Change in the Countryside – June 2017

By Julian Dierkes

For some years, I have now taken notes about visible changes in Ulaanbaatar on my periodic visits.

In part this is note-taking for my own self, because there are so many things that I don’t remember already about the time when I first started coming to Mongolian (mid-2000s), and I want to use this observations as records for myself.

Also, since I come regularly, but with long intervals in between, some of the changes may be more visible to me than to residents.

So now, I’ll start a similar listing for the countryside. Though short visits to Mongolia for me mean that I don’t get out to the countryside every time I’m in Mongolia, but over the years these visits are regular enough that some notes might be useful.

Visible Manifestations of Social Change in the Countryside

What has Arrived?

  • Guardrails in some curves on major cross-country roads
  • While it used to be that street signs (speed limits, warnings of curves, etc.) were a curious rarity (“when there hasn’t been a sign for 100km, why this one?”) they now seem to appear in clusters.
  • The state is reasserting its authority in some places. Roadside safety inspections of vehicles have returned.
  • Fences around large parcels of lands. As far as I can tell these are hayed for winter fodder as nothing seems to be planted there. Fences keep out animals in this case to let grass grow.
  • I’ve long heard discussion that many of the projects carried out with the Local Development Fund were public toilets. I have now seen some of these!
  • Not all fences around xashaa (property lots) are wood anymore. There are some prefab concrete slabs, corrugated metals, etc.

What has Disappeared, or at least, Nearly Disappeared?

  • The clever move to simply drive cross-country around toll booths on major roads.

What will Appear in the Future?

  • Much more directional street markers.
  • Cross-country biking, hiking, and riding routes away from major roads.

What will Disappear in the Future?

  • Roughly in the 2000s, I would guess, more cars were beginning to show up in the countryside, but road-construction was not revving up yet. That meant that on big cross-country routes, entire valleys were scarred by multiple parallel tracks. Along the paved sections of major roads, these scars are slowly disappearing in the landscape.
  • At construction sites, the paved roads are often simply blocked with large dirt heaps across the lanes. Effective, but scary at night.

What won’t Disappear in the Medium Term?

  • Composite electricity poles. In the countryside these consist of a concrete base to which a wooden pole is tied with wire/brackets which ends in a triangle that has space for three attached cables. Metal poles have appeared, but I know similar composite poles from the Yukon and Alaska, so they  must be well-adapted to extreme temperatures and will thus last.
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State of Digital Diplomacy in Mongolia Missions

By Julian Dierkes

With the appointment of Z Enkbold as chief of staff and Ts Sukhbaatar as foreign policy advisor, Pres. Battulga’s foreign policy team is coming together.

Foreign policy, of course, is one of the areas of policy-making that presidents have been active in, whether that be in chairing the National Security Council, travelling abroad, or in appointing ambassadors. Pres Battulga faces some specific challenges as I’ve argued in an article for World Politics Review.

Digital Diplomacy

But beyond the substance of relations with China and Russia as well as continued engagement of third neighbours, what is Mongolian diplomacy doing when it comes to digital initiatives? Digital diplomacy is an area that I’ve been interested in a Canadian context as well as for Mongolia. Digital diplomacy is the attempt to carry out diplomatic initiatives through digital means. I strongly believe that this is an especially attractive opportunity for a nation like Mongolia where the foreign service is small given limitations of personnel and financial resources.

As Mongolia will not be able to set up small or large embassies everywhere around the world or even in countries that it maintains close relationships with, there are opportunities for engaging stakeholders in Mongolia and abroad, but also for active public diplomacy through cost-effective digital means.

The high water mark of Mongolian digital diplomacy probably was the effort linked to the ASEM meetings.

Since then, and especially in the last year of the MPP government, digital diplomacy efforts have stalled at best.

Mongolian Missions on Twitter

Twitter is not the only or perhaps even the best platform for Mongolian activities. Personally, I think that the opportunities for thematic blogs written by diplomats, policy-makers and experts offer the most potential. Obviously, as I’m writing this on a blog!

But even blogs need amplification via other platforms and Twitter is one of the obvious platforms given its worldwide reach (except for China, significantly for Mongolia). And, Mongolian diplomacy had been well-represented online for some time.

Now? Not so much.

I’ve long maintained a Twitter list of Mongolian embassy accounts. If any missions are missing on this list, do let me know.

The list currently includes 28 Mongolian missions. But let’s see how active these missions are. I list them below by the county (embassies)/city (consulate) of the mission.
Australia: active (total tweets 2,882)
Austria: dormant (last tweet July ’16, total tweets 39)
Belgium: active (233)
Brazil: dormant (Sept ’16, 39)
Canada: active (733)
Czech Republic: active (492)
France: dormant (Apr ’16, 61)
Germany: dormant (July ’15, 76)
Hong Kong: active (1863)
Indonesia: active (574)
Italy: active (though, oddly, private account, total tweets 122)
Japan: active (804)
Osaka: dormant (Dec ’15, 77)
North Korea: dormant (May ’16, 13)
Poland: dormant (Oct ’16, 51)
Russia: active (2,665)
Ulan-Ude: dormant (Sept ’15, 1)
Singapore: active (5,335)
South Korea: active (3743)
Sweden: active (863)
Switzerland: dormant (Nov ’15, 10)
Thailand: active (160)
UN/New York: active (1018)
Vietnam: active (142)
United Kingdom: dormant ( July ’16, 226)
United States: active (1,414)
San Francisco: active (112)

And headquarters?

MFA in Mongolian: active (2,794)
MFA in English: dormant (Dec ’16, 2,293)

Some real surprises in this list, I find, particularly in some of the dormant accounts. No tweets in English from the MFA in eight months? Dormant accounts in some countries that are of importance to Mongolia: Germany, the UK?

Overall, not a very good situation, I would argue. 11 of 29 accounts are dormant. Unless there has been a deliberate decision by the Foreign Minister or other officials to forego digital diplomacy activities and those missions that are carrying on are driven in these activities by activist ambassadors or other staff.

