations at Asgat silver, Gatsuurt gold, and Tsagaan Suvarga copper mines; to support the implementation of the underground mining of Oyu Tolgoi.

· To issue mining licenses on the basis of prior consultation with the local community and to make the license issuing processes, monitoring, and data bases transparent.

· To support the introduction of new techniques and technology and re-processing of the mining industry waste with policies.

· To prohibit all activities related to nuclear waste in the territory of Mongolia.

· To intensify the exploration for the discovery of new oil fields. To develop a policy concerning the oil sector up to 2030. To increase the annual oil production to 1.7 million ton and income of the export to 500 billion tugrug.

· To establish the foundation for a coal refining industry.

· To approve the regulation and standards for the usage, storage, transportation, and sale of gas and liquid fuel in order to provide the public safety.

Drawing from the table, MPP declared its intention to increase foreign investment in the mining sector, ensure appropriate involvement of the state in the mining deposits and companies, and obtain payments through taxes and royalties for use of mineral resources. On the other hand, the DP centres their mining policy on human resources, equipment, technology development and production in addition to prohibiting all activities related to nuclear waste, developing oil shale production, and improving natural gas safety and security. In brief, the MPP announces that they will create environments to increase foreign investment, and reduce state involvement in the mining sector. But the DP’s policy proposes to develop and bridge the mining sector with the industrialization and strengthen the state monitoring of the sector.

TT Shares, Industrialization, and Environment

Also, both parties platform includes similar objectives to increase the value of 1072 stocks of Tavantolgoi, establish a fund from the revenue from the mining sector, improving mining closure and reclamation, develop transparent and responsible mining, increase public participation, improving legal environment for the artisanal mining and gold procurement, create geological central database, carry out researches and the mapping , and create favourable investment environment for the mineral resources sector.

Furthermore, both parties propose in their platforms that they will develop manufacturing sector based on the mineral resources, and process the mineral products. The MPP states specific names of mining projects and proposed the processing of the minerals in contrary to the DP’s proposal to develop the mining complex and industrial zones.

The environmental chapters in the parties’ platforms also included sections related to mining. The MPP highlights to work in mining reclamation and importance of improving public participation in it and the DP put forward the proposal to protect drinking water, sourcing water from rivers with outflow for the mining projects.

In addition, the DP signals that they will give priority to the extractives sector development within the economic framework and will secure safety reserves of the energy and fuel sources by increasing the capacity of specific projects.

Mining has remained as one of the central themes in the party platforms and been regarded as the main economic leverage; thus demonstrating that Mongolia has become a mining country.

About Enkhbat A

Dr. Enkhbat is associate professor in the Department of Humanities of the School of Business Administration and Humanities of the Mongolian University of Science and Technology. His special areas of interests are history of Mongolian mining and comparative examination of mining history of Mongolia and Inner Mongolia.

Posted in CIRDI, Democratic Party, Economics, Elections, Enkhbat Avirmed, Environment, Ikh Khural 2016, Mining, Mining Governance, Mongolian People's Party, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party | Tagged | Leave a comment

Changing of the DP Guard?

By Julian Dierkes

My sense is that there is not only significant frustration with the concrete implementation of democracy and its institutions in Mongolia, but more specifically with the two big political parties, MAHAH.

One of the frustrations I have heard regularly recently comes especially from young people who see the DP in particular as unable to refresh itself through leadership change and to thus represent the views and voices of younger voters.

I will therefore look quite keenly at the results of the June 29 election for an indication of this kind of generational frustration.

Any Indication of Changing of Guard in DP

The past four years of DP-led governments have been turbulent in part due to the internal party dynamics of the party where faction leaders have often seemed to be looking out much more for themselves personally, than for the party, or the nation.

Given the first-past-the-post electoral system, this election will give some constituencies the opportunity to judge some of these prominent DP leaders or their performance.

While someone like “Genco” Battulag seems to be fairly firmly ensconced in Bayankhongor and it would be quite an upset if L Eldev-Ochir managed to beat him in constituency 9.

Speaker of the UIX, Z Enkhbold, has a much tougher battle on his hands in Bayangol (70). He is running against incumbent D Lundevsanjan (MPP). But it also appears that independent candidate X Gankhuyag has made quite a push in this constituency, possibly making this one of the most competitive 3-way races.

Former PM N Altankhuyag is running in one of only two constituencies of only two candidates. That should give him a pretty good chance to be elected. PM Ch Saikhanbileg’s chances should also be good in Bayanzurkh. Frm foreign minister L Bold may have a bit of a tougher race in Khan-Uul, but he is a fairly effective campaigner.

So, among the prominent DP incumbents, Z Enkhbold and Genco may be most interesting to watch for an indication of some kind of changing-of-the-guard that is enforced by the electorate rather than through internal party processes.

Posted in Democracy, Democratic Party, Demography, Ikh Khural 2016, Politics, Social Issues, Younger Mongolians | Tagged | Leave a comment

Election Day

By Julian Dierkes

The spectre of the July 1 2008 riots still loom over Mongolian elections. While full explanations never really emerged, it seems that those riots were a combination of some orchestration of protests, the latent potential for protests in frustrations about the election, as well as a lack of preparation by the police.

If those were the factors that led to violence, then – fortunately – two of these factors don’t hold for the coming election on June 29 or its immediate aftermath:

  1. Since the 2008 riots, the police has been preparing systematically for incidents of unrest. Presumably that preparation means that any unrest would be handled more professionally, i.e. with a focus on de-escalation and appropriate responses.
  2. If there was some orchestration of protests in 2008, neither of the two main parties is likely to plan anything similar this year, in part because there is a widespread sense that 2008 was a very regrettable blip that was bad for Mongolia, and so should not be repeated.

Voter Frustration

Yet, I do see some reasons to be nervous about the immediate aftermath of the election because I see a number of factors that are likely to leave some voters frustrated. This frustration coupled with the general social ferment brought about by unemployment, lack of opportunity, and lack of prospects in some parts of Ulaanbaatar especially, is a potentially explosive mix.

Frustration about the Result: Parties

Given the dismal performance of the Mongolian economy over the past four years and the infighting and some chaos that has characterized the DP government, a thorough defeat of the DP would not be surprising. Yet, changes to the electoral law that set up hurdles for smaller parties, may mean that the Great Khural will be roughly divided between the MPP and the DP with only a few independents making it into parliament as non-big party MPs. Whether or not the MPP ends up winning or coming close to a majority of 39 seats, it now looks likely that the DP will return with relatively strong representation.

