Assessing Academic Freedom Index Score

Posted on May 20, 2025 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

I recently posted my description of what the Academic Freedom Index measures and how Mongolia has been scored. Is Mongolia’s decline on Academic Freedom Index real? Or, what is this decline measuring?

How are we to understand Mongolia’s score?

But, even though the declining score may be less meaningful in magnitude than it seems initially, it clearly is measuring something. What might that something be?

Looking at #AcademicFreedomIndex components @vdeminstitute.bsky.social since 2015 in more detail.

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— Mongolia Focus (@mongoliafocus.bsky.social) 9. April 2025 um 11:10

First, what are the five indicators measuring? Here, I turn to the V-Dem codebook for answers. Note the listing of answers also gives some meaning to the numbers that are reported with the index scores. For example, when the index reports 2.81 as the score for “freedom to research and teach” that means that the answer “Mostly free. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are rarely subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.” (see below) is closest to the average value reported.

Freedom of Academic and Cultural Expression

Survey question: “Is there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues?”
Answers:
0: Not respected by public authorities. Censorship and intimidation are frequent. Academic activities and cultural expressions are severely restricted or controlled by the government.
1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced occasionally, but direct criticism of the government is mostly met with repression.
2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced routinely, but strong criticism of the government is sometimes met with repression.
3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are few limitations on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression, and resulting sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft.
4: Fully respected by public authorities. There are no restrictions on academic freedom or cultural expression.

Freedom to research and teach

Question: “To what extent are scholars free to develop and pursue their own research and teaching agendas without interference?”
Answers:
0: Completely restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are, across all disciplines, consistently subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.
1: Severely restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are, in some disciplines, consistently subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.
2: Moderately restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are occasionally subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.
3: Mostly free. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are rarely subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.
4: Fully free. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are not subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.

Freedom of academic exchange and dissemination

Question: “To what extent are scholars free to exchange and communicate research ideas and findings?”
Answers:
0: Completely restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is, across all disciplines, consistently subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.
1: Severely restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is, in some disciplines, consistently subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.
2: Moderately restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is occasionally subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.
3: Mostly free. Academic exchange and dissemination is rarely subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.
4: Fully free. Academic exchange and dissemination is not subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

Institutional autonomy

Question: “To what extent do universities exercise institutional autonomy in practice?”
Answers:
0: No autonomy at all. Universities do not exercise any degree of institutional autonomy; non-academic actors control decision-making.
1: Minimal autonomy. Universities exercise only very limited institutional autonomy; non-academic actors interfere extensively with decision-making.
2: Moderate autonomy. Universities exercise some institutional autonomy; non-academic actors interfere moderately with decision-making.
3: Substantial autonomy. Universities exercise institutional autonomy to a large extent; non-academic actors have only rare and minimal influence on decision-making.
4: Complete autonomy. Universities exercise complete institutional autonomy from non-academic actors.

Campus integrity

Question: “To what extent are campuses free from politically motivated surveillance or security infringements?”
Answers:
0: Completely restricted. Campus integrity is fundamentally undermined by extensive surveillance and severe intimidation, including violence or closures.
1: Severely restricted. Campus integrity is to a large extent undermined by surveillance and intimidation, at times including violence or closures.
2: Moderately restricted. Campus integrity is challenged by some significant cases of surveillance or intimidation.
3: Mostly free. Campus integrity is to a large extent respected, with only minor cases of surveillance or intimidation.
4: Fully free. Campus integrity is comprehensively respected; there are no cases of surveillance or intimidation.

You might want to compare the answers you might give to these questions to the score reported to get a sense for the validity (or not, from your perspective) of the expert scores.

Changes in Mongolia’s Score

Institutional Autonomy

What are we to make of the decline in Mongolia’s score then. As far as I am aware there have been no significant legislative changes to higher education/academic freedom in the past ten years. Am I missing something?

Yes, the sense that there are some challenges with the governance structure of Mongolian higher education institutions has been common for some years. This would be captured by the institutional autonomy variable. On this variable, Mongolia is scored at 0.53 compared to a global average of 0.24 (2024). The indicator for Mongolia has been declining to approach the global indicator. But are Mongolian universities significantly less autonomous in 2024 than they were in 2014? The score here goes from 1.53 to 0.53 over this period.

 

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Recall from the answer key above that Mongolia went from somewhere right between 2=moderate autonomy and 1= minimal autonomy  to somewhere between minimal autonomy and 0=no autonomy at all. When we look across the world, compared to many other nations, Mongolian higher education institutions have between minimal and no autonomy at all? Sure, that may apply to some appointments (though note that the formal governance structure of Mongolian universities is not dissimilar to that of the example of Canadian universities), but some academic hires at least are made by academic criteria, are they not? Some curricular decisions are made without even the threat of political interference, are they not? Cynically speaking, given that the budgets of state universities are almost entirely reliant on tuition payments, is there not some level of financial autonomy in that? And, even if none of these limited levels of autonomy exist, did they exist to a much greater extent 10 years ago?

I think of events recently that have highlighted the lack of institutional autonomy. The first example I can think of is the installation of D Badarch as president of MUIS in 2023. While Badarch seemed eminently qualified given his long service at UNESCO, many faculty members objected to the process by which he was appointed, i.e. by political fiat. He was removed as president a mere year later.

The other moment when I have come in contact with the lack of institutional autonomy is in the context of the International Congress of Mongolists in 2023 where there was significant unhappiness with the governance structure of that group. There certainly is a strong sense among Mongolian colleagues that universities are unable to act autonomously and that their research does not enjoy a lot of freedom. Note that almost all my contacts are with academics at state universities.

To me, the answer is relatively clear: I don’t think that institutions are significantly less autonomous now than they were ten years ago. To be sure, I am not saying that institutional autonomy is not important in assessing academic freedom for Mongolia, nor that institutions have a large degree of autonomy, but I am saying that I don’t see a lot of change over the past ten years when the indicator shows such change.

Freedom Indicators

What about the other indicators that make up the Academic Freedom Index then? Because I had been so puzzled by the significant decline in the Index, I wanted to be sure to speak to academic colleagues during a recent trip to Mongolia to compare my observations (nothing substantial has happened) to their experience of academic freedom. Here, I am referring to aspects captured by the three freedoms in the index, academic expression, research and teaching, and academic exchange.

When I probed colleague to ask “have you experienced any restrictions on your ability to choose topics of research, teach, etc.?”. I mostly got the answer that, “no” they had not experienced such restrictions. This confirmed my own sense (and also how I scored this variable myself). But that is not where the discussion ended.

Colleagues did refer to the fairly public dispute that National University’s Munkh-Erdene G is pursuing, but as far as I can tell, this centres on conditions of employment, course assignments, etc. not content of research or teaching.

If there don’t appear to be new substantive restrictions, some colleagues did mention rising expectations of conformity from unspecified public/bureaucratic actors. For example, some kind of compliance with Vision 2050 was mentioned, to potentially be “tested” in some fashion. I was a bit shocked by that as that document really primarily collected all kinds of strategic plan, agendas, etc. without shaping them into a coherent vision as it claims to have done. How would one even comply with such a document, never mind the ludicrousness of a notion of such compliance. But, this is a concern for academic freedom! Yet, it was only mentioned as a minor irritant, not something that had really begun to place restrictions on research and teaching, yet.

Broadly speaking, I thus came away with a reinforced notion of fairly limited substantial change in academic freedom aspects despite the notable decline in the index.

Index Contrary to my Sense of Academic Freedom. How could that Be?

Bad-vibes Bias

Assume for the moment that I’m right, meaning that the institutional autonomy of Mongolian institutions of higher education has not changed substantively over the past ten years. What could be going on in the index? The social scientific literature talks about something called bad-vibes bias. What is that bias? “experts have been increasingly negatively biased due to pessimism about the state of democracy” is how it is defined by Knutsen et al. (2024. “Conceptual and Measurement Issues in Assessing Democratic Backsliding.” PS: Political Science & Politics 57(2): 162–77. doi: 10.1017/S104909652300077X.) My fear is thus that fellow V-Dem coders for Mongolia are pessimistic about Mongolia or, I would argue, perhaps see Mongolian democracy in a more negative light than others (i.e., me) might.

However, Knutsen et al. and other analyses show that on the global level some of the fears about biases, including bad-vibes bias are unfounded. The V-Dem stewards have also taken a variety of methods and statistical measures against such biases. The V-Dem Methodology pages offer extensive discussion of various coding and statistical decisions.

But those analyses are global, not country-specific and as all country experts likely do, I’m inclined to think that my case is special (obviously, Mongolia is special!).

Obviously, challenges to institutional autonomy and other aspects of academic freedom will be much more visible, perhaps palatable, to colleagues who work at Mongolian institutions. But I do wonder whether the constraints on academic freedom are not being exaggerated a bit, particularly when I look at this on a global scale.

Have there been any dismissals of academics for their choice of research topic (freedom of research and teaching)? Have any academics been censured for publishing on particular topics or reaching and publicizing their conclusions (freedom of academic exchange and dissemination, freedom of academic and cultural expression)? I am honestly not aware of such cases, while examples of such decisions abound in some countries that are ranked higher than Mongolia in the Academic Freedom Index.

Perhaps, the bad vibes are being applied specifically to an examination of Mongolia, rather than responding to a more global trend?

Mongolia Pessimism

Another source of the declining index contrary to my observations, could be that coders are adopting a particular attitude toward Mongolia, still a variant of bad vibes, but perhaps due to the narrowness of the field of research on Mongolia and the limited “supply” of comparativists likely participating in the V-Dem coding.

I have long noticed that my assessments of Mongolian democracy have been more positive than many interlocutors based in Mongolia. Some of that may be my optimistic personality, but some of it I attribute to a comparative perspective differing from one that is focused internally and exclusively on domestic developments. As I said to colleagues during conversation in Ulaanbaatar when we were going through example questions and they answered 0 and 1 to some questions, “You are not North Korea!”. Yes, things may be troubling, but they are troubling in a context where you can talk about those concerns, that in itself being a significant (academic) freedom. So, I do think that a comparative perspective may lead me to underestimate some of the atmospheric changes that are happening in Mongolia compared to colleagues and potentially fellow V-Dem experts who might be more inward-looking. Presumably, that may be due to a greater portion of single-country experts for a country like Mongolia compared to other scores.

But, in the end…

Returning to earlier consideration of #academicfreedom in #Mongolia based on @vdeminstitute.bsky.social
mongoliafocus.com/2025/04/acad…
Important to keep in mind that 🇲🇳 continues to maintain much higher levels of academic freedom than neighbours!

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— Mongolia Focus (@mongoliafocus.bsky.social) May 5, 2025 at 5:30 PM

And, here’s another comparison: Türkiye which has been a prominent case of concern as well.