Posted in Australia, Canada, Digital Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, Germany, Japan, Mongolia and ..., North Korea, Russia, South Korea, UN, United States | Tagged | Leave a comment

More Graduates of Archery 101

By Julian Dierkes & Mendee

Two years ago, Mendee posted some photos of world leaders visiting Mongolia and encountering archery.

In June, we finally had a chance to have the experience ourselves, thanks to Mendee’s childhood friend who is an archery sportscaster.

Mendee, aspiring archer

Carly T, a natural talent. Yeah, #MAAPPSisNOTdead!

The prof winds up…

…and he shoots

 

 

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Who Abstained in the Run-Off?

By Julian Dierkes

On the day before the second round of the presidential election, my biggest question was about the movement to encourage voters to submit blank ballots, essentialy voting none-of-the-above.

We have known since election night that just under 100,000 nationwide chose this option, or 8.2% of the valid votes. Note that this is different from and in addition to the 39.3% who did not vote.

Already, this number was a huge jump from the 1.5% that had submitted blank ballots in the 1st round of the election which is remarkable given that a real effort to inform voters about the blank ballot as an option did not begin until after the 1st round and was limited to a (social) media campaign. Clearly, this option was relevant enough to many voters to embrace it in a very short time span.

Just an Urban Phenomenon?

From the results offered by the GEC we at least have a regional breakdown which is displayed very nicely on the ikon.mn electoral map.

The short answer is, No!, there were abstentions in significant numbers across the country and the highest rates of abstention did not even come in Ulaanbaatar.

As the ikon.mn editor-in-chief noted, it’s Dundgovi that had the highest rate at 15.6%. That’s 1 out of 6 voters or so in the aimag.

Umungovi came in with the third-highest rate of abstention at 12.4%. Recall that this continued a trend against the national results in the Gobi region which had strongly supported Ganbaatar in the 1st round. Since Umnugovi is the province most affected by mining (disruptions as well as employment) it is hard not to think that this is the explanation for these results but it is harder to think how exactly the prominence of mining in the Gobi provinces led voters to choose Ganbaatar or the blank ballot.

Other rural areas that show results for the blank ballot that are above the national rate are Bulgan (9.6%), Dornod (9.4%), and Khentii (10.3%).

It is also true, however, that more urban voters chose the blank ballot as all the shares of the vote in the Ulaanbaatar districts as well as in Darkhan-Uul and Orkhon are above the nation 8.2% except for one small village, not in Gaul, but Bagakhangai which appears to be an enclave of very committed MPP voters, all 1,110 of them.

So yes, the blank ballot was an urban phenomenon, but not restricted to Ulaanbaatar alone.

High Support for One Candidate = Few Blank Ballots

Generally, a pattern emerges that in aimags/districts with very high support for one candidate, the number of blank ballots is low, except for Ulaanbaatar districts which overhwhelminigly supported Battulga, but also showed high rates of blank ballots.

Examples of the former are Bayan-Ulgii which voted 55.4% for Enkhbold with Uvs (56%), his highest support in an aimag, but with only 2.5% blank ballots (Uvs 4.8%). Among the aimags where Battulga had a strong showing, Bayankhongor stands out from all of them with support coming in at a whopping 64.6%, but only 1.9% of voters not marking their ballot.

Turnout and Blank Ballots

To some, a high turnout is an inherent good as it suggests more participation by voters in the democratic process. Following this argument, one might ask whether the introduction of a none-of-the-above option increases turnout or not. Obviously, we cannot know that from the shares of votes alone as we have no additional information about the voters who chose the blank ballots, but there are some suggestive comparisons to make.

At first glance, it does not seem that aimags/districts with high rates of blank ballots have a higher turnout. This does suggest that the blank voters may not have chosen between not voting at all and a blank ballot. If that had been the case, you would expect turnout to be lower in low blank ballot aimags/districts. Ignoring the aimags with lopsided results mentioned above, an aimag like Zavkhan with relatively low support for the blank ballot (4.2%) has a slightly-above turnout of 65.9%. Or Uvurkhangai with a below-average turnout of 57.3% and a rate of abstention of 6%.

The most noticeable figure here again is Umnugovi with its high support for the blank ballot, but a barely-above-quorum turnout of 50.9%.

What about Age?

Was it only young(er) voters who chose the blank ballot? We know that the GEC knows and they would also know a gender breakdown as that kind of demographic information is displayed in every polling station (though background cannot be linked to a specific vote to protext the secrecy of ballots). But we could be offered information about polling stations that have a particular age breakdown of voters and whether they have a higher or lower number of supporters for the blank ballot. While this would not be conclusive it would be as suggestive as some of the rates I’ve looked at in this post.

Implications

I suspect that the MPP will want to do away with the blank ballot in the election law as it is too obviously a tool that voters can deploy against two-party dominance.

But, the support for this option once again shows the potential for political mobilization around reform movements and in support of a change in the party landscape.

Anyone involved in such reform efforts (intra-party through leadership/generational chages, or extra-party through social movements or the foundation of third parties) will want to pay attention to some of the distribution of the blank ballots.

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Reflection on Second Round [Video]

By Julian Dierkes

With the second round of the presidential election on July 7, the “election season” has come to an end and I summarize its result in this brief video. Obviously, our attention now turns to what the future under a DP president in cohibation with an MPP government will bring.

Posted in Elections, Governance, Party Politics, Politics, Presidential 2017, Video | Tagged | Leave a comment

Big Questions on Voting Day

By Julian Dierkes

The run-off in the 2017 presidential contest is upon us.

Since June 26 there has been no campaigning, but a number of developments with a likely impact on the run-off result have occurred.

1. White Ballot Movement

Some voters have organized online to educate other on the possibility of turning in a blank ballot to prevent a majority winner and thus force a re-set of the entire election. The biggest question today might thus be how many people will actually choose the non-of-the-above option. Has this campaign reached many voters? Will they shy away from the implied costs of re-running the election entirely? Will protest voters go to the blank ballot rather to one of the candidates?