Frustration about the Results: Options

Why might the DP return a strong showing? Well, in part because of manipulations of the election system. But the other element that I have been hearing a lot about is voters’ frustration with the lack of alternatives. That is in part frustration with the self-destruction of the XUN Party and the apparent dissolution (as a parliamentary force) of the CWGP. For a brief moment last year, XUN inspired some who were looking for more professional politicians, with more real world and foreign experience, and a dedication to anti-corruption efforts, me included.

The other part of this frustration is that a significant portion of the electorate, especially in Ulaanbaatar, is likely committed to vote against the MPP and the MPRP, but also disappointed by the DP’s government. That doesn’t leave such a voter a lot of options.

A further contributing factor to the sense of a lack of options is that there are very few new faces coming up in either of the big parties. Only 21 of the 76 constituencies don’t have an incumbent in the race. This is certainly the case for the DP which continues to be dominated by some of its founders and “democratic revolution heroes” who are all ageing and remain stuck in their factional ruts. There is no obvious force for rejuvenation that has any parts of the electorate particularly excited as far as I can tell.

In the MPP, there are at least some structures for a generation turnover in place, but at the same time, there isn’t much buzz around any of the current leadership or some of the younger faces that are making their way through the party structure.

Doubts about the Results

Unfortunately, some doubting of the election results has been a common feature in past elections. Not only was this ostensibly the motivation for the July 1 riots, but the whole discussion of the “black machines” has been characterized by deep-seated mistrust of the counting and reporting process.

Presumably, the 2004 electoral system with 76 majoritarian districts should make the counting relatively straight-forward. Having said that, the deployment of electronic counting in 2012 did not bring the expected/desired speed in the counting-process in part because there are significant enough delays along the way that the process is not as easy as 1, 2, 3, count, report, aggregate. Out of fear about the aftermath of the election, results came very quickly on the morning after the election in 2012. But if the result is not entirely clear and/or if some constituencies might not reach the minimum required 50% participation, the results might be somewhat delayed. Any such delay will fuel speculation and doubt, in part because those are the default reactions to discussions about the counting process.

Ulaanbaatar in late June

One factor makes this election different, of course, the Asia-Europe Meeting Summit, July 15-16, with numerous heads of state and heads of government expected in town less than three weeks after the election.

Because of this event and the international visibility that will come with it for Mongolia, I’m sure that the government and all officials in the security apparatus will do everything to avoid protests or – worse – any kind of violence following the election.

I would not be surprised if alcohol was banned earlier than just the day before the election. Arrests of potential agitators appear to be happening already. On the election night itself, the police will be discretely omnipresent, I suspect.

However, what if the frustrations I foresee do boil over and express themselves in somewhat spontaneous protests, perhaps not in the centre of Ulaanbaatar but on the edge of the central area, for example? If anything were to escalate, the security forces would obviously be very reluctant to respond with any kind of force, as some parts of the world will be watching very closely in anticipation of the ASEM summit. But if protests turn violent and are not met with a forceful response? What happens if there is intermittent rioting for three nights running because no one actually wants to declare a state of emergency that close to a summit? Are there contingency plans to cancel/move ASEM?

What about races that end up undecided or close to it by some days after the election? Would the election commission then suddenly wave the minimum 50% threshold simply to force a result? How would such a decision be received?

Bottom Line

I am not quite predicting riots, but I would not be surprised if they did occur. While I was fairly certain in 2012 that the election and the reporting of results was going to pass smoothly, I am much less certain of that this year.

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Halfway through Сонгууль 2016 Campaign

By Julian Dierkes

The election campaign for the State Great Khural election on June 29 is over halfway through its official 18-day period. While it has been an active campaign for the 498 candidates, and visibly so, it has been politically or substantively lackluster.

Political Substance

I have frequently lamented in the past that Mongolian political parties do not offer much of a chance for citizens to give voice to their political views or preferences for the future of the country, as the parties are not defined by political platforms, but rather by personalities and patronage relations.

True enough, this campaign reinforces that impression. Not a single contested issue has really risen to the fore as something that the parties are defining themselves and their campaign around.

When ambitions are stated, they are typically described in such vague and general terms that few policy specifics can be deduced from them. Instead, a candidate’s qualifications are announced and opponents’ personal qualities are denounced. At the broadest level, the MPP is talking more about the debt that Mongolia finds itself in (and blames the DP for this debt), while the DP is highlighting some elements of transparency in mining governance.

The biggest publicity splash has been the announcement of a Tavan Tolgoi share buyback, but that really is populism in its most naked form, i.e. “hello voter, we’ll give you cash!”. There has been no policy argument attached to that, nor has the announcement really been questioned in those terms.

Black and Grey Campaigning

On social media (I continue to update the list of candidates’ Twitter accounts and I’ve identified 75 of the 498 candidates), candidates have been quite visible, but mostly just that, i.e. visible. Lots of photos from the campaign trail, some very active tweeting about candidates, some campaign-like tweeting from DP and MPP. Curiously, hashtags remain underused, even by the parties, and the notion of using social media, RTs and hashtags as a way to mobilize voters is also not apparent in the activities that are visible.

To some, the most entertaining news has been the surreptitious video of Erdenechimeg, smoking and seemingly drunk. It’s unfortunate as a measure of the quality of debate, but also because she had been a member of the women’s caucus that pushed for smoking and alcohol limitations.

Women candidates have not been particularly visible. I was actually quite surprised by an official MPP tweet that had the 20% of candidates who are women barely visible at all. The MPP doesn’t strike me as any worse in this regard than the DP, I just found this photo so visually striking at a time when any Canadian politician would be sure to feature women very prominently in campaign photographs.

Posted in Democratic Party, Ikh Khural 2016, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Social Media | Tagged | 2 Comments

Civil Society Perspective on State’s Role in Large Resource Projects

By Bilguun N

ICF Workshop “State’s Role in Large Resource Projects” – Perspectives of Civil Society

When Ts Munkhbayar, was awarded the Goldman Environmental Prize, he was interviewed by Anthropologist Bumochir Dulam. He explained a truthful reason to come to the parliament house with a weapon, which was to be shot not to hurt or punish somebody. His extreme activities illustrate how civil society is willing to catch the public eye on some mining companies that do not care about the environment and local people’s living. The mining sector, where a quarter of GDP of Mongolia comes from, is obviously the most influential one to the country’s economy because of beneficial market location and rich reservoir.

The interest of three main corners, which are government, operation, and civil society, should be balanced.