Since I continue to think abt #AcademicFreedom in #Mongolia, here’s the corresponding graph for 2019-2024, period of decline in the Academic Freedom Index components.
Note relatively (compared to 🇹🇷) even shape, pointing to, again relatively, high degree of academic freedom across all 5 indicators.

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— Mongolia Focus (@mongoliafocus.bsky.social) 13. Mai 2025 um 11:48

Posted in Academia, Global Indices, Higher Education, Research on Mongolia, Social Change | Tagged | Leave a comment

Mongolia Focus WhatsApp Channel

Posted on May 14, 2025 by JDierkes

Yes, it’s the Meta Imperium, but we’ve created a Mongolia Focus WhatsApp channel.

Mongolia Focus logo: A mongolian hearth

Follow the channel to receive notifications of new posts published here.

For other ways to follow, see our Following page.

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Guest Post: May Day by Natsagdorj

Posted on May 5, 2025 by JDierkes

By Khishigtugs Amarbayasgalan

Natsagdorj Dashdorj (1906–1937) is widely regarded as the founder of modern Mongolian literature. Natsagdorj was part of the first generation of Mongolian students sent abroad after the revolution (1921 revolution in Mongolia), and among the earliest to study in Germany—an experience that deeply influenced his modernist, globally engaged writing. A poet, playwright, and journalist, he was part of the first generation of Mongolian intellectuals shaped by revolutionary ideals and international education. He studied in Leipzig, Germany, and his works blended Mongolian tradition with modernist influences. Despite his short life, Natsagdorj left a lasting legacy, capturing the voice of a new, modern Mongolia in transition. His detailed biography is here.

Natsagdorj died tragically young, at just 31 years old, and the exact cause of his death remains unclear. Older generations often say he drank heavily and died on the street. More recent interpretations, however, suggest he may have been a victim of political repression—possibly purged by the brutal totalitarian regime of the time (watch documentaries as well as here). I think both explanations might hold some truth. Living under a system that stifled thought and punished dissent, intellectuals like Natsagdorj often faced unbearable pressure. A value crisis—a sense of alienation, loss, or disillusionment—can be as deadly as any bullet. Oppressive systems do not always kill with violence; sometimes they destroy slowly, through despair. Today, his legacy lives on. The Natsagdorj Library in Ulaanbaatar, named in his honor, is the second-largest library in Mongolia—a quiet but enduring tribute to the power of ideas and literature.

In his well-known short story “The Old Boy”, Natsagdorj wrote: “Blue mongolia became red mongolia. The old boy became the new boy.” I think the color blue symbolizes the old, conservative, feudal society, while red represents the new, progressive, socialist society. This transformation is not just personal—it reflects the sweeping changes Mongolia was undergoing during the revolutionary period.

Interestingly, the Mongolian national flag itself reflects this tension and transition. Its background is made up of three vertical bands: red, blue, red. Red dominates two-thirds of the flag, while blue occupies only one-third. It is as if the old Mongolia—the blue, traditional steppe—now stands flanked by a new, rising force of socialist transformation. Through both story and symbol, Natsagdorj captured a nation in the midst of redefining itself.

In 1931, Natsagdorj translated Part 1 Commodities and Money of the first volume of Karl Marx’s Capital into Mongolian. He completed this translation in collaboration with Tseveen Jamsran, working from February to May of that year in the Yuruu River basin of Selenge Province.

Historically, on April 29, 1922, the Ministry of Military Affairs of the Mongolian People’s Government issued Order No. 31, declaring the celebration of May 1st. The order was signed by General Sukhbaatar Damdin, stating: “Year Twelve, Third Month, Third Day. Minister of Military Affairs and Commander-in-Chief of All Armed Forces, Sukhbaatar.” Mongolia has stopped celebrating this day since shifting to capitalism 1990, and even the current younger generation does not know about this significant day.

May 1 in a Capitalist Country

“May 1 in a Capitalist Country” by Natsagdorj Dashdorj, to my knowledge, has never been translated into English before—so I decided to translate it myself. Nearly a century later, I find myself in Germany too—just like Natsagdorj once was. I translated “May 1 in a Capitalist Country” while sitting on Karl-Marx-Straße in Mannheim, right outside my student dorm. There was something quietly powerful about that moment: a Mongolian student reading a Mongolian revolutionary, on a street named after Marx.

“May 1 in a Capitalist Country” by Natsagdorj Dashdorj

On a gentle spring morning, the large red sun had just risen in the northeast sky. Its radiant light streamed through the third-floor window of a tall building facing away from the street, in one of Western Europe’s great cities. The light reached inside and flickered in Ochir’s eyes, waking him from sleep.

He got up right away, stretched a few times, and was washing his face and hands when suddenly, the sound of a heavy trumpet and drums echoed from outside. Curious, he listened attentively. The music blended beautifully with the sacred freshness of the morning air and drifted in through the open window, filling Ochir’s heart with delight and a pleasant feeling.

Soon, the music grew closer—its melody delicate and flowing like a mountain spring, gentle and intermittent. Deeply intrigued, Ochir half-wiped his face and leaned out the window. Along the wide avenue, a long procession marched forward. Workers paraded, waving red flags, singing The Internationale, and staging a powerful demonstration that shook both heaven and earth.

It was the international celebration of workers on the first of May.

Though armed, harsh-faced police surrounded the area, the workers’ march neither hesitated nor faltered. Their ranks remained perfectly aligned. Singing revolutionary songs in booming voices, they marched in unison with firm steps, showing off their fierce courage and unbreakable resolve.

Coming from a revolutionary country himself, Ochir was deeply moved. He leaned out and watched the procession intently, captivated until the very end.

(1928)

The Tibetan word “dorj” in the name Natsagdorj, the great writer himself, is a Sanskrit word for “ochir”. Therefore, Ochir is Natsagdorj himself.

For Natsagdorj, May Day was not just a political event—it was a symbol of modernity, a moment when the East and West shared a rhythm. Natsagdorj wasn’t just imitating European modernism—he was critiquing capitalism from the outside, using global tools (like May Day) in a Mongolian voice.

And now, almost a century later, I find myself in a similar place—far from home, yet walking streets once familiar to Natsagdorj. Like him, I carry Mongolia with me: in my language, in my questions, in my voice. The past and present, Mongolia and Germany, Ochir and I—we all meet in that window, looking out at the world, still asking what kind of future is possible, and what it means to belong.

On May Day, May 1st, 2025, I joined a demonstration in Mannheim, Germany. As I stood among the crowd, I realized that although the form of May Day has evolved, its core message remains the same: we must not tolerate inequality, we must protect working people, and we must resist the violence—material and symbolic—of exploitative systems like capitalism. What has changed is the scope and tone of the movement. Today’s May Day includes voices from the LGBTQ+ community, the Free Palestine movement, and environmental justice campaigns. The struggle has expanded, and become more intersectional.

I also noticed that people have changed. In Natsagdorj’s time—97 years ago—the world felt more radical and polarized, split into opposing ideological extremes. Today, many people still fight passionately, but there is more room for dialogue, more respect for human rights and diversity of thought. For example, in Natsagdorj’s story, the police are portrayed as a harsh, repressive force. But at the protest I attended, the police were not violent; they simply ensured public safety.

And yet, despite the differences in era, tone, and form, one thing remains constant: people are still searching for a better world. That spirit—that refusal to accept injustice—is what May Day continues to represent.

 

I’m grateful to Julian Dierkes for encouraging me to join the May Day demonstration and for capturing some memorable photos of the day.

About Khishigtugs

My name is Khishigtugs Amarbayasgalan (LinkedIn). I published a sociological book called Alienation in 2020. Currently pursuing my master’s degree in Sociology at the University of Mannheim, Germany. My academic focus lies in the study of social inequality—including class structures, stratification, educational disparity, values crisis and the broader implications of the Anthropocene.

Posted in Germany, History, Khishigtugs Amarbayasgalan, Literature, Reflection | 3 Comments

New to Ulaanbaatar April 2025

Posted on April 29, 2025 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

I’ve been keeping lists of things that are arriving to/disappearing from central Ulaanbaatar: June-July 2024 | August 2023 | May 2023 | November 2022 | August 2022 | December 2019 | June 2019 | April 2019 | December 2018 | August 2018 | October 2017 | June 2017 | May 2016 | December 2015 | May 2015 | November 2014 | May 2014 | October 2013 | June 2013 | October 2011 | August 2011. More informal versions of these observations also appear in the /ulaanbaatar/change/ category. I’ve also collected observations about change in the countryside.

Bulgan added her observations in Spring 2022.

I’ve copied previous lists here and am adding to them. New items since previous posts appear in italics. Since this list has been growing, I’m also beginning to delete some items that I’ve had on the list for some time. Strikethrough means that these items will be off the next list.

This list was cruelly interrupted by something that was new to the world in 2020, a global pandemic and thus restrictions on travel. After not being able to visit for 32 months, I finally made it back in August 2022.

What has arrived?

  • drive-home service for drivers who have been drinking. You call the service, they drop off a driver who drives you home in your car and is then picked up again. Given – fortunately – much stricter enforcement of drunk driving laws, a great service!
  • airport road is getting ever fancier, now there’s a giant overpass just before crossing the Tuul on the way into town. Lots of fancy on/off-ramps popping up everywhere on roads.
  • fully electric cars, charging stations, green license plates for electric cars, Tesla
  • street art (several years now, but I hadn’t noted this before) and newly commissioned public art Seeing more tags though. On buildings and in pedestrian tunnels. One particularly common one in one part of town: ‘to be or not to be’. Deep!
  • several new parks: North of Winter Palace, Southeast corner of Sukhbaatar Sq, also astroturf on Sukhbaatar Square (summer 2022) seemingly quite popular as picnic spot, park in Yarmag. The park behind Government House is open to the public again.
  • As a specific park: the redesign of the Children’s Park seems to represent commitment to preservation of that open space and greater incorporation into urban centre. The new park opened on July 4.
  • Not just parks but also nearby urban recreation, such as municipal nature reserves and hiking.
  • Oat milk and lactose-free milk. Of course, good health reasons for both, but still a little odd in the land of meat and dairy.
  • Eye makeup with small glittering tears in the corner of an eye. Note that I am not much of a fashion correspondent, but I remember seeing this first in Japan in the early 1990s when it was called ピカピカ, I think. Cat eyes have also arrived.
  • Coffee choices. Not just Korean chains, but more local choices appearing.
  • Taste for spicy foods. Surely this has arrived via Korean food, but quite the contrast to years ago when spices seemed entirely absent.
  • Solar panels on commercial buildings, also on balconies, in downtown core
  • The development of Mongolian brand consumer products, especially food products has been happening for years and I can’t pinpoint the moment they started appearing on grocery shelves in big numbers. While I still find New Zealand butter in Mongolia strange, most of the dairy shelf is now made in Mongolia, for example.

Category: increasing agricultural and domestic food production in #Mongolia.
No street vendors this time of year, but (fancy) supermarket offered 8 different varieties of honey for sale. The brand name won me over.