2. Between Two Campaigns, Enkhbold Likely to Have Lost Ground

With no campaigning, other factors might play a role in voters’ thinking. The surfacing of video material showing Enkhbold practicing for the debate will not have improved his standing. The parliamentary machinations to produce massive cash handouts look like desperation in part because they will almost certainly incite the anger of the IMF. Voters seemed to see through the DP’s last-minute Erdenet Mine announcement last year, I suspect that they will not be swayed by the announcements of the last several days.

By contrast, it has been fairly quiet around Battulga.

3. More Discussions of Vote-Buying, Electoral Procedures

As has been the case for all six elections that I have paid close attention to, in the aftermath of the count, allegations of fraud are flying all over the place.

Hand (re)counts have borne out results.

Much discussion has focused on vote-buying (including my own perspective). But talk of the buying up of voting receipts seems to be a bluff of “enforcement” rather than an actual threat of tracing ballots or voters. Voting systems are obviously designed primarily around assuring voting secrecy so the safe-guards against the possibility of tracing a vote by the receipt or ballot number, or the time stamp are extensive. Voters might not retain their receipts in this round just to combat the perception of some kind of traceability. Unfortunately, this also precludes the “I voted!” photos that some Mongolians have been posting.

 

 

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Women Run Mongolian Elections, But They Don’t Run In Them

By Julian Dierkes

When you go to vote in Mongolia, look around in the polling station. Like so many (government) offices, the polling stations are run by women. Yes, every once in a while, there will be a man as a member of the local election commission, but rarely more than one man. And, making the gender dynamics in running the election even more striking, that single man in the polling station is probably the head of the local election commission.

My observation here is based on the roughly 100 polling stations that I have visited as an international election observer in five of the past six national elections (all since 2008, but the 2016 parliamentary election).

The same observation is true for campaign offices. Whether these are in an urban setting or a remote “propaganda ger”, or whether they are of the typical age composition (MPRP = 60 years old and above, DP with many younger campaign workers, MPP with a mix), campaign offices are generally staffed by women.

And, one more way in which Mongolian elections are women’s elections: women appear to be much more likely than men to vote. Since polling stations display the ration of female to male voters, my guess from the 16 polling stations that I visited on June 26 would be that the average ratio was close to 58:42. I hope that the GEC will release this ratio on a nationwide level after presidential voting concludes, but there is no reason I see that this observation is wildly off from national patterns.

So, put simply, women run Mongolian elections for predominantly women voters.

Female Candidates

But wait, something is not quite right here.

In the current presidential campaign, there is no female candidate. In 2013, health minister N Udval was the MPRP’s candidate, but she has been the only-ever female presidential candidate in democratic Mongolia.

And parliament? The 2016 brought a significant increase in the number of female MPs to 13 of the total 76 members, or 17%. Hm… That number was reached with a candidate quota of 20% women in place. It was also reached after four years of parliamentary sessions from 2012-2016 where a cross-party women’s caucus advanced some of the most important legislative agendas, like domestic violence laws, very effectively.

Coming Elections

Of course, politics is not the only area where women seem to be running much of the business, but continue to be excluded from leadership positions. Yet, women are also involved in selecting people to leadership positions, so I certainly hope that Mongolian parties will nominate more women for leadership positions in the future. There are many very capable women who are the backbone of Mongolian democracy in organizing elections. It is a shame that they do not play a more visible role in parliament and in government.

If the current presidential election has to start over because no candidate achieves 50% in the 2nd round, I personally hope that one of the three parties would turn to their leading women to nominate one of them.

Oh, and maybe consider thanking the women of your local election commission for all the hard and diligent work they contribute to the organizing of the election!

Posted in Elections, Gender, JD Democratization, Presidential 2017, Social Issues | Tagged | Leave a comment

I Don’t Understand the Calculations Behind Electoral Fraud

By Julian Dierkes

I was shocked during election observation on June 26, again, how much of a contrast there is between the diligence and care with which polling stations and voting procedures are run, and the public perception of the legitimacy of voting due to the perception of wide-spread vote buying. Put bluntly, there does not seem much opportunity for large-scale fraud in the polling stations, yet many Mongolians suspect that elections are marred by vote-buying.

Combatting Fraud in Polling Stations

Over the past several rounds of national elections, the General Election Commission has deployed more and more technology to make elections more transparent and tamper-proof. I described some of these measures in my recent post about election observation.

All that does not mean that there is no fraud that is going on in polling stations. But such fraud is inherently difficult due to the scale of personnel needed to carry it off.

This is something that I have not quite understood about allegations of electoral fraud in polling stations.

Let’s assume for a moment that I am a criminally-inclined local campaign manager in an Ulaanbaatar riding. There are a number of ways in which I could seek to influence votes, for example by offering to “assist” elderly voters and having them accompanied to the polling station. Let’s say that I am reasonably successful with some such strategies in winning some votes, perhaps even some that would have gone to another party otherwise.

This is a massively expensive way to cheat! It requires an active cheater per vote won (like someone accompanying an elderly voter) and that cheater is then “burned” for that polling stations as s/he would easily be recognized as offering assistance a second time by the very vigilant party observers. I cannot imagine that anyone would really pursue this as a rational strategy.

The same could be said for the mobile polling (to allow the infirm) to vote which is often mentioned as a possible opportunity for fraud, or even some of the fears around submitting a blank ballot which could then be re-introduced with a mark (though the voting machines would not allow for this as that ballot would already have been counted, so this would only influence a hand count).

So, unless a party has very credible information that the result is so close that even some few votes would sway the result in their direction, it seems to me that it makes no sense to pursue such labour-intensive strategies at election fraud, especially when there are activities connected with intensified campaigning that might actually sway voters to vote a certain way for free.