The topic of Panel 5 at the Mining Governance Workshop was “Perspectives of Civil Society” and it was observed from the content of discussion that existing attitude of relation among 3 stakeholders has a tendency to be suspicious or trying to find negative side from each other. Moreover, sometimes they accuse or name each other as “treason” as Mr. Tur-Od mentioned. In other polite words, it could be determined that civil society has the aim to monitor the other stakeholders. Mr. Abdrakhmanov Saginbekov, Vice president of Kyrgyzaltyn JSC, said “There is a tendency to believe more in civil society organizations rather than the government among the people. If civil society organizations fight for people, they should be supported without any doubt.” In fact, seventy percent of 28,000 NGOs, 7,000 of which run actively in Mongolia, is funded by foreign organizations. Therefore, there may be some conflict of interest or imposed views from funding parties. If civil society organizations raise their funds from public donations or support and publish their expenditures open, it would be an ideal system.

On the other hand, it is an institutional industry, since 25,000 people work for NGOs, half of whom are women, and it is beneficial in terms of creating employment, paying tax or payroll, and so on. For example, the Ongi River Movement, which is founded by Ts Munkhbayar, raises funding by themselves by planting sea buckthorn trees and herding livestock. In addition, we need to remember that any professional association belongs to civil society. The professionals of this sector have already started to create associations in the institutional way to deliver their voice to decision makers, which is one good practice.

The Mongolian government has become more pro-active in setting regulations and refining existing legislation which used to contradict each other. Their relevance goes well beyond each level of state and a private sector. One of them is Glass Account Law (Budget Transparency Law), which states that each transaction of state organizations above MNT 5 million (~US$2,500) will be disclosed. Also, there are several NGOs running to make awareness of transparency to other organizations. This initiation has created a data base for any statistic of budgets and expenditures of organization and it leads to the net positive impact on their responsibility. The conclusion agreed all delegates and panelists was that the three corners need to realize they have shared values which they all fighting for and to support each other instead of seeking the worse from each other.

About Bilguun N

Bilguun (Bill) Nandinbilig is a Master’s student at the Norman B. Keevil Institute of Mining Engineering of the University of British Columbia. His research interests are Mining economics and finance, and Sustainable development. He is working for Oyu Tolgoi Mine as a mining engineer in Mongolia.

Posted in Bilguun Nandinbilig, CIRDI, Governance, Mining, Social Movements | Leave a comment

Interesting Constellations of Candidates

There are always some interesting individuals, opposing races, and categories of candidates to be found among a number of candidates as large as 498 in this election.

Wrestlers

Bat-Erdene B (incumbent, MPP, Khentii, 40)

Sumiyabazar D (incumbent, MPP, Songinokhairkhan 73)

Sukhbat A (MPP, Tuv, 29)

Asashoryu (former Sumo Grand Champion) not a candidate himself, but clearly supporting the DP (unlike his brother, Sumiyabazar who is running as an incumbent for the MPP)

Judo

Tuvshinbayar N (DP, Bayankhongor, 8), winner of a gold medal in Beijing and silver medal in London Olympics. Obviously he’s running for the DP in Bayankhongor where “Genco” Battulga is politically prominent, who is also chairman of the Judo Federation.

Singers

“Nara” Narantuya M (Independent, Bayangol 69)

Erdenetungalag G (DP, Selenge, 26)

Javkhlan S (Independent, Bayanzurkh 54)

Relatives

There are a number of relatives of various relations in races, sometimes even facing each other.

Byambatsogt S (incumbent, MPP, Khovd, 35) and Batsogt D (DP, Khovd, 35) are married to sisters, making them “Schwippschwager” to each other  (brother of your wife’s sister, in German, is there an English term?)

Batsambuu Sh (MPP, Zavkhan, 18) and Saikhansambuu Sh (Independent & Great Coalition, Zavkhan, 18) are brothers running against each other.

Arvin D (DP, Bayanzurkh, 54) and Anujin P (MPP, Bayanzurkh, 54) are not blood relatives but related by marriages. Anujin is famous for her TV show “Mongol tulgatan 100 erhem” (100 Respected People of Mongolia). Arvin was a member of parliament for the MPP before switching to the DP after the 2012 election.

Thanks

UBC’s geology grad student Enkhgerel G pointed out a number of these candidates to me.

Posted in Ikh Khural 2016 | Tagged | Leave a comment

Small, Unanticipated Impacts

By Julian Dierkes

[With some notes from CIRDI program manager, Marie-Luise Ermisch, PhD]

One of the challenges on attempting to apply my understanding of contemporary Mongolia through development interventions has been that it is forcing me to learn a number of bureaucratic and methodological tools that I am not familiar with.

I have come to specialize in analyses of contemporary Mongolia over the past 10 years or so. As I focus on contemporary politics as one of the elements of my analyses, there have been many moments where I’ve thought that I know how particular challenges might be overcome. Development interventions are clearly motivated by a similar sense of a recognition of an obstacle to development or identification of a potential catalyst. What is different in the context of our CIRDI activities, however, is that I am now attempting to demonstrate that these interventions make a meaningful difference, beyond instinctively knowing that this is a productive intervention. I am thus moving from “I know what needs to be done” to “Let me try to do something and think about what that activity is achieving and how”.

As we organized the first workshop under our collaboration with the International Cooperation Fund of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on “The State’s Role in Large Resource Projects” we have been thinking hard about standard and more creative ways to measure the impact that such an activity is having. These measures go from reporting on attendance, media coverage and comments from participants, to evaluation surveys and follow-up with foreign delegates. Below I’m listing some of the small pieces of evidence that are harder to collect in a systematic fashion, but that do speak to the impact of an activity.

Impact on our Project Team

  • Quasi-kick off event for CIRDI with key stakeholders. If people had vaguely heard of CIRDI and our Mongolia activities before, the event as well as the associated press coverage gave them a better idea of what we’re pursuing at least in our collaboration with the ICF. The event also provided an opportunity for stakeholders to directly engage with CIRDI project team members.
  • Gaining experience in organizing different kind of workshops, i.e. non-academic. Not only did this experience confirm our decision to partner with the Min of Foreign Affairs’ International Cooperation Fund (they handled all the logistics of the workshop amazingly and were very pleasant and gracious hosts), but the workshop was an opportunity to gain experience in managing speakers, expectations for attendance, and ideas for how to structure such events.
  • Visit to Mongolia for project manager as important occasion to gain understanding of Mongolian context given that we’re not setting up an in-country structure. The conference offered an ideal venue for her to meet with a variety of stakeholders right at the beginning of her visit.
  • Planning for next activity. The workshop itself provoked lots of ideas and some discussions about how to follow up. The next workshop we had originally planned has already morphed significantly.
  • The engagement of UBC students in Mongolia was obvious through this workshop. UBC graduate students currently completing co-op terms in Mongolia attended the workshop and served as rapporteurs. Among the workshop volunteers was CIRDI’s first-ever scholarship winner, who is set to start her MA at UBC this fall. During their fieldtrip to Oyu Tolgoi, the international delegates also encountered a recent UBC graduate now working at OT.