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— Mongolia Focus (@mongoliafocus.bsky.social) April 21, 2025 at 8:16 PM

  • So many renovated sidewalks with paving stones, benches, and planters.
  • Yoshinoya – 吉野家. How obvious are beef bowls for the Mongolian market, but their appearance is sudden to me.
  • Shisha bars. I had seen these before, but neglected to note that down.
  • Convenience stores have become a very common sight in downtown Ulaanbaatar but also beyond. Currently, this is a duopoly of CU and GS25. Note that small grocery stores have disappeared from town with the rise of these convenience stores.
  • байхгүй (“we don’t have that”) has become a frequent response of waiters in restaurants referring to items listed on the menu, but not actually offered.
  • Some new buildings appear to be considering the public space that they’re providing, for example through setbacks from the street and parks in those setbacks. One example would be large office building/mall on the way into town from Zaisan on the right before Peace Bridge with its broad sidewalk, plantings.
  • In addition to the Northwest of town and the area around the power plants which have been somewhat industrial, Yarmag seems to be turning into an industrial zone in parts as well, with the surroundings of the old airport seeing some warehouse developments.
  • In terms of city planning, many of the very large developments in Yarmag and elsewhere seem to be stand-along neighbourhoods, rather than forming a part of a larger district. Note that they all seem to have a large supermarket as an anchor.
  • Visible Korean influences continuing to grow.
  • Imagery of Mongolian People’s Republic appearing as pop cultural reference point. Not sure whether that signals nostalgia for state-socialist days (Ostalgie).
  • Blue license plates for government cars. [More on license plates]
  • Men carrying umbrellas as protection from the sun.
  • Big bus procurement scandal in 2023-24, but some very modern buses around town and major busstop construction projects.
  • Google Maps now offers transit connections as well as traffic updates. The former easier for me to use than local alternatives, as I’m familiar with Google Maps interface. Makes public transit that much more usable for visitors even before the Metro is “completed”.
  • On the drive west out of town, I passed through the underpass for the railroad for the first sign. Always such a bottleneck for traffic previously, amazing to avoid via an underpass.
  • MIAT now makes an announcement in German on the Frankfurt flight
  • Beach flags as advertisement
  • Big streets into the city now all treelined (1b tree subotnik!), those drives will look quite different in some years
  • A good portion of the trash cans in the downtown core seem to have been removed
  • There seem to be many more people using electric rental scooters in town. With them, the ringing of bells to warn pedestrians has arrived on bike paths. But in 2025, there’s a new game in town:

 

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A post shared by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes)

  • Have I not mentioned Ramen before?

 

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  • Traffic light LED strips in the sidewalk at some Peace Ave intersections

Always something new in Ulaanbaatar:
Traffic light strips in the sidewalk, paired with tactile tiles common across Japan as well.
Traffic strips blink and turn colour, ppl see them without looking up from screens, I imagine.
#Mongolia

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— Mongolia Focus (@mongoliafocus.bsky.social) April 20, 2025 at 8:17 PM

What has disappeared, or at least nearly?

  • for-pay scales (actually, they seem to be hanging on)
  • Victims of Political Persecution Memorial Museum. Promised floor dedicated to museum in newly-constructed large building on site does not appear to exist!
  • private fences encroaching on public land/sidewalks
  • It seems like (Korean) convenience store chains are replacing the small grocery stores that were ubiquitous in the downtown core. Not gone yet, but waning.
  • Urban heritage core. One building at a time, heritage buildings in the centre of town are being torn down, largely replaced by generic glass-and-steel towers.
  • Airplane turn-arounds. For the first few years, I often connected through Bejing and China Air pilots had the habit of taking a look at Ulaanbaatar and turning back around. Seemed like 1 of 3 flights. Reason: high side winds. I haven’t been travelling through authoritarian China for many years, but it seems like the new airport suffers less from dangerous winds and even from the fog that was rumoured to be common.

What will appear in the future

  • navigation systems. Google now offers in-town traffic updates. Countryside systems still limited.
  • mental maps shifting to street names/addresses instead of landmarks
  • subway (really, I wish they had selected light rail instead, but who knows whether either will come)
  • urban renewal and historical restorations embracing district north of government house (National University of Mongolia, German embassy, etc.), but perhaps it will be too late for that
  • Combined Heat and Power Plant #5 (yeah, right!)
  • hipsters discovering УАЗ (minivan and jeep), but also Porters, perhaps as platform for mobile raves?
  • giant hole blown into Bogd Khaan mountain to “drain” polluted air out of the valley (that actually is a proposal, but it will not appear! There also seems to be a proposal to blast away mountains on either end of the valley to let bad air escape!)
  • some kind of traffic routing system with overhead displays
  • Mongolia-themed bicycle stands, for example roof structure of a ger as a steel structure
  • vending machines
  • Chinese cars. I see more of these in 2025, esp. the green license plate electric cars, but still not a very large number.
  • Misters at outdoor restaurants. Very attractive feature in cities like Almaty and Bishkek when it gets hot.
  • In the very long term, current young people (starting from 2000s birth cohorts) will think of themselves as the Prius generation, analogous to German Generation Golf.
  • Given that the drive into Ulaanbaatar may now take longer than the flight to Ulaanbaatar, airport hotels must be on their way.

What will disappear in the medium-term future

I’m going out on a predictive limb here… 2-3 years is what I mean by “near future”.

Actually, since I have been predicting this as “near future” change for some years now, I guess I was wrong with all these predictions, and have changed the listing to medium-term future.

  • stretched-out hand to signal for a car ride
  • that awkward extra half-step on most stairs
  • whitening make-up.

What will disappear in the long-term future

I mean beyond 7 years or so. None of these seems to be coming true quite yet, so I’ve changed the name of this category from medium-term to long-term.

  • new (to Mongolia) cars that are right-hand drive
  • the neo-classical Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, with its Stalinist (if that’s an architectural style) spire [Tough call to make as the MFA building is now dwarfed by its own annex]
  • deels in the city [actually, they seem to be making a bit of a fashion comeback among young people]
  • some of the downtown university campuses
  • buildings of 4 floors or less in the urban core
  • Russian minivans (УАЗ452)
  • the Winter Palace. It won’t disappear entirely, but it is more-and-more surrounded by a very urban and very tall landscape making it look somewhat forlorn, a fate it shares with many other buildings
  • heritage buildings
  • street vendors with their little cardboard boxes of tissues, lighters, soda, perhaps rounded out by pine nuts or other offerings
  • that colour in staircases and hallways of apartment and public buildings
  • streetsweepers
Posted in Change, Curios, Ulaanbaatar | Tagged | 3 Comments

Plus ça change

Posted on April 22, 2025 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

“Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” = The more things change, the more they stay the same.

I feel like I experience perpetual déjà vu (yes, this is turning into a French post) in discussing constellations of political actor. Many people seem to want to talk about the personalities involved in current politics and rely on this as a lens to understand democratization or backsliding. Yet, most of the constellations of actors are repeating patterns that have been seen before.

In part, I think this is due to the prominence of international actors who are on medium-term stays in Ulaanbaatar only (diplomats, donor organizations, etc.) and to whom these constellations are new. Mongolian analysts also participate in these discussions as the fragmented and personalistic nature of politics in Mongolia seems to point to a focus on the people involved.

Repeating Patterns

Having gone through many cycles of politicians over the past 20 years that I’ve been paying close attention to Mongolia, I have to ask, do we really deepen our understanding of the political system and of democratization by gossiping about the personal relationships between various actors. Did understanding N Enkhbayar’s decades-long feud with his own party (MPRP/MPP) help us understand anything about the political system in the late 2000s, through the 2010s? Did figuring Kh Battulga out tell us anything about the presumed decline of democracy that we seem to be seeing now? What about the N Enkhbold vs U Khurelsukh battle? And, for the debate that has been raging for the past several years, do we need to understand the relationship and/or rivalry between U Khurelsukh and L Oyun-Erdene, or now between Khurelsukh, Oyun-Erdene and N Uchral?

As you can probably tell by the tone of my question, I think that a focus on the personalities can be a distraction and a bit of an analytical trap that we as a community of analysts fall into.

Yes, of course, some positions in a political system come with greater power than others. Understanding how the individuals who occupy those positions think and how they relate to each other has to be an element of an understanding of contemporary developments. Those positions include decision-making powers as defined by the constitution, most prominently, the members of the National Security Council, president, prime-minister and speaker of the Great Khural. Various cabinet-secretaries have also played important roles in shaping policy agendas (such as they are). The leaders of political parties and of factions of political parties do not  hold constitutional power, but they also have a clear role to play.

Fragmentation of Power

However, there is that fundamental observation of a fragmentation of political power. This is a topic I have written about in the past, perhaps most explicitly in a 2021 post. I initially came to this observation by thinking about investments and corruption. Whenever boom times arrive in Mongolia, I tend to get calls from international investment advisors or potential investors to ask whom they need to know to push into a certain market. Often, investors will tell me, “I met the vice minister for … and they reassured me that they would help me enter this market.” My response is always, “that’s very nice, but there are many vice ministers”. That’s why some of the grand corruption charges in the context of large projects like Oyu Tolgoi never made much sense to me. What single politician was ever in a position over the past 20 years to actually make a project happen? There were always rivals within the party and in the political system who would oppose any initiative by any given individual and would be able to restrain the power of others. This is at heart of one of the puzzles of the past several years, i.e. even with super-majorities in parliament and now the presidency, the MPP does not seem to be able to get all that much done. And, the government has felt compelled to bring the DP and KhUN on-board in their grand coalition because it has been afraid of opposition. That is fragmentation of power in action! And that is a pattern that I’ve seen repeatedly over the past 20 years entirely irrespective of the people involved. Powerful-seeming actors come and go, but the pattern of fragmentation remains and provides some checks-and-balances on the domination by single individuals. Once-powerful-seeming individuals are still active, yet seem to be relegated to the sidelines: Su Batbold, S Bayar, N Enkhbayar, M Enkhbold in the MPP, but also Lu Bold, S Erdene, Ch Saikhanbileg, even Ts Elbegdorj are all examples of that.

Political Vacuousness

Another pattern is the emptiness of the various power struggles. Did Enkhbayar have a substantive disagreement with the rests of the MPRP? Have Battulga and Elbegdorj pursued different policies? Do Khurelsukh and Oyun-Erdene have different goals? Generally, no. In fact, one of the puzzles about actors like Enkhbayar, Battulga, and Khurelsukh especially is that it remains unclear to me why they are even in politics. Has one of the three of them actually had a political project? Can you name a general political idea that any of them have pursued to make the world or Mongolia a better place? No, 1 billion trees do not count for a political goal. So, when the individuals involved in today’s political struggles (not debates!), the impact on decisions is actually entirely unclear. If any of the speculation about various changes of government (oh, have we had a lot of speculation of that kind over the past 20 years!) ever came true, would any actual policies have changed?

