By Julian Dierkes
Over my long years of providing analysis of contemporary Mongolia, there have been many occasions to reflect on the role that hosting international meetings has played.
Most recently (though not that recent) I reflected on this in the context of Mongolia joining the Friends in Defence of Democracy in 2020. I do not think that initaitive ever did anything.
But at the time, it already seemed like Mongolia’s heyday of engagement in international diplomatic conferences had long passed. Conferences that Mongolia hosted were Community of Democracies (2013), Freedom Online Coalition (2015), Asia Europe Summit (2016). Other concrete engagement with the UN in particular have been the efforts around establishing the Landlocked Developing Countries as a group. Mongolia has hosted the International Think Tank for Landlocked Developing Countries for some time. But all these activities have a distinct 2010s ring to them.
There are other, sometimes on-going activities that have also tried to emphasize Mongolia’s potential role as a mediator or location for discussions. There was a flurry of activity during Trump I when it seemed like Ulaanbaatar might be under consideration as a site for a Kim-Trump Summit. The most sustained activity has been the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue in this regard.
This August, the Mongolian government is poised to host the 17th Conference of Parties to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification as the culmination of a series of conversations about deserts and rangelands. That is really the first time since ASEM, so in 10 years, that a major international initiative is coming to Ulaanbaatar.
Mongolia’s Diplomatic Relations
What role have international events played in Mongolia’s foreign policy? Briefly, some of Mongolia’s foreign policy is focused on building close ties with neighbours beyond the two immediate geographic neighbours, Russia and China. While relations with those two neighbours are central to Mongolia’s geopolitical position and have to be constructive in all kinds of ways, additional ties beyond these neighbours are meant to provide some balance or back-up in case one or both of the neighbours become too overbearing.
Given Mongolia’s landlocked position and the challenges that poses to trade interactions, relations with Third Neighbours have thus largely focused on diplomatic initiatives. I would identify two tracks of initiatives, bilateral and multi-lateral, the latter largely focused on the UN. As bilateral relations are concerned, Mongolia has concluded more and more deepening agreements with different kinds of neighbours, from the two immediate neighbours, to Asian neighbors, and more distant neighbours, largely industrialized democracies.
There have also been various initiatives of trade policies that have expanded the network of trade agreements, though on the whole these have been greater in their symbolic political value than their impact on trade or the economy has been.
The Third Neighbour Policy and International Events
As I mentioned above, the early 2010s saw a flurry of international events that were hosted by the government of Mongolia, but we have seen much fewer efforts of this type in recent years. Why is that? Three reasons stand out to me: changed global circumstances, available funding, leadership changes.
Changed Global Circumstances
There is a relatively small area of scholarship that looks at international organizations and their prominence, see for example M Debre and H Dijkstra’s “Are international organizations in decline? An absolute and relative perspective on institutional change”. There are also attempts to capture trends in the number of international conferences, summits, etc. for example by the Union of International Associations. Looking at their numbers through 2024, there is a huge drop-off in meetings during the COVID years. Prior to that, during the 2010s, numbers fluctuate, but do not seem to show a particular trend.
But while the total number of international meetings may have held roughly steady in the 2010s, perhaps the number of meetings of organizations that had some kind of a more progressive agenda may have dropped off. Organizations like the Freedom Online Coalition or the Community of Democracies, both of which Mongolia hosted, may have represented a historical moment of momentum for democratization and freedom that has been brought to an abrupt end by the isolationist and erratic policies of two Trump administration and the resurgence of authoritarianism. Progressive international meetings may have been a particular fertile playing field for Mongolia and its Third Neighbour policy and they may have declined in significance.
Funding
From 2010 to 2013 or so was a moment when Mongolian policy makers were in a very expansive mood. The advent of a mining boom suggested future prosperity which seemed to make international initiatives that were largely aimed at bolstering symbolic relations, possible. One example of such funding was the creation of the International Cooperation Fund which was intended as South-to-South cooperation and development aid. However, the expectations of future funds coupled with policy changes that dampened the mining boom have led to structural fiscal challenges that continue to reverberate today and that ended such initiatives.
Perceptions of corrupt practices around international meetings may have also led to a decline in the appetite for such meetings. Most notorious in this regard were perhaps the “ASEM Villas” which have had a significant afterlife in popular discourse.
Leadership Changes
A little less than a year before Mongolia’s next presidential election (summer 2027) one might consider the impact that presidents have had on foreign policy. After all, foreign policy is one of the areas that is designated as an area of presidential initiative and formal responsibility, for example through the appointment of ambassadors.
If we think of the early 2010s as the heyday of the hosting of international events, than this falls squarely within the presidency of Ts Elbegdorj. And indeed, we might think of Elbegdorj as the most international president of the four incumbents I have observed (Enkhbayar 2005-09, Elbegdorj 2009-17, Battulga 2017-21, Khurelsukh 2021-2027), although I would have to qualify that as “most international” form a European or North American perspective, where I might easily confuse friendliness towards the OECD with internationalism. Nevertheless, Elbegdorj embraced a number of foreign policies that were innovative and targeted at deepening relations, particularly at the UN. His initiative to commit Mongolia to neutrality was ultimately abandoned, but might have caught the attention of other leaders. Likewise the International Think Tank for Landlocked Developing Countries, explicitly established as a UN initiative. Of course, Elbegdorj had two terms, so his impact was largely greater in any case, but I am relatively sure that even with a second term, Battulga’s impact at the UN would have remained very limited. With this term sunsetting, it is not yet clear what Khurelsukh’s impact has been. At least he has regularly travelled to UN General Assembly meetings, but it was also during his presidency that Mongolia abandoned its candidacy for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, likely to make room for a Japanese candidacy. There has been no announcement of another attempt at gaining such a seat during his presidency.
Future Meetings
Based on what I have said above, it seems unlikely that Mongolia will re-embrace its role as host for prominent international meetings. There could be all kinds of circumstances that would change that quickly, including geopolitical developments, economic developments, or leadership changes, but for the moment it seems like COP17 may be the only significant multilateral meeting that Mongolia is likely to host this decade.