Impact on Foreign Delegates

  • Opportunities to deepen pre-existing ties. One of the delegates met a former classmate, now speaker of the Mongolian parliament.
  • Distant connections. The Khazari of Afghanistan are distantly-related to contemporary Mongolians and there are a number of Khazari students in Ulaanbaatar. While they didn’t meet, our Afghan delegate was in touch with them.
  • All six foreign delegates visited Mongolia for the first time. To the extent that such mutual visits across Asia are a generic benefit (i.e. beyond the more targeted exchange about Mongolian mining governance experience), that is terrific! First-hand experience of Oyu Tolgoi, Mongolia’s largest copper mine proved a particularly valuable experience for the delegates, as was demonstrated by the excited exchange between international delegates and the OT Operations General Manager during the OT field visit.
  • One delegate reported that when the invitation for the workshop came, all colleagues said, “it can’t be done, you won’t get a passport, visa, etc.” This delegate was the first among colleagues to attend an international workshop of this kind, hopefully signalling that this kind of participation is possible to other colleagues.
  • At least one international delegate was initially taken aback by the fact that the workshop was being co-funded by a Canadian agency (CIRDI), as Canadian mining interests have a negative reputation in his home country. By the end of the workshop, however, this delegate had a better rounded insight into Canada’s role in the mining sector, and bid a friendly farewell to the Canadian organizers.
  • Access to large scale mining sites in Afghanistan is limited to women, for various reasons. The field visit to Oyu Tolgoi was therefore of particular value to our female Afghan delegate.

Impact on Mongolians

  • Opportunity to discuss taken-for-granted topics by reflecting on other country contexts.
  • Efficient form of introductory learning. As we know from an academic context, a focused workshop can be a terrific introduction to a broader topic. For many people, participating in a workshop for half a day is a more efficient way of acquiring an overview than reading a specialized book on the same subject matter. While the project team and foreign delegates participated in the workshop for the entire time, some Mongolian participants may have used this as a limited, but efficient learning opportunity.
Posted in CIRDI, Development, International Cooperation Fund, Mongolia and ... | Tagged | Leave a comment

Guest Post: State Participation in Resources Projects

By Unurjargal U

The State’s Role in Large Resource Projects

The appropriate forms for state participation in mining sector – a sensitive issue in Mongolia. The Canadian International Mineral Resources and Development Institute (CIRDI) organized a cooperation conference with the Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs themed “The State’s Role in Large Resource Projects“. At the 2 day conference participants and experts discussed their experiences and mistakes with interactive experiences. CIRDI invited mining experts from developing countries such as, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Laos, and Afghanistan. These various experts provided solutions which strengthened national mining governance, efficiently allocated resources and ensured diversity of the mineral sector.

Matthew Genasci, a principal consultant at “Mining Policy Group”, hypothesized that the state could become involved numerous ways in mining projects. The second panel discussion was having professionals from Mongolia major mining company “Erdenet”, “Baganuur LLC” partially owned by the state and state-owned company, national head investment company, basically mining assets, “Erdenes Mongol” present their objectives. All of these companies have different level of state participation yet the state’s participation has not been formalized. For instance, Erdenet company is owned 51 percent by the Mongolian Government in Mongolian-Russian joint venture, which contributed about 13.5% of Mongolian’s GDP and 10% of tax revenue. The Baganuur coal mine is owned 75% by the Mongolian Government and privatized 25% of its share on the market. In the case of Erdenes Mongol’s main objective is execute Mongolian state owned mining companies assets as well as public shares in market. Other well-performing, state-owned companies such as Codelco (Chile), and LKAP (Sweden) etc., have a similar situation requiring reform of state involvement. So, to what extent should the state get involved?

Root of State Participation in Mining Projects

Mining is capital-intensive, navigating many regulations to initiate most projects. First, the state must establish well-adapted mining regulations. In 2014, Mongolia adopted a “State Mining Policy” which documents the state’s role from a legal perspective. Second, the state will determine how these principles, rules and laws will be implemented. During the conference, participants expressed the view that SOEs’ board members must be independent, must improve and must stabilize each company’s governance. While ensuring transparency, the state needs to deal with total economic capacity prior to negotiating any large mining project. Third, the state needs to consider long-term and “unseen” consequences of their decisions. As claimed by the Fraser Institute, the state usually faces the problem of dynamic industries as like mining. For instance, empirical evidence shows the Tavan Tolgoi coal project bid has proven the state has fallen short in considering opportunity cost and long term considerations. Eventually, even state participation form could be varied, the principles of participation must be clearly identified.

How can states participate more?  The Future of State Participation

SOEs’ involvement in the resource sector is decreasing in developing countries with none in developed countries. The state must choose their participation level in mining projects. Once established, some fundamental principles could be identified, such as a distinction between the player and the regulator of the game; flexible state mining policy may be a good start. One of mining global leading country, Peru, approved corporate tax rate cuts from 28 to 30 percent beginning of 2016. Also British Columbia in Canada announced a relief plan for mining companies struggling with low commodity prices, aiming to not only remediate mining companies, but also providing relief for communities around large mining projects.

State flexibility will not work without transparency and will lead to a highly uncertainty environment. [The case of Mongolian Windfall Tax Regime]. Mongolian Constitutional law indicates natural resources in Mongolia shall belong exclusively to the people and be under state protection. Although, I oppose the windfall tax regime, people need to get benefit from the commodity price boom cycle. Also, the state should relieve companies and enterprises from harmful situations like commodity price downturn. Therefore, state participation must be flexible under a legislation framework working with mining companies, instead of against them, for the benefit of the country.

By the way, this conference was a great chance to discuss with newly developing mining countries like as Mongolia, to explore their strength as well as representatives figured out better suitable models on their countries to use natural resources efficiently.

About Unurjargal

Unurjargal Urjin is a Master’s student at the Norman B. Keevil Institute of Mining Engineering of the University of British Columbia. His research interest in Social License to Operate, company and society relations. He also has working experience in Tavan Tolgoi and Oyu Tolgoi mining companies as mining engineering in Mongolia.

Posted in CIRDI, Mining, Mining Governance, Policy, Unurjargal Urjin | Leave a comment

Notes on Parliamentary Election Candidates & Races

By Julian Dierkes

The official campaign for the June 29 parliamentary election kicked off on June 11. The General Election Commission published the official list of candidates on June 7.