Of course, it is this vacuousness and absence of any actual political goals that fuels a lot of the concern about these individuals. If my observation that neither Battulga nor Khurelsukh really have any kind of substantive agenda for the future of Mongolia, their apparent desire to run for second presidential terms is a concern, because it seems to be a desire to be in power for power’s sake. And, I think that’s why many debates are consumed with speculation about specific constellations of actors. Since we cannot engage with factions led by these kind of politicians about the substance of policies they might pursue, we are left to speculate about their power ambitions and what those ambitions might mean for democracy (generally, nothing good).

Speculation

So, I generally try to stay away from speculation about the future trajectory of “leaders”. Perhaps, that is an important role to play for someone who continues to observe the political scene over many years. “Remember M Enkhbold? Oh you don’t? So, don’t worry so much about Khurelsukh.” I am more interested in finding underlying patterns like the fragmentation of power, the absence of substance from political debates, or the persistent belief in single “best” solutions, sometimes justified as “pragmatism”.

Of course, that bears the risk, that one of these times, I will be wrong and some leader will actually emerge to become authoritarian or destroy democracy, and that is a real worry. But, that was a worry just as much eight or twelve years ago, as it is now.

Posted in Constitution, Democracy, Governance, Government, Politics, Reflection | Tagged | 3 Comments

Minegolia: A Curse or a Complex Reality?

Posted on April 15, 2025 by bulgan batdorj

By Bulgan Batdorj 

Note: This is a post I originally drafted in 2019 but never posted. I hesitated because my thinking was still evolving. Since then, my understanding has evolved, but I believe it is valuable to share this early reflection because I think many of my friends at the time shared similar mindset – seeing mining as the problem (and villains are always part of the story) and education as the solution.

Today, in 2025, I see new research by PhD.c Orkhon and PhD. Bolormaa on education and water issues in Mongolia. I also see many emerging challenges facing the country. While my perspective has matured, I still catch my mind being tempted by conspiracy theories—it’s easy to look for simple explanations in a complex system. But I now recognize that real change in Mongolia requires long-term commitment and systemic thinking as the foundation.

Here at Mongolia Focus, we will continue sharing our observations and reflections on mining in Mongolia.

_________________________

Is mining good or bad for Mongolia?  Is Minegolia cursed? What is happening with the water sources, are they all depleted? I had an itch to know about mining in Mongolia. There were always pro and anti-arguments about having or not having mining which were hard to understand. The impact sounded irreplaceably damaging yet the benefit was life-giving for us. So I wanted to understand more about mining which led me to quit my job in pursuit of making sense of this Minegolia dilemma.

In my earlier phase of the research, I was almost on the pursuit to find something or someone to blame for the lack of success Mongolia was going through. See, Mongolia is a democratic country, small population and an abundance of mineral wealth. How come all these equate to corruption, economic and political instability and polarization of the people? It did not make sense at all. So, I started my witch hunt – someone is doing something bad.

My suspects could be divided into two broad categories of “external” and “internal”. Those external suspects all our foreign friends, two neighbors, and our third neighbors, their development and policy arms as well as the businesses.

Those domestic suspects were politicians, political parties, and public service. But these people are elected, supported, and tolerated by the public. So they are like the “wart” on the face, very ugly, but are only the symptoms, not the root cause. A very common factor that seem naturally the root cause is understood as the lack of “education” of the public?

The matter of “education” is a big issue at the national level, Mongolians invest in education.  Mongolia is often praised for its high literacy rates—higher, in fact, than Japan, South Korea, and Australia on a per capita basis.

It became increasingly clear that our challenge wasn’t just the quantity of education but the quality and content. Not only the quality of the formal or technical education but also the emphasis of non-formal education, i.e. democracy, media literacy, health knowledge, environmental education are in shortage. On top of the education, the questions of identity and value are not in the core if they are present at all. Deficiency of “identity”, “value” and “education” are a good breeding ground for disinformation, populistic politic, and coercion.

Every time I pinned Mongolia’s challenges to a single factor—whether foreign influence, political elites, or education—my arguments unraveled under the probing questions of my professors and peers. The problem was not simply that these factors existed—but that I had been examining them in isolation.

I later realized that Mongolia’s struggles are products of a complex, dynamic system, where actors and structures—domestic and foreign, political and social, formal and informal—are interdependent. These interactions produce patterns that are difficult to predict and even harder to untangle. This realization led me to the concept of “wicked problems”—problems that are persistent, multifaceted, and resistant to simple solutions. My colleagues wrote about chronic policy failures in Mongolia very clear symptom of a wicked problem.

Reflecting now, I see that mining, like many of Mongolia’s challenges, is neither wholly good nor entirely bad. It is deeply entangled within the broader web of social, economic, and political dynamics. A search for villains alone will not yield understanding—let alone solutions.

Posted in Bulgan Batdorj, Mining, Research on Mongolia, Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment

Academic Freedom Index

Posted on April 9, 2025 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

For some years, I have been collecting Mongolia’s score and rank on various global indices. I have also occasionally commented on some of these indices. Here, I want to focus on the Academic Freedom Index.

#Mongolia score declined slightly in #AcademicFreedomIndex drawing on @vdeminstitute.bsky.social data.

[image or embed]

— Mongolia Focus (@mongoliafocus.bsky.social) 19. März 2025 um 09:57

What is the Academic Freedom Index?

From the AFI’s website:

The Academic Freedom Index (AFI) assesses de facto levels of academic freedom across the world based on five indicators: freedom to research and teach; freedom of academic exchange and dissemination; institutional autonomy; campus integrity; and freedom of academic and cultural expression. The AFI currently covers 179 countries and territories, and provides the most comprehensive dataset on the subject of academic freedom.

These five indicators are included in the V-Dem dataset. As is the case for V-Dem generally, this is an index that relies exclusively on scoring by experts. This is unlike other indices that rely primarily on information reported by national statistical offices like UNDP’s Human Development Index, or indices that include survey data like the Corruption Perception Index.

[Disclosure: I serve as an expert in several index projects, including V-Dem.]

Obviously, different methodologies bring different advantages and disadvantages with them. There are many global efforts focused on the UN to make statistical reporting comparable across nations, making indices based on such reporting most-easily comparable across countries. Of course, this assumes that national statistical offices operationalize data collection consistently and honestly. But, such statistical indices are clearly limited to topics that are meaningfully measurable by numbers.

Expert-based indices like the Academic Freedom Index, have the significant advantage that they can be conducted independently of the state, an aspect that may be most relevant to countries scoring low on various indices. Expert-based indices are inherently qualitative, i.e. they convert the assessment by an expert into a numerical score, which is a strength via independence and expertise, but a weakness in terms of validity and comparability. Few people can be considered an expert on multiple or even two countries, so that these expert-based survey attempt to assemble a list of experts around the world. There are many different ways in which organizers attempt to mitigate against different criteria or scales across experts by offering detailed instructions, including questions about confidence of specific judgements, or scoring experts themselves by offering them vignettes to score particular topics as a way to compare across experts. Some might also see a significant weakness in such expert-based indices in that they are virtually all based in OECD countries and, lo and behold, OECD countries generally rank high in these indices. Questions around comparability also make some of the expert indices inherently sticky or conservative in that they are looking for legislative changes or significant events to change the score for a country, particularly when the range of scores is limited.

Survey-based indices attempt to harness crowd wisdom by distributing the ranking of a given country across many more respondents than expert indices generally do. But, such survey indices are thus also susceptible to changes in the understanding of a given topic or in perceptions of governments. It is this later concern that also exists regarding expert surveys and will be a bit of a focus on the discussion below.

Why Global Indices

Accountability

Donors as well as voters might be looking for a way to assess the effectiveness of governments’ efforts on a particular topic. That is perhaps the dominant basis behind efforts related to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. Through a global process, such goals have been identified, say relating to girls’ education as an example. Governments can then be held accountable for their (lack of) success in reaching these goals.

Benchmarking

Governments may also want to compare themselves to other sets of countries to understand where they might want to focus their efforts because they are lagging countries they might consider good comparisons.

For different questions, one might want to compare to different countries. For example, the size of the population probably differentiates countries meaningfully when we are comparing social service provision. Mongolia and China may be neighbours, but their population numbers are on such a vastly different scale that few comparisons of social indicators make a lot of sense without a lot of qualifications. But, a relevant comparison group might be former state-socialist countries. For example, when looking at the development of (democratic) governance, comparing Mongolia to Poland may be of greater interest (shared starting point for democratization, roughly) because of their state-socialist history than South Korea even though democracy in South Korea has been operating for about as long as Mongolia. When looking at trade statistics, the Land-Locked Developing Countries might be the most relevant comparison.

Academic Comparisons

Any large-scale modelling of the behaviour of states will have to rely on some version of global indices to be included. For example, almost any comparative model is likely to include consideration of governance, some measure of democracy vs autocracy is generally seen as causally related to just about any state outcome. This is exactly where V-Dem enters the scene as perhaps the most academic of all the global indices. Perhaps not surprising, it thus includes measures of academic freedom.

How has Mongolia Done in the AFI?

Above, I have shown the graph produced on the Academic Freedom Index webpage, here’s the same data using the V-Dem graphing tools:

 

Post by @jdierkes@sciences.social
View on Mastodon

 

This graphs the five indicators for Mongolia for the democratic era, i.e. since 1990, that make up the Academic Freedom Index. After rising rapidly in the early 1990s with a new constitution and establishment of academic freedom, indicators remained stable until 2019. Campus integrity has fluctuated a bit, but gone from 2.01 in 2019 to current 1.69. Second highest is freedom of academic exchange and dissemination going from 1.47 in 2019 to current 0.86 Next, freedom to research and teach, 1.39 to 0.81 Second lowest is freedom of academic and cultural expression, 1.27 to 0.63 The lowest indicator is institutional autonomy, going from 1.31 to 0.53. Note that these changes are classified on the AFI website as “not significant”.

Compare some of these changes to other countries.

Compare those graphs to bigger trends around the world, for example OECD and Asia scores.

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— Mongolia Focus (@mongoliafocus.bsky.social) 19. März 2025 um 11:46

Maybe one of the first things to note here is that scale matters. When you look at Mongolia’s score only (as in Bluesky post at the top), the change looks somewhat frightening or at least concerning. When you compare Mongolia’s score to other countries/regions, you may be frightened for the world (as long as you agree that academic freedom is an important element in democracy and good governance) and also concerned about the direction of Mongolia’s trend, but perhaps less so.

In a subsequent post, I will analyze how I understand Mongolia’s score.