Evidence

In previous elections I have been quite frustrated by the oft-repeated allegations of electoral fraud that have never been backed up by real evidence.

Given how many videos of bribery have surfaced in this campaign – credible or not – and given the scale of personnel necessary to conduct electoral fraud of an extent that might actually sway the outcome, it seems odd to me that there is no more evidence of such fraud other than sporadic videos, etc. that we see.

On the other hand, I have become convinced that vote-buying is going on on some scale given how how often party observers talk about the vote-buying strategies of opposing parties in such detail as would only be known to someone who has likely thought about different vote-buying strategies themselves. Yes, not conclusive evidence at all, but I am more persuaded than I used to be that vote-buying and thus massive electoral fraud is happening.

This is especially frustrating to consider given the outcome of the 1st round of voting in the presidential election. As the MPP likely has much more significant resources (personnel and financing) to deploy than the MPRP, if any wide-spread vote-buying was happening, this likely “bought” the 2nd place finish for M Enkhbold over S Ganbaatar. I imagine that many Mongolian voters will see this similarly and will make their choice in the 2nd round with that consideration in mind.

Vote-Buying

Now, vote-buying. There seem to be so many different ways for how to pay voters in return for their vote. Obviously, this is an area where professionals keep devising ways on how to stay ahead of authorities on the one hand, but also of voters’ likely tendency to want to collect cash offered without actually having it determine their vote.

During this election, some of these schemes revolved around small loans at grocery stores, for example, where locals will surrender their national id card as collateral for small loans. Since the id card is necessary for voting, there are a number of possibilities that arise like paying off someone’s small loan just before the election which will enable them to vote and then expecting them to vote a certain way.

There has been a crack-down on attempts by voters to photograph their ballot before submitting it to offer proof that they’ve voted a certain way. In polling stations there are extensive signs now pointing out that cell phones cannot be brandished and in voting booths themselves there is a small basket provided where voters are meant to place their phone.

To the extent that rumours have specified prices, it seems that some votes were being bought for as little as ₮10,000 or just under €4. That seems like a very cheap price for a vote, but there are obviously many impoverished Mongolian voters for whom this might be a significant enough enticement to surrender their vote or to cast it for a candidate that they might have been leaning toward in any case.

Solutions

It seems to me that the attempts to secure voting in the polling stations have been just about maxed out. Overall trust in the election will not be instilled with further changes to the polling station layout, technology or other elements. Of course, that is not an argument against fine-tuning procedures further, but it means that some other approach is necessary.

Is It a Problem?

Some might argue, of course, that vote-buying does not really have an impact on the outcome of Mongolian elections as the two large parties are likely to engage in it in equal measure. I find that fairly plausible as there is no obvious reason to believe that one party is more inclined or more able to buy votes than the other party.

However, if vote-buying by the two large parties actually does more or less cancel out, it still prevents smaller parties/candidates from receiving the share of votes that Mongolians might actually like to give them. Ganbaatar in the 1st round might have been an example of this as I have discussed above.

Prosperity

There are examples of other democracies where vote-buying has more or less disappeared despite its early presence. For example, historically vote-buying seems to have been common in the U.S., but does not seem to play a significant role now, despite the many shortcomings of U.S. electoral laws and proceedings otherwise.

Part of the solution to vote-buying is wealth, of course. As incomes rise, the expected rise in “prices” for a vote will also rise, ultimately making it infeasible to purchase votes on any meaningful scale.

Voter Education

The General Election Commission should seek to increase penalties for offering to buy a vote. It should also begin to plan for the parliamentary election in 2020 to roll out some kind of campaign against vote-buying explaining to voters that selling their vote is essentially giving up the right to choose.

Office as an Earnings Opportunity

A broader effort to rid Mongolian politics of money would also be important, of course. First and foremost in such an effort has to be the perception that political office represents an earnings opportunity. As long as officials purchase their office with the expectation to financially recoup this “investment”, there will be a temptation to similarly invest in electoral outcomes.

If this perception of office as an earnings opportunity could be combatted (along with a more serious fight against corruption), some of the loose money in campaigns would also dry up.

Political Culture

In the long run, a change in Mongolia’s political culture toward more substantive debate would also counter-act vote-buying. Currently, voters are choosing to vote largely on the basis of their perception of political leaders and patronage. At that point, might as well sell your vote, as it is unclear to what extent that vote actually choses a particular course of action over another. But if it were clearer to voters what it means to vote for one party or one candidate or another to actually allow them to participate in decisions about future developments of the country, they might be more interested in casting their vote one way or another rather than simply selling it to the highest bidder.

 

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The Mechanics of a Blank Ballot

By Julian Dierkes

First, the presidential election campaign was sleepy. Then it turned sleezy. Now, things got exciting because some Mongolians seem to have found a strategy to fight back against two-party dominance and the “offer” of a choice of candidates that left many voters dissatisfied. That strategy revolves around the blank ballot, i.e. Цагаан Сонголт.

It seems that the blank ballot somehow snuck into the last revision of the election law to give citizens an option to vote “none of the above” on a ballot where they did not like the choices offered. I imagine that the original intention was simply to let voters express their support for democracy and the electoral process by showing up at a polling station, but then choosing not to elect any of the candidates.

While it is unclear to me whether this was an oversight or deliberate, this blank ballot option suddenly has taken on a lot of significance because the blank ballot is counted as a valid vote, so that it is counted when the result is examined as to whether any candidate received 50% of the votes.

This was confusing to me at first, as there are two minimum 50% requirements. [See also my earlier post on this prior to the 1st round of voting]

First, there needs to be a quorum of 50% in each polling station. If that is not reached, citizens who have not voted are given another chance to vote on the weekend following the initial vote. In the determination of this quorum, blank ballots are certainly counted. That is not the interesting question, however.

Secondly, a candidate needs to secure 50% of the valid votes to be elected, whether that is from among two or three choices.