I’ve been trying to sort through this list to take note of particular interesting races and to get an overview of the political landscape. Below are some numbers.

I suspect that I will keep updating this post or re-posting it as I notice or am told about more patterns.

The number in parentheses refers to the constituency (тойрог) number

Two Constituencies with only two candidates (DP & MPP)

Bayan-Ulgii (4)

Uvs (32)

Nine Constituencies with only three candidates (DP & MPP & ?)

Bayan-Ulgii (5) Conservative Party

Umnugovi (22) MPRP

Umnugovi (23) MPRP

Selenge (27) MPRP

Tuv (29) MPRP

Tuv (30) MPRP

Uvs (33) MPRP

Khentii (40) CWGP

Khentii (42) MPRP

21 Constituencies with no Incumbents Running

Bayan-Ulgii (5)

Bayankhongor (8)

Bulgan (10)

Govi-Altai (11)

Govi-Sumber (12)

Dundgovi (13)

Zavkhan (18)

Uvurkhangai (20)

Uvurkhangai (21)

Umnugovi (22)

Tuv (29)

Khovd (34)

Khovd (36)

Khuvsgul (37)

Khentii (42)

Darkhan-Uul (44)

Orkhon (48)

Sukhbaatar (59)

Bayangol (68)

Songinokhairkhan (71)

Songinokhairkhan (76)

21 races without an incumbent means that there will be at most 55 incumbents in the new parliament, that means roughly at least a quarter of MPs will be new to parliament.

Constituencies with Most Candidates

Bayanzurkh (51): 14

Bayanzurkh (54): 13

Chingeltei (63): 13

Bayanzurkh (49): 12

Bayanzurkh (51): 12

Bayanzurkh (53): 12

Khan-Uul (55): 12

Songinokhairkhan (72): 12

City vs. Country Constituencies

28 city district constituencies with total of 283 candidates, i.e. roughly 10 per constituency

48 country districts with total of 215 candidates, roughly 4.5 per constituency

Posted in Countryside, Ikh Khural 2016, Party Politics, Ulaanbaatar | Tagged | 3 Comments

Guest Post: ICF Workshop – Private Sector Perspective

By Aligermaa B

Does the state, responsible for national welfare, have any business getting actively involved in a business, even in one related to essential services or strategic national resources? Or, should everything be left to the private sector which, usually less concerned with social commitments, can concentrate on competence, which is judged, almost exclusively, by profitability and shareholder satisfaction?

No one knows for sure, but regular efforts are made to find an answer. One of these was the May 16-17 workshop in Ulaanbaatar on “The State’s Role in Large Resource Projects”, organized jointly by the Canadian International Resources and Development Institute (CIRDI) and the International Cooperation Fund of the Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Given the preeminence of mining in the Mongolian context, the State’s role in large resource projects was examined mostly in relation to the mining sector. Since the issue is of interest and concern to many developing countries seeking to develop their mineral resources, participants included delegates from Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos and Myanmar. On offer were views from the perspective of the State, the private sector and NGOs, all speaking from direct experience.

Among the speakers were Matthew Genasci, Director of US-based Mining Policy Group, S.Oyun, member of the Mongolian Parliament, D.Bat-Erdene, Board member of Mongolian Society of Economic Geologists, N.Algaa, President of Mongolian National Mining Association, G.Battsengel, CEO of Energy Resources, and M.Tulgat, Executive Director of Khishig Arvin.

This is not meant to be an exhaustive report of the proceedings, so I am restricting myself to what the last two said, representing the private sector on Panel 4. This was on the second day and both of them spoke without a prepared text, and this informality embellished the immediacy and impact of their chosen examples, mainly showing how state participation in Mongolian mining has done more harm than good.

State owns vs State gets

Most Mongolians believe that large State shareholding in a project means more revenue for the State budget. According to G.Battsengel, CEO of Energy Resources, the facts do not bear this out. It is a myth created and nurtured by politicians to justify having their finger in the pie. There is no question that Erdenet Copper, 51% owned by the State, pays a large amount to the State, but it is no more than a private company also would pay. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) report makes it clear that 90% of the total amount paid by a company to the Government is made up of taxes and fees, and Battsengel emphasized that this is what any company, private or State-owned, has to pay, with no special higher rates for the latter. Dividends, which come from profitable operations, accounted for only 5%-10% of what the State gets. In the case of the Mongolia-Russia joint company Monrostsvetment, 97% is tax payment and the rest dividends.

Since how much the State owns is thus not directly proportionate to what the State gets, Battsengel wanted the State to restrict its involvement to setting down rules and regulations, ensuring their implementation without any favors shown to State-owned enterprises (SOEs), and collecting taxes. It should also help create conditions that would help make domestic mining companies more competitive.

Playing outside the rules

Battsengel talked about the Tavan Tolgoi mine, where Energy Resources and State- and locally owned companies are active, to show how regulations are used selectively, never allowing the field to be level for all players, Professional inspectors usually turn a blind eye when SOEs operate outside the regulations, but they are very strict that the private companies keep to the line. For example, coal should be transported along the paved road which, incidentally but importantly, has been built by a private company on its own. However, the SOEs continue to use the dirt roads, to avoid paying for use of the paved road. Their defense is that their responsibility ends as soon as the coal is sold at the mine and thereafter it is up to the buyer to decide how to transport the coal. Battsengel wondered if a private company would be allowed to get away with such specious arguments.

He then referred to selective extraction of coal, a practice prohibited by law, but merrily indulged in by SOEs in recent years. Extracting higher-quality coal, together with less soil removal, certainly makes for more profits, but, according to Battsengel, it is a clear breach of the policy laid down for long-term natural resources use.

M.Tulgat, whos company works as an operator at the Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi mine, also talked about specific problems faced at work. For starters, he said, SOEs do not make timely payments. Not that there would be no money; more often, it would have been frittered away on underproductive and wasteful expenses. Tulgat said one person in his company would do an engineering job for which SOEs would employ four workers. Hiring an operator company would be a good way for State companies to save money. A comparison of how State, local and private companies worked in Tavan Tolgoi would be an interesting exercise, Tulgat thought.

Lessons Learned

Battsengel felt a right policy would open the door to more productive cooperation between the State and private sectors in Mongolia, and hoped the recent move to substitute State ownership with a special royalty rate would be a paradigm for future development.

State ownership of mines is almost unheard of in developed countries, but that has not stopped the mining sector in Australia or Canada – to take two countries with strong links to this sector in Mongolia – from playing an important role in the country’s economy. The lasting impression one carried from the workshop was that Mongolia should discourage any increased Government role in mining. State involvement usually turns into a license for political interference, which does the mining no good.