Posted in Academia, Global Indices, Higher Education, Social Change | Tagged | 1 Comment

Guest Post: The Centre for Law and Democracy’s Analysis of the Draft Law on Freedom of the Media

Posted on April 1, 2025 by JDierkes

By Toby Mendel

Background

Mongolia adopted its Law on Media Freedom in 1998 (1998 Media Law) as a statement of its commitment to media freedom. The 1998 Media Law, however, has only four short articles which set out the following standards:

  • Article 1 describes the purpose of the law as being to guarantee freedom of expression and the right to publish, as set out in the Constitution of Mongolia.
  • Article 2 states: “The Parliament shall be prohibited to adopt any laws restricting freedom of mass media”.
  • Article 3 comprises two key ideas, namely that the media shall be responsible for what they disseminate, and that the State shall not censor media content or finance others to do this0s.
  • Article 4 prohibits State organisations from owning media outlets.

While the intention behind this was no doubt positive, in fact the 1998 Media Law suffers from being too vague, too general or unrealistic, while the clearest provision, Article 4, has simply been ignored. Article 2, for example, is just unrealistic. Every country in the world has laws which restrict freedom of expression and indeed media freedom. It may have been inspired by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which states, in relevant part, “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press”. However, in practice, courts in the United States have defined a number of categories of so-called “unprotected speech” so as to get around the otherwise apparently absolute nature of this prohibition.

International law takes an arguably much more practical approach, providing broad protection for freedom of expression but also allowing States to impose restrictions as long as they meet a strict three-part test. This allows for a more careful tailoring of restrictions. For example, courts in the United States have not been able to read the right of journalists to protect their sources into the First Amendment, whereas international courts have had no problem doing this under international guarantees.

Local actors in Mongolia have long understood that the 1998 Media Law needs to be revised so as to provide more practical protections for media freedom, and there have been a number of attempts to introduce replacement legislation over the years. None, however, have come to fruition (i.e. in the form of a law actually getting passed).

That may change soon. The current government has made a commitment to adopt a Law on Freedom of the Media (draft Media Law) and, in 2024, the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs (MJHA) struck a multi-stakeholder Working Group to develop this legislation. A consultation draft was released at the end of October 2024. I happened to be in Mongolia at the time, for the launch of the Media Law Forum on 1 November 2024, and so I was able to meet with the MJHA Working Group to give them some quick feedback on the draft.

Discussion on Law on Media Freedom

The MJHA Working Group has now handed the draft over to Parliament, where it is being considered by the Legal Standing Committee (the 23 January draft is available here in Mongolian). If that Committee approves it for further consideration by Parliament, the latter will likely set up a working group to review the draft. As part of this process, the Parliament of Mongolia formally asked UNESCO for technical assistance to help ensure the draft Media Law was in line with international standards. UNESCO, in turn, reached out to my organisation, the Centre for Law and Democracy, to provide this technical assistance. I prepared a detailed analysis of the draft Media Law, which is available in both English and Mongolian, and undertook a mission to Ulaanbaatar from 23-29 March to meet with local stakeholders to discuss this analysis and its recommendations.

The current draft: strengths and weaknesses

Overall, the intention behind the draft Media Law is positive and almost all of its provisions are oriented towards protecting media freedom. As such, I believe it is important to move forward with this legislation, albeit in a way that makes necessary improvements to it. My analysis identifies numerous areas where the draft could be improved. These may be grouped into four different areas. First, there are a lot of fairly technical comments about improving the language and approach.

Second, one provision, namely Article 5.1, is problematical from a media freedom perspective. This article describes itself as setting out “principles” which must be adhered to by journalists, but the rules in Article 5.1 are actually restrictions on the work of journalists. They are also all either entirely inappropriate as standards for journalism – such as the requirement for journalists to “prioritise national security” – or are legitimate only as part of a system of professional regulation (self-regulation) of the media and not as directly binding legal requirements. This provision should simply be removed. There are also a number of provisions calling on the media to base their reporting on facts or to report accurately. This is again inappropriate as a directly binding legal requirement, although the need for the media to act professionally to ensure the accuracy of the information they disseminate is covered by all self-regulatory systems.

Third, in many cases, the provisions in the draft Media Law are unduly vague or general. For many of these provisions, I have proposed enhancements to the language so as to provide more practical support for media freedom. For example, Article 6.1 is very similar to Article 2 in the 1998 Media Law. Here, I have proposed that this be replaced by a set of conditions on any laws which restrict media freedom, in line with the three-part test for this under international law. An 11 March 2025 post on this site by Dulamkhorloo Baatar, Founder and Chair of the Nest Center for Journalism Innovation and Development, includes a focus on the problematical Article 13.14 of the Criminal Code. While it might be preferable simply to repeal this provision, setting clear standards for restrictions on freedom of expression might allow for this and the many other problematical provisions in Mongolia law to be reviewed.

Another example of this is Article 14, which addresses media self-regulation. Article 14.1 states that the media sector “will have” its own independent self-regulatory body, while the following articles set out mandatory conditions for the system, such as that it will adopt professional standards for the media, accept and review complaints relating to those standards and issue professional opinions in relation to those complaints. While this appears to recognise the self-regulatory system run by the Media Council of Mongolia, it does nothing to support that body and it is also not very clear. For example, if a second self-regulatory body were to be set up, would it also be recognised? I have instead proposed that the law provide for the recognition of any body which has certain characteristics (largely in line with those currently found in Article 14). But I have also proposed that, where a body has been recognised, complaints about the members of the body should be required to go through the self-regulatory system before a court case may be lodged. This approach applies in Indonesia and it has proven to be very successful in terms of both providing redress for the public and protecting media freedom. If adopted, this would significantly enhance the work of the Media Council.

Finally, my analysis casts this draft Media Law as a quasi-constitutional law, given that protection of a constitutional right is its stated purpose. As such, it should set out a broad range of governing standards for media freedom, which other laws must then comply with. From this perspective, the draft Media Law is missing a number of important elements, which I spell out in my analysis. These include, for example, the governing principles for public service media (independence, public funding and accountability to the public), as well as for the regulation of other media sectors (journalists, and print, broadcast and digital media). A 25 February 2025 blog on this site by Dulamkhorloo Baatar, Founder and Chair of the Nest Center for Journalism Innovation and Development, available here, also suggests other areas which should be included in the draft Media Law, such as subsidies for the media, but this is quite controversial and challenging to include in legislation of this sort.

The draft Media Law can be described as a good start, but more needs to be done. This law has the potential to play an important role in safeguarding media freedom in Mongolia and, as such, it should be prioritised. But significant amendments will be needed if it is to fulfil that potential.

About Toby Mendel

Toby Mendel is the Executive Director of the Centre for Law and Democracy (CLD), a Halifax, Canada based international human rights organisation which focuses on foundational rights for democracy (freedom of expression, the right to information, freedom of association and assembly and the right to participate). He has worked on these issues globally and in countries around the world for over 25 years. In addition to leading CLD, he also works with a range of inter-governmental organisations – including UNESCO, the World Bank, the OSCE and the Council of Europe – on these human rights issues. He has been working in Mongolia since 2001 and, in 2021, he was awarded the Mongolian Friendship Medal by the President of Mongolia. In March 2017, he posted a guest blog on this site, The Long Journey – Towards a Broadcasting Law in Mongolia.

Posted in Media and Press, Toby Mendel | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Noorog.mn, Youth Media Staff Detained for Unclear Charges

Posted on March 20, 2025 by JDierkes

By Dulamkhorloo Baatar and Unumunkh Jargalsaikhan

You may remember me from my previous two-part blog post about the proposed Press Freedom bill (Draft Bill | Analysis and Outlook). This time, I am addressing you with a yet gloomier picture on Mongolia’s democracy and civic space.

2025.03.18 Ulaanbaatar | Eight staff of Noorog.mn media were detained under charges initially understood as “breaking national unity” under clause 19.9.1 of Criminal code, with their contents intensifying concerns over the growing crackdown on press freedom in the country.

Local Mongolians blew up after the event, expressing their support for Noorog.mn and for press freedom.

Noorog.mn has been known for its critical reporting and explainer contents on Mongolia’s political and economic landscape. The outlet had previously announced that it would cease political coverage due to mounting pressure. However, the latest raid indicates that authorities continue to scrutinize and suppress independent journalism, especially as Noorog.mn nears the completion of a documentary on Mongolia’s electoral process, scheduled for release in April.

According to Noorog media staff, who have been interrogated between 10 PM, March 17th, until 06:30 AM the next day, the nature of the interrogation focused on the content of their reporting, and why they decided to cover each of their stories. After arresting them from a place different from their office, their office was also raided and essential work equipment, including computers, hard drives and mobile phones were seized.

Photo: Noorog.mn CEO Ulamsaikhan Otgon addresses the media after the overnight interrogation. Full video can be seen here: https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1DPDPEk3wB/

In a press conference at 12:30, shortly after being released from the overnight interrogation, Noorog.mn CEO Ulamsaikhan Otgon stated to the media that this was an unexpected detention and they were informed that they were being questioned for illegally acquiring personal information, and breaking national unity.

Unclear Justifications from Authorities

The Mongolian Cyber Police Authority has provided vague and ambiguous explanations for their actions. In a statement to the media, following the press conference by Noorog.mn, law enforcement officials said, “It is impossible to tell the grounds for this arrest. After checking all their files and hardware, we will know what kind of clause we should use for this arrest.” Another statement added, “We noticed possible violations of the law. It is not defined yet. Investigation is working on proving them.” Furthermore, during this press conference, the stated that “there are indications that Noorog.mn has been carrying out illegal gambling” and “this arrest was carried out following a chat from a citizen” adding that “this arrest has nothing to do with their contents or journalistic activities”. This was entirely different from what Noorog.mn staff had been informed during their overnight interrogation.

Photo: Head of Cyber Police Department Taivan.S addresses the media on the Noorog case. Full video can be seen here: https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1B4kPijGMG/

Such remarks by the authorities only deepen concerns about the arbitrary nature of the raid and the potential for authorities to construct charges retroactively. The lack of clear legal justification raises serious questions about due process and the rule of law in Mongolia’s handling of independent journalism.

Photo: Minister of Justice and Home Affairs Altangerel Oyunsaikhan addresses the Noorog case while informing journalists on Government meeting decisions. Full video can be seen here: https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1BjxUreZ2b/

The next day, the Minister of Justice and Home Affairs, Altangerel Oyunsaikhan stated that Noorog.mn staff were arrested under suspicions that they were organizing illegal online gambling, with a total of 9.3 billion MNT transferred through six different accounts and on a separate charge that the alleged caused a suicide by a different individual, which had been under investigation since September, 2024. This is a stark contrast from what the Noorog staff had been informed during their interrogation.

Most importantly, the suspected suicide case involves Ulamsaikhan’s late girlfriend, which is a deeply personal and completely unrelated issue.

Despite authorities’ remarks, aimed at diluting the discussion away from press freedom, Nest believes that the entire process adds to concerns over the crackdown on press freedom, proving that authorities are able to use any legal clause to shut down independent journalism.

Additionally, the fact that the authorities are exposing deeply personal, yet unrelated information in this case is extremely inhuman and an egregious action aimed at breaking the courage and morale of the Noorog team.