Think about the July 7 second round:

The voting machines will tabulate four different piles of votes:

  1. Kh Battulga
  2. M Enkhbold
  3. blank
  4. invalid.

Now, in determining whether anyone has secured 50%, piles 1, 2, and 3 are thrown together to determine the total number of valid votes. Does the leader have at least 50% of this total? You see what is going on here: a blank ballot makes it that much harder to reach 50%. Assume 100 votes. A candidate would have to receive 51 votes to win. But if 10 votes are blank, the candidate needs 51/90 of the ballots that have made a choice, i.e. 57%.

Back to our current election. Battulga received 38% of the vote in the 1st round, Enkhbold 30%. If the share of blank ballot rises from 1.5% in the first round to even 4 or 5% it will make it that much harder for a candidate to win 50%.

And the revolutionary clincher is: If no candidate wins the second round, the giant reset button is pushed to force an entirely new election that excludes the possibility of re-nominating the candidates of the first election!

Discussions of the blank ballot have been percolating for the past week. First-round presidential candidate S Ganbaatar seems to have endorsed the blank ballot. Hashtags have proliferated:

On July 7, two numbers will be exciting to watch:

  1. Which candidate will receive the most votes?
  2. Will that candidate reach 50% or will the blank ballots prevent that?

 

Posted in Governance, JD Democratization, Presidential 2017, Social Movements | Tagged | 1 Comment

Ganbaatar Voters in 2nd Round

By Julian Dierkes

Ganbaatar received roughly 30% of the votes in the June 26 presidential election. One of the big questions about the July 7 2nd Round of voting is thus whom those Ganbaatar voters will support.

Enkhbayar Negotiations

To the extent that an official endorsement from the MPRP might be in play, that will most likely be determined by party chair Enkhbayar, not by Ganbaatar as the (former) candidate. [BUT SEE PS BELOW.]

If nothing else, frm president N Enkhbayar is a clever tactician, and seems to have become even more wily since being convicted for customs violations some years ago.

When there were no protests at all on the day after the election despite the sour taste that the trajectory of Ganbaatar’s initial lead over Enkhbold took Monday night, I suspected that various officials had prevailed on Enkhbayar to keep quiet, partly because of the lingering trauma from the July 1, 2008 riots and deaths. I also suspected that Enkhbayar would clearly look at this as an opportunity to negotiate, especially since the revisions to the criminal code that take effect July 1, seem to make him eligible for office again so that negotiations may be much more attractive to him than a lingering chance for a Ganbaatar presidency via protests might have been Tuesday morning.

And indeed, Mongolian media reported a lengthy meeting between Enhbayar and Enkhbold.

What might Enkhbayar be hoping for?

Should an endorsement by the MPRP put Enkhbold over the top, he’d have to resign from his parliamentary seat. That would be filled in a by-election that Enkhbayar could presumably run in. Obviously, there would be a DP and other party candidates, so the MPP would not be able to promise that seat, but it might be Enkhbayar’s best chance back into parliament.

More intriguing rumours suggest that Enkhbayar might be gunning for Prime Minister under a President Enkhbold. Now that would be a combination and a stunning comeback for the former president!

The third scenario is that if the blank ballot campaign succeeds at derailing the 2nd round of voting by holding both candidates to under 50% of the vote and causing a whole new election, Enkhbayar himself could presumably run for president in that election.

Electoral Calculations

But would Enkhbold (or Battulga) be well-advised to negotiate with Enkhbayar? The 30% of votes that Ganbaatar achieved are a tempting prize, of course. But it seems fairly doubtful that Enkhbayar would be able to “deliver” those votes to another candidate through an endorsement.

Recall that the level of party support for the MPRP seems to be somewhere around 7-8% judging by results in the 2013 and 2016 elections. So, more than two thirds of Ganbaatar’s 30% (or around 20% of the total vote) are swing or protest voters. Even if the loyal MPRP voters would follow Enhbayar’s endorsement, is there any likelihood that the remaining voters would?

If they are indeed protest voters, then they were protesting against DP-MPP dominance and are thus unlikely to support the DP or MPP candidate.

For those protest voters deciding to support either of the remaining candidates, it would be more likely to be Battulga to create a balance against MPP parliamentary dominance.

Or, such protest voters might choose to join the “white ballot” campaign to turn in blank ballots in the hopes of derailing the election with these candidates entirely. Or, they might simply stay home, depressing turnout which is still likely to be an advantage for Enkhbold, but an Enkhbayar endorsement or not probably has little to do with whether voters choose to participate or not.

It thus strikes me as pretty unlikely that large number of Ganbaatar voters would vote for Enkhbold calling the rationale behind negotiations with the MPP into question.

P.S.: Did Ganbaatar Just Endorse “None of the Above”?

In a press conference on June 30, Ganbaatar now seems to have resigned to his fate of (according to him) having been cheated out of the chance to compete in the second route voting. Instead, he seems to have endorsed the While Ballot (): “Саналын хуудсыг цагаан хэвээр нь уншуулахыг уриалж байна.”

If he continues to call for Mongolians to vote with a blank ballot, that is very likely to have a significant effect on the election as it will increase the number of blank ballots from 1.5% in the first round. Any increase in this number will make it more difficult for any candidate to receive 50% of valid votes.

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Observations during Presidential Polling

By Julian Dierkes

From the perspective of a repeat election observer (this was my fifth national election for which I served as an international observer), the reporting about the election is always somewhat challenging.

On the one hand, I gain so many impressions from election observation that I am keen to share as regular readers of this blog would guess. On the other hand, I feel a real obligation not to draw any conclusions from my personal observations, as they are just that, one person’s observation.

The verdict that the press typically looks for is “free and open” or some variation thereof. In the Mongolian context, I am not sure that that stamp of approval is of any interest to individual voters or even to NGOs, but the international press certainly feeds this label straight into reporting as it provides a nice summary that does not require further fact-checking as a quasi-official statement.