There is much talk in Mongolia about responsible mining. It appears we first have to understand the need for responsible governance.

About

Aligermaa Bayarsaikhan will be a Master’s student at the Norman B. Keevil Institute of Mining Engineering of the University of British Columbia. She has been working at the Central Bank of Mongolia since 2012. Her Master’s project is focused on the effective management of the revenues generated from Mongolia’s extractive sector.

Posted in Aligermaa Bayarsaikhan, Business, CIRDI, EITI, International Cooperation Fund, Mining, Mining Governance | 2 Comments

Transparency and My Independence

By Julian Dierkes

Mongolian

Since around 2014, I have increasingly been asked why I am interested in Mongolia. As my interest is academic and curiosity-driven, I thought it best to offer a discussion of my independence in providing analyses of contemporary Mongolia, especially with another election looming in 2016. Note that I’ve already written about the roots of my interest in Mongolia (English/Mongolian), but want to add a discussion of my independence to that post.

Academic Freedom and Professional Autonomy

I am a tenured associate professor.

What does that mean?

“Tenured”, in a nutshell (though not legally) means that I hold my position until I retire. Short of doing something pretty terrible or not fulfilling my obligations, I cannot be fired by my university. For more discussion, you might enjoy the Wikipedia entry.

Why would a university ever offer a professor tenure? The system of tenure evolved with the establishment of universities as one of a number of safeguards of academic freedom. Essentially, universities (at least in their origin in Europe and their institutionalization in N America) have recognized that researchers who are free to follow their research interests are more likely to make “heretical” academic discoveries. While not every professor who thinks that everyone else is wrong about a particular aspect of our understanding of the world, is right, every once in a while a researcher comes along who offers an entirely novel perspective. S/he is protected by academic freedom to elaborate this perspective and pursue a research agenda.

How is Tenure Granted and What does it Mean?

How is this security and the professional autonomy that comes with it earned? In Canada, researchers (in the social sciences where I dwell as a sociologist) are typically hired when they are about to complete their PhD (i.e. defend their dissertation), or after they have completed their PhD. Note that the PhD requires different kind of reviews at different institutions, sometimes involving outside examiners (outside one’s department or even university) as well as professors who have not been advising the student. Today, the PhD is essentially required to become an assistant professor in Canada.

Typically, assistant professors are then hired on a three-year contract. After three years this contract is renewed following a review for another three years. After these initial six years, an assistant professor then applies for promotion to associate professor rank AND for tenure. The process to grant this promotion and tenure again involves the review of the applicant’s research (publications, often prioritized over other aspects), her/his teaching, and contributions to the operations of the university. These achievements are reviewed within the applicant’s unit (i.e. department, in my case, UBC’s Institute of Asian Research). That unit then issues a recommendation to a committee at the Faculty level (in our case, the Faculty of Arts, for example), which in turn issues a recommendation to a committee at the university level. That committee issues a recommendation to the university president who generally follows these recommendations. This process all in all lasts about a year and then results in promotion with tenure, or in a final year-long contract after which the individual who has been denied tenure & promotion will have to find a job elsewhere.

This lengthy process involves myriads checks and balances. For example, to prevent departments from simply reproducing themselves by pressuring assistant professors to follow the example of senior professors, committees beyond the department are involved. Also, criteria for the evaluation of applicants for promotion are somewhat general, but are meant to give candidates an idea what they need to be striving for in terms of research, teaching (including teaching evaluations and graduate supervision), and service.

And in the end… the lucky candidate like myself is rewarded with tenure, giving me job security and the professional autonomy to select my areas of interest. At UBC there are additional annual merit evaluations that can result in additional pay increases, and there is also promotion from Associate to Full Professor (following a roughly similar process to that for tenure and promotion to Associate), but even without merit pay increases, an associate professor could stay in his/her job until her/his retirement.

Especially on matters of academic and research substance, this entire system is designed to isolate an academic from any imaginable pressures in choosing the subject matter, theoretical orientation, or methodology for their research. A Dean, Provost or President may well discuss my research with me (obviously, I would be delighted to talk about my research), but they are generally not in a position to tell me what to do research on. As it comes to my Mongolia interests, there is thus no “superior” or “boss” who could direct me to study one subject matter over another, or to take a particular perspective in my research.

Financial Benefits

Investments

As an academic, I am well-paid, but not well enough to be a private investor of any significance. I thus have no direct financial stakes in any companies doing business in Mongolia or anywhere else.

My UBC pension fund invests in all kinds of companies and financial instruments, including some tied to the mining industry and/or to Mongolia, but those decisions are removed from my views and activities in Mongolia and I actually don’t know what exactly investments my pension fund may hold.

Consulting

I have benefitted from the fact that my understanding of Mongolian political developments, and of mining policy, has been useful to various individuals and companies in the past. I have thus been able to offer some limited consulting services, primarily to financial investors who are keen to develop an understanding of the likelihood of political changes or on investments they may be considering. I also contribute to some systematic attempts to capture political and other risks, and some of these contributions are paid.

The grand total of my income from such consulting opportunities over the past 10 years would amount to less than twice my monthly income. Other than with a small number of global indices (of the kind listed on my Mongolia Scorecard), I have not had any sustained relationship with any clients of this kind.

Other Funding

I have been fortunate enough to find support for many trips to Mongolia and academic activities from a variety of sources, including private individuals, companies, foundations, and governments.

The largest amount of funding was related to a conference I organized in 2008 that was held at UBC and resulted in an edited book, “Change in Democratic Mongolia“. All the funding I received in that context went toward paying for participants in the conference to attend and for their accommodations, food, etc., as well as some research assistance. I have received some small amounts from the Canadian government, typically to support conference trips.

Accepting Funding

I would be delighted to accept donations, endowments, or any other kind of support for Mongolia activities at UBC. That support would be appropriately acknowledged and such acknowledgment would also signal the source of the funding.

Note that the same kind of professional autonomy that is in place for me as a researcher, holds for UBC as an institution. If we were to receive a significant donation to support Mongolia activities, for example, this would be accepted only on the condition that all substantive and especially all academic decisions would be made within the university. Typically, a donor sets the direction for activities based on a donation but does not select or endorse specific activities. For example, someone might fund another significant conference on contemporary Mongolia, perhaps even with a theme, but the selection of presentations would be academically-driven, not determined by a donor.

In sum…

I would confidently claim that I have not been influenced and would be unlikely to be influenced in the future by any financial advantages I might derive from support of my Mongolia research.

Political Independence

Nations

I am not a spy.