Even at this time, there is existing concern that this very act of sending a blog post for Mongolia Focus could be framed as an espionage or, desacato case against the author of this post.

This is even more concerning after a recent study by V-Dem institute on the global democratic landscape showed that Mongolia’s democratic landslide is heavily noticed. Mongolia has been marked as one of two lost democracies in South and Central Asia, including India.

Contrary to the democracy map by Freedom House from a year earlier, V-Dem report categorizes Mongolia as one of 45 countries autocratizing globally.

The series of events also prove the need to significantly improve the existing Press Freedom Law. “Even if the proposed bill was passed, this would not have made any difference in this specific case. It would not have been able to provide any protection for the media”, said lawyer Narantsetseg Batsaikhan.

Call for help

With all the recent unfolding events, we feel the authorities will use all necessary measures to put Noorog.mn behind bars, and international support is critical at this moment. We call for your help in supporting the press freedom in Mongolia. Despite remarks by the authorities, the nature of their very first interrogation and the fact that their journalistic materials are still not released, prove that this arrest was entirely aimed at targeting them as a media organization. Nest center stands ready to provide additional support and on the ground information on this issue.

About the Authors

Dulamkhorloo Baatar is founder and CEO of Nest Center for Journalism Innovation and Development NGO, a media support organization.

Unumunkh Jargalsaikhan is a media development specialist and freedom of expression advocate. He reports local news to international agencies and is a program manager at NEST Center for Journalism Innovation and Development

Posted in Dulamkhorloo Baatar, Media and Press, Unumunkh Jargalsaikhan, Youth | Leave a comment

Guest Post: More to Know about the Proposed Press Freedom Bill – Analysis and Outlook

Posted on March 11, 2025 by JDierkes

By Dulamkhorloo Baatar

I have recently written about the context and content of the proposed new Press Freedom law. Here, I will add some analyses and a sense of the draft’s chance of adoption.

Why are we concerned?

“The draft law on Media Freedom, presented to the Parliament, is praised for including important regulations that ensure journalists’ and media organizations’ right to protect their sources, as well as for promoting transparency in media ownership and financing. However, it is premature to conclude whether the draft law improves the Law on Press Freedom, adopted in 1998, until it is officially adopted by the Parliament and its implementation effectiveness is assessed.” said Narantsetseg Batsaikhan, CEO and co-founder of Fidelitas Partners law firm.

Additionally, even in case the proposed bill is adopted and becomes a law, there are several problematic clauses.

The draft lays out five key principles that media organizations should follow including dissemination of factual information, ensuring objectivity, prioritizing national security, human rights and the public interest, to uphold human dignity and justice and to show respect to legally protected confidentiality. “The mention of safeguarding national security is concerning as it may open a pathway for the state to intimidate journalists and sentence them behind closed doors” according to Mandkhaikhatan Tsevegmid, the CEO of Youth Policy Watch. The removal of such vague principles is also very important according to International Center for non-profit Law (ICNL). “Under international legal standards we don’t recommend prohibiting the publication of false news or require the publication of fact because the term “fact” or “false information” are very broad and gives authorities the discretion to decide that something is not fact or violates the law.” said Lily Liu, legal advisor at ICNL. The Press Institute of Mongolia also states that the mention of these vague principles poses a significant risk to journalists and indicates that several provisions need to be clarified to be effectively utilized to ensure freedom of the press.

The Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs has submitted the Press Freedom Bill as part of a package of laws regulating civic space, including the Law on protests. “Across the bills submitted by the Ministry of Justice, we see a trend to further shrink civic space and increase state interference” said Mandkhaikhatan at the request of Nest Center to comment on the legal landscape. Her concern is shared among several civil society advocates, including the Nest Center despite optimism from the international community welcoming the proposed bill.

Personal liability of journalists isn’t addressed properly in the proposed bill

Another key issue that is still left unaddressed is the personal liability of journalists. This issue that is currently being addressed by the Criminal Code is expected to be left unaddressed even after multiple mentions by civil society groups during a series of discussions with the Ministry of Justice.

The Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs have included two definitions on misinformation and a hybrid of disinformation and malinformation, claiming this will provide guidance to how provision 13.14 under the Criminal Code is applied. The problematic provision uses the term of false information in place of libel and has been used to intimidate journalists under this clause. According to Globe International Center, a total of 2260 cases have been opened under this provision between 2020 and 2024, and 133 instances were submitted to court.

If we break down the data, only on 5 cases, the journalist was found guilty, and was sentenced under the Criminal Code after libel provision was added to the law in January 2020. Between 2020 and 2024, a total of 5 journalists were found guilty under the Criminal Code provision 13.14 out of a total of 2260 cases opened. Although the data is scarce and scattered when it comes to the criminalization of libel, according to Globe International Center, in the four years leading to 2024, 5 percent of all cases opened under this clause was submitted to court and only 0.3 percent of cases was ruled guilty by court. This would mean 99.7 percent of all accused are intimidated under this clause.

Firstly, the fact that only a fraction of the cases opened are submitted to court shows that this clause is mostly used as an intimidation tool, calling journalists to be questioned only to be recused after a series of questioning. Secondly, the prohibiting of false information violates Mongolia’s commitments to the ICCPR, Article 19.

Contrary to what the Ministry of Justice claims, local lawyers say that even if a definition is provided in the Press Freedom Law, it can’t be used to define how the Criminal Code is applied, as the Criminal code is a standalone, procedural law.

Merely providing definition to disinformation in the Press Freedom Law is expected to be insufficient to address the fact that journalists are still being questioned and sentenced by this provision.

“Rather than just including terminology and content specific to the digital environment and dissemination methods in the draft Bill on Press Freedom, it is more important to outline a process that ensures the rights are implemented equally in these different environments and methods. This will help protect press freedom. The draft law needs improvement in this direction in my view.” said Narantsetseg Batsaikhan, CEO and co-founder of Fidelitas Partners law firm.

Do we believe the bill will be successfully passed this time?

If history is any indication, former President Elbegdorj had withdrawn a Press Freedom Bill he had submitted more than a decade ago as the bill’s entire concept was lost during Parliament discussion due to conflicting interests.

“It is unclear how the draft law will change during the stages of discussion and adoption by Parliament. Members of Parliament, standing committees, party, and coalition groups may introduce dissenting opinions or propose substantive changes to the draft law in accordance with the procedures set out in the Law on Procedure of the Plenary Session of the State Great Khural of Mongolia.” said Narantsetseg Batsaikhan, CEO and co-founder of Fidelitas Partners law firm.

Civil society groups are now in a wait and see mode until the Parliament session commences in March to see the initial reaction from Parliament members. Although conflicting interests of MPs may pose a threat to the passage of an ideal law, the civil society groups are hopeful that the current Parliament with record number of members, most of them new to the Parliament would uphold their duties to protect the constitutional rights.

“Regardless of the digital environment or the means of dissemination, legislators must fully uphold their duty to ensure the guaranteed exercise of the constitutional right to freedom of expression. There is no legislation specifically aimed at ensuring the implementation of the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of expression” said Narantsetseg.

What’s next?

The spring Parliament session is expected to commence mid-March or early April.

Although the proposition of the bill is a welcome step towards ensuring freedom of expression, the international community, as well as local CSOs agree that there is a long way to go for the proposed bill to be sufficient to address existing issues.

Julie Hunter, senior legal advisor at ICNL states that, “Mongolia does stand out for its generally much better laws and having open process. I think it is a very encouraging sign. And the challenge is to safeguard and continue to protect rights and not necessarily to rush laws. I understand the eagerness to pass the law, but if they do have any of these more restrictive provisions those can be so problematic that they might eclipse the positive aspects of the law. I think the press freedom effort is really important because free journalism and access to information is one of the bedrocks to democracy. We need to protect it globally.” Pierre Dagard, from RSF says, “this draft law is a good basis on which the Parliament can work on”.

Local civil society groups and media professionals will continue to monitor the process and advocate for a legal environment that would be relevant in the years to come.

About Dulamkhorloo

My name is Dulamkhorloo Baatar. I run the Nest Center for Journalism Innovation and Development NGO, established in 2020 to support media organizations to become financially sustainable and resilient, enabling them to better serve the public’s right to information. Following our incubation programs enabling journalism startups to invest in their public interest reporting and creating several high impact stories, our beneficiaries started witnessing increased intimidation attempts which led us to gear our mission towards improving legal regulations and creating a safeguard for journalists.

Posted in Dulamkhorloo Baatar, Media and Press | 2 Comments

Guest Post: Reflections of my visit: Change, Challenges and Resilience

Posted on March 10, 2025 by bulgan batdorj

By Bolormaa Purevjav 

This is a part of our series on “Change in the countryside.”

After living in Vancouver, Canada, for six years while completing my PhD, I returned to Mongolia in the summer of 2024. This visit was an opportunity to reconnect with my homeland and witness the changes that had taken place over the years. I spent the summer traveling across four provinces—Khovd and Zavkhan in the west and Sukhbaatar and Dornod in the east. Having extensively traveled across Mongolia in the past, I was eager to revisit these regions, which are known for their breathtaking landscapes and contrasting natural beauty.

Western provinces: coffee over milk tea

In the western provinces, the magnificent mountains filled me with the same energy and admiration as before. However, it was impossible to ignore the rapid modernization in provincial centers. New hotels offering Western-style breakfasts and coffee had emerged. Surprisingly, traditional Mongolian milk tea (suutei tsai) and boorzog—a classic fried pastry often enjoyed with fresh cream—were absent from the menus. When I inquired, the answer was clear: fresh cream and milk tea were no longer commonly made, as making and serving coffee was considered more “modern and cool,” alongside the convenience of coffee machines, which were perhaps also more profitable. It was striking to see coffee culture take root deeply, even in rural Mongolia.

Another noticeable shift was in service quality. While infrastructure had improved, hospitality had not kept pace. Hotel staff often lacked proper training—some hotels had clean rooms yet with unchanged bed sheets and missing towels. Previously, I enjoyed chatting with staff, who eagerly shared stories about their communities. This time, however, many were distant or too busy to engage.

A concerning dynamic was also noticeable in workplaces, where young employees were subjected to verbal criticism without regard for their feelings during my visit in throughout the provinces I visited. This lack of empathy at the workplace,  reservations of emotional connection and openness in the general hospitality and general work environments shows the growing disconnect between modernization and emotional intelligence.

Eastern provinces: New economic growth and changing traditional economy

In the eastern provinces, a different set of dynamics played out. Hotels in Sukhbaatar and Dornod were fully booked, bustling with tourists and business people from China and Russia. In Dornod, a major event in Khalkhyn Gol soum commemorated Mongolia’s victory over Japan in 1945 in alliance with the Soviet Union, which accounted for the influx of Russian visitors. Chinese businesses were visibly expanding their presence in both provinces. This rise in Chinese presence reflects the deeper economic interconnections emerging between Mongolia and its neighbours, though it also raises concerns about local industries.

