By Julian Dierkes
During my April 2026 visit to Mongolia I had a chance to have some discussions about Mongolian foreign policy and geopolitics, including discussions at the Institute of Strategic Studies and the Academy of Science’s Institute of International Studies, but also with various contacts – Mongolian and international – around town.
I heard some arguments and areas of concern that looked different to me before these conversations.
Power of Siberia
I thought the Power of Siberia pipeline had died a slow death. It had always seemed like the only party interested in a gas pipeline from Siberia via Mongolia to China was Russia. Chinese interest seemed lukewarm at best and I have never heard a plausible argument that Mongolia has anything to gain by the pipeline.
But now, largely due to repercussions of Trump’s attack on Iran and resultant disruptions to global supplies, the pipeline may be back alive. Apparently, it has now been mentioned in the Chinese Five-Year Plan for the first time, “China will begin to advance preparatory work on the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline”. Begin to advance preparatory… not exactly a ringing endorsement, but an endorsement none the less. The timing of the change of the 5-year plan is unclear to me, by the way. Did this come after attacks on Iran?
Of course, given Trump’s unpredictability and the current ceasefire, attacks on Iran may end any day and if it has been disruptions to Chinese supply caused by those attacks that revived the pipeline project, this factor may also disappear nearly as quickly as it appeared.
To be sure though, I fail to see any scenario where Mongolia gains anything by hosting the pipeline, in fact, I think it will be a threat to Mongolia.
Yes, the pipeline may have a small spigot for Mongolia to draw gas, but that would still be a Russian supply, so the country would be no less dependent on Russia than before. I imagine that pipeline technology is far enough advanced that the Mongolian spigot could be (threatened to be) turned off without flow to China being disrupted.
Yes, there will be some kind of transfer fee, but I have not heard of a country that has got rich off pipeline transfer fees.
Yes, there will be construction, but with China in the mix, I would be very surprised if Mongolian companies got any kind of significant share of these contracts.
Finally, the threats: Russia will construct the pipeline to be some kind of extraterritorial conduit from Russia to China. That implies the potential to provide justification of some kind of intervention to defend this Russian asset on Mongolian territory as one can sadly easily see being made.
Also, environmental threats, as pipelines always carry some risk.
Dalai Lama Succession
In my list of potential threats to Mongolian security I had listed Dalai Lama succession as a topic that means very little to the world outside of Mongolia. My discussions showed that this is a topic very present to Mongolian foreign policy thinkers.
What’s the threat? The Chinese regime continues to react quickly and harshly to just about anything to do with the Dalai Lama, including visits to his Mongolian flock, back when those were still happening. But, the Dalai Lama is aging. When he passes, it seems to be expected that there will be some kind of battle over naming a reincarnation between Beijing and the Tibetan Buddhists clergy (or the government in exile). A scenario where two reincarnations are identified seems somewhat likely to be the result.
What if the non-regime-sanctioned reincarnation is found in Mongolia? Chinese pressure against or reaction to any such announcement would be severe. Yet, the Mongolian population may be supportive of such an announcement leaving the government to deal with a traditionally strong anti-Chinese sentiment that would be coupled with religious fervour.
Somewhat similarly, would Mongolians largely reject a regime-identified reincarnation and thus bolster counterclaims?
Or, another interesting scenario, what if Mongolian Buddhists turn inward upon passing of the current Dalai Lama who is clearly revered in the country. So, a domestic turn with the reincarnation of the Bogd Khaan as the leader and a Mongolian turn away from Tibet? This would sidestep Chinese kneejerk reactions to anything to do with the Dalai Lama. This scenario might be bolstered by the boy’s U.S. birth and links which presumably would give a sort of security back-up to Mongolian veneration.
I wonder what such a scenario would mean for Inner Mongolians, ie would they follow a Mongolian branch led by the Jetsundampa, or turn toward the regime-identified Dalai Lama?
While there clearly is some interest in the fate of the Dalai Lama internationally and, related, of Tibetan Buddhism, as shown by the comparable media frenzy around the Mongolian announcement of the identification of the reincarnation in 2023, there is little awareness of this as a factor in Mongolia’s geopolitical position.
The Neighbors: Eurasian Economic Union and China Asserting?
I have yet to meet anyone who seriously argues that the EEU is anything but a Russian power play and that there is any chance of Mongolian businesses benefitting. Otherwise, the usual from Russian actors in Mongolia: frequent testy reminders of Russian interests. Moscow seems to be in one of its not-so-interested phases, despite the pipeline, perhaps.
I did hear some conversations that pointed to increasing Chinese aggressiveness toward Mongolia, but quietly so. I am a little skeptical on these pointers as they are often taking a relatively short-term view of Sino-Mongolian relations. For the 20 years that I have been observing these relations, I would claim that the Chinese regime has been remarkably “soft” on Mongolia. Yes, ocassional outbursts around Dalai Lama visits, but otherwise? Small to medium-sized investments in the resource sector and a presence in domestic markets that befits the only (really) trading partner, but major grabs of pieces of the resource sector. And, the one foreign policy area where Beijing seems to have a clear preference, full membership in the SCO, has been an area where the Mongolian government has resisted.
Is the current Chinese ambassador, Shen Minjuan, particularly aggressive? I would point to 2020 when a visit by Foreign Minister Wang seemed to spur a bout of wolf diplomacy aimed former president Elbegdorj over criticism of language discrimination in Inner Mongolia. So, this does not appear to be particularly new and we would have to ask China-watchers to understand bureaucratic policies within the Chinese foreign ministry to really have a sense.
I did hear increasing discussions of Chinese and Russian disinformation campaigns. I am not sure that I have enough information about what is being asserted there to really try to analyze it, but might at a later stage…