I cannot make such a statement myself, particularly in an election where I was not part of a larger organized election observation mission like the OSCE’s. For the 2017 presidential election, please see the OSCE preliminary report for such a more systematic assessment.

But, I do have a perspective to offer beyond my observations on June 26, namely that this has been my fifth election that I have observed, so I have seen some patters and can compare this year’s election to previous iterations.

Impressions

For a series of photos from the 2017 presidential election, see the Neue Zürcher Zeitung’s Matthias Müller’s photos.

On the whole, I did not see any great differences between the 2013 presidential election and this year’s iteration. As has been noted by all election observation reports, I have always been impressed by a) the care that all the people involved in polling stations take, and b) the technology that is deployed in an effort at electoral transparency and security. Both of those factors were consistent across different polling stations this year as they have been in previous years.

Just for context I should note that for this election I travelled in a long circle from Ulaanbaatar to Zun Mod to Nalaikh and back to Ulaanbaatar. In all these locations, I visited a mix of neighbourhoods from very urban to very rural. In the past as well, I have been in Ulaanbaatar as well as in various aimags across the country, from polling stations that are a stone’s throw (well a powerful throw anyway) away from government house to a polling ger set up especially for an election to comply with the no travel beyond 70km required stipulation, in this case in rural Zavkhan where in the days before the voting machines, the hand-counted results had to be transmitted by riding onto a large hill that had cell phone reception to reach the aimag electoral commission in Uliastay.

This week, I visited 16 polling stations, staying for as long as 30min at some, but as little as 10min at others. Over the five years I would say that I’ve visited a total of 100 polling stations.

This week again, the polling stations operated very smoothly. When challenges arose (lines formed, we saw one malfunctioning voting machine) the electoral commission dealt with these challenges calmly, competently and effectively.

The Layout of Polling Stations

While the physical set-up varies across polling stations, they all diligently provide a private space for voters to fill out their ballot. Tables where voters will out the ballot are deliberately angled away from the view of election officials and observers. When there was no chair in the observers’ corner once and I stood, leaning against the wall, I was quickly asked to sit down on a shared chair, as my height might have allowed me to look onto the desks where voters were filling out their ballots.

At this election for the first time (note that I was in Ulaanbaatar last year for the parliamentary election campaign, but did not stay for election day and did not serve as an observer) I saw seating plans posted at the ballot stations as part of the extensive information about the voting process that is displayed at the stations. These small architectural drawings specify locations of the registration desk, the ballot dispersal station, the voting booths, the voting machines, and the drop-the-folder-and-get-ink-mark station. Actual physical layouts followed these plans very closely. I never saw a voter even glance at the information provided, but it is another piece of evidence of the care that is taken with planning and execution of the election

Another innovation this year were the arrows that pointed voters along the chain of stations as they progressed through the polling station. In most stations, voters are guided through the sequence in a clockwise direction, following general Mongolian practice around ovoos, etc. The arrows did not seem to be very effective as few voters noticed them.

Depending of the number of voters in a riding, there are one, two, or three machines to collect the ballots.

Technology

The technology that is deployed at polling stations continues to be impressive.

Filming inside of polling station for broadcast to outside

At all polling stations, there is a large TV placed outside of the actual voting place that shows a video image of the inside. Any interested voter individual could observe the entire proceedings all day long should they care to.

Voter demographics

As voters are checked in via their fingerprint, their photo appears on a large screen in the polling station, allowing observers (mostly party observers) to confirm their identity.

The same screen also offers tabulations of voting.

This includes the same of female/male voters, a breakdown of voters by age cohorts, a breakdown of votes recorded by those collect through mobile voting, those added to a local registration, and those voting as registered.

The turnout is also presented as a number as well as a bar graph.

Obviously, an empirical social scientist’s dream.

Given the data that is produced here for the information of local citizens, I completely agree with the preliminary report of the observation missions, that “transparency was somewhat limited by the GEC releasing only aggregated results”.

If citizens and perhaps especially the local citizens and party observers could access the polling-station-by-polling station information, they would be able to compare these to their own observations further increasing trust in the election procedures. Visiting social scientists would also be thrilled. For example, during my day of observation, I noticed that in virtually all polling stations female voters outnumbered male voters, generally in a ration of about 58:42. Was this a local/regional phenomenon? What does it mean?

Fingerprinting, Laptops, Machinery

There are usually at least four laptops around the polling stations. Two operated by election officials from the citizens’ registry (sorry, forget the exact name of the agency) that are connected to the fingerprint-reader.

We saw a few incidences of the fingerprint-reader having a hard time with someone’s fingerprint, perhaps because of wrinkles, very darkly tanned skin, or skin disease. In those cases, voters were allowed to vote by being entered by their national id number.

Challenges

I have seen some challenges in the voting process, a number of them recurring. I list these here not to criticize the procedures as they were not impacted severely by these challenges, but perhaps as suggestions.

Folder

The folder that voters use to carry the ballot to the voting machine does not work well. It is simple enough, i.e. an open folder of almost equal size to the ballot. It was folder over at the top to prevent voters from trying to feed the folder into the voting machine with the ballot. We actually observed this twice, i.e. voters trying to feed the folder into the voting machine, so the fold seems to fulfill an important role. Yet, the folder system is awkward.

Voting Machine

In its design, the slot where the ballot is fed in resembles a fax machine. Those readers of a younger generation are encouraged to search for “facsimile machine” online and I trust that some virtual museum will offer a display. The design is easy enough, i.e. a slot that the ballot is fed into, just like we used to feed sheets of paper into a fax machine. But the problems seems to be that the vast majority of voters have never used a fax machine. Perhaps this design could be improved upon.

Also (as always happened with fax machines, and still happens with copy machines) it is very unclear how to insert the ballot, upside down, right side up? It turns out that it does not matter, but voters do not realize that and election commission members are often asked to help. That seems to be a somewhat systemic weakness, though it also speaks to the humanity and pragmatism of the election commissions.