In Sukhbaatar, herders suffered devastating livestock losses, with some losing up to 80% of their animals due to the harsh winter (dzud). Despite these struggles, I deeply admired the wisdom and resilience of an older herder who told me, “Nature has given to us abundantly for years. If it takes back once, that is acceptable—it will give again in time.” His words reflected a profound understanding of the natural cycle, but I also recognized that younger herders, especially those with families of three to five children, could not afford to be so patient. The risks of losing everything were too high, and many were contemplating giving up herding as a primary livelihood. Instead, they were seeking alternative income sources to reduce their vulnerability and avoid further risks to their families’ survival.

Nevertheless, Mongolia’s resilience remains strong. The entrepreneurial spirit is alive, with young Mongolians striving to start businesses and adapt to changing market demands.

Herders, though struggling, continue to find ways to sustain their livelihoods, forming cooperatives and adjusting migration patterns to cope with climate change.

Economic divide and social challenges

A growing economic divide is becoming increasingly evident, particularly in urban areas. The gap between wealthy elites and ordinary citizens continues to widen. While supermarkets are well-stocked, reflecting the country’s consumer-driven growth, poor customer service persists. This issue stems from a lack of proper training, low wages, and heavy workloads within the service sector. Despite the availability of goods, the quality of service remains subpar, which contributes to customer dissatisfaction.

Young Mongolians are seeking opportunities abroad due to the prospect of better job opportunities and higher wages. This migration of skilled workers is leaving critical sectors, such as healthcare and education, struggling to find qualified professionals. The loss of talent is creating gaps in these essential services, further deepening the inequality between those who can access quality services and those who cannot.

Social cohesion and young Mongolians

The growing division between different social groups is weakening trust in institutions and breaking down social cohesion. As the gap widens between the wealthy elites and the rest of society, many people feel increasingly disconnected from the country’s progress and the institutions that should be serving them. This sense of disconnection leads to frustration and a loss of trust in the government and other societal systems, as people feel that their needs are being overlooked.

This feeling of frustration is particularly strong among younger generations. They face harsh workplace environments, financial struggles, and uncertainty about their futures. With many young people facing low job security, heavy workloads, and a lack of career advancement opportunities, their stress levels increase. The morale declines, and ethical standards in the workplace suffer. This situation contributes to a growing sense of disillusionment, with many individuals feeling that their efforts won’t lead to a better future. As optimism fades, people become less motivated to work together or contribute to society’s overall well-being.

Ulaanbaatar, progress and pollution

Ulaanbaatar, too, has transformed, both positively and negatively. Office culture has modernized, with some workplaces adopting hybrid models, reflecting broader global trends. More Mongolians are gaining international education and experience, bringing back valuable skills and ideas. Amid rapid changes, the country retains its strong cultural identity, with traditions such as Naadam, throat singing, and respect for elders continuing to shape society.

At the same time, air pollution and traffic congestion have worsened significantly, overshadowing the city’s progress. The thick smog poses a severe health risk, affecting not only the current population but also unborn children. Addressing air pollution is not just an environmental issue—it is a fundamental necessity for public health and quality of life. Without urgent solutions, the city’s livability will continue to decline. Our country is evolving rapidly and experiencing significant modernization, but it faces deep-rooted challenges that threaten its future sustainability. Key issues such as air pollution, inflation, and the erosion of workplace morale must be addressed. Investment in education, workforce training, and sustainable environmental practices is crucial.

Mongolia remains resilient, but the road ahead requires a joint effort for a prosperous, bright future.

About Bolormaa Purevjav

Bolormaa Purevjav holds a PhD in Mining Engineering from the University of British Columbia (UBC). She is an engineering economist and an independent researcher with many years of experience in social performance and water resources management. A graduate of UBC’s Mining Engineering program, she currently serves as a Senior Lecturer at the German-Mongolian Institute for Resources and Technology (GMIT).

Posted in Air Pollution, Bolormaa Purevjav, Change, Countryside, Demography, Economics, Environment, Herding, Inequality, Pop Culture, Public Opinion, Reflection, Society and Culture, Younger Mongolians, Youth | 1 Comment

Russian-Mongolian Friendship and the Rehabilitation of Tsedenbal and Filatova

Posted on March 3, 2025 by Marissa Smith

By Marissa J. Smith

After leading the Mongolian People’s Republic continuously since 1952, Yu. Tsedenbal was dismissed from his office in 1984 while traveling in Moscow (Atwood 2004, 549). Tsedenbal and his Russian wife, Filatova, never returned to Mongolia.

However, ever since, Tsedenbal’s legacy has been periodically re-contested. Though at the time of the Democratic Revolution some had even called for Tsedenbal to be tried in Mongolia, when Tsedenbal did die in 1991, his body was returned to Mongolia (Sanders 2017, 818). Tsedenbal’s son Zorig also returned and ran for parliamentary election in 2000 (Ibid.). More recently, in the mid-2010s, a new statue of Tsedenbal was erected in front of the State Drama Theater, directly across from the statue of Rinchen at the National Library, which in turn had replaced a statue of Stalin. For a few years at least, members of the Mongolian People’s Party participated in an official ceremony laying flowers there to memorialize Tsedenbal.

Since the beginning of 2025, a new wave of Tsedenbal-memorialization has taken place. As in the mid-2010s, Tsedenbal and Filatova’s son Zorig, media productions, and the statue have been elements in the drama. 

Pop star and former Member of Parliament Javkhlan performs his ballad about Tsedenbal and their shared homeland, “Baruul Dargiin Nutag.” The official music video is available on YouTube:

However, a new element is the explicit participation of Russian actors to encourage narratives of Russian-Mongolian friendship featuring Tsedenbal and Filatova.

As previously discussed on this blog, the marriage of Tsedenbal and Filatova has long been symbolic of Mongolian-Russian relations. However, in the past this was a multivalent and ambiguous; while today, parties are moving to make the marriage Tsedenbal and Filatova an explicitly positively coded example of Russian-Mongolian friendship, with Mongolia as a subject of Russian civilizational and imperial projects.

In December 2024 it was reported that, the Russian ambassador to Mongolia laid flowers at the statue of Tsedenbal in front of the State Drama Theater:

In recent years, Filatova has been annually celebrated on Children’s Day, and credited with projects such as the Nairamdal (“Friendship”) camp. This year, however, the Russian Cultural Center participated in “continuing the tradition of memorialization.“

At the same time, backlash from the public against these narratives is also evident from social media commentary (see links above). Additionally, while visiting Erdenet this past summer, I observed a memorial placard to Tsedenbal at the Mongolian-Russian Friendship monument, which had been defaced.

Monument to Russian-Mongolian victory in WW2 with Erdenet mine in the background (left), and defaced monument to Tsedenbal (right), Erdenet, June 2024

References:

Christopher P. Atwood. (2004). Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire. New York: Facts on File.

Julian Dierkes, Kenny Linden, and Marissa Smith. (2020). “Historical Memories: Contemporary Perspectives on Choibalsan,” Mongolia Focus.

Sanders, Alan J.K. (2017). Historical Dictionary of Mongolia (4th ed.). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 816–823.

Posted in Mongolia and ..., Mongolian People's Party, Russia | Tagged | Leave a comment

Guest Post: What you should know about Mongolia’s proposed Press Freedom bill

Posted on February 25, 2025 by JDierkes

By Dulamkhorloo Baatar

After 27 years, Mongolia takes another stab at passing a new Press Freedom Bill. The bill was submitted to Parliament for discussion in late January 2025 and is expected to be discussed as soon as the Parliamentary sessions commence in mid-March. This is at least the third attempt to renew the current Press Freedom Law which was adopted in 1998. The simple 4-provision law of 1998 guarantees freedom of the press by prohibiting all forms of censorship and state ownership of media, but fails to guarantee protection of confidential sources, which have long been a cause of intimidation for journalists pursuing investigative reporting.

Photo: Ministry of Justice and Home affairs submits Press Freedom Bill to Parliament for discussion. 2025/01/25 Photo credit: Parliament

As the media environment drastically changed in the wake of social media era and false information, the country has been amending other existing laws to deal with these modern problems. Currently, defamation is criminalized under the Criminal Code which has been long frowned upon by the international community. Criminalizing defamation was one of the key reasons Mongolia’s Press Freedom Index fell to 109 (declining by 21 places year-on-year) out of 180 countries tracked by the Reporters Without Borders (RSF) in 2024, its historic low since the index was tracked. The proposed legislation follows an attempt by the government in 2023 to pass the “Law on Protecting Human Rights on social media” which was vetoed by President Khurelsukh Ukhnaa following an outcry from civil society groups and journalists leading to concerns of state censorship such as blocking all forms of communication if a government member decided a certain situation was threatening national security.

A month after the proposition of the Press Freedom Bill the Minister of Digital Development, Innovation and Communication announced plans to establish an anti-disinformation unit under the government, which is seen as yet another step to shrink the freedom of expression space.

We are concerned that the legislative process follows an existing international trend of closing civic space and shrinking press freedom observed across the globe despite Mongolia’s celebrated democratic success.

Nest Center for Journalism Innovation and Development NGO is closely watching the public discussions on the proposed bill as this will have a lasting impact on Mongolia’s democracy.

Existing legislation

According to Globe International Center NGO, who have been a strong advocate of press freedom in the last 26 years, there are currently 300 mentions of the words “press” and “information” in existing legislations in Mongolia, each imposing duties and responsibilities to media organizations. Currently, defamation lawsuits are possible under the Criminal Code, under the guise of disinformation. Although Mongolia is celebrated for having an “Access to Information Law”, it singles out 68 types of information as open to public and journalists, while more than two thousand types of information are “protected” by other legislations and regulations categorized as state or organizational secrets. Despite the current proposed draft, “” said Onon Batmunkh, CEO of Globe International Center in a conversation with Nest Center for this blogpost.

There have been instances where provisions about keeping state secrets or espionage have been utilized to put public figures and journalists behind bars, leaving the public without much information about the details of the cases.

A number of key issues are still left unregulated due to the lack of legal environment. All media staff, except the journalists working for broadcast media do not enjoy the right to protect confidential sources to this day. The existing legal environment does not accept the legality of freelancers, which has been a challenge for individual journalists to access certain information in an already challenging environment.

Existing legislations except the 1998 Press Freedom law imposes duties and responsibilities to media organizations and journalists and fails to explore international best practices to support freedom of expression.

Additionally, the criminalization of defamation continues to be possible under the Criminal Code, provision 13.14. According to Globe International data, a total of 2260 cases have been opened under this provision between 2020 and 2024, and 133 instances were submitted to court. This proves that this clause poses a threat to freedom of expression. Furthermore, it opens doors for intimidation against journalists, calling them out to be questioned multiple times, just to have the case closed after multiple interrogations.

Is new legislation needed?