I do like to read spy novels, watch spy movies, and I did grow up in (West) Berlin, by some accounts the one-time greatest hotbed of Cold War espionage.

However, I do not act on any governments’ behalf, neither my native German government, nor the Canadian government. Not even the Mongolian government, although my enthusiasm for all things Mongolian might make some people believe that I act on behalf of Mongolia.

Somewhat disappointingly (to this delighted reader of spy fiction), no government agency has ever attempted to hire me as any kind of spy.

Political Parties

I do not actively support any Mongolian political party. Nor am I a member or active supporter of any particular party anywhere else. I would say that my political leanings are broadly social democratic, but that orientation doesn’t match all that well onto the Mongolian political scene.

I know members and activists of several Mongolian parties and I enjoy political conversations with them. I also have had and will continue to have interactions with governments and the party members that fill important positions in governments.

Surely, some political activists have tried and will try to convince me of political positions or statements that might benefit their party more than another party. And, I’m sure, that I have been convinced by such political arguments in the past and that this will also happen in the future. However, I hope and I am reasonably confident that I am persuaded by the power of an argument or evidence for a perspective, not by a party affiliation or my personal association or friendship with a political activist.

Some Views of Mongolian Politics

In general, I strive for political neutrality in my comments on Mongolian political developments.

I do believe that Mongolia would benefit from more substantive political debates and from the introduction of more evidence-based policy proposals. But that holds for the entire spectrum of political views and is really more of a perspective on the political process, rather than a perspective on any particular political party.

I have little understanding for the kind of corruption that seems to involve personal enrichment, typically at the expense of fellow countrymen and women. I find that kind of behaviour in politicians deplorable no matter what political stripes politicians wear.

I am also not a great fan of political maneuvers that are carried our for political gain, independent of the benefit or loss to the nation. One of the aspects of learning more about Mongolia that makes this an interesting endeavour is the feeling, nay knowledge, that Mongolia’s potential is enormous. If only… is an attitude that could be applied to many aspects of contemporary Mongolia. This is especially true of politics.

Abuses of power and its use for political gain are more likely to occur in a ruling party or among members of a government, independent of that party’s orientation. I am thus more likely to identify faults that I see in any current government or government policy, than in the opposition.

In sum…

I claim to be politically neutral and focused on analysis of political developments, not to influence them.

Bottom Line

I have outlined these various elements of my professional autonomy to make one essential point: I do not take orders from anyone in terms of the substantive emphasis of my analyses of contemporary Mongolia. I invite anyone who suspects me of any kind of bias (post-colonial, Eurocentric, industry, political, national, etc.) to scrutinize the above and to examine my analyses. I hope that the discussion above does allow a critique to begin her/his scrutiny from a position of a basic trust in my independence if the above discussion has been useful.

Julian Dierkes
June 2016

Posted in Research on Mongolia | Tagged | 4 Comments

Democracy in Decline?

By Julian Dierkes

Is it time to worry seriously about the state of democracy in Mongolia?

Mongolian Democracy in International Context

Globally, democracy appears to be declining. After the euphoria of the post-Cold War spread of democracy and various seasonal and coloured revolutions around the world, there seems to be an overall trend of backsliding. This is prominent documented in attempts to measure the state of democracy globally, such as Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Index. The 2016 edition of the Freedom in the World report is entitled “Anxious Dictators, Wavering Democracies: Global Freedom under Pressure“.

Seen in this global context, Mongolia is a bright spot.

In a regional context where democracy is declining across SE Asia (except for Myanmar, perhaps), for example, and not deeply institutionalized across the Asian continent, Mongolia remains the only post-state socialist democracy in Asia.

It is important to take note of this exceptional status of Mongolia, especially given the rather tough neighbourbood that it finds itself in in terms of good governance and democracy with its sometimes overbearing immediate neighbours Russia and China.

Note that it is Mongolian dedication to democracy that I usually emphasize in discussions outside of Mongolia. Such discussions have always acknowledged the numerous challenges and contradictions that are inherent to democracy, and the fact that most democracies continuously search for improvements to electoral systems, the nature of parties, and the engagement of voters. Mongolia is no exception to this, nor are Canada or Germany.

Mongolian Democracy in a Domestic Context

While it is important to emphasize Mongolia’s democratic achievements when comparing them to other democratic and non-democratic countries, it is also important to take stock of the country’s democratization in the context of Mongolians’ aspirations. Here, recent polls (SantMaral | IRI)  seem to suggest clearly that while Mongolians are devoted to the idea of democracy, they are (increasingly) unhappy with the political institutions that govern the country.

While these doubts about political institutions have existed for some time, there are some new elements to concerns about the trajectory of democracy. For me these concerns centre on

  • a new sense of fear and intimidation of critical voices
  • more and more blatant manipulation of the electoral process
  • more and more blatant disregard for the courts and the constitution
  • the ongoing absence of policy or, indeed, political debates.

Let’s go from the most general to the more specific concerns.

The Absence of Political Debates

Elections and the general political process are intended to give citizens the opportunity to determine the direction of developments of the nation. In many democracies this expression of the citizens’ will is mediated by political parties who stand for particular ideologies or approaches to national development.

Elections are not intended as a contest over who can secure power for power’s sake, but rather for the sake of seeing through a particular vision for the country.

Popular and fringe political parties in Mongolia have not developed strong ideological or policy-related profiles over the 25 years of democracy. While the General Election Commission is currently examining election platforms, I don’t think anyone is expecting radically different proposals by the DP from the MPP, for example. Even on the most consequential questions facing Mongolia, for example regarding the development and governance of mineral resources, the parties do not have distinct positions. Recall as an example the 2008 campaign: The DP offered a cash payment of₮1mio to each citizen. The then-MPRP trumped this with a ₮1.5mio offer. Were these different conceptualizations of Mongolia’s future? Differences between the parties, including the smaller parties, often mirror this past campaign promise in that they do not speak to a different approach to policy-making or different policies to be pursued.

Given the lack of political profiles among the parties, voters are deprived of the opportunity to make their views on important questions heard. This leads to the apparently wide-spread sense that voters do not have any real alternatives to chose from. This is not a new nor an unusual feature of Mongolian democracy, but in the current context of changes to the electoral system, it is a feature that is ever clearer and where there are few visible changes.

Note, however, that it is in the hands of Mongolian voters to change this by voting for political options that are defined by policy (differences), as long as the electoral process allows them to do so. That opportunity is looking more remote for this coming election, however.