The greatest menace to the voting machine are toddlers and babies. Mongolia being a very child-friendly society in public, obviously sees many parents of young children brining their kids along to vote. Well, kids like to push buttons and pull on things. The voting machines do not always take well to these expressions of affection and some officials get quite nervous when children are circling the voting machine.

Conclusion

I have nothing to say about the election in general, having only seen a very specific subsection of polling stations. However, the election operated smoothly at these stations (as it had at the very many stations I have visited previously since 2008), and the operations inside the ballot station do not give rise to any suspicions of fraud at all. Instead, in technical terms, it seems to me that the enormous effort put unto planning and execution of the election pays of handsomely in terns of the organizational success that it represents.

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Gobi Success for Ganbaatar

By Julian Dierkes

The electoral map from Monday’s results holds a number of surprises. One of the more puzzling ones is Ganbaatar’s strong results across the Gobi region.

Umnugovi

For example, in Umnugovi fully 43% of voters supported Ganbaatar on turnout that was in line with the national rate.

Recall that Umnugovi is Mongolia’s leading mining aimag with the large projects at Oyu Tolgoi and Tavan Tolgoi. But Ganbaatar’s record shows him at least skeptical about governance arrangements for these provinces. While there may be local concerns about the impact of mining, there are also numerous jobs in this region that depend on mining and since the pre-election nation-wide surveys suggested that employment was one of the concerns foremost on Mongolians’ minds, it seems surprising to see this high rate of support.

When we saw Ganbaatar campaign in Dalanzadgad, the event did not suggest a surge of support in the province only days before the election. While Ganbaatar turned his mining rhetoric down somewhat at the event, he still spoke about the questions he wants to raise about large mining projects.

Any visit to Dalanzadgad will also show a town that might not quite be a boomtown, but that is certainly bustling, with more active markets and more modern buildings and cars than one might expect in a relatively small aimag capital of a population of less than 20,000. Of course, the total population of Umnugovi is less than 70,000 and the aimag only contributed a total of 27,000 votes, so this is a bit of a Pyrrhic victory for Ganbaatar.

Across the Region

And it wasn’t just Umnugovi. In Dundgovi, Ganbaatar received over 46% of the vote! In Dorngovi the three candidates split the vote more or less evenly. In Govi-Altai, Ganbaatar was strong in second place behind Enkbold. It was only in Bayankhongor where Battulga seemingly atoned for his 2016 parliamentary defeat with a very strong showing (60%) that Ganbaatar failed to make any inroads (10.5%).

I have yet to come across an explanation of this strength across the southern region of Mongolia. Could it be related to the lower population density somehow? More reliance on media rather than word-of-mouth or discussions with neighbours?

Posted in Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Presidential 2017 | Tagged | 4 Comments

Presidential Elections: 3 Things Happened

By Julian Dierkes

The results of the June 26 presidential election has come as a big surprise. I did not expect Battulga to win and certainly did not expect Enkhbold to struggle to finish 2nd.

Lots of questions to think about in coming days. But here is an attempt at a very first, overarching look at what has happened and how to understand it by describing the result around 3 themes:

  1. Battulga won
  2. Mongolians spoke their mind
  3. Campaigns matter

Note that these are almost purely domestic issues, foreign policy and even relations with neighbours did not play a big role in the outcome, I think, despite some of the patriotic symbolism.

Battulga Won

Some of the football podcasts I listen to start with “chronicler’s diary”, i.e. the basic facts of the previous match.

While the closeness in the number of votes between Enkhbold and Ganbaatar and how that has come about is a fascinating topic, the most fundamental result of the election is that Kh Battulga won this election. He did not win it outright, i.e. not with 50%+, but he received around 8% more of the votes than either Enkbold or Ganbaatar.

Battulga essentially won on the back of a sweep of the large (in population terms) Ulaanbaatar districts. He achieved his best result in the city in Bayangol district where he received 50.6% of votes. Enkhbold’s less-than-glorious history as Ulaanbaatar mayor particularly related to land privatizations probably played a role in this sweep of the city districts, though the city has traditionally been a DP stronghold.

Mongolians Speak their Mind

Like last year, Mongolians spoke their mind and gave nearly a third of their votes to a candidate that was deemed to have at best an outside chance, Ganbaatar. Since the “natural constituency” for the MPRP is only about 7 or 8%, more than 20% of voters were either convinced by Ganbaatar’s campaign (strikes me as unlikely, see my impressions) or cast their ballot in protest against dominance of politics by MAHAH.

They voted in numbers equal to the last presidential election and some of the drop from last year’s parliamentary election might be attributed to the stifling heat.

I think that democracy is alive and well.

Campaigns Matter

Even when many Mongolians seem to think that only money matters in elections, some of the result can probably be attributed to campaigning. Not the substance of the platforms (which I’ve written about), but the personal qualities of the candidates. Put simply, Battulga was a much better campaigner than many expected and Enkhbold possibly even worse than expected.

Battulga seemed at ease in large as well as small forums and gained momentum by more and more support from DP grandees over the course of the campaign. This was also visible in the TV debate between the candidates. Battulga seemed at ease and even somewhat charming.

Not Enkhbold. He almost never smiled during the campaign, does not connect with audiences (even partisan ones) and simply does not build enthusiasm for his candidacy. While some may argue that a portion of Mongolian voters appreciate the dour-apparatchik demeanour as a signal of seriousness, I think many do not.

Posted in JD Democratization, Presidential 2017 | Tagged | 5 Comments

Presidential Debate or FAQ?

By Mendee

The presidential campaign closed with a two-hour debate on June 24.  Under the agreement between the DP, MPP, and MPRP for the debate, candidates were basically provided opportunities to express their views on frequently rumoured allegations during the presidential campaign.  Although the format (e.g., opening and closing, sequencing, timing, and grouping of questions) was great, it wasn’t a presidential debate, where voters could critically judge three candidates based on their values/principles, election platforms and/or policy options.