According to the author of the proposed bill, the Minister of Justice and Home Affairs Altangerel Oyunsaikhan, a number of key improvements are expected from the adoption of the bill. “Firstly, the adoption of the bill will help improve the press freedom index which has been constantly declining in the past few years. The ability of journalists ensured by the international conventions that Mongolia abides by will strengthen. The legality of self-regulation organization and the right to protect confidential sources will be put in place. And by providing a definition of disinformation, journalists who have been questioned under the Criminal Code will be protected. Also, we will ensure transparency of media organizations and support the development of responsible media organizations.” he said in an online panel discussion led by Nest Center in December 2024.

Photo: Online panel discussion about the proposed Press Freedom Bill conducted by Nest Center. (Participants from left to right: Munkhmandakh Myagmar, CEO of Press Institute of Mongolia, Dulamkhorloo Bataar, Chairperson at Nest Center for Journalism Innovation and Development NGO, Lily Liu, Legal Advisor at ICNL, Julie Hunter, Senior Llegal Advisor at ICNL, Altagerel Oyunsaikhan, Minister of Justice and Home Affairs of Mongolia)

The right to protect confidential sources was long requested by the media community from the state. This is one of the key and welcome additions proposed in the draft bill on Press Freedom. “I personally think we need to work together to improve the proposed draft bill as it has attempted to regulate several key issues that are currently missing in the 1998 Press Freedom law, such as ensuring right to publication from the state, prohibiting any attempts to censor and shrink freedom of the press and freedom of expression, prohibiting creation of any government position with the role to censor and intimidate media and journalists, as well as ensuring the protection of confidential sources which has been long requested by civil society organizations”, said Munkhmandakh Myagmar, CEO of Press Institute of Mongolia in a separate conversation with Nest Center.

There is also need to recognize freelance journalists and renew journalism related terms to better navigate the changing information space and fit the social media first world. Additionally, there is a need to address the changing business ecosystem and differentiate individual information creators from journalists who are bound by professional ethics.

With this said, Nest Center feels that no additional regulation is needed unless it significantly improves the existing legislative environment for journalists and creates a legal safeguard for them to effectively serve the public’s right to information. After all, it is better to operate in a grey area than operating in a closed space. Nest Center’s position is to significantly improve the proposed legislation during Parliament discussion as there is significant need to legislate new trends, but is decreasing the Press Freedom in the name of a Freedom Bill.

What the draft bill fails to address?

Even after a series of discussions with groups of civil society organizations as well as the media, the bill still fails to address a number of key issues that would bring meaningful improvements to the information ecosystem.

“Some of the main issues we observed in Mongolia over the past years are, growing number of attacks against journalists in the form of threats and pressure, sometimes arrest. A certain amount of it was reported to be coming from public officials or politicians. We’ve also seen the use of defamation laws to silence journalists and politicization of media outlets through ownerships which is highly concentrated in Mongolia. And finally, what was also striking was the poor working conditions of journalists. Low salary, high workload result in some pressure to produce less value content or that is detrimental to respect of journalistic ethics” said Pierre Dagard, Head of Advocacy at RSF in a virtual panel discussion organized by Nest Center.

Photo: Online panel discussion about the proposed Press Freedom Bill conducted by Nest Center. (Participants from left to right: Altantuya.B, Specialist and the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs, Dulamkhorloo Bataar, Chairperson at Nest Center for Journalism Innovation and Development NGO, Naranjargal Khashkhuu, Founder of Globe International Center, Pierre Dagard, Head of Advocacy at RSF)

The current draft fails to address the deficit in advertising revenue created by the growth of social media companies. It overlooks the existing best practices that support professional journalism such as softer taxing requirements or subsidies, which would have a tremendous enabling effect on the resiliency of media organizations.

A group of international rapporteurs, including the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression laid out several non-invasive mechanisms to support the freedom of expression in a joint declaration in 2017, including introducing subsidies for media organizations to support their public interest reporting which are yet to be considered in existing regulations.

It also includes a number of provisions that impose more duties and responsibilities for media organizations. “The current draft is more of an industry regulation rather than a Press Freedom Bill. It includes provisions stating that the state ensures freedom of the press while it is already ensured by the Constitution implying that state holds the power over media organizations” said Mandkhaikhatan Tsevegmid, CEO of Youth Policy Watch NGO, an advocate for better governance.

There has also been a reluctance to accept international standards such as the Initiative that ensure due processes are followed during news creation, and rather preferring imposition of requirements framed as principles in the bill. ing imposition of requirements framed as principles in the bill.

I will offer an analysis and an outlook for the bill in coming days.

About Dulamkhorloo

My name is Dulamkhorloo Baatar. I run the Nest Center for Journalism Innovation and Development NGO, established in 2020 to support media organizations to become financially sustainable and resilient, enabling them to better serve the public’s right to information. Following our incubation programs enabling journalism startups to invest in their public interest reporting and creating several high impact stories, our beneficiaries started witnessing increased intimidation attempts which led us to gear our mission towards improving legal regulations and creating a safeguard for journalists.

Posted in Dulamkhorloo Baatar, Media and Press | 3 Comments

Remonstrance in Red and Black, With Response: The Demonstrations of January 2025

Posted on January 30, 2025 by Marissa Smith

By Marissa J. Smith

So far, winter 2025 has seen two brief demonstrations. Neither approaches the scale of the last major demonstration event, the so-called “coal theft”/нүүрс хуулгайч protests of December 2022 and January 2023, which was followed by a cabinet reshuffle (see post).

The earlier protests might be characterized as remonstrance, albeit in a direct, rude mode; also a more muted mode was seen. The absence of Mongolian script, which was found in abundance in demonstrations in the past few years, is notable. This might be related to the expansion of use of the script by the government, which I observed this past summer, and is in congruence with The Law on the Mongolian Language, stipulating that as of January 1, 2025, “State and local self-government bodies shall conduct their official affairs in dual scripts of Cyrillic and Mongol Script.” In this new context, Mongolian script may be inappropriate for addressing the state. The second demonstration appears to counter the first set of demonstrations, and was nationalist in character, with participants aligning themselves explicitly with the state.

Remonstrance in Red and Black

The first demonstrations, occurring primarily on January 11, saw large crowds drawn to the Central Square in front of the Government Building, a march around the square, and also at least one physical encounter. In the latter, soldiers stationed on the steps of the Government Building held back demonstrators pushing up towards the monumental statue of Chinggis Khaan and the doors through which demonstrators entered the Government Building in 2023.

Across these events, a specific sign with large red capital letters in Mongolian Cyrillic was observable, reading:

“ХУЛГАЙЧИД,
ЛУЙВАРЧИД
ЗАЙЛЦГАА”

This sign directly orders “theives and swindlers to get the **** out!.”

At the same time, signs with contrasting, more polite tones, were also displayed on online media:

“Эх орондоо сайхан амьдрах боломж олго!!!” [Confer the possibility of living well in the motherland!]

(Post on Facebook, Zuv.mn)

Other demonstrators and social media posts included past slogans/hashtags, including “огцор” [resign], the slogan that characterized the massive demonstrations that culminated with the resignation of then-Prime Minister (now President) Khurelsukh in 2021(see this post). The protest has mostly petered out, with members of the Liberté movement associated with E. Odbayar continuing at the time of writing.

Riding in Response

(Facebook Reel by Морьтон Монгол)

The second demonstration, visible on social media on January 25, consisted of a long string of riders and race horse trainers (уяач), some bringing spare mounts, wearing opulent Mongolian traditional clothing. In addition to the spare mounts, some members of the ride were singing, bringing a martial character to the action. They carried no signs and labeled their action only as морьтон монгол, “Mongols on horseback.” One of their social media posts however carried the label “Төрийнхөө сүлдэнд адуугаа залсан Морьтон Монголчууд мориндоо мордхоороо сүрдмээр юм. 🇲🇳🇲🇳🇲🇳,” [Having adorned their horses with the State emblem, the Mongolians on Horseback are terrible as they ride], explicitly identifying their action as in alignment with the interests and power of the state.

The second demonstration appears to be a counter-demonstration comprising of members of more affluent groups aligned with the state, as against the first group of demonstrators, who made remonstrance against the state (in modes both more rude and more polite).

Posted in Civil Society, Demonstrations, Politics, Protest, Protest, Social Movements | Tagged | Leave a comment

Road Numbering

Posted on November 17, 2024 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

I do really like my Mongolia countryside drives, whether I am along for the ride as a passenger or driving myself.

 

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One of the aspects I really like is the visual peace of staring across the vast, open countryside. Compared to total visual overload of signage on Japanese roads or the relative frequency of signage on Canadian roads even in relatively remote Canadian roads, there is very little distraction on Mongolian roads. Given driving styles and the variable quality of the roads, that is probably a good thing.

But signage is actually kind of interesting. It is also something that I have occasionally commented on in my updates on what I have observed to be new in the countryside.

 

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This is an unusual collection of several road signs in one spot on the road from Khatgal to Murun. You might wonder why four signs are posted here within 25m or so of one another when there really is quite a lot of space across the countryside.

The occasional signs warning of animals have also caught my attention.

 

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This message here, “watch out for cows” really applies to the entire country and I do find it amusing that cows and other herds sometimes seem to avoid the locations of these signs in particular, but are almost ubiquitous otherwise.

By contrast, the large road signs as in the above near Khatgal, leave something to be desired. The schematic representation of directions is typically at best that, schematic, rather than reflecting actual intersections or directions. Even less helpful is the fact that distances are not offered on these signs and are rarely posted otherwise.

As I was thinking about these road signs this summer, I started wondering about the road numbering system. Roads appear to be all called A-something, the something usually being a four-digit number. As anyone who has driven across the countryside knows, a four-digit designation for roads seems a bit of overkill in a nation where there are only several dozen cross-country roads in the entire country. Perhaps this is designed for some future expansion of the road system, but for now, I do not find a road designation as A1101 (that would be that road between Murun and Khatgal, for example) all that intuitive.

However, I have found an explanation of the road numbering system and it is at least somewhat systematic: All roads are called A-something. The first two digits designate the road, numbered sequentially 01 to 27 at least as of 2018 when that explanation was written. That means that the Khatgal-Murun highway is road 11, for example. The final two digits are sections of the road, so that this road is section 01, for example. Road 11 continues West from Murun where it turns into section 02 until Uliastai where section 03 begins which finally ends at the intersection with Road 03 in Altai . By contrasts, the road heading from Murun eastward, towards Bulgan is section 02 of road 09, so A0902. I have not discovered any system to the numbering of the roads or the sections, for example heading to/from Ulaanbaatar, or in particular cardinal directions.

In terms of the sequential numbering, that would seem to suggest that Road 01 should be the oldest in Mongolia. A0101 leads from Nalaikh via Bagakhangai to Choir where it turns into A0102 past Sainshand where it turns into A0103 all the way to the Chinese border. I do not know whether that was the first road built, but that certainly seems plausible as part of a North-South axis paralleling the Transsiberian Railroad. Note that the airport road is designated A40 as possibly the latest road (not sure if that’s the case in 2024) without any segments.

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