Disregard for the Courts and the Constitution

The track record of Mongolia’s governments in terms of respecting the courts is somewhat spotty. Of course, democratic governments all over the world disagree with courts’ decisions. That is perfectly fine. All constitutions provide a process by which legislatures are able to overrule court decisions as the legislature represents the voice of the people, the courts are only meant to adjudicate between conflicting views of the law. However, it is the process by which legislatures and governments are able to respond to court decisions that is important. A prerequisite for this process is an independent judiciary, that is a court system where judges are respected and where they do not need to fear retaliation by the government if they overturn a law.

Of course, judges are not above the law themselves.

However, over the past six months we’ve seen instances of the dismissal of judges that are ostensibly based on misdeeds, but fairly transparently are motived by political opposition. That is a very dangerous precedent because it opens the courts to manipulation. There’s no point to courts that can be manipulated politically.

The same disregard for the courts found an expression in the brief flurry of a constitutional debate late in 2015. While discussions of constitutional structures are important and 25 years seems like an entirely appropriate time to have such discussions, no real discussions occurred. There were proposals, including on the important question of the balance of power between the presidency, the cabinet and the State Great Khural. But the speed with which these proposals were dropped suggests that the proposal was primarily rooted in political purposes, perhaps a side skirmishes to distract from more important and pressing decisions, rather than a genuine constitutional discussion.

Casual and half-baked constitutional proposals are not likely to instil a respect for the constitution which does, of course, provide the most basic set of rules that govern political processes.

The High Court decision that proportional representation is not constitutional also strikes me as primarily political rather than judicial. Obviously, there are very legitimate debates about different electoral systems and how the impact that the wording of the constitution has on this choice. Ironically, Canada is debating a shift to proportional representation just as Mongolia has been abandoning it.

But it should be remembered that stability in the electoral system is a virtue most of the time. It means that voters understand how they’re voting and that results are more easily anticipated and thus more legitimate. That is not to say that there should be no discussion about alternatives; it would be good to recall, however, that all electoral systems have biases and flaws, so endless tinkering will not bring a perfect system. For Mongolia, the coming election will be run under the 2004 electoral system of 76 first-past-the-post constituencies which means that the last three elections (2008, 2012, 2016) will have all been conducted under different systems.

Regarding the High Court decision, I also have to find it rather curious that the Ikh Khural was elected in 2012, sat as a legislature for four years and just 2 months before the next election its constitutional legitimacy is challenged? Is there a legitimate argument that does not see this as politicking?

Manipulation of the Electoral Process

The broader electoral system is one of the challenges that Mongolian voters will be facing, but there have been numerous other changes that look like political manipulation to preserve power, not a deepening of democracy. The DP and MPP as the largest and best-organized parties are the likely beneficiaries of these changes and appear to be colluding in bringing these changes about. The switch to majoritarian districts is thus one that is likely to be a disadvantage to smaller parties and independents.

Sure, a shortening of the campaign period to 18 days means that less money will be spent, but it also gives an advantage to incumbents and well-established political forces, including the two big parties. And given that there has been little effort to reform campaign/political finance otherwise (despite some recurring proposals to do so), it’s hard not to think of this as primarily a move to lock out independents and smaller parties.

The fact that candidates are not allowed to make appearances in their constituencies until the beginning of the campaign period also gives an advantage to incumbents who are allowed to continue to go about their (political) business.

It seems like no efforts are being spared to keep out any upstart parties and independents. While the XUN Party has self-destructed through internal conflict to some extent, the fact that it is being excluded from the campaign largely on formal grounds of late submission of paperwork, etc. speaks volumes about the seriousness of the effort to keep smaller parties out. Of course, administrative requirements and provisions of the election law should be enforced, but why have these provisions been put in place in the first place? Have they been included to promote democracy or to limit it?

The same argument might apply to the MPRP and N Enkhbayar’s candidacy in particular. I am not arguing that former president Enkhbayar has been a force for democratization and general well-being before or since his criminal conviction, but he continues to be the preferred political option of a significant number of Mongolians. He, like any candidate, needs to adhere to administrative and legal requirements, but by the same token, these requirements should not be designed to deliberately limit democratic choices.

All this is happening, as I have argued above, in the absence of political programs from the DP and MPP and thus appears to be a fairly naked bid for the preservation of power.

A New Sense of Intimidation

What is most startling and entirely new to my experience in Mongolia is a sense of dread and sometimes even fear among Mongolian friends, especially journalists and public figures. Whether or not the allegations about the political use of the security apparatus are true or not (or if they can ever be true given that they trade in the currency of conspiracies, etc.), the mere fact that some Mongolians now appear to be afraid about speaking out is a terrible development. For this, only the current government and thus the DP can be blamed since they (legitimately) control the security apparatus.

For me that development started around the death/murder of Bolormaa, the former editor of the Mongolian Mining Journal. As far as I know, we still have not been given an official and conclusive answer on the question of whether she was murdered or not. That in itself is worrying, but it is also a sign of the disregard for critical voices. Bolormaa had become increasingly outspoken in her writing and criticism of corruption prior to her death. The sense that this might have been the ultimate motivation for her murder – IF it was murder – seems widespread.

A much less extreme and traumatic step was the dismissal of Jargal De Facto by MNB. While all kinds of official reasons were given, this seemed to be the consequence of Jargal calling out political interference in the courts.

Bolormaa and Jargal de Facto have in common that they are journalists that have established themselves as independent and critical voices. Not critical in a partisan way, but rather calling on politicians to not be corrupt and to be dedicated to the tasks that they have been elected too, criticisms that an independent and free press is essential for in democracies.

At an event during my last trip to Ulaanbaatar, I was taken aside and asked to recall the provisions of the election law in choosing how to present my views. That is entirely appropriate. When I speak in Mongolia, I am obviously subject to the provisions of Mongolian law and it is good to be reminded of that. However, I also take note that this was the first time that anyone had ever felt like such a reminder is needed.

Why? Because the election law bans comments on the likely result of the election and any comments that might be interpreted as benefitting or denigrating any parties that are running in the election.

I have always thought that some of the provisions of Mongolian election laws have been innovative and worth considering. The ban on polling is an example of such a provision as polls do certainly sway voters in elections elsewhere. However, when the intention to allow citizens to submit their vote without any undue influence by polling and others’ opinions turns into a restriction on analyses of the political scene and discussions of the implications of electoral outcomes, that goes too far in my mind.

My Worries

In sum, I am worried about the fate of two essential ingredients of any democracy in Mongolia:

  1. free, lively, unencumbered political debate
  2. elections as an expression of the populations’ intentions for the future of their country.

 

 

 

 

Posted in Democracy, Elections, Governance, Ikh Khural 2016, JD Democratization, Media and Press, Party Politics, Politics, Security Apparatus | Tagged | 3 Comments