If three debates were held as had been hoped by organizers, things might have been different.  Candidates were skillful in engaging the blame-game techniques: Enkhbold on the DP government, Battulga on the MPP government, and Ganbaatar against the MANAN/ANMAN (a coalition government of the DP and MPP).

Responding to Allegations

The debate achieved at least two objectives.

First, we have seen three candidates on one screen and compared their public speaking skills.  Second, voters learned their personal views on numerous allegations: shady city land privatization deals and public post trading (known as the 60 million case) from Enkhbold; incomplete university, Feng Shui, and the “moonies” from Ganbaatar; non-transparent privatizations of state-owned enterprises, railroad deals, ties with Singaporean businessmen from Battulga.  Even though it was nice to hear their own views on these allegations, the final say rests with the judiciary and law enforcement agencies, esp., the anti-corruption authorities.

Policy Challenges

Candidates didn’t engage in real policy issues pertinent to the presidential institution. This causes some worries. First, (maybe) advisors, associates, and staffs of the presidential candidates have little knowledge about the institution.  Second, (maybe) the public or those who sent questions were most interested in street rumours. Third, our candidates are either little prepared or less enthusiastic about the post.  In the end, one of these candidates will assume the presidency, associates will work for the president, and voters need to judge them again after four years.  We could expect that less enthusiastic presidents will do nothing whereas too ambitious/less knowledgeables president will cause more challenges.  The former would just sit there as a symbolic figure with second-round hopes and the latter would upset the power dynamics.

Instead of wasting time over unproven allegations and incomplete investigations of their past wrongdoings, voters would love to see their wisdoms on the following issue.

For one, the most important constitutional mandate for the president is “the embodiment of the unity of Mongolian people (art. 30.1).  Voters all know that political and business elites, factions, and public are deeply divided based on our values, principles, interests, and social status.  There are hidden problems with Kazakh ethnic minority. Voters can come up with many explanations for why, but candidates could tell us how they approach – the issue of national unity.  Nowadays, a simple election, single Korean businessman, religious sect (Moonies) or sinophobic rumours could easily divide the homogenous society.

Secondly, the president, as a head of state, has greater authority and responsibilities in regards with foreign policy, which requires delicate, professional management.  Yes, Ganbaatar and Battulga expressed their views on lopsided relations with China vis-a-vis Russia.  Ganbaatar highlighted economic engagements.  However, all candidates need to express their views on how Mongolia could adapt in changing geopolitical and economic arrangements at the global and regional settings.  Would we expect changes or innovations in our current conduct of foreign policies?  What are their stances on the SCO, EEU, APEC and dealings with EU?  How about the tripartite summit with two neighbours?  How about third neighbours?  And, most importantly, what would candidates do to limit the politicization and partisan instrumentalization of the foreign service?

Thirdly, the president is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and shared responsibilities with the parliament and cabinet over all other uniformed services:  intelligence, police, border troops, emergency service and marshall.  Yes, at a moment, Mongolia is at peace, but there is a constitutional mandate for the president to initiate and oversee policies to maintain the “small, capable, professional” armed service. Voters clearly see the increasingly politicization of uniformed services and questionable conduct of professionalism in a number law enforcement agencies.  Military veterans, who were part of the Soviet-style, professional service, expressed their discontents for having a wresler – Defence Minister, an emergency serviceman – Deputy Minister, and a logistical officer as the Chief of the General Staff and for politicizing the most respected professional service – the military.  Candidates didn’t say a word in this regard.

Fourthly, the most discussed issue was the judiciary. All seemingly agreed the existence of the partial judiciary and politicized conducts of the law enforcement agencies.  Ganbaatar and Battulga presented themselves and their associates as victims of the nonpartial and politicized judiciary and law enforcement authorities.  Yes, there are facts and experience.  Seemingly, we all know about it and even both candidates as well as voters may be in agreement on why this is the case.  However, none of candidates tell us how they would fix this imminent, most dangerous policy problem.   Would they just simply continue the past practices?  What do they think of past judicial reforms?  How about new criminal code?  Or, the marshall service (tahar)?  How would they execute the power of pardoning (including foreigners)?  What would they do to increase trust in judiciary and law enforcement agencies?  Could they make them merit-based, independent, and professional?

Besides these key authorities, they, if willing, could exercise more authorities (checks and balances) in dealing with the parliament and cabinet.  Just to list a few:

  • How they would use the veto power and the authority to initiate laws and changes?  Would they pressure the parliament to implement the legislation on law-passing procedures?  Are there new legislative actions (bills, amendment) in their mind?
  • What would be their initial guidance to the Prime Minister under the Constitutional article 33.2? In what areas?  Are they in support or disagreement with policies and measures of the current cabinet (Prime Minister)?  Could we expect any changes?
  • How would candidates understand the power of the National Security Council (NSC)?  How would they use the power of the Chairmanship of the NSC and organizations under the NSC?  What would be the top 5 issues to be discussed at the first series of the NSC meetings?

Finally, two important issues were not fully discussed.  First, how would each candidate deal with their respective political party once he takes the oath of leaving partisan politics behind? Would he deal with all parties equally?  Would he believe in complete disconnection from his own party bureaucracy, especially the financing?  Second, what were their thoughts on the constitutional change?  Come on, this could have been the most crucial issue for the presidential institution because this second revision would re-shape the power arrangement of the domestic politics completely.  Whether he is in favour or against the change?  If so, what would be his role and stance in this process.  These two issues very critical for the new president.  Soon, he would be entering the lame duck period asking favour from his party leaders and factions to support him for the second round.  Or, he would fighting for the institutional survival in the constitutional revision process.

Posted in Corruption, Foreign Policy, Military, Presidential 2017 | Tagged | Leave a comment

Reflection on Campaign & Outlook [Video]

By Julian Dierkes

If you’re tired of all our blog post or of my convoluted prose, here’s a 2-minute wrap-up of the presidential campaign and a little bit of an outlook.

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